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Abstract 
 
Recent years have seen a great deal of interest in phenomena such as Al Qaida ‘terrorism’, 
Islamic ‘radicalism’ or, increasingly, ‘jihadism’ - on the Internet. However, as I argue in this 
thesis, much work in these areas has been problematic for a number of reasons. Much 
literature has been narrowly focused on the security issues which it pre-judges the content to 
raise, and has therefore taken some aspects too literally while ignoring others. Conversely, 
where authors have addressed ‘jihadi’ content or ‘electronic jihad’ as a phenomenon unto 
itself, they have had difficulty making sense of it within religious studies or political 
communication frameworks. In this dissertation, I propose an alternative approach. 
Deliberately eschewing frameworks based on pre-existing conceptions of religion or politics, 
I draw, instead, on the academic literature on fandom and subcultural media consumption. 
Using this conceptual lens, I attempt to analyse jihadism on the Internet (which I define in 
terms of online consumption of, and identification with self-described ‘jihadi’ content) as a 
subcultural phenomenon on its own terms. I argue that, without necessarily denying the role 
that beliefs and ideals expressed in ‘jihadi’ content may sometimes have in sustaining the 
physical violence of the ‘global jihad’, the cultural practices which constitute Internet 
jihadism have a tactical logic of their own which may not always coincide with the ‘strategic’ 
interests of ‘global jihad’. By better understanding what ‘ordinary’ jihadis, most of whom 
will never participate in violence, get out of their practices, and how they negotiate the 
apparent contradictions of their situation, I suggest that we may be better placed to 
understand not only why some jihadis ‘fail’ to negotiate these contradictions, but also, 
perhaps, to raise questions about how popular media consumption works more generally.  
!
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A Note on Transliteration 
 
In this dissertation I have generally followed the system of transliteration advocated by the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies. Where the original of a text is in Arabic, it is 
transliterated in full, with the exception that initial hamza is omitted. ‘ayn is a forwards apostrophe. 
Hamza is a backwards apostrophe. Macrons are placed on long vowels. Emphatic consonants are 
indicated with a dot under the letter. T! marb"#a is written ‘a’ normally, and ‘t’ if it is sounded in 
an i$!fa construction. Alif-l!m (connected by a dash to the following word) may lose its alif through 
elision, (necessitating another dash), but never its l!m as well. Sun letters remain shibboleths as 
usual.  
 
As recommended by the IJMES, proper names are transliterated in part, where they derive from an 
Arabic original. The letters stay the same, but the diacritics are lost, and ‘ayn and hamza make do 
with an apostrophe directed whichever way the word processor decides to put it. They also gain 
some capitals, so for instance I write Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, not ab" mu%‘ab al-s"r&.  
 
For Arabic names which have been encountered ready-transliterated, this transliteration is used. 
‘Younis Tsouli’ stays ‘Younis Tsouli’. Arabic words familiar in English are generally spelled 
without diacritics.  
 
There are some exceptions to this. Where I particularly mean an Arabic word to be approached as 
an Arabic word - not an Arabic word which gets used in English, I sometimes emphasise this by 
spelling it as such. So sometimes ‘jihadi’, becomes jih!d".  
 
Arabic web forums often have their own suggested English transcription, for example, Al Mojahden 
Electronic Network. Sometimes, I prefer to re-transliterate these into a more conventional English 
 4 
spelling - Al Mujahidin Electronic Network. When I use the former in this case, I am talking about 
the forum as it talks about itself in English. When I use the latter, I have in mind that I am relaying 
content as it is encountered in Arabic.  
 
Sometimes, I keep a silent t! marb"#a as a final ‘t’, where the word would be unrecognisable to an 
English speaker without it. This happens in %al!t (prayer) and zak!t (almsgiving).  
 
For some reason, it felt disrepectful to deny Allah the traditional English capital letter reserved for 
God regardless of context, when His name sounds thus in Arabic.
1
  
 
‘l! illaha ill!-Allah, Mu'ammadan ras"l-Allah’. 
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1. 
Jihadism and the Internet 
1.0 Introduction 
 
‘Give me a place to stand on,’ Archimedes is reputed to have said, ‘and I will move the Earth’. The 
project of this dissertation is less ambitious. But the problem of finding firm ground on which to 
stand is, perhaps, hardly less difficult. As Volpi observes, with regard to attempts by terrorism and 
security experts to talk about political Islam, ‘Specialists in both Islamism and terrorism have been 
divided on the issue of terminology. The myriad labels in use include: political Islam, radical Islam, 
militant Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, Islamism, jihadism, salafist jihadism, 
jihadi terrorism amongst others'.’
2
 None of these labels are neutral, and all invoke an artificial 
construction - in large measure, indeed, the construction of Western, or Western oriented 
intellectuals. But one has to start somewhere. Later in this dissertation, I shall confront the word 
‘jihadism’ and try to show how it can be presented in more emic terms. But this is not the purpose 
of this chapter. 
 
‘Jihadism’ codes into three parts. In so far as jihad is understood (however partially or inaccurately) 
as entailing specifically violent activity, it seemingly relates to the study of security or crime.
3
 As 
an Islamic concept, it relates to the study of Islam as culture and religion. As an ‘ism’, it falls into 
the category of political ideology. In discussing how Internet jihadism has been written about, one 
may therefore look to at least three different places: to those with a disciplinary interest in the social 
study of political violence (or ‘terrorism’); to Islamic studies, Middle Eastern Studies, or religious 
studies more generally; or to the study of political movements and ideologies. One might further 
appeal to the fields of Internet studies and globalisation theory; but these represent a different side 
to the problem. These bodies of knowledge concern the space in which the phenomenon in question 
is to be encountered, rather than the phenomenon itself.  
 6 
 
Since political violence is, ipso facto, violent activity, it would seem that of these three potential 
perspectives, it is this one that is least promising as a starting point for understanding what must be 
approached – in the first instance at least – as an online phenomenon. After all, Internet content, 
however radical, disturbing and alarming it may seem is not, in and of itself, violence. Rheingold 
notes that one advantage of the Internet is the fact that no one, however irate can ‘punch you in the 
nose’.
4
 And yet as this chapter will show, in setting out the available literature on Al Qaida related 
material and, more specifically, on ‘jihadism’ on the Internet, the literature on terrorism and 
political violence has tended to take the lead. Broadly speaking, people interested in Al Qaida as a 
violent group have pursued their interest (however tentatively or partially) into the more diffuse 
areas of Islamic studies, social movement theory, globalisation and political ideology. Conversely, 
though, the reverse transformation has happened only in a handful of instances. People who study 
Islamic culture online have rarely dealt head on with ‘jihadi’ cyberculture. People who study ‘new’ 
social movements online have seldom dealt with Islamist social movements - let alone with Islamist 
social movements online.
5
 People who are interested in political communication, mass media and 
ideology have - except for those media experts who already had an interest in terrorism as 
communication - not ventured in droves to apply themselves to the jihadi case.  
 
My argument will be, following from this, that research into the phenomenon of jihadism on the 
Internet has been dominated by a literature that can only approach it as a problem relating to the 
security risk of terrorism. My concern is not that there is something wrong with such an approach 
per se. It is quite understandable that people and institutions (especially governments), worried 
about the prospect of terrorist violence, might be interested in what role online activity might play 
in promoting this violence (or alternatively, what Internet content might have to teach about the 
nature of this violence). Robert Cox points out that theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose.
6
 But when government backed security researchers study jihadism, the desire to obtain 
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thereby some measure of control over the object of enquiry is at least to that extent explicit. 
(Though the same might not be said when they study Islamic phenomena or Middle Eastern culture 
in a wider sense). Following from this, I don’t mean to use this dissertation, as such, to oppose a 
‘problem solving’ theory with a ‘critical’ theory which envisages the possibility of a fundamental 
change in social structures.
7
 Rather, my concern is that, by virtue of their narrow focus on a 
particular problematic aspect (namely, physical violence), of an otherwise discursive phenomenon, 
researchers have produced superficial analyses of jihadism as it occurs on the Internet, producing 
little more than descriptive accounts of Internet jihadi texts and the beliefs they espouse, and 
proceeding from this immediately to make assumptions about the presumed threat such texts pose. I 
do not intend to comment on whether or not this is bad politics. But I do think it is bad science.  
 
By contrast, a small handful of researchers have approached the issue of jihadism on the Internet 
less as an aspect of ‘terrorism’ or as an ideological opponent to be vanquished in a ‘war of ideas’
8
 
than as a phenomenon of contemporary religion or politics which is of interest in its own right. 
Unfortunately, as I shall argue, such approaches have yet to find a satisfactory set of conceptual 
tools for exploring the phenomenon. Examining jihadism as an essentially religious phenomenon, 
researchers face (simplifying somewhat) an unsatisfactory dilemma: either to condemn jihadism as 
an aberration to ‘true’ or ‘mainstream’ Islam, and in so doing abandon scholarly impartiality, or to 
accept it as a historically precedented extension of the traditional meaning of ‘jihad’ and risk 
accusations of negatively essentialising the religion as a whole, or, finally, to face the problem of, 
as Volpi puts it, of ‘how one can move away from essentialist accounts of Islam without simply 
saying “there are different Islams”’.9 On the other hand, viewing jihadism as an essentially political 
phenomenon, with only a superficial relationship to religion means facing the same problem 
implicitly, by assuming that Western assumptions about what is ‘politics’ can be sustained in the 
face of claims to have religiously transcended these very distinctions.
10
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My task in this chapter, then, shall be to review the contributions which each of these three 
perspectives on Internet jihadism - as an adjunct to ‘terrorism’, as religion and as politics - have 
made, and to consider where they appear to fall short.  
 
1.1 Information War and Cyberterrorism 
 
In their book Making Sense of War, Alan Stephens and Nicola Baker
11
 make the acerbic 
observation:  
 
 Many of the Western strategic analysts orphaned by the Cold War were so impressed by the conventional 
technological capabilities of the United States that they attributed a similar or even more advanced level of 
prowess to potential adversaries. This type of threat inflation was driven in part by the realisation that anyone 
wishing to fight the United States would have to resort to asymmetric  warfare... This kind of mindset was also 
influenced by the common strategic tendency to ‘mirror image’. Having concluded that adversarial forces 
would seek to use non-conventional tactics and weapons, analysts focused their attention on the kinds of 
threats that actors in a high-technology environment like their own might generate. Thus, a whole literature 
sprang up on cyber warfare... These kinds of preoccupations led many to ignore the possibility that less 
conventionally capable actors might opt instead for a low-technology approach, sneaking under the radar rather 
than trying to attack it... Al Qaida fighters in Afghanistan did  not hide in multi-storey, air-conditioned bunker 
networks as envisaged, but in caves scarcely big enough to shelter a goat. And they were just as  likely to 
contact each other by human messenger, by post or even by pigeon as they were to hide  encoded instructions 
on the Internet.
12
 
 
For many, however, September 11th came not to abolish prophecies of high-tech terrorism, but to 
fulfill them. In 2003, for instance, Lt Col. Timothy Thomas described Al Qaida’s use of the Internet 
in terms of a ‘virtual battleground’ similar to that which had previously provided for ‘peacetime 
hostilities between Taiwan and China, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India and China and the 
United States’.
13
 Thus, while he conceded that ‘cyberplanning may be a more important terrorist 
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tool than the much touted and feared cyberterrorist option’,
14
 he presented Al Qaida’s use of the 
Internet for hosting websites and some of the planning behind the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon in terms of a continuity with previous strategic thinking. In a similar vein, 
Dorothy Denning - a professor of computer science at the US Naval Postgraduate School argued 
that phenomena such as the dissemination of beheading videos or ‘training’ manuals such as Al 
Qaida’s Al Battar Training Camp were to be understood as examples of terrorist use of ‘information 
operations’.
15
  
 
The term ‘information war’ dates back to Thomas P. Rona’s presentation on the subject to Boeing
16
 
in 1976. And, in science fiction, the idea of Internet like data grids as conflict zones predates the 
Internet itself.
17
 It was not, however, until the mid 1990s - when the Internet actually emerged as a 
widely used civilian technology - that ideas of threats to state authority from the medium began to 
become a serious concern for governments. As a typical example, in 1996, three security analysts 
(Devost, Houghton and Pollard) won the Sun Tzu Art of War Research Award
18
 with an article 
called ‘Information Terrorism: Can You Trust Your Toaster?’ It sketched out a scenario in which a 
fictional group, the ‘Serb Council for the Liberation of Bosnia’ launches a devastating cyber attack. 
First hacking into the control systems of NATO aircraft, they cause a mid air collision. Riding on 
the publicity of this, they direct the world’s Internet users to a website they have created, explaining 
their motives. For their troubles, these interested readers are rewarded by being infected with a 
devastating computer virus, which proceeds to wreak widespread economic havoc.  
 
The article reflected the coming together of a number of themes. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
United States seemed to have acquired unapproachable military dominance. It had the largest 
economy, the most advanced technology and the most powerful military. But all of this seemed 
only to beg the question: in the face of a power which looked like it very well could be a single, 
global hegemon, what then, was the future of war? The threat of a nuclear confrontation seemed to 
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have receded, and no country seemed in a position to take on the United States’ conventional 
power. That left, so it seemed, two implications.  
 
First, if there were no states willing or able to fight, then the enemies of the future would have not 
to be states at all.
19
 In a world in which people were starting to question whether the state really had 
a future at all in the face of what seemed to be ever accelerating commercial globalisation, the idea 
seemed not implausible. At RAND corporation, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt started to 
develop, the idea of a new
20
 model of ‘netwar’ in which the antagonists would not be the 
monolithic, easily recognisable hierarchies of the industrial age, but rather amorphous, adaptable 
networks.  
 
Second, if the physical dominance of the United States remained unquestionable, then the fighters 
of the future would have to take the fight to a new arena - that of information. Given the 
unparalleled sophistication of the United States’ communications systems – both military and 
civilian – it seemed easy to envisage that the ability to subvert these from within could present a 
new front for attack. This idea was developed in the form of ‘information war’, or (for Arquilla and 
Rondfeldt, idiosyncratically) ‘cyberwar’ and ‘netwar’.
21
  
 
For these thinkers, Al Qaida was a classic example of the latter. Indeed, perhaps the most obvious 
pre-9/11 reference to Al Qaida’s use of the Internet is to be found in Michele Zanini and Sean J. A 
Edwards’ ‘The Networking of Terror in the Information Age’ - a chapter of Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s 
edited RAND monograph Networks and Netwars, in which it was noted that: 
 
 In the Greater Middle East, terrorist organisations have diverse origins, ideologies and organisational 
 structures, but can be roughly categorised into traditional and new generation groups. Traditional 
 groups date to the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the majority were (and some still are) formally or 
 informally linked to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Typically, they are also relatively 
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 bureaucratic and maintain a nationalist or Marxist agenda... in contrast, the newer and less hierarchical 
 groups, such as Hamas; the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Hizbollah; Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group; the 
 Egyptian Islamic Group; and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network, Al Qaida [my emphasis] have 
 become the most active organisations. In these loosely organized groups with religious or ideological 
 motives, operatives are part of a network that relies less on bureaucratic fiat and more on shared values and 
 horizontal coordination mechanisms.
22
  
 
That these ‘horizontal coordination mechanisms’ were meant to include information technology is 
made clear in the opening paragraphs of the chapter, in which it is claimed:  
 
The information age is affecting not only the types of targets and weapons terrorists choose, but also the ways 
in which such groups operate and structure their organisations.
23 
 
Thus, notwithstanding Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s insistence that the principles of ‘cyberwar’ were 
rooted in age-old ideas, new technology was key to producing new interest in the strategic 
importance of information. Indeed, a major intellectual resource for the new thinking on war was 
Alvin Toffler’s notion of the ‘Third Wave’ of human civilisation - a gigantic paradigm shift which 
this sociologist believed to be sweeping the world from the 1970s onwards, in which the 
technologies of the agrarian age (from the Neolithic onwards) and of the industrial age were being 
superseded by a new age dominated by the superior processing and manipulation of information.
24
 
The extent to which this notion had entered into strategic thinking was revealed when, in 1993, 
Alvin (and Heidi) Toffler themselves produced a book on military strategy - War and Anti-War.
25
 
Here, the authors underlined what they saw as the crucial, post-industrial shift towards the ‘de-
massification’ of militaries, in favour of everything from robot weapons, to smart bombs to 
computer hacking to subtler media strategies - as exemplified by the authors’ call for the 
establishment of a ‘rapid reaction contingency broadcasting force’.
26
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A virtue, then, of the information war concept, was its breadth. It stretched all the way from a 
debate about the most efficient way to annihilate Cold War formations of tanks and infantry to a 
problematic of the meaning of war itself - all the time, however, without abandoning the salience of 
the actual term ‘war’. The sheer (apparent) perfection of warmaking as represented televisually 
during the 1991 Gulf War
27
 provided the starting point for Baudrillard’s provocative thesis that, 
given the extent to which the event was shaped by media to resemble a ‘war’ in the normal public 
sense of the word, ‘The Gulf War Did Not Take Place’.
28
 And yet, as outrageous as Baudrillard’s 
claims appeared
29
, they bear comparison with the observations of a far from post-structuralist 
military theorist - Martin C. Libicki. In a methodical work on ‘information war’, Libicki describes 
witnessing an attempt at an ‘information war game’ carried out by the Pentagon in 1994 in which 
two countries, ‘blue’ (the U.S) and ‘red’, a ‘middle sized, middle income nation with an advanced 
electronics industry’ were pitted against one another. The game resulted in complete confusion, 
with neither side able to determine what ‘information war’ was, and whether it was taking place – 
let alone whether they were losing or winning. Crucially, ‘blue’ seemed to believe that information 
war consisted in using an army of hackers to attack the enemy’s computer systems, whereas ‘red’ 
believed that information war consisted of psychological manipulation through the media. From 
this, he concluded: ‘Information warfare, as a separate technique of waging war, does not exist… 
The concept of information warfare has as much analytic coherence as the concept, for instance, of 
an information worker.’
30
 
 
1.2 Terrorism ‘on’ The Internet 
 
And yet, taking account of the strategic obsession with information war and, consequently, with 
diffuse, ‘networked’ actors is a necessary backdrop to understanding the way in which ‘terrorism’ 
has come to be identified as an amorphous but genuine online threat. The ideas of terrorism and of 
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information war are, after all, closely akin to one another. Indeed, for many scholars, terrorism is by 
definition violence as communication. As Schmid puts it in his ‘consensus definition’ of terrorism: 
 
 Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi)-clandestine 
 individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons whereby - in contrast to 
 assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of 
 violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative of symbolic 
 targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication 
 processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and the main targets are used to manipulate the 
 main target (audience(s), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, 
 depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought.
31
 
 
The argument that terrorism is intended to generate publicity for the terrorist is, in fact, of axiomatic 
importance for understanding terrorism within a strategic framework, since it provides a rational 
motivation for the actions which terrorists undertake. As such, the political science project of 
understanding terrorism strategically
32
 has been closely allied with ideas drawn from 
communications research. Thus, for instance, Schmid and de Graaf
33
 and Midlarsky, Crenshaw and 
Yoshida
34
 have deployed ideas about media ‘contagion’
35
 as a possible cause of terrorist violence. 
On the other hand, communications scholars such as Nacos
36
 and Weimann and Winn
37
 have 
analysed how terrorist incidents help to upset normal relations of media dominance and editiorial 
decisions about coverage.  
 
Given this body of concerns, it is perhaps unsurprising that discussion of the relationship between 
Al Qaida, Islamist violence and the Internet after 9/11 was dominated by general notions of 
‘terrorist use of the Internet’ which seemed at least implicitly to assume a relatively static and 
identifiable terrorist actor, committed rationally and strategically to taking advantage of the 
capacities offered by the Internet - for ends which were, it could be presumed, unquestionably and 
ipso facto ‘terrorist’.  
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This tendency is readily observed in two preoccupations which dominated work on the subject: 
quantification of the terrorist ‘presence’ in cyberspace, and enumeration of the various ways in 
which terrorists were supposed to use the Internet.  
 
Since, at least, the publication of Weimann’s Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New 
Challenges, various claims as to the overall number of terrorist websites have been advanced. 
Weimann wrote in 2006 that: 
 
 In 1998, fewer than half of the thirty organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S 
 Department of State maintained Web sites; by the end of 1999, nearly all thirty terrorist groups had established 
 their presence on the Net. Today there are more than forty active terrorist groups, each with an established 
 presence on the Internet. A thorough and extensive scan of the Internet in 2003-5 revealed more than 4,300 
 Web sites serving terrorists and their supporters.
38
  
 
Weimann further claimed that ‘Our findings reveal a proliferation of radical Islamic websites. This 
is not a methodological bias, but rather a significant trend highlighted by our study.
39
 Indeed, by 
2008, he asserted that Al Qaida alone maintained more than 5,300 websites
40
 - a claim which would 
seem to imply that ‘Al Qaida’ sites made up a significant proportion of the 4,300 ‘sites serving 
terrorists and their supporters’ he mentioned two years previously.  
 
Weimann’s claim was in fact relatively conservative. In 2008, the Anti Defamation League kept an 
official tally of 8,000 ‘terrorist’ websites, whereas the Dark Web Portal project of the University of 
Arizona claims that, as of 2007, there were as many as 50,000 ‘terrorist’ websites online.
41
 This 
figure - again - compares interestingly with Dubowitz’s unsourced claim that ‘In 1998, there were 
only 12 jihadist websites. By 2007, that number had increased to 50,000.’
42
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The problem, of course, with these tallies is one of definition. Weimann asserts in his book that he 
was ‘Using the US State Department’s list of terrorist organisations’
43
 to arrive at his total, and, in a 
correspondence with the author, declined to elaborate further. But the problem is not one of 
defining terrorism or terrorist organisations, but rather of defining what it means for a website to be 
‘serving terrorists and their supporters’. After all, many counter terrorist websites offer access to 
material produced by ‘terrorists’ - indeed, in the author’s experience, beginning the research that 
was to become this dissertation, it was not uncommon for Al Qaida videos to surface in ‘jihadi’ 
contexts that bore the brand of the SITE Institute
44
 - a private intelligence and analysis service 
specialising in the collection and analysis of such material. If merely expressing support for 
terrorists is enough, then what about left wing sites which argue that groups such as South 
America’s Shining Path are legitimate resistance organisations, and that accounts of their brutality 
are governmental fabrications?
45
 If the requirement is that the site actually advocate violence then 
what is to be made of the fact that - as Weimann himself (with Yariv Tsfati) was the first to report - 
the official websites of groups listed as terrorist very seldom publicise (let alone advocate) the acts 
of violence they are accused of committing?
46
 
 
The notion, then of a ‘terrorist website’ (however loosely invoked) seems to imply the possibility of 
a relatively monolithic terrorism which, somehow, inhabits cyberspace. In reality, of course, it has 
from the beginning been widely recognised that ‘terrorists’ use the Internet ‘like everybody else’ - 
in many different ways. In a paper in 2006, for example, Conway
47
 compared four lists of ‘terrorist 
uses of the Internet’ stretching back to 1999 - Furnell and Warren,
48
 Cohen,
49
 Thomas, and 
Weimann and Tsfati.
50
 Similar attempts at synthesising definitive typologies are to be found in the 
work of, for example, Reid,
51
 Weimann
52
 and Sieber.
53
  
 
While there is an understandable need for people studying violent groups to attempt to gain some 
general sense of how they make use of particular technologies, discussions of such uses of the 
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Internet become dogged by circularity when – as has been the case – most research into this has 
been conducted online. In Weimann’s work, for example, attempts to argue primarily on the basis 
of Internet research for terrorist uses of the Internet such as ‘networking the terrorists’
54
 or 
‘training’
55
 would seem questionable. Regarding the first, the network might be very real. But how 
exactly terrorist violence emerges from it (and to what extent Internet use is an effective cause, 
rather than indicative or epiphenomenal) might be open to question. In the latter, the assumption 
that the online availability of training manuals equates to the ‘instrumental’ use of the Internet for 
‘training terrorists’ would seem to make unacceptable leaps from content on the screen to what 
must necessarily be much more complex individual and social learning processes.    
 
As it happens, in fact, such assumptions have increasingly come under empirical critique. 
Stenersen
56
 has observed, the ‘training material’ which authors such as Weimann have attributed 
great importance
57
 is generally of low quality, and is not backed up by any systematic interactive 
learning process. Sageman
58
, - drawing on the theoretical insights of Kenney
59
, has further noted 
that in practice, learning skills such as bomb making from online manuals is not realistic without 
opportunities to physically practice and perfect this practical, hands-on skills, buttressing his case 
with real life examples of unsuccessful attempted attacks by self starter terrorists.  
 
Similarly, the communicative usefulness of the Internet as an organisational platform has been 
called into question by Internet groups themselves. Notwithstanding the observation of Kohlmann
60
 
that jihadist forums such as Al Ansar were on occasions used to provide members with assistance in 
travelling to join the jihad/insurgency/resistence in Iraq, contemporary postings on successor 
forums now seek to dissuade individuals from such ‘naive’ behaviour.
61
 This potentially invites a 
reassessment of claims by, for example Gohel,
62
 that networks such as that uncovered by the UK 
police operation Praline are evidence of the usefulness of the Internet as an operational platform, 
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rather than representing an overall liability. As Pantucci has suggested, in relation to this particular 
case:  
 
...it also raises the adjacent question of whether the Internet is really as useful a tool in such planning as was 
previously thought. It may provide very disparate groups with an ability to connect and develop plots together, 
but it also likely leaves some electronic trail which provides an all-important link for counter-terrorism police 
to target
63
 
 
Overall, an irony of the approach of scholars such as Weimann is that - for all its talk of the 
revolutionary and transformative potential of the Internet for terrorist groups, it seems to remain 
methodologically stuck in a world of ‘old terrorism’ in which groups are reasonably enduring and 
stable, and can therefore be treated as institutional ‘terrorist’ actors with reasonably coherent 
strategies. And yet it is precisely because ‘Al Qaida’ is not this sort of entity that makes its online 
‘presence’ so seemingly significant.  
 
1.3 From ‘Terrorism’ on the Internet to ‘Jihadism’ on the Internet 
 
One approach to this problem has been a growing interest in identifying loose, networked actors as 
the main terrorist adversary. Thus Al Qaida has been replaced with terms such as the ‘Global Salafi 
Jihad’ – a usage apparently coined by Sageman in his influential book Understanding Terror 
Networks.
64
 Here, Sageman attempts to deploy a basic social network approach as an alternative to 
more structured, top down views of Al Qaida as a coherent organisation. Sageman’s work marked 
the beginning of a new wave of network informed research in the Al Qaida phenomenon, which 
ranged from the work of Magouirk and Atran65 which, similar to Sageman’s was based primarily on 
databases of biographical and plot information, to the prolific collaborative work of the Dark Web 
Portal, a project under the directorship of Hsinchun Chen which uses automated software to map 
networks of ‘jihad’, ‘extremism’ or ‘hate’ on the un-indexed ‘darkweb’, as well as to carry out 
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various forms of automated or semi-automated text analysis.
66
 With the advantage of overwhelming 
thoroughness and quantity of data, the Darkweb Portal has been able to overcome the 
methodological paradoxes associated with ‘purposive sampling’ or qualitative content analysis of 
‘terrorist’ websites by producing identifiably network clusters associated with particular ideologies 
or regional interests. At the same time, the insistence of affiliated researchers on retaining 
‘terrorism’ as the object of enquiry means that some of the basic problems discussed above remain: 
exactly where does the terrorism inhere in terrorist content? Does it apply to group affiliation, 
worldview, or presumed ‘operational’ relevance?  
 
The quest for an identifiable focus for counter terrorism – particularly with regard to the Internet – 
has thus led to increased interest in ideology and iconography as issues in themselves, rather than 
on ideology and iconography as more or less implicit markers for locating the ‘terrorism’ online. 
Rogan, for instance, who focused her 2007 study on ‘jihadist’ rather than Al Qaida materials 
specifically makes this point (following Lia):  
 
 ...media producers [of jihadist material] sometimes seem to have a weak organizational affiliation to 
 militant groups or to the command structure, which allows them to speak with a relatively autonomous 
 voice, and to operate through networking, rather than according to hierarchical structures.
67
 
 
The project of mapping out jihadist thinking and its presence on the Web has, at least until recently, 
been dominated primarily by professional researchers into the topic (for instance, Katz, Kohlmann, 
Kimmage), and by academic researchers working or publishing through military staff colleges 
(Brachman, Fishman, Lia, Rogan, Stenersen and - to a lesser degree - Hegghammer).
68
 Perhaps as a 
result, much work has been primarily descriptive, or has retained, with regard to ‘jihadism’ a 
strategic focus not dissimilar to that directed towards Al Qaida as an organisation. Indeed, it is 
perhaps ironic that acceptance that ‘the enemy’ is an ideology rather than a physical entity, rather 
than being taken as evidence that military approaches may be of limited use has, instead, been 
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seized on enthusiastically by military thinkers (perhaps particularly in the US) as a means of 
refocusing the war on terror around the notion of a ‘war of ideas’
69
 or of ‘fourth generation 
warfare’.
70
  
 
Nonetheless, the empirical depth and value of research produced either by private entities or by 
military colleges should not by any means be disregarded. Indeed, such work has made substantial 
headway in mapping out and demystifying the thought of ideologues associated with the ‘global 
jihadist movement’ or more specifically with Al Qaida, and the networks, agencies and methods by 
which such material appears on the Internet. Thus, Katz
71
 has presented a convincing picture of a 
‘decentralised but hierarchical’ system for jihadist media dissemination, whereby ‘Islamic Media 
Agencies’are responsible for producing and packaging new propaganda items which then proceed 
through a pyramid of first tier and second tier forums, before spreading out to the Web as a whole.
72
 
This process has been empirically mapped out in detail by Daniel Kimmage,
73
 whose report  ‘The 
Al Qaida Media Nexus’ has neatly captured the difficulty of terminology which afflicts study of the 
area. The ‘nexus’ that Kimmage refers to in the title in itself attempts to deal with the problem of 
talking about a specific group in a situation where, as he writes: ‘the “original” Al-Qaida led by 
Osama bin Laden accounts for a mere fraction of jihadist media production’. Recently, work on 
jihadi Internet content by the Mohammed Ali Musawi
74
 and by Stephen Ulph
75
 has begun to 
approach the level of concrete detail necessary (though this is not the intention of the authors) to 
provide the groundwork for appreciating online jihadism almost in an ethnographic sense.  
 
Similarly, researchers working perhaps particularly at Westpoint in the US and at the Norwegian 
Defence College have produced a good deal of useful work examining the specific content of 
notable jihadist texts disseminated online. Indeed, the desire to understand the underlying ‘meta-
narrative’ and ‘strategy’ of the jihadist movement could perhaps be described as an ideological, 
theological or even, in a broader sense, cultural
76
 ‘turn’ in counterterrorism strategy. For some, in 
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fact, the transition from an identifiable organisation (which may or may not have originally been 
called ‘Al Qaida’ ) in Afghanistan to an amorphous ideological network is itself a product of 
strategic calculation. Notably, for analysts of the work of the ‘jihadi strategist’ Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri 
such as Lia
77
 and Cruikshank and Hage Ali
78
, the new shape of the global jihadist movement can be 
located in Al Suri’s strategic concept of ‘organisation without an organisation’ (nizam la tanzim). 
 
A useful illustration of this trend can be seen in the way in which formerly arcane matters of lslamic 
theology have come to take up significant space in the Sentinel - the in-house periodical put out by 
the Countering Terrorism Centre of Westpoint since 2007. These have included, in addition to 
examinations of relatively well known concepts of jihad
79
 and takfir,
80
 relatively detailed discussion 
of hitherto obscure topics such as tatarrus,
81
 inghimas fil ‘aduww,
82
 and comparative Sunni and 
Shi‘i apocalyptic literature.
83
 
 
Rather oddly, then, the movement away from thinking about Al Qaida as a distinct organisation
84
 
has not necessarily led to an increased focus on the agency of individual supporters of violent jihad. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the long insistence on the rationality of recruits to violent groups, and the 
many behavioural, environmental and chance factors that lead to actual involvement,
85
 concern over 
global jihadism on the Internet has, in a sense, invoked ideology as an actor in its own right, if need 
be identifying ideologues as the new, quasi hierarchical leaders in the supposedly ‘leaderless 
jihad’.
8687
  So much so, in fact, that notwithstanding a recognition of the importance of ‘turning 
consumers into producers’,
88
 ordinary Internet supporters of Al Qaida have not only been largely 
ignored, but have been treated almost disparagingly in the literature as mere ‘jihobbyists’ (a term 
coined by Brachman).
89
 Alternatively, ideology has almost become reified (in the wider field) as an 
explanation in itself. This, for instance, seems to be broadly the thesis of Assaf Moghadam’s work 
on suicide bombing,
90
 which neatly avoids the potential tautology of using ideology to explain a 
 21 
type of behaviour that is by definition ideologically motivated,
 91
 by dispensing altogether with the 
term ‘terrorism’ in his analysis.
92
 
 
1.4 Jihadism as Internet Islam 
 
In moving away from a conventional, pre 9/11 ‘terrorism studies’ approach, it can be seen that the 
study of jihadism has found itself engaging increasingly with often obscurely theological or 
medieval Islamic topics. This can perhaps be seen as part of the old tendency, denounced most 
famously by Edward Said, for orientalist knowledge to be used for purposes of domination.
93
 At the 
same time, however, Al Qaida’s association with the Internet can also be located within what is (to 
use the distinction made by Poster)
94
 a culturalist rather than instrumentalist body of enquiry 
represented by religious studies and (particularly anthropological) area studies of the Middle East 
and the ‘Muslim World’.  
 
However, for the most part, writing about jihadism on the Internet and about Islam on the Internet 
more generally has not coincided a great deal. Scholars such as David Cook
95
 whose interests in 
Islamic thought and history also extend to interest in the sort of ‘jihadi studies’ mentioned above 
have certainly used jihadi sources on the Internet. But in such cases the concern is firmly with the 
message rather than the medium.  
 
By contrast, it might be suggested, scholars of contemporary Islamic culture and politics, while they 
have taken significant interest in the way Internet has impacted on Islamic practices in a wider 
sense, have seldom directly addressed specifically jihadi phenomena online. Indeed, where 
discussion of the intersection between Muslims, the ‘War on Terror’ and the Internet does exist, it 
has generally focused only on broader concerns of this area such as online Muslim reactions to 
9/11,
96
 use of the Internet by minority Muslim communities who may for this reason be viewed in 
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their countries as a potential ‘radicalisation’ concern,
97
 or on the demonisation of Muslims on the 
Internet.
98
 This is despite the fact that the relationship between the Internet, Islam and the Middle 
East - while still underexamined - is an area of rapidly growing interest, as evidenced by, for 
instance, the foundation of the online journal Cyber-Orient.
99
 
 
The general absence of work on Internet jihadism by scholars of contemporary Islam is, in a sense, 
puzzling, given the extent to which discussion of ‘digital’ Islam tends to proceed from an 
intellectual framework which - at first glance - seems well able to incorporate the phenomenon. For 
instance, the essays in Anderson and Eickelman’s groundbreaking New Media and the Muslim 
World: The Emerging Public Sphere (perhaps particularly Anderson’s chapter ‘The Internet and 
Islam’s New Interpreters’
100
 present the arrival of the Internet into Muslim societies not (as some 
scholars of the Internet have seen its impact on Western societies)
101
 as a retribalisation of society 
which heralds precisely the fragmentation of the rational Habermasian public sphere,
102
 but rather 
as a further extension of the processes of modernity which have profoundly changed Muslims’ 
understanding of their religion over the past half century.
103
 According to this argument, the arrival 
of mass education in Muslim societies has upset traditional hierarchies within Islam in much the 
same way it upset those hierarchies in early modern Christianity in Europe. That is, by 
simultaneously privileging new scientific forms of knowledge over old, oral forms and rote 
memorisation, and by producing a newly literate, technocratic class of people interested in 
approaching religious texts directly.
104
 This has produced new forms of religious engagement which 
are simultaneously more diverse and at the same time more scripturalist and, in this sense, 
‘fundamentalist’.
105
   
 
On the other hand, it may be suggested that the apparent reluctance of researchers operating broadly 
within this framework of getting deeply involved with jihadi content may be as much because of as 
in spite of the potential relevance of such ideas to the emergence of this type of material. In so far as  
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prominent scholars of contemporary Islamic culture (John Esposito might be a particularly notable 
example)
106
 have tended to find themselves cast in the role of public apologists for Islam, so claims 
about the heterogeneity and diversity of Islam have tended to become not an explanation for the 
possibility of militant jihadi trends, as a rebuke to them.
107
 Simultaneously, observing a scripturalist 
tendency to new forms of Islamic piety becomes problematic if extended to the jihadi case, since it 
might seem to imply that the violence of networks such as Al Qaida is a actually encoded in, so to 
speak, the Islamic ‘source code’, as opposed to being a product solely of contingent political and 
historical circumstances - an argument which seems to fall close to the essentialism which most 
scholars of contemporary Islam try strenuously to avoid.
108
  
 
Another problem - following from this - is that, in the very insistence on seeing Islamic use of the 
Internet in rational, modernistic terms, Islamic phenomena on the Internet tend to be reduced to a 
similarly ‘instrumental’ set of concerns as those which have characterised the search for ‘terrorism’ 
on the Internet. This difficulty is noted by Cesari, who observes  that the study of Islam on the 
Internet ‘has primarily concerned itself with Islamic oriented activism’.
109
 This means that, in her 
view, the tendency has been to study ‘Islam on the Internet’, rather than ‘Islam of the Internet’. And 
yet, despite noting this weakness in contemporary research, Cesari does little herself to remedy this 
lack. While she idenfities ‘cyberjihad’ as an online activity, consisting of ‘a web waged war of 
ideas consisting primarily of increasing instances of agitation and propaganda in order to 
manipulate the thinking of the community’
110
 or, alternatively, as a range of hacking activities. She 
gives no attention to the internal meanings which might be ascribed to such activities by the 
(presumably) virtual communities which partake in them. Indeed, her uncharacteristically 
unbalanced use of language in ‘manipulate the thinking of the community’ seems to place her 
almost in the cyberwar context as reviewed above. Her discussion returns, for all its concern with 
‘Islamic’ activity specific to the Internet, to a concern with the impact on the Islamic community of 
the ‘activism’ which she considers to be only a limited part of the phenomenon under examination. 
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A rare exception to such tendencies is to be found in the work of Gary Bunt. As one of very few 
non-security focused scholars of contemporary Islam to devote close attention to jihadi content on 
the Internet, Bunt’s work offers a refreshing alternative to approaches which would see such content 
solely in terms of a potential threat, viewing it, rather as one aspect among many of a heterogeneous  
patchwork of ‘cyber Islamic environments’ - a term which, for Bunt, ‘[a]cknowledges diversity 
among and within different zones in cyberspace that represent varied Muslim worldviews within the 
House of Islam, all of which present a reference point of identity.’
111
  
 
By placing virtuality and non-physical notions of spatiality at the core of his approach, Bunt avoids 
reducing Islamic phenomena encountered on the Internet to mere extensions of wider spheres of 
Muslim politics or public life. Indeed, extending the spatial metaphor, he compares his researches in 
these to, on the one hand, the travels of Ibn Battuta and, on the other, the residency of Edward Lane 
in Nineteenth Century Cairo.
112
  
 
This in turn opens up the core problem (for Internet religion) of authenticity. He opens Virtually 
Islamic by writing:  
 
To an extent, the Cyber Islamic Environments I visit are simulations too, representations of the real and also 
representations of the ideal. Some contain depictions of physical objects: mosques, sacred texts, and images of 
Muslims. They also contain hard information and data, pure text without physical mass. The Qu’ran in 
cyberspace does not physically resemble the Qur’an on my desk. The  difference between Cyber Islamic 
environments and Flight Simulator is that the ‘fragmentation’ can impact on the real lives of individuals, at 
significant and mundane levels.
113
  
 
Since religions are already, in part, constructed out of texts and ideas, the borderline between the 
virtual and the real is necessarily a complex one. And yet it is not always clear that Bunt’s densely 
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descriptive accounts always work through such ideas to the degree that they seem to require. 
Indeed, notwithstanding Bunt’s heavy use of virtualising terminology, his preoccupations tend to 
remain broadly similar to those scholars just mentioned - that is, with the transmission and changing 
nature of Islamic authority. Bunt (and also, very likely, the Muslim Ummah itself) has increasingly 
emphasised the centrality of the Internet to contemporary Islam. In 2004, he opens Islam in the 
Digital Age by observing: 
 
 Islam does not need computers; in many parts of the ‘Muslim world’, Islam is practised without  computer 
 interfaces or the use of a mouse, and the Internet may remain a rumour or a luxury in the hands of the 
 elite.
114
 
 
He goes on to summarise what the Internet does have to offer Islam. ‘Without the Internet... 
 
 ...a substantial minority of Muslims and Islamic organisations would be bereft of their significant 
 propagation and networking tool, unable to dialogue, research and disseminate their message to followers or 
 to interested (Muslim and other) observers.
115
  
  
By 2009, he feels able to strengthen this assertion considerably. 
 
 One critical question is: to what extent has using the Internet for Islamic purposes become a religious 
 obligation for some?... There are many people for whom being online for the sake of Allah represents an 
 obligation.
116
  
 
At the same time, Bunt is consistently sceptical of the possibility of inferring from the existence of 
material on the Internet pertaining to ‘militant jihad in cyberspace’, anything about Islamic 
militancy in the real world. At the opening of his chapter on ‘defining e-jihad’, the writes that: ‘The 
thesis that the hyperlinks between one site and another are indicative of specific allegiances of an 
individual or an organisation is a problematic one’.
117
 Later, he points out that: ‘the extent to which 
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the Al-Neda site represented bin Laden “officially” is perhaps open to question, given that his 
whereabouts or existence was difficult to ascertain during 2002’.
118
 In iMuslims he puts the point 
still more forcefully:  
 
Does it matter that, as I noted when undertaking this research, 800 individuals downloaded an Al Qaida related 
file in twenty-four hours? We do not know who the 800 people were, or their motivations; we do not know 
how many copied the file and distributed or showed it to others; we do not know whether it had a substantive 
effect on them, or how many academics, researchers, journalists and analysts were among them.119 
  
Bunt’s comments serve as a valuable corrective to implicit assumptions that jihadi content is, ipso 
facto a security threat. However, taken within the broader thrust of this work, there seems to be a 
contradiction. If studying the ‘Cyber-Islamic environments’ which form the basic unit of his 
analysis relates in some ‘real’ way to the ‘real world’ practice of Islam, then it would seem difficult 
to argue that jihadi content alone is somehow insulated from wider relevance. In fairness, this 
contradiction can to some extent be resolved by appealing to the fact that, for instance, an ‘e-fatwa’ 
may be a real Islamic fatwa in the sense that an ‘e-jihad’ may not be a real jihad.
120
 But it seems 
questionable that Bunt really allows himself this escape route. For while Bunt speaks of an Islam 
‘of’ the Internet, he does not seem (which would appear to be necessary) to disavow the possibility 
of speaking about the ‘Muslims’ he there encounters as people whose Islamic practices extend also 
to the real world.  
 
A deeper problem with Bunt’s work is, as Karim has pointed out with regard to Islam in the Digital 
Age, is that it lacks a ‘sufficiently vigorous theoretical framework’.
121
 As the self-styled virtual 
equivalent of the 19th century travel writer, he seems always more comfortable with descriptive 
accounts than with taking the ethnographic risk of interpreting what he sees. The diagrammatic 
framework he offers in iMuslims is less a conceptualisation than a map. For Bunt, it seems, it is 
sufficient simply to observe that something is ‘Islamic’ and that it is ‘cyber’ - almost as if the 
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juxtaposition of Islam and technology still remains something to be surprised at. Indeed, in so far as 
Bunt places his work in a larger theoretical problematic, it is - he insists - to be understood as ‘a 
challenge to what has been described as Electronic Colonialism Theory’.
122
 This is telling in that it 
requires only the positioning of cyber-Islam en bloc as something culturally different as refutation 
of the idea that the Internet will turn us all into English speaking Americans, rather than any very 
nuanced consideration of how cyber-Islam works for the people who participate in it, or what - in a 
particular sense - they do with it.  
 
At first, it might appear that the conceptual thinness of Bunt’s work (especially in relation to 
jihadism) is simply an outcome of its premises - of its insistence on finding an Islam of, rather than 
merely on the Internet, which to a degree constrains him to locating one ‘Cyber Islamic’ 
phenomenon only in relation to others. But this seems insufficient. After all, many researchers into 
other online environments have been able to produce conceptually rich accounts of their 
functioning. Rather, it might be suggested, the issue lies more in the very diversity which Bunt 
strives to acknowledge, leading him to fall into the difficulty identified in Volpi’s caveat - quoted 
above - that, in escaping essentialist positions, one ends up saying only ‘there are different Islams’. 
As such, Bunt’s almost unique preparedness to acknowledge and give attention to jihadi 
environments seems to present him literally as ‘the exception that proves the rule’. That is, the very 
fact that Bunt seems unable to discuss jihadism on the Internet without producing a conception of 
‘Islam’ so thin and heterogeneous as to mean almost nothing beyond the reported speech of those 
Muslims who engage with it seems to offer a useful indication of why researchers into 
contemporary Islam find Internet jihadism so hard to talk about. In offering us a map of Islam on 
the Internet, it seems, Bunt must abandon hope of providing also a compass.  
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1.5 Internet Jihadism as Internet Politics 
 
The scholarly discomfort associated with discussing jihadism as a religious phenomenon has, 
perhaps, been paralleled by a determination to normalise jihadism (and other types of ‘political 
Islam’) as politics which merely uses religious motifs as a means to an end. With regard to the 
relationship of jihadism to the Internet, this appears to have two potential implications. In so far as 
jihadism is viewed as a social movement, so jihadism’s ‘use of the Internet’ would seem to be 
mappable onto the existing literature about how social movements use ICTs.
123
 Alternatively, in so 
far as jihadism is seen as an ideology, or as a ‘meta-narrative’,
124
 it seems to invite analysis using 
existing theories of political ideology and political communication.  
 
Social movement theory has had a good deal to say about how social movements (especially 
‘transnational social movement organisations’ or TSMOs)
125
 have made use of the Internet for 
purposes of mobilising, organising and campaigning. Indeed, it can be argued that it is the Internet’s 
potential for enabling new types of transnational politics upon which much of its claim to be a 
politically liberating and transformative medium lies. Social movements, for instance, play a crucial 
role in Castells’ vision of the ‘network society’.
126
 However, work in this area has tended to focus 
on actors such as global anti-capitalist and environmental movements, rather than on Islamists - and 
certainly on ‘jihadists’. Indeed, this would seem to relate to a familiar criticism of new social 
movement theorists in general - that they prefer to study groups which they themselves appear to 
sympathise with, rather than groups often thought of as extremist or even ‘hateful’ such as ‘radical’ 
religious movements or those on the extreme right.
127
  
 
This is not to deny the growing importance of social movement theory in the literature on Al Qaida, 
‘terrorism’ and violent jihad. At a conceptual level, Tilly has argued the case for replacing the idea 
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of a reified phenomenon of terrorism altogether with a view of political violence as a part of a wider 
repertoire of social movements generally.
128
 Hafez has shown how a combination of resource 
mobilisation and structural strain approaches familiar to SMT can serve to explain ‘Why Muslims 
Rebel’.
129
 More specifically, Sutton and Vertigans have tried to show how Al Qaida itself could be 
understood as an example of a ‘new social movement’
130
 and Wiktorowicz has provided a practical 
demonstration of how a social movement theory approach can be applied to a non violent, but 
clearly ‘radical’ Islamic group.
131
  
 
In practice, however, analysis of jihadi Internet content as an instance of social movement use of 
ICTs has been hampered by the sparsity of reliable information about the actual interface between 
online data and the physical functioning of the jihadi ‘movement’. Recently, researchers have, 
however, begun to apply the social movement theory concept of collective action frames to the 
propaganda materials of particular Al Qaida affiliates.
132
 But such research - while clearly a step 
forwards - would seem to remain bound by the problem outlined above, of being primarily limited 
to material (such as the identifiably ‘official’ content of specific, violent groups) in which the direct 
intent to mobilise, and the existence of something to mobilise into, is clear. 
 
In consequence, it can be suggested, attempts to render jihadism on the Internet accessible to 
analysis as a social movement have run into problems very similar to those encountered by 
researchers approaching from a ‘terrorism’ or ‘security’ perspective: the problem of disaggregating 
a comprehensible political actor from a morass of more or less ‘jihadi’ political content. Hence, 
even where jihadism has been studied as political discourse, rather than as quasi-violence, it has 
generally fallen within the purview of semi-academic investigations of political ‘extremism’ or 
‘hate’. For instance, one of the earliest studies of ‘Islamist’ content on the Internet (published in the 
journal Terrorism and Political Violence) was authored by Michael Whine,
133
 Director of the 
Community Securities Trust - a British NGO which has been described as ‘the defence agency of 
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the British Jewish Community’.
134
 Whine’s publications generally address issues of ‘extremism’, 
‘hate’ and antisemitism.  
 
A glimpse at an alternative approach is offered by those researchers who have focused more on the 
discursive dimensions of the phenomenon. Here, as suggested above, there has been a tendency to 
avoid direct engagement with ‘jihadi’ material, in favour of broader (and, as above, problematically 
holistic) analyses of the political potential of Islamic Internet use in general – an approach of which 
the work of Siapera provides a useful example.
135
 An interesting exception to this is the work of 
Chase Knowles, which concerns herself with what it calls ‘Islamist Neorealism’ as a ‘new Web 
genre’,
136
 thus placing the onus back on (de facto) jihadi material as content and as ‘culture’, rather 
than simply as strategic action. But as Knowles acknowledges, finding a way of adapting existing 
paradigms of political communication (in particular, the understandings offered by the Frankfurt 
School), is deeply problematic precisely because of the specifically religious claims made by the 
content in question, which, as she points out, seem not to be adequately recognisable without falling 
back on essentialist, orientalist or ‘reverse orientalist’ theories such as that advanced by 
Mowlana.
137
  
 
For Knowles, the central paradox provided by the Islamist content she surveys is, however, not 
merely tied to the difficulty of making sense of religion within the context of political discourse, but 
also with, as she puts it, ‘a major theoretical puzzle... in short: why are a range of non-fiction and 
fiction formats being hybridized into one collective visual, virtual paradigm?’.
138
 Knowles seeks 
answers to this question through comparison between the Islamist ‘web genre’ and that of ‘socialist 
realism’,
139
 through the dependence of the material, as she sees it, on the ‘fictional epic’
140
 and 
lastly through a ‘dualism between text and spirit’ which she calls ‘infospirituality’.
141
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While certain difficulties in interpretation which may arise from the author’s lack of specific 
expertise - for example she, probably incorrectly, understands the form ‘the word’ in the refrain of 
the nashid The Word is the Word of the Sword Until the Wrongs are Righted)
142
 as meaning ‘the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah’.
143
 However, a deeper problem seems to arise from the author’s ultimate 
inability to reconcile the political and religious meanings which she finds in the texts. Having 
initially problematised this very issue, she concludes by arguing that there are two main rhetorical 
purposes to what she calls ‘Islamist Neorealism’: the communication of a message of resistance 
through strategic narrative (the crafting of narratives for specific strategic aims), and the production 
of ‘infospiritualism’.
144
 But how these two ends are connected - or, if not, why they persistently 
coincide with one another in the same content ‘genre’ remains unexplained.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Jihadism on the Internet poses conceptual challenges which no approach thus far applied has been 
able satisfactorily to address. While some jihadi content is certainly produced by entities which are 
closely affiliated, or incorporated into violent ‘terrorist’ groups, it is not simply reducible to a 
notion of ‘terror on the Internet’. Such perspectives unhelpfully reify and securitise what is - 
however defined - undoubtedly a polyvocal and heterogeneous body of content which is, in turn, 
reincorporated by users into a yet larger and more complex body of narratives. But in moving away 
from this perspective, it is not clear that there are any very attractive looking alternatives. Jihadi 
content is self-evidently ‘Islamic’. But this observation does not seem to take us very far on its own.  
Islam is what people make of it. So this simply raises the question of what those who engage with 
jihadism on the Internet are using Islam to make. On the other hand, trying to rationalise away the 
‘spiritual’ and ‘epic’ elements of jihadism on the Internet seems to force the content into 
assumptions about political communication, or political mobilisation, in which it does not sit easily.  
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In finding an alternative perspective then, there are a number of criteria which must be met. First, 
given that jihadism ‘in real life’ is necessarily highly secretive, we must find a way of  
talking about Internet jihadism - as far as possible - as we find it, without making further 
assumptions about authorship, authenticity, purpose and effect which can be validated only with 
reference to external data. Following Bunt, it would seem that, broadly speaking, a 
phenomenological and cultural approach is needed.  
 
Secondly, it would seem to follow from this that jihadism on the Internet must be approached, as far 
as possible, on its own terms. Ideally (and this may seem at first a paradoxical initiative), jihadi 
texts should be appreciated emically as jihadi texts without forcing onto them larger ideas about 
what Islam is, or where the boundary lies between religion and politics.   
 
Lastly, however, an investigation of jihadi texts on the Internet cannot be merely descriptive. 
Understanding the phenomenon on its own terms and in its own vocabulary is a crucial first step. 
But if that is all that we do, we risk being misled by claims whose production may have more to do 
with the textual practice of ‘jihadism’ than the actual violent practice of ‘jihad’. As an example of 
this, one might consider the many examples of jihadi ‘strategic studies’,
145
 which may be read at 
face value as genuine information on what ‘the jihad’ is trying to do, but which might perhaps also 
be seen as post hoc rationalizations which serve not so much as effective blueprints for action, but 
as a way of upholding the apparent coherence of jihadi practice as a whole.
146
 There is, then, a 
difficult trick to be accomplished here. On the one hand one must deal with a set of surfaces, 
without presuming the necessary relevance of these surfaces to broader notions of ‘Islam’, the 
practice of ‘politics’ and, still less of ‘Islamic politics’. On the other hand some means must be 
found to understand these phenomena on a deeper level than their own description of themselves – 
to produce some theory, however tentative, of why jihadism, as it presents itself may matter to 
those who engage with it. It is this that the following chapter shall attempt to supply.  
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2. 
Fandom and Subcultural Consumption 
2.0 Introduction 
In ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger distinguishes between an ‘instrumental’ 
definition of technology as a ‘means to an end’, and a ‘human activity’ and, on the other hand, 
technology as ‘poiesis’ - a ‘way of revealing’, something that ‘enframes’.
147
 Perhaps one of his 
meanings is that we tend to look at technological artifacts as if what is done with them can be 
separated from the new reality that they create (or, for Heidegger) ‘reveal’ or ‘bring forth’. We 
forget that technology doesn’t just help us to get more of what we want. It changes what we want, 
and how we  understand our very existence.  
In the previous chapter, I tried to make the case that there has been too much focus on the 
‘instrumental’ side of Internet technology in the study of jihadism on the Internet - particularly in 
the absence of consistently good answers as to exactly who is wielding the ‘instrument’ and to what 
effect. But if we are to decouple ‘jihadism’ on the Internet from assumptions about its precise role 
in larger concerns such as ‘Islam’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘globalisation’, how then are we to make sense of 
it? What, exactly, is technology ‘bringing forth’ in this case?  
One useful place to start would seem to be precisely where the previous chapter left off - with 
Knowles’ concern regarding the unclassifiability of what she calls ‘Islamist Neorealism’. As I 
noted, Knowles has found that Frankfurt School approaches to political communication cannot 
seem to make sense of the ‘epic’ and religious themes included in this material while, at the same 
time, distinctively ‘Islamic’ approaches to the question appear to be culturally ‘essentialist’.  
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What is interesting with relation to this problem is that it is seen as problematic and essentialist to 
propose that the content in question ought to fit one (as it happens, Muslim) scholar’s supposedly 
‘Islamic’ model of communication, but that things would be well and good if the content could be 
made to fit a model of communication produced by a particular group of mid twentieth century 
German-Jewish philosophers. The implication that all cultural practices, properly understood, must 
fit the universal models devised by Western thinkers seems to risk replacing essentialism with 
chauvinism – and thus perhaps, subtly, with another kind of essentialism.  
This, in fact, relates to a wider set of concerns about the applicability of critical theory approaches 
to specific cultural situations. For example, feminist Muslim anthropologists such as Saba 
Mahmood
148
 and Lila Abu-Lughod
149
 have questioned the validity of Western conceptions of 
‘resistance’ in certain Islamic contexts, while others have asked whether insistence on finding a 
close analogue to the Habermasian public sphere has blinded scholars to the emergence of certain 
important new kinds of public dialogue in Muslim society.
150
  
In this chapter, I wish to draw on work in an area where scholars have been particularly dynamic in 
devising alternatives to Frankfurt School approaches: that of post-industrial popular culture. My 
argument will be that, by reassessing the agency of consumers – particularly when conceptualised 
as ‘fans’ – in relation to ideological and supposedly hegemonic discourses, this area of scholarship 
has provided a fruitful set of tools for reconceptualising what is going in the case of jihadism on the 
Internet. 
To this end, I shall attempt to provide a brief account of the evolution of certain areas of popular 
cultural studies, addressing some of the conceptual concerns these raised in their development, 
before going on to consider in more depth some key thinkers and underlying issues. I propose to 
follow this approach - rather than a more straightforwardly thematic one - as I feel that before 
‘expropriating’ some of the concepts developed in this area, it is necessary to present the contexts 
and problems regarding which they were used.  
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2.1 Popular Culture and Cultural Studies 
In exile from Nazi Germany, Rolf Wiggerhaus notes
151
 how the Frankfurt School philosophers 
Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer came into contact for the first time with American 
commercial mass culture. From this distasteful experience they drew their theory of the ‘culture 
industry’, which they saw as a means by which capitalist societies are able to ideologically 
indoctrinate and satiate the masses in a ‘circle of manipulation and retroactive need’.
152
  
From this conceptual starting point, Adorno and Horkheimer - as well as a long succession of media 
scholars who followed and continue to follow their lead - proceeded to develop a critical analysis of 
popular culture aimed at exposing the ideological ends served by mass media content.  
As such, the historian Dennis Dworkin presents the Frankfurt School as the main alternative to the 
approach offered by what he sees as a unified tradition of cultural Marxism in postwar Britain - 
including not only the sociological work of British Cultural Studies, but also that of Marxist 
historians such as E.P Taylor and Eric Hobsbawm. According to Dworkin, both the British and 
Frankfurt schools shared a preoccupation with culture as a means by which capitalist power 
maintained its hegemony over the working class, based on Gramsci’s rejection of deterministic 
views of culture implied by ‘economism’. However, while the Frankfurt School’s critical theorists 
‘tended to see contemporary culture as the debased mass entertainments of the culture industry... a 
culture that encouraged the masses to think as passive consumers’, British tradition ‘saw [popular] 
culture as more contradictory’ - seeing within it ‘subversive’ potential. They also ‘attempted to 
understand cultural consumption from the point of view of consumers, rather than producers’.
153
  
In other words, scholars following the British cultural studies approach offered two main arguments 
in opposition to the pessimism of the Frankfurt School.  
First, against the idea that the ‘industrial’ technologies of mass media were inevitably bound to 
convey only the ideology of capitalism, they explored the possibility of these media becoming the 
conduit for alternative messages. This was, in fact, an idea that had previously been put forward by 
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Walter Benjamin - a thinker peripherally associated with the Frankfurt School, but not one whose 
ideas were embraced by Adorno and Horkheimer.
154
 
Second, (a point which we shall return to shortly), they proposed that mass media audiences were 
more discriminating than might be supposed.   
2.2 Youth Subcultures as Authentic Popular Culture 
Taking this first idea further implied the possibility that, rather than there being a single industrial 
culture, popular culture in capitalist societies existed in both positive and negative variants. One 
distinction, for instance, noted by Buxton, recognises ‘authentic’ forms of popular culture, such as 
rock music, as opposed to ‘commercial’ forms, such as ‘manufactured’ pop music and television 
series. He quotes Gleason
155
 to the effect that ‘radio and pop music belong to youth. Television 
belongs to their parents’. For Tania Modleski, these alternatives can be labelled as, on the one hand 
‘mass’ culture, which is ‘imposed from above’ by a dominant culture industry and ‘popular’ culture 
which arises ‘from the people’.
156
 
Concern with (in Modleski’s formulation) ‘popular culture’ as a bottom up alternative to mass 
culture can be seen as a key aspect of one of the major projects of British cultural studies at the end 
of the 1970s - the incorporation into Marxist frameworks of post World War II youth subcultures.  
At its most general, a subculture is simply, according to Wolfgang and Ferracuti, ‘a normative 
system of some group or groups smaller than the whole society’.
157
 In principle, then, the notion of 
the subculture is widely applicable - as much as a methodological perspective or as a conceptual 
tool as a coherent body of theory. Gay, Ellison and Powers talk, about ‘demoninational 
subcultures’, for example, within an American church.
158
  
In reality, however, the study of subcultures has tended to focus on those cultures which are 
perceived as lying for some reason outside of the mainstream of society. Thus, the work of the 
Chicago School of sociology - which, according Gelder and Thornton,
159
 represents the starting 
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point for contemporary subcultural studies, involved work such as Anderson’s The Hobo
160
 - an 
ethnographic examination of the culture of homeless men in the Chicago area, and Thrasher’s 
Gang.
161
 Historical studies of subculture reach back as far as the cultures of ‘rogues and vagabonds’ 
of early modern Europe. Accordingly, Gelder proposes that subcultures are distinguished by the 
following characteristics:  
-Through their often negative relation to work (as idle, parasitical, hedonistic, criminal etc) 
- Their negative or ambivalent reaction to class 
-Their association with territory rather than property 
-Their movement away from home into non-domestic forms of belonging 
-Their ties to excess and exaggeration (as opposed to restraint and moderation 
-Their refusal of the banalities of ordinary life and, in particular, of massification. [ie, of 
being incorporated into wider ‘mass’ society].
162
 
 
For British cultural studies scholars, primarily working at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, the concept of subculture gained a new sociological momentum as theorists sought 
on the one hand to understand the rise of distinctively dressed youth cultures; and on the other to 
explain the apparent decline of Marxist-style class consciousness among people who were 
traditionally ‘working class’. Works by researchers at the Centre such as Hebdige’s Subculture: The 
Meaning of Style,
163
 and the essays of Mungham and Pearson (eds) Working Class Youth Culture
164
 
and Hall and Jefferson (eds) Resistance Through Rituals
165
 sought to identify in youth subcultural 
groupings seemingly based on shared clothing style and musical taste, an underlying possibility of 
political resistance to the prevailing capitalist order. Hebdige, for instance, argued that groups such 
as Skinheads and Teddy Boys, far from losing a sense of proletarian class consciousness were in 
fact using exaggerated and stereotyped references to working clothes of the older generation as a 
way of symbolically re-establishing the communal solidarity of working class communities which 
had been fragmented by changes in the industrial economy.
166
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In the 1990s, such romantic characterisations of youth culture began to lose some of their sheen. 
This was partly due to a theoretical and empirical re-examination of those same subcultures which 
had concerned Hebdige and his colleagues, and partly due to actual developments in youth 
subculture itself, which seemed to raise important questions about the political potential and 
meaning of the phenomenon. Clarke observed, for instance, a tendency by these researchers to 
focus narrowly on visual style - particularly of small ‘authentic’ subcultural elites while ignoring 
both the larger mass of ‘straights’ of the same social class, or even what the subcultures under 
consideration actually had to say about themselves.
167
 Taking this further, Muggleton sought to 
undertake a comprehensive re-examination of subculture, substituting the Marxist theoretical 
assumptions which were practically de rigueur for scholars of popular culture in favour of a ‘neo-
Weberian’ approach, based on a ‘nominalist’ rather than a ‘realist’ methodology which ‘privileges 
subjective meanings’ of those being studied.
168
 Arguing that Birmingham CCS researchers such as 
Hebdige had presumed to read, from youth style, meanings which would have been 
incomprehensible to the youth themselves, Muggleton proceeded to insist instead that working class 
subcultures, rather than representing relatively stable forms of group solidarity were far more fluid 
than had been supposed, and far closer to supposedly middle class subcultures such as the hippy 
movement. As such, they were rooted - he claimed - in the internalisation by working class youth of 
liberal ideas of ‘hyperindividualism’, leading on to a conception of subculture as a playful, 
postmodern activity, with important elements of performativity and the use of ‘masks’.
169
  
In rethinking things thus, Muggleton made similar claims for relatively old movements such as 
punk as were being made at roughly the same time by scholars working on distinctively new youth 
trends. For Thornton, 
170
 and later, Redhead,
171
 the emergence of the phenomenon of the rave in 
particular seemed to present something very different to earlier subcultures based (supposedly) on 
exclusivity and authenticity. While in theory (if not necessarily in practice) being both a hippy and a 
punk had been a contradiction in terms, these researchers observed that attendees at raves came 
from a wide variety of subcultural backgrounds - uniting culturally around the sheer aesthetic joy of 
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a particular occasion before going their separate ways back into their ordinary lives. The common 
thread for such research was thus the movement away from subculture as a way of fighting 
capitalism to subculture as a way of living within capitalism. For Redhead, this could understood in 
terms of the ‘orgiastic’ and ‘aesthetic’ sociology of the theorist Michel Maffesoli.  
2.3 Fans as Subcultural Consumers of Mass Media 
Let us now pick up on the second front which British cultural studies opened against the Frankfurt 
School. While Hebdige and others were investigating the revolutionary potential of youth 
subcultures, scholars such as John Fiske were attempting to rethink the ideological role of mass 
media such as television. As has already been observed, British cultural studies had consistently 
taken a more nuanced view of this issue than had Horkheimer and Adorno and, later, Habermas, for 
whom television bore much of the responsibility for ‘transforming a public that made culture an 
object of critical debate into one that consumes it’.
172
 According to Stuart Hall, communications 
followed a model of ‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’ by which the intended message of a sender could be 
rejected or renegotiated by a recipient. Fiske built on this, drawing from Hall’s encoding/decoding 
model,
173
 the notion of ‘polysemy’ and Bakhtin’s concept of ‘heteroglossia’
174
 to present a view of 
television as a ‘producerly’ discourse potentially open to a variety of interpretations by viewers.
175
 
For Fiske television viewers, rather than simply soaking up content, actively ‘read’ it, sometimes 
‘resisted’ it, and always reworked its meanings through their own social lives and the ‘oral culture’ 
of gossip.
176
 Moreover, the act of reappropriating culture was not simply relevant in terms of the 
alterations implied to the final understanding of the message. The very process of reappropriation, 
as a subversive activity based on escaping established social codes served to produce a particular set 
of pleasures which Fiske - drawing on Barthes notion of jouissance - placed at the heart of his 
theory of popular culture.
177
  
Coming from a different scholarly perspective, and initially working unaware of developments in 
British scholarship (although later heavily influenced by Hebdige and other CCS scholars such as 
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Angela McRobbie), Janice Radway came independently to roughly similar conclusions in her study 
of how a group of American women from the small town of Smithton read romantic novels of the 
kind generally thought to be both intellectually lowbrow and rife with sexist clichés.
178
 In 
rethinking the impact of such literature, Radway oberved that the practice of media consumption, 
and the impact this had on how people organised their lives might be as important as the ostensible 
content. ‘Smithton women’, she pointed out, ‘repeatedly answered my questions about the meaning 
of romances by talking about the meaning of romance reading as an activity and a social event in a 
familial context’. It turned out that for the women she studied, spending money on romance books 
and demanding time in which to read them meant standing up to the demands of their husbands, and 
mutually supporting each other in doing so.179  
At the same time, Radway also insisted that, whatever scholarly critics might think, viewed from 
the point of view of the ‘interpretive community’ formed by the Smithton women, the content of 
romance novels was understood not in terms of patriarchal domination, but rather of liberation. For 
example, the readers appreciated particularly the tendency of romance novel heroines to occupy 
unconventional gender roles and defy male expectations of what women were supposed to do.180 
Work such as Fiske’s and Radway’s provided much of the inspiration for the first serious academic 
investigations of the phenomenon of media fandom which began to appear at the beginning of the 
1990s. In a sense, however, the phenomenon of fandom - and the body of scholarship that set to 
work on it - can be seen as lying at the meeting point of the two lines of cultural scholarship just 
discussed. As autonomous subcultures, fan groupings were seen as deviant outsiders by members of 
‘normal’ society. But they faced the added stigma of being groupings premised on a supposed 
addiction to consuming mass cultural texts widely considered to be the worthless, trivial, mass 
produced rubbish of the culture industry.  
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Indeed, the negative stereotypes which Jenkins observed in media treatment of fan cultures 
correspond closely to those set out by Gelder as hallmarks of subculture in general. For Jenkins, 
fans have been stereotyped as:  
- Brainless consumers who will buy anything associated with the show and its cast 
- [People] who devote their lives to the cultivation of worthless knowledge 
- Are feminised and/or desexualised 
- Are infantile, emotionally and intellectually immature 
- Are unable to separate fantasy from reality
181
 
 
In fact, as Jensen noted, fandom was frequently seen in an even more negative light - as a 
‘pathology’, with violent mob behaviour, stalking or even celebrity assassinations seen as inevitably 
outcomes of the fan’s supposed obsessiveness, deviancy and frail grip on reality.
182
 Viewing similar 
stereotypes from a fan point of view, Bacon Smith recalled the discomfort which organisers of a 
women’s fan convention had felt in conversation with an outsider whom they, jokingly, suggested 
had viewed them as a ‘terrorist society’.
183
  
For what the scholars whom Gray, Sandvoss and Harrington identify as the ‘first wave’ of fandom 
theorists,
184
 the main task was to overturn such assumptions. Against the notion of fans as ‘brainless 
consumers’, Jenkins and Bacon Smith showed how real fan communities were actually based less 
on the obsessive desire to own commerical merchandise as a creative impulse to engage in the 
fictional world created by the media text - one which drove many fans to produce artistic work of 
their own, such as fictional stories, ‘filk’ songs or visual art relating to characters from television 
shows.  
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For Jenkins, fans were to be seen as ‘rogue readers’, who - using the terminology of the theorist 
Michel de Certeau, ‘poached’ on texts which were supposed to be the property of others.
185
 As 
such, they were not victims of the industrial media that produced the texts they consumed, so much 
as cultural activists who confronted their producers, demanding a measure of creative agency over 
their production. As illustrative of this - and in contrast to others’ ideas of fans as a ‘powerless 
elite’
186
 - it was noted how organised fan groups put together letter writing campaigns demanding 
that studios revive axed series, or protesting new plot trajectories that they felt betrayed the spirit of 
a particular show.  
Indeed, as ‘interpretive communities’, Jenkins argued that fans operated on the objects of their 
fandom with much the same intellectual vigour and passion that connoisseurs applied to ‘high’ 
culture. As such, he argued, much of the stigma against fans appeared to derive not so much from 
their intellectual vacuity as from the close similarity of their reverence for supposedly devalued 
texts to the textual practices exercised by connoisseurs of ‘high culture’. By seeming to ape and 
parody what were supposed to be inherently valuable and worthwhile activities, fans produced in 
consumers of high culture the unpleasant feeling that the inherent superiority of their own cultural 
texts might, too, be ultimately without foundation.
187
  
2.4 New ‘Waves’ of Fandom Theory 
For ‘first wave’ fandom theorists, the main task was to take a much maligned and mocked social 
group and present it in a heroic new light. As such, the meaning of this project depended to a 
significant degree on the existence of the very boundaries it set out to challenge: the status of fans 
as social outsiders, the existence of widely recognised ‘high’ cultural forms and socially sanctioned 
types of fandom, such as sports fandom. Therefore, thinking about fandom was set on a new 
trajectory as the 1990s progressed and many of these boundaries started to erode. Increasingly, the 
taken for granted superiority of high culture seemed to come under question. At the same time, 
fandom became more and more socially acceptable. Indeed, in contrast to the conflictual 
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relationship which had set the scene for the heroic treatment of fan groups by media scholars, media 
companies increasingly started to court fan groups.  
One consequence of this was a more sceptical view of the liberating potential of fan groups 
themselves. While earlier fandom theorists had emphasised how fan groups were socially inclusive, 
and used their interpretive relationship with texts to reimagine them, too, as paradigms of 
inclusivity (writing homerotic relationships into Star Trek, for example, or filling out larger roles 
for female characters), newer theorists started to look at how fan groups helped to replicate in 
miniature the same prejudices as society as a whole.
188
  
Perhaps more far reaching, however, was a new questioning of what texts were appropriate objects 
for fandom. According to some critics, early scholars of fandom had - in privileging interpretive 
communities of texts over readings of the texts themselves
189
 - arrived at the paradoxically 
patronising position that texts didn’t matter, and that any one text was as good as any other. In fact, 
these scholars had always insisted that fans chose particular texts not arbitrarily, but because they 
were from the outset open to being read for those things fans sought in them. At the same time, 
however, this insistence did open up an important question about whether the ‘popular 
culture’/‘high culture’ distinction might have some validity after all.  
For Fiske - writing at the beginning of the ‘first wave’ in 1992, fans’ engagement with popular 
cultural rather than high cultural texts was not simply arbitrary, or something forced upon them by 
their being shut out from acquiring this level of ‘cultural capital’ (a concept drawn from the widely 
used cultural theories of Pierre Bourdieu). Rather, fans drew on popular cultural texts because they 
offered different possibilities.
190
 It was not so much a matter of whether texts were ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
but rather (as McKee succinctly puts it) of what they were good for.
191
 Unlike ‘high’ cultural texts, 
popular cultural texts were, Fiske believed, less rigidly bound to ideas of authenticity and 
authorship. They were, for this reason, more open to creative re-interpretation or re-writing. At the 
same time, however, Fiske recognised that the boundary between what was high culture and what 
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was popular culture was not an eternal one - items which had once been popular culture (such as 
Shakespearean drama) became enshrined as high culture and, potentially, vice versa.  
This idea seemed to invite the possibility that fandom, rather than being defined as a connoisseur-
like relationship to devalued popular texts, might instead be definable as a certain kind of 
relationship to any text.  
2.5 Redefining Fandom 
This development naturally required a new attention to what was meant by the term ‘fandom’ - or, 
as became a common usage, ‘fannish engagement’ with a particular text. For Jenkins, the essential 
difference between fandom and ordinary cultural consumption had been threefold: fans exercised a 
high level of selection and distinction - making conscious choices about media consumption and 
often re ‘reading’ favourite texts; secondly, they then went on to form an interpretive community. 
Thirdly, this community in turn developed into a distinctive art world, allowing for the production, 
evaluation and consumption of further works of art produced by the community itself.
192
 
Uricchio
193
 put it more simply, arguing that a fan is differentiated from a non-fan by the fact that 
fans ‘incorporate… cultural texts as part of their self identity, often going on to build social 
networks on the basis of shared fandoms’. Yet more generally, Matt Hills has asserted that
194
 
‘intense affective relationships’ with texts are what lie at the heart of the phenomenon, although he 
is at pains to point out that it is an ‘inevitably contested term,’ and that it is, ‘what fandom does, 
culturally’ that is more important than reifying the phenomenon into a precise object for enquiry.
195
 
The implication of this was that it became possible to speak (hypothetically, at least) of people as 
engaging ‘fannishly’ with texts such as Shakespeare, Chekhov or Bach. Alternatively, a new 
category of the ‘anti-fan’, whose active, productive and well-informed dislike of a particular text 
became the basis for personal identity and community.
196
  
The simultaneous widening of the parameters for fandom, and (to some extent) depoliticisation of 
the relationship between fans and producers did not, however, invalidate all of the core 
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preoccupations of early fandom theorists such as Jenkins and Bacon-Smith. Indeed, in stripping 
away some of these concerns, it can be suggested that the relevance of certain core arguments about 
‘what fandom does’ present in work such as Textual Poachers and Enterprising Women actually 
became highlighted still further. In so far as fandom related not to a macropolitical agenda about the 
relationship between a capitalist media industry and its consumers but to individual concerns about 
identity and the re-creation of community amidst modernist anomie, both writers had argued that 
fandom - in their cases most especially science fiction fandom - worked by producing both a shared 
fantasy, or myth which incorporated within it ‘utopian’ possibilities and, at the same time, an actual 
human community which seemed to actualise some of these values. Thus, for instance, Jenkins 
observed how fans were attracted to the world of Star Trek precisely because of its optimistic view 
of a future in which technology, rather than leading to alienation and totalitarianism could help 
make people ‘more fully human’.
197
 Fans looked longingly to the Star Trek world both for a model 
of a better society and for an escape from the everyday world of ‘mundania’. And when the series 
failed to live up to the ideals they saw in it, they used their own fan art to imagine new 
possibilities.
198
  
A key concern of Jenkins’ was to refute earlier scholars who, perplexed by the devotion and 
apparenty ritualistic behaviour of Star Trek fans, had come to the conclusion that the phenomenon 
was to be seen as a new form of religion.
199
 Jenkins emphasised against this the ‘nomadism’ of fan 
reading and its critical, rather than slavish and literalistic attitude to its objects. But while engaging 
with multiple texts (for example, different SF series such as Star Trek, Star Wars, Blake’s Seven 
and Doctor Who, or science fiction novels), as well as certain real life political issues (such as 
funding for NASA), Jenkins and Bacon Smith did insist that fans were able thereby to affirm certain 
core underlying ethical values. At the same time, they were also able to imaginatively cope with 
some of the stresses and anxieties of modern life by imaginatively projecting themselves into the 
possibility of a better future. 
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Then, at a collective level, some fans ‘inhabited’ a ‘weekend world’ of travelling fan conventions 
held in hotels and conference centres which, although not spatially or temporally contiguous, was 
nonetheless very real. By engaging in this world performatively (through costume, song and dance) 
fans were able to produce a society which provided for them the sense of inclusive community, 
sociality and ‘carnival’ that their ordinary lives lacked. As such, fan communities can be seen, 
arguably, as yet another manifestation of the part time ‘clubculture’ which subcultural research had 
begun to identify at roughly the same time.  
2.6 From Fandom to Consumer Culture 
Given the cultural Marxist roots of fan scholarship, it is something of an irony that as media 
companies have started to woo fan groups, as the social supremacy of high culture has fallen into 
doubt, and as the political potential of subcultures has been rethought, the study of fan cultures has 
become a subject of increasing interest to a discipline which would appear to be the perfect nemesis 
of cultural studies: marketing research.  
Some cultural scholars might argue, however, that the increasing interest of market researchers in 
subcultural aspects of consumption has represented not just the unmitigated triumph of capitalist 
hegemony over all forms of resistance, but rather the movement of the political potential of fan 
activity elsewhere, and the emergence of a much more complex and ‘playful’ paradigm of 
‘resistance’ and cooption by commercial ventures.  
For instance, for Jenkins, one implication of the emergence of what he calls a ‘convergence 
culture’
200
 has been that the experience of engaging in participatory media has also begun to shape 
participatory ways of engaging in politics and religion. Rather than fan groups engaging in quasi-
political activity (for example, by organising protest campaigns against the cancellation of favourite 
series), political subtexts make it into the performance of entertainment. He observes, for instance, 
how popular cultural brands such as The Apprentice were used in order to mount a political critique 
of George Bush’s presidency,
201
 and how anti-brand ‘culture jamming’
202
 (also discussed by, for 
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instance, Kozinets and Handelman,
203
 Sandlin and Callahan,
204
 Carducci
205
) has become a form of 
political expression; or, alternatively, how Christian fans of the Harry Potter books have found 
creative ways to negotiate a potentially controversial position, re-deploying and re-reading the texts 
as Christian allegory.
206
  
Indeed, for marketing scholars Desmond, McDonagh and O’Donohue, this apparent irony actually 
reflects what they see as a transition ‘from revolutionary to aesthetic counter-culture’.
207
 For Cova, 
Kozinets and Shankar, whose edited volume Consumer Tribes represents an important development 
in this trend, it is the outcome of consumers becoming ‘hip’ to the rules of the capitalist game. As 
they write ‘Consumers, in other words, are not naive about living in their commercial-material 
world... They know the game plan; they read the playbooks, they know the strategy’.
208
  
The application of market research as a perspective for looking at cultures of fandom and of 
consumption, and consequent abandonment or toning down of Marxist assumptions, has enabled a 
rather more complex view of the sets of relationships that exist between fans and media producers. 
Going beyond the rather black and white analysis by which fans must either be consumption 
addicted cultural dupes or heroic cultural rebels, Cova, Kozinets and Shankar produce a two 
dimensional framework for understanding the actions of groupings which they refer to as ‘consumer 
tribes’. According to how far they (1) appropriate the market for a product and (2), how far they 
annex the market for a product.
209
 In practice, this schema produces four categories. First, there are 
‘activators’ - groups which take an essentially non-commercial brand, and create value by engaging 
with it as, for example, people who keep alive the ‘brand’ of the British Royal Family by collecting 
paraphernalia.
210
 These are opposed to ‘entrepreneurs’, who take an already valued brand and start 
distributing and marketing their own home made spin-offs of it, as with those who write and 
distribute their own DIY Harry Potter stories.
211
 The other dyad in the framework is between 
‘double agents’, and ‘plunderers’. The former take a commercial brand thought to stand for one 
thing and imbue it with a different set of values, thereby opening it up to a new market. For 
example, as when a group of cool indie kids decided to make an unloved but proletarian brand of 
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beer the new in thing to drink.
212
 The latter are groups such as ‘culture jammers’ who ‘hijack’ 
brands by spoofing their advertisements and satirising their claims to stand for particular values.
213
  
2.7 Cultural Theorists: De Certeau, Bourdieu, Maffesoli 
Thus far, we have occasionally glimpsed at certain theorists which researchers into fandom and 
‘subcultures of consumption’ have themselves drawn on. For his work, Jenkins has made particular 
use of Michel de Certeau. Kozinets and his peers - sometimes via Redhead - have drawn on 
Maffesoli. Fiske notes his particular debt to the work of five theorists: Bourdieu, de Certeau, 
Barthes, Hall and Bakhtin.
214
 As they have been particularly drawn on in this dissertation, it shall be 
worthwhile at this point to consider in greater depth the ideas of three theorists in particular: 
Bourdieu, de Certeau and Maffesoli.   
Bourdieu’s work has been much admired by theorists of cultural studies, although the relationship 
has not been mutual (for a discussion of this, see, eg Robbins: 1991).
215
 In the context of fandom 
and subculture, three of Bourdieu’s concepts are particularly important: those of habitus, capital 
and field. These are, in fact, interdependent ideas central to Bourdieu’s work as a whole. The 
concept of habitus, which Bourdieu first introduced in his study of peasantry in Bearn, and properly 
developed in his Outline of a Theory of Practice
216
 with reference to his previous ethnographic 
research among the Kabyle in Algeria represents an attempt to escape from the tendency of social 
scientists, as outside observers, to ‘elicit’ solid-seeming, timeless structures from the day to day life 
of the societies they study.
217
 In place of this, Bourdieu attempts to produce a way of thinking about 
how structured conventions such as practices of reciprocal gift giving or killing can emerge out of 
the time-bounded choices made by individuals living their lives. Bourdieu’s central idea is that 
individuals in such practical circumstances act tactically to advance their interests within the 
possibilities pre-set by a subconsciously learned repertoire of cultural behaviours, attitudes and 
expectations.  
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Extending this idea to complex industrial societies such as France produces the notion of the ‘field’, 
which Bourdieu describes as ‘a separate social universe having its own laws of functioning 
independent of those of politics and the economy’.
218
 His concept is explained by Patricia 
Thompson in terms of the science fiction idea of the force field - an invisible barrier which shuts off 
an area to the outside world; and real life physics’ idea of a field as a mathematical space described 
by vectors, which act as axes of a coordinate system.
219
  
In Bourdieu’s conception of things, the axes of the field are provided in turn by varying levels of 
different types of capital, which introduces the third key concept. Indeed, if a field is, as Bourdieu 
suggests, a game without formally set out rules, played tactically but unconsciously
220
 by players 
who are guided by their individual habitus, then the object of the game would seem to be the 
acquisition of the various (to some degree interchangeable) types of ‘capital’ which Bourdieu 
distinguishes: economic capital (that is, economic resources of more or less universal fungibility), 
social capital (networks of social obligations), educational capital (qualifications) and, of most 
specific relevance, cultural capital - meaning the acquisition of tastes and aesthetic competencies 
indicative of high levels of acceptance in a given field. This latter is in turn divided by Bourdieu 
into three forms: the ‘embodied state’, the ‘objectified state’ and the ‘institutionalised state’.
221
  
Since Bourdieu sees fields as capable of overlapping and containing one another, this would seem 
to mean that high value cultural capital in one field (for instance, ownership of certain types of art) 
might be low value or even worthless in another. For Fiske, fan communities can be seen as fields 
within the larger field (what Bourdieu would call the ‘field of power’) of society, which, by 
bounding themselves - sometimes aggressively - against the outside world, are able to add a sense 
of value to the symbolic capital they possess.
222
  
Michel de Certeau defined himself, when pressed, as a historian,
223
 and arguably his most important 
personal work was historiographic. Buchanan,
224
 laments how de Certeau has become known in the 
Anglo-Saxon world almost exclusively through his book, The Practice of Everyday Life (accurately: 
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L’Invention du Quotidien), with subsequent translations of Volume 2 of The Practice of Everyday 
Life: Living and Cooking, The Capture of Speech and Culture in the Plural being presented as 
‘companion volumes’. However, it is this work which has been most influential (particularly via 
Jenkins) in the development of thinking on fandom, and therefore it is primarily with The Practice 
of Everyday Life which I will now be concerned.  
Compared with Bourdieu, de Certeau’s thinking in The Practice of Everyday Life provides a useful 
contrast. In simple terms, if Bourdieu is concerned with the big sociological question of how large 
scale social structure arises from individual agency, de Certeau’s main concern is with how – these 
great cultural systems having come into being – individual ‘users – commonly assumed to be 
passive and guided by established rules’,
225
 are able to survive within them. For de Certeau, this 
means being able to engage creatively, even subversively with the seemingly humdrum and private 
activities which make up ‘the quotidian’.  
De Certeau’s concern here is with how, by opportunism and cunning, ordinary people are able to 
score little victories against the ‘technocratic and scriptural’ strategies which seemingly dominate 
the world they live in, and in this way to make their lives liveable. In doing so, he distinguishes 
between two kinds of actor (or of action), There is the ‘strategy’, which ‘assumes a place which can 
be circumscribed as proper’
226
 and which, by virtue of having a proper place is able to ‘produce, 
tabulate, and impose these spaces’.
227
 And on the other hand there is the ‘tactic’ which, ‘because it 
does not have a place... depends on time’, and  ‘can only use, manipulate and divert these 
spaces’.
228
 De Certeau’s vision is about (yet again) the folk-heroic fable of the weak overcoming 
the strong. And he talks about low income French workers who practice the fine art of diverting 
office time and resources to little personal projects
229
 and about native South Americans who, 
without changing the laws and religious practices imposed on them by their colonial masters, made 
of them (using De Certeau’s own emphasis), something else.
230
 ‘A tactic is determined by the 
absence of power, just as a strategy is organised by the postulation of power’. But this does not 
mean that strategies lack very particular characteristics. By the very fact that they are able to control 
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space, they are able to effect ‘a triumph of place over time’ - which is to say that they are able to 
plan, systematically, for the future.
231
 But their very power makes them vulnerable to trickery. For 
the rationale of strength is such as to make mere feints impolitic.
232
  
One particularly influential working out of this scheme (the one that names Jenkins’ best known 
book on fandom) is de Certeau’s notion of reading as ‘poaching’. For de Certeau, writing seems to 
have inherently totalitatarian potential - a point which (perhaps underscored by his own Jesuit 
commitment) helps to underscore his concern with the Reformation project of fixing a supposedly 
corrupt society with recourse to immovable systems of written law. The end of this, he (rather 
prophetically) states is that a ‘scriptural system moves forward on its own; it becomes self-moving 
and technocratic; it transforms the subjects that controlled it into operators of the writing machine 
that orders and uses them: a cybernetic society’.
233
 Against this - and more specifically against the 
apparatus ‘mass artistic consumption’,
234
 he offers the tactical practices of readers as ‘poachers’ 
who bypass the literal meaning of the elite through the ‘transformation of the social relationships 
that overdetermine his relation to texts’.
235
 
De Certeau addresses and takes issue with Bourdieu on a number of points. He is suspicious of 
how, as he sees it, ‘even more clever than usual in this case, Bourdieu, outwitting the practices 
themselves in order to fix them in the labyrinthine developments of his own language, discerns in 
them several essential procedures’.
236
 His argument is that, while Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus 
appears to offer people agency within culture, it ultimately falls back on ‘the most traditionalist sort 
of ethnology’, in which culture is rendered ‘coherent’ and ‘unconcious’.
237
 And yet, it may 
nonetheless be argued that Bourdieu and de Certeau’s respective thinking can still be reconciled. As 
de Certeau himself observes, Bourdieu’s theory ultimately explains how culture perpetuates and 
structures itself, in spite of being produced, in the final analysis, by individual agency. By contrast, 
de Certeau’s thinking relates to another trend which is equally present: the way in which individuals 
gain by subtly subverting these structures, and by ‘colonising’ those dominant practices which have 
gained discursive supremacy. 
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As theorists have moved on from the the idea of subcultures as relatively rigidly defined groupings 
within a grand, Marxist scheme, so some have turned
238
 to the ‘neo-tribal’ sociology of Michel 
Maffesoli and, in particular as found in his book The Time of the Tribes.
239
 If Bourdieu is concerned 
with the grand sociological question (alongside other major contemporaries such as Giddens)
240
, of 
how apparently stable social structures emerge from individual level behaviour; and if de Certeau is 
concerned with the way in which individuals creatively take advantage of the possibilities offered 
by these structures in order to make living space for themselves, then Maffesoli’s central concern is 
the way in which living space is produced in the face of large scale structures, not by individuals, 
but by the spontaneous sociality of ad hoc groups. Maffesoli holds that the ‘mechanical’,
241
 ‘mass’ 
society of modernity has become ‘saturated’ - that it is no longer capable of further development. 
As a result, the political, bureaucratic power (‘pouvoir’) in his terminology, has become opposed 
(antithetically, rather than politically as such) to the raw, primal and, in a Bergsonian sense, vital
242
 
power of the mass of ordinary people, which, to contrast from formal pouvoir he calls puissance. 
The fragmentation of the modernist mass society, Maffesoli believes, has therefore meant not that 
people have become ever more individualistic, but rather that they have increasingly reassembled 
into ‘tribal’ groups formed ultimately around nothing more than basic ‘sociality’ - what Maffesoli 
calls the ‘glischmorphic’ tendency of humans.
243
 Given their primal nature, these groups tend to be 
bound internally by the aesthetic - a word which Maffesoli uses to mean ‘group feeling’,
244
 and by 
such basic features as secrecy toward the outside world, dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, and 
by the use of ‘masks’ - by which Maffesoli means, for example, particular requirements for dress 
and hair as seen in youth subcultures of certain kinds.
245
 But the very importance of ‘masks’ as 
indicators of membership means that the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in these groups are, 
in a sense, more performative than essential. In living ordinary modern life, a person can become 
caught up in a succession of different tribal groupings, moving from one to the next by changing 
masks, each one hanging together by aesthetic performativity rather than enduring structure. 
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Maffesoli is adamant about avoiding analytical distance, about getting caught up in the carnivalistic 
‘paroxysmal’ nature of his subject matter - so much so, in fact, that he is scornful even of 
Bourdieu’s efforts to critique this distance. For Maffesoli, Bourdieu’s ideas of ‘practical beliefs’ 
and ‘popular theoretical sense’, produce what he calls a ‘centrifugal perspective whose reference 
lies beyond the object with a more or less explicit judgemental attitude’.
246
 Nonetheless, in building 
his theory of the power of group feeling over formal institutional structures, Maffesoli has recourse 
on a number of occasions to one of the key ‘thinking tools’ of Bourdieu’s sociology: the ‘habitus’ - 
which, however he traces back to the hexis of Aristotle, rather than directly to Bourdieu’s work.
247
 
For Maffesoli, this concept serves as an alternative building block for sociality to what he sees as 
Enlightenment insistence on verbal communication as the sine qua non of social relationships. In 
his view, it may be equally important for people to do things together, to feel things together, or 
simply to share space - which, indeed, may in itself be real or emotional. This means that his non-
technocratic, non-scriptural tribal formations may not so much replace the larger social forms of 
modern society, as co-exist alongside them, or even within them. Indeed, Maffesoli’s central 
concern - like de Certeau’s is with ‘the quotidian’ - the experience of everyday life, which he seeks 
to valorise in the face of what he understands (some would say simplistically)
248
 as a collapsing 
modern order. In a sense, then, Maffesoli’s thought occupies a mid point between that of the two 
thinkers just discussed, in that it offers a roughly similar idea of tactical, impromptu and non-linear 
‘resistance’ to that of de Certeau - but at the level of the group, while stopping short of concerning 
itself (except in an oppositional sense) with a bigger notion of society. Indeed, in spite of 
Maffesoli’s determination to present his work in opposition to that of Bourdieu, as with de Certeau, 
it can be argued that he may be seen as offering a complementary, rather than contadictory 
perspective. If Bourdieu provides a set of ‘thinking tools’ for understanding the inner mechanics of 
subculture, Maffesoli offers an imaginative vocabulary for appreciating its gestalt.  
2.8 Conclusion: Making Use of Concepts of Fandom 
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Why, in a dissertation about jihadism on the Internet, ought we to care about Star Trek fans, coffee 
lovers, romance readers or the rave movement? Having set out an account of the evolution of 
thinking about fandom – the context in which it emerged, and some of the theoretical work which 
has most influenced it, it is now time to produce a synthesis, to (following De Certeau’s turn of 
phrase), make of this body of work something which will be useful in what follows.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I pointed out that critiques of Critical Theory approaches to 
resistance and hegemony are not exclusive to popular cultural studies. Nor indeed is the idea that 
consumer contexts may matter more in relation to potentially radicalising use of the Internet than 
the material itself. Indeed, this point has been very aptly made by de Koning, who argues that - with 
relation to concern about Muslim ‘radicalisation’ on the Internet: 
 The basic assumption seems to be that on the one hand the individual user on the Internet is completely free to 
 construct his or her own Islam (which leaves the possibilty that the Internet has its own structures of inequality 
 and exclusion and inclusion unaccounted for) while on the other hand the Internet seems so powerful that it 
 must lead to radicalisation (thereby seeeing the Internet user as a passive and powerless observer). 
At the same time, however, the language of ‘youth culture’, ‘transforming consumers into 
producers’,
249
 ‘marketing’ and ‘brand’
250
 have become increasingly fashionable in discussions of Al 
Qaida and Muslim ‘radicalisation’ generally. Olivier Roy, for instance, wrote in a 2008 report:  
...it is more productive to understand Al Qaida in Europe as a youth movement which shares many factors with 
other forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-left), or behavioural: the fascination with suicidal violence as 
illustrated by the paradigm of random shootings in schools.
251
   
Such ideas - if they are to be taken seriously - place the study of the phenomenon within the broader 
remit of cultural studies. Indeed, as the title of Jenkins’ recent book suggests, we are now living in a 
‘convergence culture’ in which old assumptions about news versus entertainment, politics versus 
lifestyle and mass versus popular media are being overturned.
252
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In making this transition, however, one might suggest that something has been lost. Emblematic of 
this is the way in which the role of grand theorist taken up by de Certeau in Textual Poachers is in 
Convergence Culture taken up by Pierre Levy, a thinker whose work, arguably, represents the 
antithesis of de Certeau’s project. Where de Certeau is commitedly anti-utopian, Levy speaks of his 
‘collective intelligence’ as an ‘achievable utopia.’
253
 Where de Certeau is fundamentally concerned 
with the individual ‘user’, Levy seeks to reject ‘the individualistic “cogito” of Descartes’ in favour 
of an ‘immanent social order’ built, politically around the ‘virtual agora’.
254
 Forced to grow up and 
take responsibility in an age of supposedly flattened media hierarchies, the witty double entendres 
of practice are replaced with a more literalistic interest in speech. The politics of form are replaced 
by the politics of content.  
For example, Fiske, in 1989, argued against ‘the familiar division of television’s programming into 
information and entertainment, which assumed that the former was ‘objective, true, educational and 
important’, while the latter was, ‘subjective, fictional, escapist, trivial and above all, harmful’.
255
 
For Fiske, it was necessary not for news to be less, but more ‘popular’ - presenting necessary public 
interest stories in such a way as to make people wish to incorporate them into their own cultural 
practice. And yet, when Fiske talks about how people consume news, he is still concerned with a 
‘struggle over meanings’ more, seemingly, than the question of what people do with those 
meanings. Similarly, when Jenkins turns his attention to the white suprematist computer game 
Ethnic Cleansing, it is to observe that – for many who play it – it will serve not to encourage, but to 
educate about racism.
256
 Or when Gray starts out by describing the case of a woman who avidly 
followed Canada’s parliament channel not in order to become informed about Canadian politics, but 
as a soap opera, he ends up referring to Marcus’ notion of ‘emotive citizenship’.
257
  
The reasons for this may perhaps be located in the optimistic political vision which informed the 
development of cultural studies. Because the original reason for studying the consumption of 
popular texts was in order to save some notion of progressive potential even in a culture which (for 
them) was utterly permeated by the hegemonic power of capitalist order, cultural studies scholars 
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have been arguably very ready to see consumers as rejecting (say) the ‘techno fetishism’ of Star 
Wars in favour of its emphasis on resistance to totalitarianism.258 But they have been less interested, 
for example, in how films such as This is England259 or American History X260 (which respectively 
deal with their protagonists’ disenchantment with white power movements in these two countries) 
have been expropriated by some far right sympathisers as nostalgic, romantic statements in favour  
of these groups. For the same reason, while it is possible to talk about how television fans seem 
only to be concerned with amassing ‘trivia’ and mobilising politically for the cause of more 
programming they like, they are actually advancing an underlying progressive agenda which is all 
about forming inclusive communities and challenging power structures the opposite argument 
seems rarely to be addressed in this literature. That is, that people who seem to be engaging in 
‘progressive’ politics through the media might actually be helping to reinforce the very structures 
they claim to oppose.
261
  
In building a theoretical approach for this dissertation then, I shall therefore seek to return to 
notions of a micropolitics of fandom rather than a larger concern of political media consumption 
across public spheres. And it is the lessons with regard to the nature and meaning of phenomena of 
this former kind that I intend to draw from the theoretical developments charted above. As 
heterogeneous as thinking about fandom and, in the wider sense, consumption culture has been, it 
has been unified by some core preoccupations. Fandom is far from passive. Fans’ consumption of 
media is very much something that they engage in, which they – to use a term frequently employed 
in the literature – invest in. Doing so is at once about acts of interpretation (finding things that 
‘matter’ to one in the text), and acts of distinction (determining what qualities about texts make 
them worthy of acquisition and display). Individual investment in the consumption of media 
provides a basis for collective investments, which further increase the value of the texts by making 
them the foundation for a community which, (perhaps Metcalfe’s law might be invoked at this 
point)
262
 is more than the sum of its parts. Within such a community, the texts which members have 
chosen to consume help to bound the set of cultural capital relations which give meaning and 
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‘value’ to community members’ actions – including their own creative productions. Moreover, by 
offering a basis for community which is ‘virtual’ in the sense of being premised neither on spatial 
nor on temporal contiguity it provides members with a distinct ‘world’ which they can enter and 
leave with relative freedom. By making such investments, fans are giving meanings to texts or 
objects which are unique for the fan community. They are therefore seemingly challenging the logic 
of industrial mass production. They are, in this sense, subversive, since they wrest meanings away 
from authors, producers and owners, to assert a kind of ownership of their own. But this does not 
mean that the texts from which fans draw meaning are simply arbitrary, that any one is as good as 
any other. On the contrary, fans are drawn to particular texts for particular reasons – for potentials 
which lie, albeit in a complex sense, in the text itself.  
In approaching jihadism on the Internet in this dissertation, then, I propose to take the template 
offered by the study of fandom - or, more broadly, of consumer culture - without necessarily taking 
on board its political teleology. In reading jihadism on the Internet as what it is (that is, media 
consumption and associated online subculture/s) rather than what it seems to be (part of a violent 
political movement, an extension of aspects of Islamic practice into cyberspace, and so on), I 
propose to do two things. Most simply, I hope to offer a way of understanding jihadism not through 
a priori assumptions, but on its own terms. Perhaps more ambitiously, by showing how jihadi 
engagement on the Internet may have a cultural logic of its own, I hope – tentatively – to construct 
a possible alternative reading of where it leads, and what its potential may be.  
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3. 
Netnography and Methodologies 
3.0 Ethnography and the Internet 
The Internet has been a natural home for fandom and consumption cultures. Rheingold, writing 
about ‘The Well’ – the bulletin board that formed the basis for his pioneering discussion of the 
Virtual Community, noted the crucial initiating role of the ‘Deadheads’ (fans of the rock band The 
Grateful Dead), who ‘came online and seemed to know instinctively how to use the system to create 
a community around themselves’.
263
 One reason for this may have been the extent to which fans 
had already been creating virtual communities for themselves before the commercial availability of 
the Internet, by means of travelling conventions, photocopied fanzines and mailing lists. Thus the 
latent potentialities or ‘affordances’ of the Internet
264
 were perhaps more rapidly recognised and 
exploited by such groups for whom they fulfilled an existing need.  
Indeed, since fan communities are almost by definition not defined in terms of spatial contiguity or 
uninterrupted temporal continuity, there is some question, in studying them on the Internet, where 
interest in online fan community as an object of empirical study ends, and where interest in the 
online traces left by the proceedings of fan communities as a methodology begins. Michael Jindra, 
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for example, in writing on the fan culture of Star Trek as a religious phenomenon remarked how, in 
researching this question: 
 I was introduced to a different kind of ‘community’, that of the computer on-line networks, and quickly 
 found there was no way I could follow all the talk on these nets, for the volume of the ST  Newsgroups 
 exceeded 1,000 messages every week.  
I found this ‘electronic’ ethnography to be quite unique. One could call it ‘participant-observation’, but 
without posting anything on the net, one remains only the total, anonymous observer. The observation is of a 
kind that is almost ideal if one wants to avoid the postmodern problem of the observer affecting the 
participants. It has its disadvantages in that one cannot always know who (gender, social position) is saying 
what.
265
  
Indeed, as research into media audiences and their communities has developed, so has Internet 
ethnography or, ‘netnography’ arguably emerged as one of its central methods. The purpose of this 
brief chapter will be to outline in what sense Internet research in general, and the type conducted for 
this dissertation in particular can be considered ‘ethnographic’, the particular concerns with 
conducting ‘ethnographic’ research in this instance and how, more practically, the data for this 
thesis was gathered and analysed.  
Ethnography as a method in general is described by John Savage as being applicable to ‘any small 
scale research that is carried out in everyday settings; uses several methods; evolves in design 
through the study; and focuses on the meaning of individuals’ actions and explanations rather than 
their quantification’.
266
 Traditionally, the ethnographic method has been particularly the preserve of 
social and cultural anthropology. Indeed, Bronislaw Malinowski - arguably the founder of modern 
social anthropology has said about the method:  
The field ethnographer has seriously and soberly to cover the full extent of the phenomena in each aspect of 
the tribal culture he studies, making no difference between what is drab, or ordinary, and what strikes him as 
astonishing and out of the way. At the same time, the  whole area of tribal culture in all its aspects has to be 
gone over in research. The consistency, the law and order which obtain within each aspect make also for 
joining them into one coherent whole. An ethnographer who sets out to study only religion, or only 
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technology, or only serial organisation cuts  out an artificial field for inquiry, and he will be seriously 
handicapped in his work.
267
  
Given Savage’s insistence on direct contact with human agents, it might be considered questionable 
as to whether Internet ethnography - particularly as described by Jindra above - is not a 
contradiction in terms. And indeed, as Kozinets observes: ‘with some notable exceptions, 
anthropologists, on the whole, have been rather slow and reluctant to follow social groups 
online’.
268
 This is in spite of the fact that, as Wilson and Peterson observe ‘anthropology is uniquely 
suited for the study of socioculturally situated online communication within a rapidly changing 
context’.
269
 One reason for this is the intense insistence of anthropologists on ‘being there’
270
 as a 
claim to ethnographic authority - even perhaps as the sole claim social and cultural anthropologists 
retain to distinguish themselves from sociology, a claim which threatens to be eroded when applied 
to the quasi-metaphorical, ‘telepresence’.
271
 This insistence is one which, for instance, Varisco 
argues to be increasingly out of step with reality in a world in which online interactions are taken 
for granted by many as a part of daily life, suggesting, indeed, that the anthropological notion of 
‘being there’ be modified to encompass a ‘virtual Dasein’
272
 - the Heideggerian notion of being in 
the world as a necessary precondition for anything, subjectively, to be.
273
  
Indeed, if the validity of ethnographic research conducted online may be questionable when viewed 
from the point of view of traditional ideas of what ethnography is, the seriousness of potential 
objections diminishes when considered in the light of the wider methodological debates and 
developments in ethnography over the past forty years. These have served both to widen the idea of 
what counts as ethnography and narrow the expectations of what it can achieve. To focus on two 
notable moments in this, first there is Geertz’s argument in Interpretation of Cultures that 
ethnography is a ‘symbolic-constructivist’ endeavour, in which a culture is read as a text,
274
 and 
translated by the anthropologist into an account which is, etymologically speaking, literally a 
‘fiction’
275
 (i.e, something made). This has shaken the idea of ethnography as a truly positivist 
endeavour and invited the notion, explored by Atkinson, for example, of ethnography as a literary 
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as much as a scientific endeavour.
276
 Moreover, the ‘literary turn’ implied in the idea of reading 
culture as text has perhaps helped to make possible its obverse: reading text as culture. Accordingly, 
a genre of ‘ethnographies’ have been produced of such subjects as Regency England as presented in 
the novels of Jane Austen,
277
 the New Testament,
278
 and classical Athens.
279
 
Second, the progressive disappearance of the ‘primitive’ societies which were once social 
anthropology’s central object of study,
280281
 combined with the increasing interconnectedness of all 
societies as a result of globalisation has made it increasingly difficult for anthropologists to believe 
in the ‘bounded’ sites within which founding figures such as Malinowski conducted their research. 
As a response to this, Marcus has called for a ‘multi sited’ ethnography of the ‘world system’ - a 
concept which seems implicitly to undercut the central tenet of ethnographic authority argued for by 
Geertz (following Gilbert Ryle)
282
 - that of the power to produce, through intensive participant 
observation - a ‘thick description’ of a particular culture.
283
 In place of this, Marcus advocates a 
number of different ways for an ethnographer to organise a study no longer bounded by 
geographical space.
284
 
Given the turn towards an ethnographic practice in which both the area of enquiry and the account 
produced of it are understood as objects constructed by the researcher, online ethnographic research 
can even be understood in some senses as a return (at least a ‘virtual’ return) to some of the 
characteristics of classic ethnography. Virtual communities may, for example, be neatly bounded by 
‘space’ (a particular Web forum, for example), and while their subcultural otherness may be 
affected (perhaps as the self expression through ‘rupture’ talked about by Hebdige)
285
, it may 
nonetheless be an otherness which is quite real to the researcher, not a theoretical, internal 
distance
286
 cultivated by the ethnographer who walks in cultures which are no longer ‘other’ in the 
sense that they were to, say, a Malinowski, an Evans Pritchard or a Margaret Meade.  
This seems to be the point made by Tom Boellstorff, whose Coming of Age in Second Life
287
 
deliberately echoes, through its title, the classic ethnographical work of Margaret Meade.
288
 Indeed, 
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Boellstorff’s central methodological argument seems to be that his work in this virtual world was 
not, in fact, ‘virtual’ ethnography at all, but rather, real ethnography in a place which, while 
represented by computer technology, is in effect a real place. In fact, Boellstorff’s justification of 
his research into a wholly virtual community actually seems to arise from his rejection of the call 
for a multi-sited ethnography, when he points out that he could not conduct simultaneous research 
into more than one virtual world, just as he could not conduct research in Thailand at the same time 
as conducting research in Indonesia.
289
 Consequently, Boellstorff is sceptical of the idea that the 
sole purpose of Internet ethnographies must be to shed light on practices in the ‘real world’. ‘Why,’ 
he asks, ‘is the punchline of so many studies of online culture identification with the offline? Why 
does it feel like a discovery that the online bleeds into the offline, and vice versa?’ As he points out: 
‘if Koreans and Swedes really do participate in Second Life differently, that difference will show up 
in Second Life itself.’
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Whether ‘netnography’ – which has become the normal term for ethnographic market research 
conducted on the Internet – is Internet ethnography to the level of purism avowed by Boellstorff is, 
perhaps, questionable. Sometimes, the approach as typically applied can be seen not so much as 
ethnography on the Internet (as typified by Boellstorff) or ethnography of the Internet (as, for 
example Miller and Slater’s ethnography of Internet use in Trinidad and Tobago,
291
 or Hine’s 
‘Virtual Ethnography’ of the Web itself) as ethnography by means of the Internet. For instance, in 
the study of online ‘coffee culture’ used by Kozinets to illustrate the methodology paper
292
 in which 
he first discussed his previously coined term
293
 ‘netnography’, it seems the author is concerned with 
using the Internet as a means to gain pragmatic insights into people’s attitudes towards a real world 
activity - consuming coffee. And yet, at the same time, his study is concerned not with finding out 
about coffee drinking habits per se (how much coffee is actually drunk, whether those in the forum 
he investigates actually possess the elaborate coffee making equipment the enthuse about) but rather 
about the beliefs and attitudes which members of the community express towards coffee and, 
further, the values they express through their enthusiasm for coffee.  
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As such, it can be argued that netnography - deriving, as it does, from the preoccupations of 
audience research and consumer research - cuts through many of the problems and ambiguities of 
the Internet as a ‘field’ for ethnographic research. Since it is premised (generally) on an object of 
enquiry which is defined by a ‘central consumption activity’,
294
 it naturally tends to treat the issue 
of siting more as a tactical concern than as a defining problem. In contrast to Azande, Portuguese 
Aristocrats or even American hoboes (who, in spite of their homelessness and migratory nature, 
were spatially defined by their being semi-permanently confined to certain parts of a city such as 
Chicago), Star Trek fans or coffee afficionados generally manifest themselves in real or cyberspace 
as, when and where it suits them.  
Thus, for netnography, it is a built-in assumption that one will be working not with spatial, but with 
conceptual ways of ordering things. The use of Internet search engines is taken for granted as a first 
stage of enquiry, and the selection of forums and similar ‘locations’ as places in which to conduct 
research is dictated purely by the usefulness of such locations as places in which the researcher can 
obtain appropriate cultural data for the subject under investigation. On the other hand, the very fact 
that netnography concerns itself with communities which are not spatially bounded (even in a 
virtual sense) means that it is potentially vulnerable to the question as to whether the Internet alone 
is an adequate site for exploring the objects of its enquiry. Kozinets draws a distinction here 
between ‘online communities’ (those which only exist on the Internet) and ‘communities online’ 
(those which exist in any case, but have an online dimension).
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At first, it might appear obvious that ‘(salafi) jihadism’, as a conceptual entity, extends beyond 
cyberspace. It is, however, of necessity, a secretive phenomenon which generally reveals itself 
publicly only through violent acts or, in some cases, their pre-emption. While, in certain contexts, 
there may be physical signs or places which are, in practice known to be indicative of ‘jihadism’,
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or strongholds of jihadi feelings, jihadism qua jihadism has no overt physical public space.
297
 In 
this sense, it may be argued that, as an overt, public activity distinct from general forms of ‘radical 
Islamism’ on the one hand, and actual engagement in violence on the other, jihadism as a global 
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culture is almost by definition confined to the Internet. This point (which raises significant 
empirical questions) will be explored at greater length in subsequent chapters.   
A more pragmatic response to the problem of whether netnographic research can adequately 
explore jihadi culture would be to turn the problem on its head. Given a highly secretive social 
phenomenon which only reveals itself publicly online, it can be argued that Internet research, 
whatever its drawbacks, is in fact one of the only means available to obtain authentic data. A close 
parallel of this is offered by Kozinets
298
 in the work of Campbell in using an online community to 
research attitudes to race in skinhead culture.
299
 
3.1 The Application of Netnographic Method to Covert Internet Research  
Another potential ambiguity in netnographic method - foreshadowed by the experience of Jindra - is 
the extent to which netnography entails active participation by the researcher. In   ‘The Field 
Behind the Screen’, it is unclear that Kozinets participated in the coffee discussion group he 
investigated beyond posting his final study to the group for comment. In his later, book length 
methodology, however, he insists that ‘netnography is an adaptation of “participant observational 
ethnographic procedures”’. At the same time, he notes that others, such as Langer and Beckman 
have argued the case for using netnography as a means of conducting ‘covert research on sensitive 
topics’.
300
  
This debate relates directly to the production of this dissertation, which was envisaged, along 
Langer and Beckman’s lines as a (quasi)
301
 ethnographic project. As such, these researchers’ 
modified approach to Kozinets’ list of steps for carrying out a netnography provided a basis for the 
research. Kozinets lists five methodological stages for a successful netnography, as follows:  
- Entrée  
- Data collection 
- Analysis and interpretation 
- Research ethics 
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- Member checks  
 
3.2 Entrée 
 
Beckman and Langer’s approach to ‘sensitive research’ differs from Kozinets’ at a number  
stages. Kozinets describes ‘entrée’ both as the process of formulating a research  
question, and as ‘to reach out, find and enter the field of a culture or  community’.  
Practically, he recommends, for instance, the use of search engines by the  
researcher in order to identity suitable forums for study. He also recommends, however,  
that the researcher find a way of introducing herself or himself to the community in  
question. For Beckman and Langer, entree was primarily understood as the process of formulating 
the research question, partly in view of the ‘sensitive’ nature of the research, which precluded 
interaction with community members, but also (perhaps) due to the researcher’s prior familiarity 
with the topic under investigation, which seemingly meant that they were able to immediately 
identify a suitable online ‘field’ in which to conduct the research.  
For this dissertation, identification of field was, in itself, an integral part of the research process. 
Rather than employ a prior definition of ‘jihadism’, a series of systematic web searches for various 
permutations of the word ‘jihadi’ were used to generate results which formed the initial point of 
entry for the analysis. This enquiry, which takes up the following chapter was used to produce both 
an understanding of (1), how ‘the jihadi’ is talked about in accessible Arabic language Web 
material, (2) where self-styled ‘jihadi’ items are located online, (3) how they are classified (both in 
terms of media form and semantic content), and (4) broadly what motifs and themes they contain.  
As such, it might be argued that, in a manner of speaking, this was not only a virtual, but also a 
‘multi-sited’ project - an ethnography (to paraphrase Marcus above) in/of a world system. Since 
‘the jihadi’ as an aspect of Arabic and Islamic culture, as a genre of media items, and as an online 
subculture in its own right
302
 does not properly occupy an single area of webspace, and since, 
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practically, Internet ‘jihadis’ freely traverse from online location to location so too the research for 
this dissertation took place in a number of different virtual places.   
3.3 Data collection 
Kozinets’ second stage of ‘data collection’ is intended to draw on both interactions by the 
researcher with forum members, and the qualitative analysis of content posted by members of the 
community under examination. With regard to data gathering, Kozinets draws not only on the 
ethnographic literature, but also the Grounded Theory tradition, as put forward by, notably, Glaser 
and Strauss,
303
 Strauss and Corbin
304
 and Charmaz.
305
 This is a qualitative research methodology 
which aims to reverse the normal scientific method by laying out systematic techniques for 
generating theory inductively from data. Kozinets uses in particular the Grounded Theory 
terminology of ‘saturation’.
306
 This refers to a situation in which a researcher finds that the 
conceptual codes which have emerged from qualitative data keep on being reinforced by analysis of 
new data without new codes emerging. In general, grounded theory sets out to produce, via a 
process of memo writing and coding, a framework of interlinked codes (axial codes, in Strauss and 
Corbin’s terminology)
307
 leading ultimately to a single ‘core category’ which forms the basis for the 
grounded theory. In the ‘constructivist’ grounded theory of Kathy Charmaz (which has been 
strongly criticised by Barney Glaser
308
 - one of the originators of the method), it is possible to speak 
of a ‘grounded theory ethnography’.
309
  
In this dissertation data was gathered in a three main ways, informed by the need to develop and test 
emerging hypotheses, and bounded more by conceptual than ‘spatial’ limitations.  
(1) Web searches  
Web searches were frequently used to locate content on specific issues (e.g. ‘media jihad’, ‘the 
intelligence penetration of Al-Hisbah forum’ and so on. However, searches were also used in a 
more systematic way to produce quantities of analyzable data. As already mentioned, the starting 
point for analysis was with the seemingly naïve question ‘what content gets described as “jihadi” in 
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Arabic?’ This question evolved through the course of a series of searches carried out between 
March 2008 and August 2010.  
 
The first series of searches – which occurred before the question had been properly formulated - 
was carried out simply with the broad aim of capturing content which might intuitively be 
understood as, in a purely subjective sense, ‘jihadi’, and therefore suitable for generating questions 
for further research.
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 Terms such as ‘jihadi websites’ (muw!qi‘ jih!diyya), ‘jihadi forum’ 
(muntada jih!d"), ‘jihadi preparation’, ‘media jihad’ (jih!d al-i‘l!m"), ‘supporters of jihad’ (an!!r 
al-jih!d), ‘lions of jihad’ (us#d al-jih!d) and the inanimate plural/feminine form of ‘jihadi’ itself (‘ 
jih!diyya). For each of these terms, the first 50-100 results were manually downloaded. Where sites 
provided a list of further ‘jihadi’ sites, links to these sites were followed manually in turn.  
 
In September 2009 a more formal series of searches was conducted, this time with the specific 
intention of investigating how the word ‘jihadi’ is used in Arabic material on the web. These 
searches were based on the various possible cognates of the word ‘jihadi’ in Arabic (jih!d", 
jih!diyya, jih!diyy#n, jih!diyy"n, jih!diyy!t as well as, for comparative purposes, muj!hid("n) and 
jih!d). The first aim of this exercise was simply to answer very simple questions about how the 
term was used in readily accessible Arabic material: is ‘jihadi’ material simply identical to material 
‘of jihad’? How far is ‘the jihadi’ relatable to political ideas about ‘jihadism’ in its various forms? 
Even more basically, does Arabic know ‘jihadi’ as a noun, or solely as an adjective? And if the 
former, when does ‘jihadi’ apply rather than mujahid?
 311
 
 
Based on the previous results, searches were also conducted (in June 2010) for particular types of 
‘jihadi’ item. These included ‘jihadi’ songs and books. Additionally, Google’s dedicated image 
search engine was used to locate images returned for various permutations of the word ‘jihadi’ as 
well as ‘jihad’. This produced a sample of five hundred ‘jihadi’ images. Thirdly, Google’s advanced 
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search facility was used to conduct a year-by-year search for the occurrence of various possible 
forms of the word ‘jihadi’ on the web since 1999 paired with those words which the previous search 
results had suggested to be common. The purpose of this exercise was not precise quantification; 
and indeed contrast between actual searches conducted in 2008 and 2009 and the number of hits 
returned for the same terms retrospectively indicated the unreliability of this method. Rather, the 
purpose was to gain some broad indication of the validity of apparent frequency relationships 
encountered in previous searches. In particular, the search seemed to confirm that the most common 
words associated with the word ‘jihadi’ in Arabic are consistently ‘operation’ and ‘nashid’.
312
  
 
(2) Jihadi literature 
While there has been increasing interest in ‘stealing Al Qaida’s playbook’ by exploring the wealth 
of ‘jihadi’ literature available on strategic and ideological topics, there is – as commented on in the 
first chapter – a tendency to read such work literally with a view to understanding the ‘strategy’ 
which is presumed to govern the global jihad movement’s activities. Less common has been to read 
this literature to obtain an ethnographic understanding of the ‘jihadi current’ as a subcultural 
phenomenon in its own right. As a result, it may be suggested that certain works have been 
overlooked (for example, Abu ‘Amru Al-Qa‘idi’s A Course in the Art of Recruitment, which I draw 
on quite heavily, has been derided for its supposed limitations as an actual recruitment course 
without consideration of the interesting things it reveals about the writer’s background assumptions 
on society and the natures of different Islamic movements, and the meaning of jihadi engagement 
online). This material was obtained from various online sources: jihadi forum posts, Web searches 
and sites such as Scribd and Archive.org.  
(3) ‘Webservation’ 
The third source of information derived from the process of what Daniel Varisco, in a paper cited 
earlier in this chapter, calls (participant) ‘webservation’ – that is, virtual presence (perhaps 
‘telepresence’) in online locations. To some extent this entailed observing the essential features in 
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terms of organisation, presentation and organisational functioning of, specifically, ‘jihadi’ forums. 
In this sense, this form of data gathering was genuinely more akin to ‘observation’ in real life than 
to textual analysis. Necessarily, however, passive observation of forums readily led into the 
acquisition and analysis of text. For this purpose, Firefox’s ‘Scrapbook’ add on was used. This is an 
‘offline browser’ programme which automatically downloads linked files, preserving the original 
link structure. In this way, large sections of forums were obtained for later analysis. A particular use 
of this programme for this dissertation was to download the complete posting records of selected 
forum members, who could then be (metaphorically) followed, in order to obtain a relatively 
naturalistic, in a sense ‘longitudinal’ insight into the experience of participation in a forum 
community. This was particularly used in the case of the very large forum ‘muslm.net’ which is 
discussed in chapter 7. Here the experience of engagement as a ‘jihadi’ in this forum was viewed 
through the case of a particular member, ‘al-Hatf2’. This principle was extended in the instance of a 
small ‘jihadi’ forum Al-Sayf. This forum was downloaded in its entirety and qualitatitively coded 
post by post.
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3.4 Analysis and Interpretation  
The method by which data was analysed varied. Some data (for example, the posts on Al-Sayf 
forum or much of the content obtained through the initial web searches) was coded using the 
emergent, qualitative approach recommended by grounded theory,
 
 particularly in its Straussian 
variant.
314
 
 
On other occasions (for example in drawing on books written by jihadi authors) a more 
literary ‘immersive’ method was adopted.
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  Since the material collected was in Arabic - a second 
language for the researcher - texts deemed important were translated fully into English, in order to 
ensure complete comprehension. All translations were carried out by the researcher.
316
 Other 
material was translated partially or read in Arabic.  
Translation is, of course, a highly contentious and much theorised endeavour.
317
 ‘Skopos’ theory in 
translation studies argues that a translation must vary depending on what purpose it is intended for - 
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for example, a translation of a text intended to be enjoyed as literature will be translated differently 
to one intended to be used for legal purposes.
318
 Drawing on the philosopher Alasdair McIntyre, 
Chesterman argues that translation is a practice which necessarily entails an engagement with 
history and tradition.
319
 Generally, literal accuracy was the emphasis in this dissertation even to the 
extent that, on some occasions, I have preferred my own direct translation certain expressions of 
Arabic texts to the looser and more idiomatic expressions in jihadi translations of the same 
document. Where a point turns on a specific word or phrase in Arabic, the original is given (see 
note on transliteration at the beginning of the dissertation).  
While translation necessarily adds another point of potential failure in interpretation, it can be 
argued that in some ways it was an advantage, rather than a liability. The very act of translation 
necessarily requires a process of ‘text analysis’
320
 The intensity of the translation process therefore 
added, in practice, another stage to the process of analysis, as the need to reproduce exact meanings 
- sometimes for very specific and technical terms - necessarily forced the process of categorisation 
and interpretation.  Indeed, in so far as content analysis entails engaging with a ‘content’ which is 
conveyed by, but not dependent on the precise linguistic form of the text by which it is conveyed,
321
 
it might be argued that qualitative content analysis is already in itself either a form of ‘intralingual’ 
translation or (when it transfers syntactical sentences into diagrammatic schemes), a form of 
‘intersemiotic’ translation.
322
 
The process of ‘emergent coding’ is central, in general, to techniques of qualitative content 
analysis.
323
 Shaw
324
 argues that this ‘emergence’ is the outcome of a necessary identification by the 
researcher of ‘latent’ themes, which in turn give meaning to the ‘manifest content’ of the text. As 
such, this process is a necessary underpinning to almost all social research into semantic content - 
ultimately including quantitative methods. At the same time, it is a difficult one to fully rationalise, 
being premised on an intuitive ability for ‘sensing themes’,
325
 or what Glaser and Strauss call 
‘theoretical sensitivity’,
326
 which can come only through the continual, sometimes bruising 
confrontation between the researcher and his or her data.  
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A deeper methodological consideration which - because it shall be easier to discuss in the context of 
the research actually having presented - shall be discussed more properly in the concluding chapter 
is also worth signposting at this point. Given that this thesis entails making claims about latent 
motications for why those who engage with jihadism on the Internet may act as they do which - 
necessarily - would likely be rejected by these people themselves, it might be objected that I have 
violated a key ethnographic principle of privileging subjective meanings of the people studied over 
prior theoretical assumptions.
327
 While I cannot altogether exonerate myself from this accusation, I 
have done my utmost to support my arguments with claims made directly be ‘jihadi’ sources, and at 
all times to take seriously indigenous meanings (even if I have not always accepted them at face 
value).  
3.5 Research Ethics 
Sensitive netnographic research of the sort recommended by Beckman and Langer necessarily 
breaks the normal ethical rules of ethnography in so far as it entails the researcher carrying out 
covert research without informing those who are under examination. Conducting such research in 
the context of what was in the recent past framed as a ‘war on terror’ calls for still greater 
sensitivity on the part of the researcher. Boellstorff is at pains to differentiate his own online 
ethnographic research from the ‘culture at a distance’ approach used by anthropologists such as 
Ruth Benedict in order to attempt to gain some insight into the cultures of enemies during the 
Second World War.
328
 But while Benedict’s work may now have become a byword for 
compromised ethnographic practice, it was not always so, and in recent years there has been more 
interest in her legacy.
329
  
Indeed, rather like the uncomfortable fact that the supposedly anti-authority, free for all medium of 
the Internet came into being largely under the aegis of the US military, it is perhaps worth drawing 
attention to the extent to which the approaches and methods of cultural studies were actually pre-
empted by the ‘culture at a distance’ approach created by Benedict, Mead and others on behalf of 
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the US Office of Naval Research. In fact, William Beeman, in introducing the new edition of Mead 
and Métraux’s The Study of Culture at a Distance
330
 actually contrasts the systematic 
methodological emphasis of the University of Columbia teams conducting this research to critiques 
of cultural studies as overly theoretical and paying inadequate attention to methodology.  
In drawing this parallel, it seems hard to escape what has been called ‘the cultural turn in studying 
war’
331
  as recently epitomised, perhaps, in works such as Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla.
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On the one hand, some anthropologists (perhaps particularly those involved in the US’s ‘Human 
Terrain System’) have argued that the application of anthropological knowledge has great potential 
to make war more humane, by avoiding needless spirals of suffering and recrimination resulting 
from misunderstandings between occupying forces and civilian populations.
333
 For others, however, 
the use of anthropological knowledge in the service of military ends can be seen as nothing more 
than and attempt ‘to fill the culture “slot”, providing a general sense of the enemy culture so that 
military operations can be more effectively carried out and foreign policy objectives realised’.
334
 
Behind this, of course, lies a long historical debate about the colonial ends served by the research of 
such foundational figures in anthropology as E. Evans Pritchard, and the extent to which not only 
the ethical justifiability of such people’s work, but also its accuracy may have been compromised 
thereby.
335
  
To some extent the issues raised in the rancorous anthropological debate on the legitimacy of 
engaging in ‘human terrain mapping’ are somewhat different from those that are raised by the 
prospect of attempting to study jihadism on the Internet. First, since the intention is not to study, a 
broad, supposed unit of ‘culture’ such as, say, ‘Pashtuns,’ or ‘Iraqis’,
336
 the idea that an innocent 
civilian population is being exploited would seem to be less convincing. This is not to say, of 
course, that anyone who engages with jihadi content on the Internet is a criminal who automatically 
forfeits his right to fair treatment as an object of research (even criminals retain such a right, after 
all). But it does mean that one is not exploiting a population who have, after all, hardly chosen to 
belong to their particular cultural grouping, but rather a deliberate, performative set of social actions 
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which are productive of an antagonistic attitude towards outsiders. One cannot abuse trust, it might 
be suggested, where there is of necessity no possibility of trust to begin with. There is a more 
interesting point here, which relates to matters that will be discussed in later chapters. ‘Jihadis’ on 
the Internet are perfectly well aware that their forums are not secure, that they include, both as 
observers and as participants, people from intelligence agencies and the like. However, they 
continue to frequent jihadi online communities because – so it seems – that they enjoy the feeling of 
sociality - the ‘jihadi ambience’ of such places. As such, the self declaration of a person to be 
anything other than a jihadi is far more disruptive, far more injurious to the experience of 
participants in this situation than is covert viewing by non jihadi others which is taken for granted 
as an ill that must be endured.  
Secondly, of course, in carrying out the research for this dissertation, there was neither the need nor 
the possibility of being ‘embedded’ in a military project. While the position is not taken in this 
dissertation that it is necessarily and automatically inappropriate for any social research into issues 
of this sort to be directed towards helping to produce more intelligent, effective, and just 
government policy, there was no sense in which the researcher owed anything to any other power 
for his access to the data that was used.  
For Beckman and Langer, the justifications for breaching the normal rules of ethnographic 
procedure in online research are that, first, the data being gathered are in any case publicly available 
texts rather than deliberately private communications; second, the data could not be obtained in 
other ways; third, the study is being conducted in the interests of a public good, and is not being 
conducted in to the detriment of those being studied.  
This study appeals to similar ethical justifications. At no point does it draw on information that 
cannot be obtained freely and openly, the only possible exception being data on the registration 
procedures of jihadi forums. It is worth noting that all members of such forums assume nicknames, 
and that registration on the forums entered is freely open to anyone without any need for deception 
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other than this. It was judged that given the nature of these forums, not registering under a 
nickname would have had ethical implications greater than using one would have done. Even so, 
the data in question - given, after all, that it pertained to forums on the Internet, clearly could not 
have been obtained other than from forums on the Internet. From a public interest point of view, the 
value of gaining some insight into the online culture of people who may pose a risk of conducting 
acts of political violence is clearly significant. But the study was not conducted with a view to 
advising on how best to eliminate a supposedly threatening jihadi presence on the Internet, and still 
less with a view to gaining information of use for law enforcement purposes against people on or 
off the Internet. No jihadis were harmed in the making of this dissertation.  
A final question relating to the legitimacy of the research conducted for this dissertation relates to 
its legality. It is illegal in the UK, under section 2 of the 2006 Terrorism Act, to disseminate 
‘terrorist publications’. According to the Act: 
 A publication is a terrorist publication, in relation to conduct falling within subsection (2), if matter 
 contained in it is likely— 
 
 (a) to be understood, by some or all of the persons to whom it is or may become available as a 
 consequence of that conduct, as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to  the 
 commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; or 
  
(b) to be useful in the commission or preparation of such acts and to be understood, by some or all of those 
persons, as contained in the publication, or made available to them, wholly or mainly for the purpose of being 
so useful to them.
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In the course of the research conducted for this dissertation, some material that might be judged to 
fall into this category was, inevitably, obtained. However, it is not sufficient to be guilty under this 
act merely to possess such content. Rather, one must also be judged to possess it for the purpose of 
disseminating it. Even then, it must further be judged that the one who does so: 
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a.  intends an effect of his conduct to be a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; 
b. he intends an effect of his conduct to be the provision of assistance in the commission or preparation of such 
acts; or 
c. he is reckless as to whether his conduct has an effect mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).
338
 
 
None of the material gathered for in the course of the research was made available to anyone else.  
 
3.6 Complicity?  
 
There is a conceptual issue in using an ethnographic approach to understand jihadis which is also, 
potentially an ethical issue of the opposite kind to most of those discussed above. When audience 
researchers started looking ethnographically at fan communities they were accused by some of 
becoming too complicit in their subject matter. Jenkins  and Tulloch observe
339
 how Tania 
Modleski has argued that enthographic fan researchers ‘may unwittingly wind up writing apologias 
for mass culture and embracing its ideology’. In a similar vein, Walter Laqueur complains that the 
rise of casualty rates in terrorist attacks may be the outcome of an insistence on explaining evil, 
rather than condemning it.  
 
As a critique of the ethnographic approach in general, this is (as Jenkins and Tulloch go on to point 
out), misplaced.
340
 Ethnography is not about uncritically accepting the world view of those studied, 
but rather about developing the skill of moving between ‘critical distance’ and mutual 
knowledge’.
341
 As Boellstorff observes, cultural relativism is about methodology, not necessarily 
about the conclusions that one draws. As he vividly illustrates, in the hypothetical example of the 
tribe who slay every third born child, it still makes sense to try to see the cultural logic that makes 
this acceptable, even if one will never come to accept it oneself.
342
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But indeed it is possible, out of such assertions, to make a more proactive case both for 
ethnographic understanding of this subject in general, and the validity even of the sorts of  limited, 
covert approach it necessitates employing. A little ethnography is better than none at all. For even if 
the types of methods implied in studying jihadism on the Internet, (which ultimately come down, as 
Kozinets puts it, to the ‘coding exercise’ of analysing text, image and moving image) are in the end 
nothing more than ‘culture at a distance’, yet even so, one might argue that even the sort of 
compromised, second-hand insight which Mead, Benedict and their team were capable of achieving 
remains sorely lacking in its equivalent exercises today.  
 
For the sake of comparison, let us consider on the one hand the work of Reid, Salem and Chen in 
analysing the content of jihadi extremist groups’ videos with that of a member of the University of 
Columbia ‘culture at a distance’ team on the contents of Nazi propaganda film. In the former case, 
the concern is almost exclusively with issues such as audience and ‘groups’ communication 
approaches’, with actual discussion of the thematics of the visual content itself limited to comments 
such as that: ‘The majority of the videos fell into the group-oriented violent acts [category], which 
include documentary, beheadings, and hostage takings. This finding supports the Western media 
descriptions of extremist groups’ videos as “callous” and “insensitive” for displaying brutal attacks 
that are morally repulsive.’
343
 By contrast, an anthropological researcher such as Gregory Bateson 
approached a film like Hitlerjunge Quex from the perspective not simply of trying to understand 
what media effect the propagandist behind the film was trying to achieve, but of trying to decode 
the symbolic language of the work in order to understand deeper tensions within Nazi and, by 
extension, wartime German culture. Thus, for instance, in this film’s portrayal of licentious, 
animalistic disorderly communists, as opposed to the almost ‘empty’ life of clean living, 
strenuously disciplined Nazi youth, Bateson sought to read a statement about the Nazis’ own fears 
of what they might become.
344
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As ‘overdetermined’ as Bateson’s analysis may perhaps be, the contrast in terms of ambition 
between his work and that of Reid is striking. If anthropologists in the context of a real war, facing 
a real existential threat, with far less access to data than their 21st century successors were capable 
of making such comparatively nuanced and penetrating enquiries, then it seems that the limitations 
to gaining access to a phenomenon such as the culture of jihadism on the Internet - significant 
though they may be - can hardly be taken as an excuse.  
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4. 
 
In Search of ‘the Jihadi’ 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
At the outset of this dissertation, I used the word ‘jihadism’ to describe my object of study. In using 
this word, my intention was not to present some monolithic notion of Islam-flavoured militancy. 
Rather, I hoped to foreshadow a problematic. Indeed, I used the word as much to avoid terms such 
as ‘Al Qaida’, ‘Islamic terrorism’, ‘radical Islamism’ on the one hand, and ‘jihad’, or simply ‘Islam’ 
on the other. What I wanted to stake out was a space for enquiry which was neither ‘terrorist’ in the 
sense of having clear affiliation to a particular violent actor, nor unproblematically ‘Islamic’ in the 
sense of being specifically explicable with reference to Islam, whether as theology, or as ‘cultural 
system’.  
 
Having demarcated things in this way, it is now time to consider how this conceptual space can be 
justified, and what it is that we may find within it. The main problem here would seem to be that the 
terms of the enquiry are paradoxical. Having spoken earlier of looking for a more ‘emic’ approach, 
am I not – in looking for something called ‘jihadism’ – imposing my own conceptual boundaries 
from above?  
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Adopting the perspective of fandom, and, methodologically, of ‘netnography’ offers, I propose, a 
solution to this, by focusing the discussion around the activity of consumption. For Kozinets, who 
claims to have originated the term, the ‘culture of consumption’ is first and foremost about the 
‘material culture’ of a particular consumption activity and only secondarily about the ‘tribes’ that it 
forms.
345
 Thus the idea of the ‘culture of consumption’ effectively turns the problem of bounding 
the object of enquiry on its head. Rather than trying to determine how we define ‘jihadism’ or ‘a 
jihadi’ on the Internet, and then considering how jihadism expresses itself, it forces us to begin with 
content. We must ask first, ‘what constitutes “jihadi” content?’ Only then can we move on to 
consider what sorts of putatively ‘jihadi’ consumption behaviours occur in relation to this content.  
 
Surprisingly, the question ‘what is jihadi content?’ is one that still does not seem to have been 
explored in so many words. There are, of course, numerous studies of jihadism, or ‘jihadi’ 
phenomena on the Internet, a number of which have already been referred to. But all of these appear 
to be based on prior assumptions about what the term means. Even Bunt, who extensively discusses 
the sort of material which refers to itself as ‘jihadi’, seems to be applying his own definition.
346
   
 
In this chapter, I shall consider two questions: how the word ‘jihadi’ is used in Arabic Web content, 
and what it means for content to describe itself as ‘jihadi’. The aim is not, of course, to produce an 
exhaustive understanding of either of these. Rather, the purpose is to produce an exploratory study 
which, it is to be hoped, will adequately demonstrate that it is possible, working up from the basis 
of content which self-identifies as ‘jihadi’ to reconstruct a notion of online ‘jihadism’ which 
adequately resembles conceptions of ‘jihadism’ and ‘salafi-jihadism’ put forward in existing 
academic typologies.  
 
4.1 Jihad, Jihadism and ‘the Jihadi’  
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One possible reason why scholars have not tended explicitly to base their discussions of online 
‘jihadi’ phenomena on that which describes itself as ‘jihadi’ is an unwillingness to concede to 
‘jihadists’ the meaning of the word ‘jihad’ – from which the form ‘jihadi’ seems an obvious and 
direct derivation. Many eminent scholars have, of course, considered the question of how the word 
jihad has been used in medieval and modern Islamic history,
 347
 and among contemporary 
Muslims.
348
  Others, on the other hand, have looked at ‘jihadism’ as a contemporary political 
phenomenon which may or may not have much to do with traditional understandings of the word. 
For these, ‘jihadism’ is seen as a ‘mental shortcut’ which ‘helps heuristically to deal with a difficult 
subject’,
349
 not a phenomenon which is necessarily meaningful for the subjects concerned.   
 
With regard to the latter, the definitional debate has thus largely turned on the question of how best 
to typologise a wider set of political Islamic phenomena. Wiktorowicz, influentially, sees ‘jihadis’ 
as emerging from the salafi movement, particularly in Saudi Arabia, within which they are to be 
contrasted with quietist ‘purists’ (who focus on personal and community piety, foregoing political 
engagement) and activist ‘politicos’, who engage in peaceful types of party politics within existing 
state structures.
350
 This division is only slightly modified in the work of Hegghammer and 
Lacroix,
351
 for whom there is a contrast to be drawn between properly ‘jihadi’ salafism, which is 
politically focused and (in the Saudi context) predominantly concerned with global issues and 
extreme, millenarian ‘reformism’ such as that of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, whose followers carried out 
an armed occupation of the Haram al-Sharif in Mecca. In a ‘meta-review’ of the literature on 
jihadism, Armborst argues that jihadism can be defined with reference to ten ‘criteria’ arising from 
the distinct spheres of ‘jihad (military conflict)’, ‘jihad (dogmatic)’ and ‘Islamic activism’.
352
 
 
One point agreed on unanimously is the essential novelty of the term. For Kramer, (a point agreed 
on by Roy), before 2001, ‘use of jihadism [as a term] was largely confined to the Indian and 
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Pakistani media.’
353
 And indeed, as recently as 2007, the notion of there being a distinctive 
ideological phenomenon of ‘jihadism’ was suspect enough for Sedgwick to write: 
 
A mujahid is not necessarily the same as a “jihadist”, although it is sometimes used... to mean mujahid. For 
many, a “jihadist” is not just a participant in a jihad, but a believer in “Jihadism”.  I am not myself convinced 
that “Jihadism”, which is often taken to mean the practice of jihad as an end in itself, actually exists.
354
  
  
And yet, there seems to remain a certain doubt that notions of ‘jihadism’ or the ‘jihadist’ may even 
so retain a certain grain of apparent authenticity, by virtue of incorporating the word ‘jihad’. 
Brachman and McCants,
 355
 for instance, propose that Western policy discourse use instead the term 
‘Qutbi’, which they believe to reflect a distinctive emphasis on the thinking of Sayyid Qutb that 
puts jihadis theologically at odds with core salafi thinkers such as Nasir al-Din al-Albani.
356
  Even 
so, Brachman still concurs on the novelty of the phenomenon. ‘As staggering as it may seem’, he 
observes, ‘the global jihadist movement in its current incarnation stepped out of its adoloscence and 
into adulthood remarkably recently (circa 2003)’.
357
  
 
4.2 Problems in the Meaning of ‘Jihadi’ 
 
Despite having been generally ignored in the gap between ‘jihad’ as a preoccupation for religious 
studies, and ‘jihadism’ as a concern for political science, it may be that the question of what is 
‘jihadi’ is a little more complex than it might seem. Firstly, if we take ‘jihadi’ in its most obvious 
linguistic sense as simply meaning ‘pertaining to jihad’, we are still left with the question of 
whether the sum total of ‘jihadi’ things actually reduces to the concept of ‘jihad’ itself. To provide 
an analogy, an ardent Christian might concede that a room decked out with boughs of holly, a 
Christmas tree, brightly wrapped presents, tinsel and sprigs of mistletoe does indeed look 
‘Christmassy’, but might still insist that the ‘true meaning of Christmas’ has been lost. In the same 
way, then, we might imagine a pious Muslim who would agree that a picture of Abu Mus‘ab Al-
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Zarqawi with an AK47 superimposed on the Dome of the Rock is ‘jihadi’, while at the same time 
insisting that Al-Zarqawi was a murdering thug whose actions had nothing to do with the ‘true 
meaning’ of jih!d. To take the same notional example a little further, let us suppose that the same 
hypothetical Muslim were shown two further images – one of Qassami militants in the context of 
Operation Cast Lead, and a second of a person in a library reading a volume of Sahih Bukhari.  This 
person might, perhaps, be more immediately ready to identify the former as ‘jihadi’ than the latter. 
But this would not necessarily imply that he understood ‘jihad by the sword’ to be more valid than 
‘jihad by scholarship’. It could simply be that the word ‘jihadi’, in its practical usage, derives from 
a culturally constructed prototype
358
 of ‘the jihadi’ which is does not relate in any simple way to the 
formal, religious definition of the word ‘jihad’.  
 
On the other hand it is worth considering whether – linguistically speaking – there may be more to 
the form ‘jihadi’ than meets the eye. In form, ‘jihadi’ is a ni%ba or ‘gentilic’: part of a subset of 
Arabic substantives which normally function as adjectives of ‘membership of a class’. Badawi, 
Carter and Gully
359
 observe that in early classical Arabic (including, therefore, in the language of 
the Quran) the form was used in relation to tribes or locations (eg, Makk&, for an inhabitant of 
Mecca, or Qur!sh& for a member of Muhammad’s tribe, Quraysh). In later classical Arabic, the 
category was expanded to apply to classes in general such as Isl!m& (Islamic). The practice of 
producing such adjectives ‘as the need arises’, however, did not appear until modern times. 
Moreover, while adjectives in Arabic are not rigidly distinguished by form from nouns, the ni%ba 
form is only rarely used in the first instance as a noun. Grammatically, this can happen in two ways. 
First, the mechanics of Arabic syntax are such that the ni%ba form can simply be used in the sense 
of a noun for a particular thing with that attribute. So just as one can talk about ‘al-kab&r’ – ‘the big 
one’ so too one can, in principle, talk about al-jih!d& – ‘the jihadi one’. Secondly, the ni%ba form is 
also used to make  abstract nouns in the sense of English ‘ism’. This is done using the 
feminine/inanimate plural ending, t! marb"#a. So ‘jihadism’ in Arabic translates as ‘al-jih!diyya’, 
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which would also be the form of the word used to refer to a singular feminine person or an 
inanimate plural as being ‘jihadi’.  
 
An apparent implication of these purely morphological points is that whereas in English the endings 
on ‘jihadism’ or ‘jihadist’ clearly mark these terms out as foreign from mujahid or jihad, the 
transition is potentially more nuanced in the Arabic. Simply put, the Arabic for ‘jihadist’ is also 
‘jihadi’. But the Arabic word ‘jihadi’ does not necessarily mean the same as ‘jihadist’. Hence, in 
referring to a violent operation as ‘jihadi’ one is not automatically saying that it is ‘an operation 
inspired by a contemporary political ideology which claims to represent Islam’. But, on the other 
hand, neither is one necessarily saying ‘here is a clear example of the true jih!d f& sab&l Allah’. The 
word seems, grammatically, to hover somewhere in between the two.  
 
4.2 Searching for ‘the Jihadi’ 
 
Let us turn to the first question first. How is the word ‘jihadi’ used in Arabic Web content? The 
most obvious (and probably unsurprising) distinction to be made here is between the set of senses 
given to the term by content such as mainstream news articles which generally talk about 
distinctively jihadi phenomena, and content (mainly posted to Web forums) which advertises jihadi 
texts.  So, for example, a news story such as ‘spread of the salafi jihadi group in Morocco’ seems to 
imply that ‘salafi jihadism’ is a distinctive ideology followed by a certain group.
360
 On the other 
hand, a forum post advertising ‘wonderful jihadi nashids’
361
 (apart of course from its positive 
assessment of the content), apparently uses the term to designate a particular genre of nashid, rather 
than a nashid with a specifically partisan outlook. The difference seems analogous to that between 
talking about a ‘Christian hymn’ (as opposed to a hymn from some other religion) and a ‘Christmas 
hymn’ (as opposed to one for Easter or the Harvest Festival).   
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This leads naturally to a second – also obvious – distinction: that is, between instances in which a 
text refers to something ‘jihadi’ from the standpoint of neutrality or even opposition, and instances 
in which a text refers approvingly to something ‘jihadi’. For example, ‘Al Qaida loses support of 
jihadi groups in the Arabic world’
362
 – a story by the US CENTCOM sponsored website Al-
Shorfa
363
 seems implicitly to take a different stance in relation to the ‘jihadi groups’ it talks about 
than does ‘the military camp of jihadi groups’
364
 on the ‘jihadi’ forum Al-Ma‘arik Al-Salafiyya. And 
yet even at this point, it is possible to appreciate a blurring of the line between ‘jihadi as jihadism’ 
and ‘jihadi as jihad’. Are the ‘jihadi groups’ referred to by Al-Ma‘arik Al-Salafiyya ‘jihadi’ simply 
because they are doing jihad? Or is it also because they have a particular stance in relation to the 
matter of jihad? 
 
Drawing on the search results discussed in the previous chapter, we can construct the following 
tables of usages of the term ‘jihadi’ both from ostensibly ‘jihadi’ and non-‘jihadi’ standpoints.  
 
Ostensibly Neutral/Opposed 
As System of 
Thought 
As Individual Status As Social Entity As Practice 
jihadism jihadis movements violence 
salafi-jihadism salafi-jihadis supporters of work 
thought  groups project 
revisions  leaders operations 
fatwa  forums journey 
  poetry  websites  
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As System of 
Thought 
As Individual Status As Social Entity As Practice 
  current  
 
Pro ‘Jihadi’  
 
As Commitment As Individual Status As Social Entity As Practice 
manhaj ‘a’ jihadi  groups operation 
beacon as online nickname 
element 
units march  
way as ‘laqab’ leader(ship) work 
star as characteristic (jihadi 
woman, jihadi hacker)  
movement(s)  battle  
‘my jihad’   current mission 
dreams  announcements  excursion 
biography  foundations expedition 
  corporations assistance  
  history  
 
While there are certainly differences between what gets labeled as ‘jihadi’ in these two instances, 
there are also commonalities. Both those uses of ‘jihadi’ in an apparently supportive and in a non-
supportive context apply the term in such a way as to suggest both organized social groupings (the 
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‘jihadi’ group, movement, current) and a programme of violent activity which, unsurprisingly, takes 
on a more military connotation in supportive mentions: ‘violence, operation, battle, mission’.  
 
Perhaps more surprisingly, both contexts seem to speak of people as ‘jihadi’. This, however, is done 
in a more nuanced way in the second set of contexts than the first. Whereas mainstream media 
sources clearly talk about people as ‘jihadis’, situations in which a person is described as a jihadi in 
the second are a little more ambiguous. In online nicknames such as ‘veiled jihadi’, or phrases such 
as ‘yes, I am a jihadi, and I do not deny it’
365
, there may be some sense of a rebellious and self-
conscious adoption of a sobriquet originally bestowed by the ‘other’. Alternatively, where the term 
forms part of a real person’s nom de guerre – as in ‘Abu Anas al-Jihadi’, it retains an adjectival 
sense.  
 
Indeed, the fact that ‘jihadi’ as a noun for a person committed to jihadism remains relatively 
unusual in Arabic generally, and particularly unusual in pro-jihadi contexts can be demonstrated by 
the fact that the animate plural forms of ‘jihadi’ (jih!d&y"n, jih!d&y&n) return notably fewer results 
than the singular and inanimate plural forms.
366
 In the 2009 search (as mentioned above), these 
produced 5,700 and 11,300 results respectively compared to 274,000 hits for ‘jihadi’ and 572,000 
for ‘jihadiyya’. When this was repeated in 2010, the same terms produced rather more results: 
approximately 18,000 for the first, and 45,600 for the second. But these were still many fewer (just 
over 6%) of the hits returned for the singular and inanimate plural forms, which this time amounted 
to 501,000 and 511,000 results respectively.  
 
Moreover, results returned for ‘jihadis’ used the word almost exclusively in non-‘jihadi’ contexts. A 
sole exception was a forum dedicated to the Al-Quds Brigade
367
 – a unit of Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad
368
 - which called itself ‘jihadiyun’. But this was in itself revealing, since it seemed to refer not 
to ‘jihadis’ in the sense of ‘global jihadis’, but rather to the local Palestinian usage of ‘jihadi’ for a 
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member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This was revealed by another post from a pro-Fatah forum, 
which addressed ‘hamsawiyun, jabhawiyun [ie, members of the Popular Front – jabha – for the 
Liberation of Palestine], and jihadiyun’.
 369
 
 
Indeed, even in the mainstream media stories about the activities of ‘jihadis’ which made up most 
of the results, the word tended to be placed in quotation marks. This presumably indicates a sense of 
unfamiliarity and, perhaps also, a questioning of the legitimacy of the ‘jihad’ contained in the word. 
Al Sharq al-Awsat for example tells us about explosions ‘attributed to misguided “jihadis”’.
370
 
‘Jihadis’ call for the death of a BBC reporter (Alan Johnston - then imprisoned in Gaza),
371
 ‘jihadis’ 
demonstrate in an Egyptian prison.
372
  
 
Perhaps the most important difference between the two sets of usages relates to the usage of ‘jihadi’ 
as referring to a distinct body of thought – ie, ‘jihadi’ as jihadism. As well as the term ‘(al-
salafiyya) al-jihadiyya’ appearing on a number of occasions with this apparent sense, non-jihadi 
sources used terms such as ‘jihadi thought’ with similar implications. This notion did seem to 
appear in evidence in pro jihadi results. However, these did sometimes place the word ‘jihadi’ 
alongside words indicative of being ‘jihadi’ as a distinct moral commitment, or way of life.  
 
Overall then, the basic set of usages which the search results suggested broadly confirmed what 
might have been expected: that there is a distinction to be made between ‘jihadi’ in regular Arabic 
news media, where it means something like ‘jihadist’ in English – that is, adherence to a modern 
ideological project only notionally premised on the concept of ‘jihad’. On the other hand, ‘jihadi’ in 
more popular usage can mean ‘pertaining to a legitimate project of Islamic jihad’. And yet, the very 
need by those using the term in the latter sense to identify certain things as happening to be relevant 
to this project (whether dreams and paths, films and books, operations and expeditions or even self-
styled ‘jihadi’ individuals) nonetheless requires the extension of the sense of ‘pertaining to jihad’ to 
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a point at which the concept begins, after all, to bear some resemblance to the notion of a distinctive 
‘jihadism’ envisaged by the mainstream sources.  
 
 
4.3 Constructing ‘the Jihadi’  
 
Having considered in what senses the word ‘jihadi’ is used, we now turn to the second question 
posed above. How is ‘the jihadi’ constructed? What things does the label happen to adhere to? An 
initial way into this question – bypassing issues of language and linguistic context – is through the 
visual. In asking how ‘the jihadi’ is pictured, or what a picture ‘of jihad’ looks like, it might be 
suggested that we can obtain an idea – to use the word in its etymological sense – of the 
‘imagination’ of jihad within Arabic Web content.  
 
  
Contemporary weapons 
 
Enemy/regular military 
 
Paramilitary forces  
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Suicide bomb vests  
 
Medieval weapons 
 
Lion 
 
Horsemen 
 
!Traditional" costume 
 
Explosions/flames 
 
Scenes of destruction 
 
 91 
  
Countryside/landscape 
 
Banners 
 
Maps 
 
National flags 
 
Group logo 
 
Arabic text as image 
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Particular individuals 
 
(Desecration of) Enemy 
Symbols 
 
Al Aqsa Mosque 
 
Globe in space (and other 
celestial bodies represented 
astronomically)  
 
Prayer/Mosque 
 
Qur"an  
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Women and children as 
participants/combatants  
 
Victims 
 
Martyrs 
 
Demonstrations/Crowds 
 
Satirical cartoon/morph 
 
 
There is, it should be pointed out, nothing especially surprising or original about the categories of 
image identified here. Indeed, the basic types of image overlap to a substantial extent with those 
identified by Brachman, Boudali and Ostovar’s ‘Islamic imagery project’.
373
 This is precisely the 
point, however. For it demonstrates that a study based on Westpoint military academy’s ‘extensive 
collection of jihadi imagery’ (presumably based on that institution’s subjective understanding of 
what constitutes ‘jihadi’) is dealing, in its essentials, with the same body of imagery that just 
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happens to be turned up by Google web spiders looking for images tagged with this word. It may, 
of course, be objected that this fact is no coincidence, but rather is explained by mainstream Arabic 
media picking up on the same notion of ‘jihadism’ put forward by the US led ‘war on terror’. 
Except that – as we saw with reference the previous searches, and as is true for these as well – the 
‘jihadi’ material turned up by Google searches of Arabic content derives from forum posts, user 
generated sites, and even self-styled ‘jihadi’ forums just as it does from mainstream news.  
 
An agglomeration of ‘jihadi’ images produced in this way is clearly a very artifical text to work 
with, and attempts to advance towards what Strauss and Corbin would call an ‘axial’ level of 
coding
374
 must, of course, proceed with caution, lest patterns be found where none really exist. And 
yet, the basic themes that can be discerned within this set of categories seems so clear, and so 
coherent as to be expressable with reasonable confidence. ‘The jihadi’ – according to these search 
results – is consistently about violence (both given and received), solidarity and – certainly in the 
most iconic and superficial sense – Islam. 
375
  
 
A somewhat more complex and extensive set of (sometimes overlapping) sub themes might 
tentatively be developed along the following lines.  
 
First, there are images which seem to be quite straightforwardly about fighting. Images of 
paramilitiaries, of guns and rocket launchers, as well as groups of fighters in military clothing, 
disciplined or patrol formations and covered faces present the notion of the central importance of 
armed activity. Medieval weapons and equipment are relevant here too, but have more complex 
implications.  
 
Secondly, and nearly as straightforward are images of oppression. This would include portrayals of 
conventional military forces which, in a ‘jihadi’ context seem almost always to be engaged in 
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illegitimate violence, generally aimed at civilians. This in turn links into images of vulnerable 
civilians bloodied, killed, screaming or hiding. Oppressive enemies can also be represented through 
their own symbols, particularly the hateful image of the Star of David. And this, in turn, offers the 
possibility of symbolic resistance - for instance, through the destruction of such symbols.  
 
Thirdly, images such as maps, national flags and certain kinds of traditional clothing (such as the 
Palestinian  'atta) illustrate the importance of geographical community. It should be noted that this 
may be less significant in parts of the world where ‘traditional’ clothes are simply part of everyday 
dress.  
 
Fourthly, place overlaps with but does not necessarily reduce to history. In the context of ‘jihadi’ 
images this is primarily invoked through the generic medievalism of swords, horses and banners. 
Slightly more obscure is a reference such as that in the logo of the Islamic State of Iraq to the seal 
of the prophet Muhammad which, apart from the distinctive writing style and design, consists only 
of the Muslim declaration of faith. Significantly, (though not surprisingly) historical images in 
content labeled as ‘jihadi’ appear to invoke only the most generic notions of ‘Islamic’ history, 
rather than histories of particular groups and communities.  
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Fifthly, there is the theme of devotion to the group. Here might be placed specific group logos and 
images of leaders and martyrs. Conceivably, certain images also relating to violence might too be 
placed in this category. The guerrilla style of covering the face – which suppresses identity in more 
senses than one – the use of clothing styles unique to a particular group or even, perhaps, the 
gesture of solidarity implied by the image of the suicide bomb vest (allowing, of course, for the 
complex range of resonances such an image might have).  
 
Sixthly, there is a wider theme of solidarity within the community. Most obviously this can be seen 
in images of crowds and demonstrations. Pictures of armed children and (particularly where they do 
not seem to be of an age or appropriately clad for actual combat), women can perhaps also be read 
not so much as images of violence per se, but rather as delibarate incongruity, showing that the 
whole community, combatant and non-combatant is united in the cause.  
 
Seventhly, there is in addition to the theme of collective solidarity, a theme of devotion to the 
cosmic or transcendent. This is achieved through images of prayer, of mosques, or the Qur’an. It is 
also achieved through astronomical depictions of the globe in space, of the moon, or of other 
planets or, sometimes of images of nature: landscapes, sunsets or seascapes. Such images might 
bring to mind at once Qur’anic passages concerned with the awesome spectacle of the night sky, the 
demand that Muslims ‘read’ the signs (ayat) of nature, and the marvels of the Universe as revealed 
by modern science.  
 
Thus ‘the jihadi’ might be seen as being characterized as the representation of violence in response 
to oppression by particular organized groups on behalf of a wider community occurring within the 
bounds of three spheres: a geographical one of space, a temporal one of (shared) history and a 
moral one of the physical and ethical laws of the cosmos. This is, as has already been pointed out, 
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scarcely a new point to make. Indeed, Armborst’s definitional fields of ‘jihad – military conflict, 
jihad – dogmatic and jihad – Islamic activism’ seem well represented here. ‘The jihadi’ on the Web 
is then, it seems, tolerably close to ‘jihadism’ as Western academic literature seems to understand it.  
 
4.4 Jih!d" An!sh"d/Poetry 
 
The corpus of ‘jihadi’ images located by search engine algorithms provides a useful starting point 
for analysis precisely because it suppresses much of the complexity introduced by the editorial 
choice of the individual online contributor. As such, it would seem, potentially, to offer us a basic 
ideographic vocabulary of ‘the jihadi’ as a universal, shorn of partisan and ideological difference, 
individual artistry and contextual nuance. It helps to provide the contours, in other words, for what 
might be called (following Manovich’s ideas on new media artistry), a ‘database of jihad’ - the set 
of stock motifs available for constructing more complex ‘jihadi’ items. But jihadi images in the 
form we have considered them are not jihadi media in their natural contexts: rather, they are 
artificially broken down elements. The next stage then must be to examine jihadi content items as 
unified pieces of work.  
 
Along with ‘operation’ the single word most commonly combined with the word ‘jihadi’ in Arabic 
material on the web is the word nash"d. The jihadi nashid is a subgenre of the Islamic nashid 
generally. As such, these are (usually) à capella songs for one or more male voices. Instruments, 
which are often considered 'ar!m by strict Muslims
376
 rarely appear in accompaniment. However, 
voices are generally multi-layered and manipulated with studio effects. The nashid form - as a 
general term for religious singing - is a well established Islamic tradition.
377
 However, the 
contemporary form of the Islamic nashid as represented by most ‘jihadi’ nashids may be a relatively 
modern introduction.
378
 The lack of instrumentation and use of harmonic vocal lines - almost choral 
in style - does not seem to be reminiscent of previously widespread Middle Eastern musics, with the 
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possible exception of certain ancient chants such as the (ajj anthem Labbayk Allahumma, whose 
words, at least go back to the dawn of Islam and beyond, and are said to have been sung by Adam 
on his arrival at the original Ka‘aba.
379
  
 
Jihadi nashids can be found in a wide range of online locations. They are posted to sites such as 
YouTube or Archive.org and to mainstream and secular Arabic bulletin boards (such as Majida,
380
 
Ibtesama
381
 or Al Jazeera Chat
382
 just as they are also posted to ‘Islamic’ sites such as Muslm.net, 
Palestinian sites such as Paldf
383
 or ‘jihadi’ forums such as Al Fallujah,
384
 Shumukh al-Islam
385
 and 
so on. Commonly, however, such posts link back to ‘Islamic’ websites, or to Islamic websites 
specifically specialising in the nashid genre such as www.enshady.com or www.dawa.ws. 
Moreover, they are often found as part of collections of other ‘Islamic’ or ‘da‘wi ’ nashids. As such, 
the jihadi nashid appears to represent a relatively ‘mainstream’ form, with famous ‘munshids’ 
(nashid singers) such as ‘Abu ‘Ali’ releasing large numbers of nashids on jihadi as well as other 
Islamic themes.
386
 This compares usefully with online references to jihadi ‘operations’ which are 
more often found on - and which generally refer back - to a specifically ‘jihadi’ website. As such, 
nashids can be seen as representative of a more ‘popular’ jihadi tradition than other jihadi items, 
with relatively less dependence on access to the official or semi official propaganda productions of 
fighting groups.  
 
Where only the words of jihadi nashids are posted, these may be described as ‘jihadi poetry’. And 
indeed, since the following analysis will not take account of musicological considerations, the two 
genres can be treated as essentially the same. 
387
   
 
At the simplest level, the nashids examined exhibit the same set of themes suggested above. They 
are about violently fighting an oppressive and murderous enemy. The vengeful heroes are marked 
out by their qualities of ‘steadfastness’ or ‘solidarity’ (%um"d); by their pious yearning for the 
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rewards of paradise and the accounts of the Day of Reckoning over the transient pleasures of the 
world (‘they did not care whether there was rice or anything between their teeth’. Their primary 
weapon is the machine gun, from which nothing will separate them. But explosives, too, have their 
part to play. Through this combination of piety, loyalty, devotion to the point of sacrifice and 
aggressive violence, the heroes will redeem their people, liberating ‘Al Aqsa today - Al Andalus 
tomorrow.’  
 
Nashid collections are sometimes labelled so as to indicate that they represent a particular jihadi 
group - for instance, a ‘collection of 300 hamasi jihadi nashids’.
388
 However, in general there 
appears to be a good deal of ideological plasticity to the genre. A nashid commemorating an attack 
by, for instance, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, such as fajr" al-mal‘"n ya bint al-jih!d (Blow Up the 
Cursed One, O Girl of Jihad), may turn up as the soundtrack for a montage of attacks by the Al 
Qaida affiliate Islamic State of Iraq.
389
 On the other hand, it would seem that jihadi nashids enjoy a 
fairly broad audience. For instance, a nashid relating to the Chechen jihad such as 'ayy al-kata’ib 
can be appreciatively received by very secular presenting forum goers.
390
  
 
In the same collections of jihadi nashid lyrics, it is possible to encounter nashids which appear to 
relate to jihad by groups in Palestine, by groups in Iraq, and specifically by Al Qaida. It may be 
suggested that there are particular shared characteristics to the former group as opposed to nashids 
relating to other fields of jihad. Specifically, in ostensibly Palestinian nashids, the authorial voice 
suggests a narrator who is profoundly engaged in what is portrayed as a collective and enduring 
struggle by a whole people. What is distinctive is a quality of solidity and permanence - even of the 
eternal - to the set of relations embodied in this struggle. Indeed, so intertwined are themes of the 
natural world, of fertility, the shared fate of the people and the land, and the redemptive courage of 
the martyr hero (which will ‘plant’ a seed which will grow into ‘thorns of vengeance’ among the 
coming generation)
391
 that they almost seem to bring to mind romantic notions of pagan sacrifice to 
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appease the forces of nature of the sort imagined in, for instance, James Frazer’s notion of the year 
king.
392
 
 
Sacrifice, as presented in such songs, appears to be an event of tightly circumscribed symbolic 
significance.
393
 There is, for instance, an important motif of body parts: ‘our skulls are offered so 
that your [Islam’s] honour can remain whole’. ‘I have given you’ [Jerusalem] a pledge of my 
blood’. ‘They were covered in blood and smiled in great jubilation’. The idea of sowing the 
dragon’s teeth is almost explicitly used in Blow Up The Cursed One O Daughter of Jihad, when it 
says ‘pour out your blood, for if good blood falls upon the ground it will grow into soldiers in the 
time of need’. The hero’s denial of the body is that of the inward-looking ascetic. Its value is 
mediated by the good of the community, which through the sacrifice, is connected directly to the 
eternal. In this poetic scheme explicitly religious themes – prayer, mosques, religious labelling of 
opponents and, more important, Paradise and Judgement Day are invoked more as powerful 
abstractions than as concrete realities. Indeed, in one poem, the end of service through jihad as a 
good in itself seems almost to be elevated above that of attaining salvation in paradise.  
 
 To the gardens [of paradise], and the gardens are an abode... they are a resting place and a shelter   
 for the shahid. And more wondrous than their yearning for Eden...their yearning for God, the Majestic 
 If they were called upon they said, in hope... we would have returned and fought all over again.  
 For to have fought for you once is satisfaction enough... and in satisfaction we aspire still more 
 
The same song culminates: ‘And if we die it does not matter to us... we are not pleased with the life 
of the slave.’ It is, therefore, not the prospect of achieving Paradise which ‘teaches solidarity’ as the 
song puts it, but rather the determination not to live in dishonour and ‘slavery’. In these songs 
religion seems to be as Durkheim insists, ‘a figurative expression of the society’.
394
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Indeed, so closed is the imaginative system - so fixated on the triangular relationship between 
martyr, community and the eternal - that even violence against the enemy seems to disappear into 
abstraction. The hero dies fighting the enemy. But it is the gore of his own demise that is valorised - 
not that of his opponents. It is somewhat paradoxical that even the violence of the fighter is 
subsumed into wider story of victimhood. ‘A generation refusing injustice’ is raised by the blows 
and injustices of the enemy. But the main role of the heroes thereby produced is, in turn, to die 
heroically. The concern here is not, it seems, the actual physical destruction of the community, but 
its social death, its dissolution through loss of honour.  
 
Other nashids - while not using a fundamentally different ‘vocabulary’ of images, differ in some 
important ways from this template. Here, the community - or at least the narrator’s membership of 
it - seems not necessarily to be a given. Feelings of commonality may be temporary, and the 
narrator may even appear to express notions of alienation and nostalgia. No longer does the author 
merely celebrate the outstanding dedication of a third person hero. Rather, he is at pains to declare 
his own loyalty. In the case of one example by a person who writes under the pen name of ‘poet of 
Al Qaida’, it is the very act of producing poetry itself which affirms the writer’s commitment.  
 
 Do not doubt my heart, O friend 
 I am the pure one, and your outpouring that cries out 
 My arm rhymes precious verses 
 Over the concert of the swords, and the shields 
 Proud, sweet rhymes 
 Calls- ‘come to prayer, come to salvation’ to the people of jihad.  
 It paints its letters, it makes my hymn become 
 As sharp as the spear of Al-Samhariyyat 
 I have given my slaughter to the Islamic state 
 I have sworn allegiance to it, and forfeited all return.  
 I reach out to the Amir with an overflow of longing 
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 So reach out so that we can swear allegiance by hand 
 
Indeed - as can readily be noted, the possibility that the writer’s sincerity might be doubted is 
offered at the very inception of the work. Elsewhere, the community and solidarity expressed in the 
first category is represented as a longing for a time which has now vanished.  
 
 Where are our days? Where? ... Where have we spent them?  
 They went in the blinking of an eye... O my place, remember them 
 
 O blessed Kandahar... the Lord keep her 
 .... by jihad... The Guide build her 
 
 Paradise of the merciful... noble Kabul 
 By God, we are not pleased... with injustice anywhere 
 
Perhaps as a consequence of this, these poems seem simultaneously more concerned with violence 
against a specific enemy, and less sure about the prospect of salvation. As one nashid asks: ‘One 
day a whole Ummah will kneel... in healing gloom...To an important question... did you do your 
duty to the prophet?’. No longer is the existence of an afterlife merely a matter for celebration. 
Now, it is a matter for concerned personal reflection, which presumably is compounded for some by 
feelings of distance and lack of agency, as for the author of O World What is this Silence? Who in 
conclusion to events in Chechnya can offer only that:  
 
 The Russians will continue the fighting... and we shall continue to be pious while others sleep. 
 
This apparent angst is not explicitly present - but perhaps it can be discerned in the unprecedentedly 
hysterical violence in the popular Iraq war song: Blow Them Up, where issues of martyrdom all but 
disappear in the call to:  
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 ...kill them  
 Shred them, scatter them, capture them... and slaughter them  
 Burn them, drown them, round them up and reap them...  
 ask the Lord for steadfastness and longanimity...and defeat them. 
 
4.5 Jihadi Animation  
 
The medium of the jihadi flash animation
395
 offers a useful combination of the two types of material 
so far analysed: isolated images and poetic text. Indeed, jihadi flash videos can be considered an 
extention of the nashid genre into a new medium. They are to be found on the same forums as 
nashids - indeed, they are sometimes distributed by specialist nashid sites.
396
 Jihadi flash videos are 
invariably accompanied by nashids. Many of them also present the texts of poems as part of their 
visual display. These texts may or may not be the same as the accompanying sung words. In a 
technique discussed by the new media theorist Lev Manovich, cinematic techniques are often used 
on the text itself, which scrolls, or is panned over or zoomed in on by an imaginary camera.
397
 In 
one flash video ‘Open Fire!’
398
 (the imperative is, interestingly, in the feminine form), strikingly 
simple use is made of angry red text in order to produce an effect of violence and menace which is 
underscored by the text itself, which calls: ‘open fire, burn the Romans, my war is dear to me, it 
wears down the crusaders’. The same words boom out on the soundtrack. In another example - 
Prison is a Paradise or an Inferno
399
 text is combined with visuals still more ingeniously, to 
provide an interactive element: the viewer ‘unlocks’ the video by clicking on a key. This reveals a 
photographic image of a sparse and gloomy prison cell with a stool, a slop bucket and thick metal 
bars over the window. Outside these bars, a succession of photographs (of prisoners, presumably) 
passes by. Moving the cursor over the image produces a stream of sparks which scatter in the 
darkness. Passing it over a particular section to the left of the image illuminates the words of the 
poem which gives the work its title.  
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Jihadi flash animations (like all jihadi media) vary greatly from quite sophisticated productions to 
relatively crude assemblages of clip art and pasted-in photograph. Even relatively slick productions, 
however, generally remain efforts at packaging a limited collection of images, mostly culled (it 
would seem) from mainstream media reporting. These retain the closed range of the images 
discussed above: crowds, wounded civilians, enemy soldiers, masked mujahidin and representations 
of the conventionally religious and, more generally the ‘sublime’.  
 
The extensive intertextual possibilities of the jihadi flash video, combined (perhaps paradoxically) 
with the apparent limitations placed on some of the more excessive imagery conjured by jihadi 
poetry seem to make the thematics of jihadi flash slightly more difficult to read. The seeming 
‘distance’ of the narrator which can be used as a main distinguishing feature between two categories 
in the case of the former may be complicated or subverted in the latter. For instance, in a video 
entitled The Arrow of Yesterday Continues, a standard narrative about solidarity in the face of 
Zionist oppression is complicated by the fact that it is presented as happening inside a television, 
within a simple CG rendering of a prosperous, Western-style living room. As a result, the themes of 
suffering in Palestine which are often so distinctive in the nashid form tend to be subsumed into 
narratives about mediated Muslim suffering in general. Images of Palestinian figures (Shaykh 
Yasin, Abdulaziz Rantisi are commonly to be seen alongside heroes of other conflicts (Khattab, 
Shamil Besayev). Images of dead, wounded and dismayed civilians may as easily be Afghan, 
Chechen, or simply generic as Palestinian.  
 
Distinctions here are better made between categories which may loosely be termed ‘politics’, 
‘militancy’ and ‘religion’. This is to say that certain ‘jihadi’ flash videos (such as Prison is Paradise 
or Inferno) for instance, make essentially no direct mention of violence. Others invoke religion 
primarily as a label: the ‘people of truth’ versus the Romans and the Crusaders, taking as their main 
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dimension the violence necessary to defend the one against the other. Finally, yet others make a 
more serious attempt to subsume worldly events into the eternal. An English language script runs:  
 
 Why do I love thee O Afghanistan? 
 It isn’t your land, it isn’t your dust 
 It’s the law that you have from Allah the just 
 
This is almost the precise inverse of the ‘first category’ of nashid above. In contrast to the shackling 
of religion to the worship of the land - a concern which may, perhaps help to explain recurrent use 
of the hadith prophecy in which - as one nashid recounts it: 
 
 ...tomorrow we shall hear sense from inanimate objects 
 Stones and rocks there in our Jerusalem... it is promised that inanimate objects shall become Muslim 
 ‘O Muslim of God... O servant of God...behind me is a Jew, progenitor of treachery 
 ‘Kill him, and purify our soil of his filth…’ 
 
Here the value of the natural landscape is utterly discounted in favour of the abstract and eternal 
values embodied in Islamic law. 
 
Indeed, it is possible to find flash videos labelled as ‘jihadi’ in which there is nothing more militant 
than a concern with the global interests of Islam as a whole. A work such as ‘Strangers’ (ghurab!’) 
- composed, apparently, with a non-Muslim in mind, asks the question ‘Islam: Do you really know 
what it is?’ before proceeding to ask a set of leading questions (in English) about double standards 
relating to non-Muslim attitudes to Muslims: 
 
...have you ever wondered why a nun can be covered from head to toe, and she’s respecting God,  but when a 
Muslimah does that, she’s “oppressed”... why a Jew can grow a beard and he’s just practicing his faith, but 
 106
when a Muslim does that he’s an extremist? ... when a Christian or a Jew kills someone, religion is not 
mentioned, but when a Muslim is charged with a crime, it is Islam that goes to trial? 
 
By contrast, Our Brothers [sic] Return takes a notably militant subject - Amir Khattab of Chechnya, 
and links it to the eternal. The muscular, burly mujahid is seen, perhaps incongruously, seated - a 
ghostly, superimposed presence - over an ocean sunset by a tropical desert island, complete with 
palm tree. The animation takes standard montage images - Khattab in his iconic grenade throwing 
pose and, the weeping heads of omnipresent wronged civilians, disembodied, in black and white, 
and washing langurously across the screen before, at last, the beatic, martyred head of Khattab 
himself - all against the backdrop of sun and sea. The overall effect appears to be the disassembly of 
the material realities of combat and its dissolution into the eternal. 
 
The broad themes of flash videos, then, seem to reconstitute at the level of a ‘globalised’ and 
deterritorialised discourse, the same triangle of concerns seen in the ‘category one’ nashids above: 
violence, community and the eternal - in which, in any one example, it is usual to treat two in detail, 
with the third either invoked but unexplored, or merely implied. While some of the subtleties of this 
discourse may be lost with regard to attachment to specific places, what is perhaps more interesting 
is the manner in which the distinctive features of the second category of nashid also seem to be 
dissolved. The angst of the narrator’s distance from the subject, the fear of inadequate commitment, 
the concern of words not binding to their meanings is either harder to represent visually – or 
possibly, is somehow resolved through the visual language of montage, which does not so readily 
privilege the superior authority of those physically present in the conflict zone, and confers on the 
creator a certain authority simply for the fact of having produced, as opposed to mere speech, a 
digital artifact.  
 
4.6 Jih!diyy!t and Ideological Factionalism 
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We have already seen that there is a relationship between certain types of content, and levels of 
ostensibly ideological boundedness. Jihadi nashids, flash videos and graphic design may have a 
partisan focus, but quite often do not. Indeed, in spite of the apparent distinctiveness of Palestinian 
nashids, it would be a mistake to presume that jihadi material simply represents contrasting ‘global’ 
and local, or ‘irredentist’ (particularly Palestinian) jihads.
400
 Rather, a more accurate picture might 
be to suggest that there are - at the level of the Web - two distinctive ‘global’ jihads being 
represented. On the one hand, there is what might be called a ‘translocal’ jihad. This consists of the 
generic, ‘lowest common denominator’ images of ‘the jihadi’ which are to be found in the wider 
context of ‘da‘wi ’, or, ‘Islamic’ materials (isl!miyy!t) such as an!sh"d and flash animation.  
 
These consist of a combination of relatively generic ‘Islamic’ images (a silhouetted horseman 
brandishing his sword beside the form of the Ka‘aba), together with images which relate more 
specifically to actual militancy in particular theatres (Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya) and to certain, 
widely supported groups (the Al-Qassam Brigades), and individuals (Amir Khattab).
401
  
 
Contained within this vocabulary of images (which is very much the same as the images returned in 
the image search which began this enquiry), is a subset that seems to invoke a more specific notion 
of what might be called a ‘transcendent jihad’. This is expressed by those images which relate to 
abstracted, historical violence, to quintessential images of Islam as a generality, to the moon, space, 
and to ‘the globe’ itself.
402
 This vocabulary can be encountered routinely within ‘Islamic’ materials. 
There is, however, a more specific set of ‘jihadi’ images which are commonly omitted from this set: 
those of the leading figures of Al Qaida - bin Ladin, Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Abu Mus‘ab 
al-Zarqawi, as well as other icons such as the collapsing World Trade Centre. These images, 
therefore, seem to represent (together with the other images of ‘transcendental’ jihad which usually 
accompany them) what called a ‘higher tier’ or, if we must, a more ‘extreme’ end of a jihadi 
continuum.
403
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Indeed, the existence of such a continuum can be demonstrated with reference to yet another type of 
‘jihadi content’ - the ‘jihadi book’.
404
 If one searches the Web for the Arabic term ‘jihadi books’ it 
turns out that, of the first forty six hits that actually return a result for ‘jihadi book(s)’ as such, 
twenty three link directly to sites which can be with some confidence designated as ‘salafi-jihadi’ 
forums: that is, sites with banners at the top advertising official releases by Al Qaida affiliate groups 
and media agencies. The category of the ‘jihadi forum’ and its defining characteristics will be 
discussed more fully in a subsequent chapter. But for the most part, these are sites such as ‘Al 
Mujahidin Electronic Network’,
405
 ‘Ansar al-Mujahidin’, ‘Al-Fallujah’,
406
 ‘‘Ishaq al-Hur’,
407
 and 
‘Shumukh al-Islam’,
408
 which actually refer to each other as such.
409
 Others, such as ‘Ukht bin 
Ladin,’ ‘Leyouth,’ ‘Jihadway’, ‘Al Qimmah’ (a forum primarily associated with Shabab al-
Mujahidin in Somalia) and Bayt al-Maqdis (a network of sites which is mainly devoted to ‘Jaysh al-
Ummah’ a ‘salafi jihadi’ group in Gaza) fall broadly into the same category also. Of the remainder, 
most are either book hosting sites, or salafi, but not jihadi websites, such as Muslm.net, ‘Sahab 
Salafi Network, slfya.maktoobblog, and so on.  
 
By contrast, entering the term ‘jihadi nashids’ brings up - in its first fifty hits, only two such sites. 
On the other hand, it also brings up (which ‘jihadi books’ does not), sites sympathetic to non salafi 
groups such as Qassimy.com, or Palestinian sites (which often lean towards similar groups) such as 
Fursan Al Aqsa, or Palestine Network. A much quicker and simpler search further confirms the 
trend. Placing quote marks around the term ‘Hamasi Jihadi books’ returns not a single result. 
Placing quote marks around the term ‘Hamasi books’ returns just five hits (three of which are for 
the same text), which point towards the work of the Muslim Brothers ideologues Sayyid Qutb and 
Hassan al-Banna. By contrast, looking for “Hamasi nashids’ delivers more than 54,000 results for 
that precise phrase.
410
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If we take the one reasonably extensive list of ‘jihadi book’ titles from a website which is not 
overtly either salafi, or jihadi salafi, (from the Yemeni forum ‘Hadramut’), we find a list which 
begins as follows:  
 
- The Future of the Peninsula and of Iraq by the martyr (God willing), Yusuf al-‘Uyayri.  
- The American Presence in the Peninsula: Its Truth and its Aims, Yusuf al-‘Uyayri (may God 
accept him) 
- Guidance for the Confused on the Permissibility of Killing Prisoners, Yusuf al ‘Uyayri 
- O Mujahidin, the Spirit, not the World, Abdullah Al-Rashid 
- Thus we See the Jihad, and we Desire it, Hazim al-Madani 
- The Creed of the Saved Sect, Abdul Majid Muhammad Muni’, may God accept him in the heights 
- The Whinnying of the Horses in Explanation of the Book of Jihad Abd al-Rahim al-Shafi’i 
-  The Late Warning Concerning the Most Important Important Matters Necessary ‘Izz al-Din al-
Maqdisi 
 
There is little point in reproducing this list of fifty books in its entirety.
411
 It goes on to offer eleven 
books by Abdullah Azzam, as well as volumes by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Salman al-‘Alwan and other identifiably ‘salafi’ jihadi writers. Moreover, the fact that all 
the lists of ‘jihadi books’ encountered included items along similar lines cannot be explained simply 
by an absence of books from other perspectives on the subject of jihad. For instance, although 
plainly it is a book ‘of jihad’, nowhere is the mainstream Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s (2009) Fiqh 
al-Jihad listed as a ‘jihadi book’.  
 
As intuitively satisfying as is the notion of a single jihadi continuum from ‘moderate’ to ‘extremist’, 
whereby the person who engages with materials such as jihadi nashids or flash videos is, broadly, 
likely to be someone who supports the Al-Qassam brigades whereas the ‘hard core’ jihadi who 
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takes the time to read jihadi books will be inclined to support Al Qaida, there is something 
enigmatic about it. After all, non Al-Qaida jihadi groups practicing what Gerges calls ‘irredentist’ 
or ‘internal’ jihad
412
 are not merely dabblers in jihadism, but distinct entities which attract serious 
commitments of their own. It must apparently be possible to be a ‘hard core’ afficionado of the Al-
Qassam brigades or the Islamic Army of Iraq. But how is this commitment represented? 
 
4.7 Partisan Difference in Three Jihadi Videos 
 
The key to this puzzle can be found in the extent to which groups of the latter type add to their 
symbolically ‘Islamic’ commitment other themes - notably nationalism. To this extent, production 
of a feeling of the ‘jihadi’ for such groups is a more plainly modular endeavour. It is an aggregation 
of ‘the Islamic’ (Qur’ans, mosques, the Muslim shahada), ‘the militant’ - (guns, rocket launchers)  
‘the national’ (flags, maps, symbolic clothing items) and ‘the group’ (logos), in which each element 
could conceivably be separated out and reincorporated somewhere else. By contrast, Al Qaida 
related material tends to draw on a body of images which are, in themselves complex - embodying 
in a single instant the multiple themes of armed struggle, cosmic justice and shared heritage. The 
stereotyped figure of the cavalryman stands at once for militancy, Islam and community. Likewise, 
the black banner of the shahada (a device which is, of course, used by other groups - but with less 
simplicity) stands for a specific group (the Islamic State of Iraq), but also, and irreducibly, for Islam 
in general.  
 
Indeed, the difference here can usefully be illustrated through comparison of official videos of an 
Al Qaida affiliate as opposed to non Al Qaida affiliate groups. As representative texts, let us take - 
as relatively prominent and well-made examples the Islamic State of Iraq’s series Knights of 
Martyrdom,
413
 the Islamic Army of Iraq’s Baghdad Sniper 2,
414
 and the Al-Qassam Brigades’ The 
Voice of the Angry Hero Came Across.
415
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The latter video - essentially a compilation and retrospective celebration of acts by the group it 
represents - offers a rapid montage of images. It opens with the image of a rifleman, coloured with a 
green filter, before the image of an explosion bursts through the scene, to reveal the logo of the 
Qassam Brigades: itself a compilation of images - the Dome of the Rock, a kalashnikov, and a 
green flag with the shahada, before cutting rapidly to footage of Qassamis on parade. Shot from 
below, the approaching group presents the impression of over-running the viewer. Over the imagery 
are sung the words: 
 
 The voice of the angry hero came across 
 To the world I write ‘Qassami’ 
 To serve the throne at the gates of glory 
 And honour the Ummah with feverish blood 
 
As with the Palestinian nashids discussed above, writ large in the video is a set of imaginative 
relations in which the transcendent and the ineffable have important, but only walk-on parts. A 
Qassami is shown contemplatively reading a Qur’an - just before another is shown waving the flag 
and others are presented setting up a rocket launcher. Framed photographs of martyrs are fast-
forwarded against a backdrop of blue sky and fluffy clouds. And yet the true power of the video lies 
in its portrayal of military actions and shows of solidarity that - mutatis mutandis - could be inserted 
into a video for, say, the PKK or the Real IRA without any obvious incongruity. Even the song - 
Islamic themes in the lyrics notwithstanding - breaks with fundamentalist nashid convention by 
incorporating synthesiser accompaniment and a bouncy beat. The role of religion (meaning ‘the 
transcendent’), one gets the impression, is to vindicate the emotive effects, not to create them.  
 
Juba, the sniper of Baghdad represents perhaps the most sophisticated transmedia project ever 
attempted by a militant group. Using montaged footage of individual sniper operations, the Islamic 
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Army of Iraq apparently succeeded in producing an artificially constructed viral Internet hero with 
his own website, anashid and numerous self declared ‘fans’ (as can be seen in the use of ‘Juba’ as a 
nickname element).
416
 In keeping with this, Juba 2 is a sophisticated piece of work, which cleverly 
integrates the core ‘jihadi’ themes. After an initial sequence, portraying a man in a balaclava 
cocking a sniper rifle, over which the production is credited to the central media foundation of the 
Islamic Army in Iraq, and offering it as an ‘Eid present to the people of monotheism’, the video 
opens with the sounding of the adh!n (the Muslim call for prayer). A door opens and the same man 
in a balaclava enters into a sparsely furnished white room, still carrying his rifle. He sets this 
carefully down on a table, together with a side arm, a mobile phone, a radio and some bullets. He 
turns to a wall chart, on which are written the prophetical words ‘do not associate with an 
unbeliever, and fight him into the everlasting fire’. He scores off another mark on a growing tally, 
and sits down to write a communique to the Muslim Ummah, referencing the blood of ‘our Muslim 
grandfathers’ and the shame of its desecration by the same Jews and Crusaders. ‘What will we say’ 
he asks, ‘on Judgement Day?’  
 
The use of direct religious-military associations here is considerably subtler and stronger than in the 
Al-Qassam video. While the Al-Qassam video embodies themes which can be described as political 
rather than religious without losing much in translation, in Juba 2, politics (i.e, power relations 
between different actors) is mainly subsumed into theological language. It is the desecration of 
mosques and the Qur’an, the shame of the Ummah, and the failure to implement shari‘a  that are the 
main grievances voiced by the sniper. And yet, even here, the images do not so much achieve their 
merging of transcendent and everyday concerns by integration but by juxtaposition. From the 
context, we assume that Juba has just finished praying. Or, if he hasn’t, that he ought to be. So 
when he lays down his weapons and carefully checks off his latest kill, the care with which he does 
it brings to mind the same ritual care that would be brought to Islamic ablutions - the wu$#’. 
Moreover, the overtly ‘Islamic’ sequence at the beginning of the piece is followed by scenes which 
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are wholly temporal in content. An interview with the ‘commander of the sniper brigade in 
Baghdad’ provides a wholly rationalistic and operational-sounding justification for the use of 
sniping which seems almost to deny the absolutist and deontological admonitions which have just 
preceded.  
 
Thus it is the consistent challenging of this comparmentalisation of sacred and profane categories 
that gives such force to a production such as Knights of Martyrdom. Here, the film begins with a 
computer generated rendering of a green and well-tended garden, chirruping with birdsong - a 
typically Islamic vision of Paradise which seems all the more effective for its ‘virtuality’. The 
(imaginary) camera pans over the scene to show us something shocking and incongruous. In the 
middle of Paradise is the hulking shape of a large lorry.   The door of the lorry opens. Using the 
cinematic language of the ‘first person’ computer game, the camera zooms in, and we find 
ourselves looking at the dashboard, as if we are seated in the cab. The door closes, as if the viewer 
has closed it. The lorry drives off. Suddenly, it is not on grass anymore, but a dusty desert road. At 
the end of the road is a stylized military compound, dominated by a large, red cross. The truck 
drives into the compound. There is a cry of ‘Allahu Akbar’. Suddenly, the computer animation 
switches to live footage of an explosion at the end of a desert road, just like the one represented in 
CG. There are two things which are clearly distinctive about this. First, the attempted breakdown of 
the barrier between viewer and event: taking advantage of the visual language of first person 
computer games, it is visually implied that you, the viewer are the one driving the truck. Second, it 
is not only the boundary between ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ that is challenged, but that between 
religion and violence. The visual language of the suicide bombing makes it - to use Devji’s 
terminology - unmistakeably an ‘ethical act’.
417
 The target, the attacker, the method of attack and its 
place in the cosmic order are all inseparably intertwined. Even the figure of the truck - scarcely 
evocative of the heroic period of Islamic history - is very carefully linked to the eternal. Unlike the 
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Palestinian martyr, or the Iraqi assassin, the truck bomber in this case is unmistakably shown to 
practice not just violence as a Muslim, but Islamic violence.  
 
4.8 ‘Entering the Jihadi’ Webspace and Jihadi Content 
 
There is, then, something of a puzzle concerning the nature of Arabic ‘jihadi’ content or ‘the jihadi’ 
as it appears on the Web. On the one hand, it seems that there is a largely univeralistic vocabulary 
out of which different jihadi idioms are constructed. And yet, at the same time, there seem to be 
definite ‘levels’ of ‘jihadiness’ which, furthermore, are to some extent inherent in the images 
themselves. The image of the medieval cavalryman, for instance, which would almost never be used 
by Qassami or by Islamic Army of Iraq material, is in a sense irreducibly ‘more jihadi’ than the 
image of a gunman with a Palestinian kuffiya, because it contains ideas of ‘Islam as militancy’ that 
cannot be easily separated into distinct iconic components. And yet images of this kind are 
routinely to be found alongside one another, as if they were differentiated not as symbols of 
incompatible, disrete ideologies, but as matters of personal taste.  
 
One way of explaining this ambiguity can be found in the way in which information is organised 
topically by the Arabic Web. In describing the fundamental morphological properties of the Web, 
Manovich invokes the idea of the ‘massive branching structure’ as proposed from a technological 
point of view by Vannevar Bush as invoking or paralleling the philosophical and literary notion of 
the labyrinth in Borges’ story The Garden of Forking Paths. In a similar sense, the organisation of 
‘the jihadi’ can be perceived as - to use Borges’ phrase ‘a labyrinth which [is] strictly infinite’.  
 
It is of the nature of the Web - as a network - that its organisation of information appears 
hierarchical from any given starting point, branching out in sequential categories and subcategories. 
A relevant hierarchy of this kind can be observed, for instance, with regard to a large general 
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interest Arabic forum such as ‘Al-S!'!t al-‘Arabiyya’ or ‘the Arabic realms’.
418
 The name of this 
forum derives from its subdivision into several ‘realms’ or sa'!t - the open forum, the Islamic 
forum, the political forum, the management and economics forum, the arts forum, the technical 
forum, the medical forum, the sport forum, the cars forum, the travel and trips forum and the forum 
for affairs relating to The Arabic Realms itself.  
 
As such - and indeed, as can be deduced partially from its name - The Arabic Realms presents itself 
as a comprehensive lifestyle site for Arabic readers - a notional public sphere of public spheres 
reflecting the overall interests of online Arabic speakers as a whole. Within this sphere, notably, 
‘the Islamic’ is simply one topical space among others.  
 
Within this space, it is notable that the topic of ‘jihad’ and the ‘mujahidin’ is consistently a topic for 
the ‘political,’ rather than the ‘Islamic’ realm - reflecting the topical nature of reported jihadi 
activity already mentioned above.  
 
On the other hand we have already established that ‘the jihadi’ as a content genre in the form of 
ostensibly ‘self produced’ items (ie, not items such as operations videos or communiques which are 
clearly the ‘official’ creation of particular fighting groups) belongs not to the online ‘realm’ of the 
political so much as to the ‘realm’ of the Islamic in the form of ‘Islamic’ sites such as luqman, 
enshady or dawa.ws.  
 
Thus it is possible to establish a putative hierarchy of topics in Arabic Web content which begins 
with the sphere of general interest (such as, for instance, the Arabic Realms as a whole), down 
through ‘the Islamic’ before finally arriving at the sub-sub category of ‘the jihadi’ as a media area 
of optional interest within Islamic Web content as a whole.  
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And yet, the linear hierarchy of data on the Web is, of course, only apparent. In fact, the nature of 
content on the Web is such that an apparent hierarchy can in principle be extrapolated from any 
starting point. Thus, just as ‘general’ Web space, such as that occupied by The Arabic Realms has 
its Islamic category, so too does a specifically ‘Islamic’ site such as, say Muslm.net subdivide into 
topical categories, some of which - such as Muslm.net’s own ‘news forum’ overlap with categories 
which would be a realm to themselves on alsaha.com. In other words, just as one may ‘enter’ the 
topic of ‘the Islamic’ through the portal of what is notionally the online Arabic public sphere, so too 
one may enter ‘the news’ through the portal of ‘the Islamic’.  
 
In the same way, ‘jihadi webspace’ offers a means to access a variety of different - notionally 
subsidiary - topic areas: something which can be demonstrated with reference to the many different 
‘directories’ of jihadi websites which are to be found posted on Arabic Web forums serving, in 
effect, as self-created conceptual maps of ‘the jihadi’. These lists of jihadi websites often seem to 
overlap for significant sections, and appear to be the product of accumulating cutting and pasting of 
weblinks. They therefore cannot be taken as fully independent corroboration of one another. At the 
same time, the broad similarity of lists of ‘jihadi websites’ posted to forums,
419
 particularly between 
2007 and 2008 provides a useful insight into how an emerging category of ‘jihadi’ webspace has 
come to be understood. Typically,
420
 such lists span a conceptual space stretching from ostensibly 
‘Islamic’ sites (www.freemenbar.com; www.islam-syria.com), militant Iraqi nationalist sites 
‘www.iraqiasaeb.net)
421
 and sites of specific shaykhs said to have ‘jihadi’ inclinations (eg Shaykh 
Hamid al-Ali at http://69.72.226.92/npage, and even a Hamas sympathetic site such as 
http://www.3awda.com/vb/. They also contain links to sites (virtually all now defunct) specialising 
primarily in jihadi ‘preparation’ including information on military tactics and weapons training. The 
bulk of the sites listed in these ‘directories’ can, however, best be described as fitting into the 
‘universalist’ jihadi category. These are notably pro-Al Qaida sites such as ‘al-Ikhlas’, ‘Al Boraq’, 
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and ‘Al Firdaws’, sites specifically dedicated to particular ‘Al Qaida’ leaders and other leading 
figures such as Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri and the like.  
 
In other words, within ‘jihadi’ content on the Web, ‘salafi jihadism’ as ideology can be located 
iconographically simply as an outgrowth of ‘the jihadi’ as a genre of content. The possibility of a 
‘jihadi’ category of content invites the possibility of a ‘jihadi’ Web space, which in turn assumes 
the subsumption of other forms of content (weapons training, theology, national resistance) as 
subfields with a greater or lesser centrality to a notional acme of ‘jihadiness’. Indeed, it is worth 
oberving that, morphologically at least, Arabic makes no distinction between jih!diyya as an 
abstract noun meaning ‘jihadism’ and the same word as an inanimate plural referring to an 
‘agglomeration of “jihadi” items’.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the aim has certainly not been to produce a single, definitive reading of jihadi 
content on the Internet. Indeed, as was argued in the second chapter, the idea that texts should be 
expected to exhibit unified, stable meanings is in any case suspect. Rather, the purpose of the 
exercise above has been to show that it is, at least possible to treat self-described Arabic ‘jihadi’ 
content on the Web as a meaningfully interconnected whole. That is, that the ‘jihadi’ content which 
we can associate with Al Qaida, with the Islamic Army of Iraq, with Hamas and with no particular 
group or political ideology
422
 all shares important common elements and, moreover, that content 
tending towards different jihadist movements can often be found side by side in the same collection. 
This does not, of course, imply a single coherent system of thought. Rather, it might be useful to 
think in terms of what Lawrence Grossberg calls the ‘mattering map’ – a system of interlocking and 
overlapping cultural ‘investments’ which help individuals to negotiate the triangular relationship 
between self, social groupings and media consumption.
423
  Indeed, notwithstanding the centrality 
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(which shall be considered in the following chapter) of official group propaganda to ‘jihadi’ 
consumption behaviour, it is important to point out that jihadi content is clearly not the monopoly 
of violent groups. On the contrary, popular forms such as the jihadi nashid which may, but by no 
means must be related to particular organisations would seem to be among the most common types 
of jihadi item on the Web. As such, the jihadi would seem to be popular or folk culture as much as 
it is formalized theology or ideology.  
 
A key implication to this is that it would seem that taking consumption practices rather than 
ideological belief as a starting point is not only possible, but may even be necessary. If we take, for 
example, the case of a hypothetical person browsing the productions of a munshid such as ‘Abu 
‘Ali’, how might we go about explaining the decision to download a ‘jihadi’ nashid, as opposed to 
one on some other Islamic subject? It seems doubtful that we could reliably relate this decision to 
different individuals holding different opinions about the legitimacy of violent jihad since, after all, 
they are consuming material by the same singer and from the same site. If so, then we would 
seemingly have to suppose that the matter is more one of ‘taste’. Presumably some people simply 
‘like’ Islamic materials which deal with matters of, say, the virtues of the prophet or one’s gratitude 
to one’s mother more than those which deal with oppression, injustice, heroism, blood and 
martyrdom.  
 
Consumption as a behaviour invites us to think of different types of jihadism not as tightly bounded 
ideological fiefdoms ruled unswervingly by particular points of theological or political orthodoxy, 
but rather – to use Kozinets’ definition of the ‘culture of consumption’, as ‘a particular 
interconnected system of … images, texts and objects that particular groups use - through the 
construction of overlapping and even conflicting practices, identities and meanings - to collectively 
make sense of their environments and orient their members’ experiences and lives’.
424
 Indeed, by 
seeing ‘the jihadi’ as an interlocking set of texts and cultural artifacts which can be engaged with to 
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varying levels of depth, for different reasons and in different ways, we can also resolve the 
apparently unidimensional nature of ‘jihadiness’ in content. In the same way that not everyone who 
sometimes wears black lipstick or nail varnish aspires to a deeper engagement in ‘goth’ style, so 
one might assert that the trappings of ‘the jihadi’ are something which can quite meaningfully be 
adopted by groups or individuals in half measures.  
 
This, in turn, suggests an alternative way of considering what it means to be ‘a jihadi’. If one 
defines ‘a jihadi’ as someone who engages in certain ways with ‘the jihadi’, this suggests a 
distinctive set of ways of operating with this body of material (perhaps relating to the possession of 
differing levels of jihadi cultural capital) which may possess a logic of their own. As a cultural 
system, the rules governing the pleasures, incentives and even, perhaps, means of advancement in 
Internet ‘jihadism’ may well relate to, but need not be identical to the ideological principles which 
are supposed to lie behind the global jihad as a whole.   
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5. 
Forums as Jihadi Webspace 
5.0 Internet Jihadism as a Collective Enterprise 
The object is the complete transmission of experience to the Internet. It is true that one of our brothers is 
missing, and by God he has left a profound influence in the heart. But it is necessary that jihad not rely on any 
single person. And if we have experienced a loss, then I say as a media mujahid that we have not joined except 
so that we can experience imprisonment. We ask God for mercy and forgiveness. I ask God to accept us for 
recruitment to the lands of jihad and martyrdom. Right now, your duty is to have conveyed all your experience 
and all your information to others, whether in a manual, or forum threads, and you will have a reward, God 
willing, which will reach you after death and martyrdom. A brother who is inventive in the field of graphic 
design of videos or banners, if he presented a study, and tried to summarise the essence of what he knows will, 
God willing, complete the preparation of ten others beside himself. It is true that every brother has skills and 
creativity.  But the transmission of information remains necessary, and it influences many. Another example: a 
brother who is a munshid, if he mentioned to us the programmes he uses and the useful programmes, and ways 
to record (but with the condition that this does not implicate him, or constitute a security risk), and this 
munshid brother has a voice and an outstanding way of singing nashids, but by this means there become 
known, and we see, twenty munshids who did not know how to get started. And always the words of the one 
who works in a certain field will have a place in people’s hearts.
425
  
As this extract from a forum post usefully shows, Internet jihadism is very much a collective 
enterprise. There are jihadi poets like the ‘Poet of Al Qaida’ we encountered in the previous 
chapter. There are jihadi designers, there are jihadi hackers and computer experts, there are jihadi 
administrators, and (at the lowest rung of involvement) there are prolific jihadi web trawlers and re-
posters. Like other types of collaborative project, such as the wiki, these activities can perhaps be 
read as exemplifying Levy’s notion of collective intelligence. ‘No one knows everything, everyone 
knows something, all knowledge resides in humanity’.
426
 One person can design, another can hack, 
a third knows about theology, a fourth is a poet, a fifth is prepared to trawl the Internet all day 
looking for choice titbits. Put it all together, and it makes a forum.  
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But when jihadis collectively produce on the Internet, what is it that they are collectively 
producing? And, in the process of doing so, what do they actually do? Is there, in fact an overall 
purpose being served? The post above makes very clear, of course, that the ultimate end is supposed 
to be jihad and martyrdom. But looked at more closely there is an ambiguity. The actual concrete 
practices which the writer talks about seem to have little direct relation to the goal that he seeks. 
‘Emigration’ and ‘martyrdom’ come across as much as rewards which the Lord will provide to 
those who commit themselves faithfully enough to the cause of sharing experience online. Is then 
the amassing, production, and mutual consumption of jih!diyy!t simply what it claims to be: a way 
of helping the mujahidin, or could it be, for some, a reason for staying online by itself?  
5.1 Basic Characteristics of Jihadi Forums 
As we saw in the previous chaper, in immediate, practical terms, the centrepiece - the primary 
‘location’ of Internet jihadism is the ‘jihadi forum’ (al-muntada al-jih!d"). A jihadi forum is, at its 
heart, a web forum - the modern equivalent, in fact, of the electronic bulletin boards which provided 
the platform for some of the earliest manifestations of ‘virtual community’, including Howard 
Rheingold’s original ‘virtual community’, The Well.
427
 In other words, it is a many to many, 
dominantly text based, asynchronous communication platform.
428
 In practice, jihadi forums are 
nearly always the centrepiece of a wider, eponymous (even seemingly synonymous) ‘Islamic 
network’. But while the forum itself is frequently described by users as the ‘network’ (shibka), in 
reality the term accurately reflects the fact that these are indeed networks which extend over a 
variety of media. Embedded in the jihadi bulletin board is a private messaging system internal to the 
forum, which may be used to carry more sensitive communications not visible to other members.
429
 
The forum’s management also communicates with members by means of a mailing list, which is 
used to provide information on new releases of various kinds. These may include, in turn, writings 
located on blogs or websites external to the forum itself, which may be named obscurely - 
presumably to avoid detection by casual browsers. Indeed, any material requiring significant 
amounts of bandwidth (video and audio in particular, and also pdf files) is hosted externally - 
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usually by a commercial ‘one click download’ site. At least since 2008 it has been normal practice 
to encrypt such material where it is hosted, providing the password along with the forum post which 
advertises and links to it. In addition to this, the ‘network’ centred on the forum may initiate 
particular branded ventures into other media. The network Ansar al-Mujahidin possesses its own 
(somewhat nomadic) group on the chat service PalTalk,
430
 and continues to operate an ostensibly 
affilliated YouTube channel.
431
 Awan and Al-Lami note Al Fallujah forum’s interest in establishing 
a presence on the social networking site Facebook.
432
  Madad al-Suyuf, seemingly in imitation of 
another type of networked jihadi entity - the ‘Islamic media foundation’ has set up its own content 
brand - mainly, it seems, for the provision of videos of Islamic 'alaq!t.  
The Islamic network, both by virtue of being a network, and also by deliberate design, is a robust 
entity. The forum is continually backed up by the administrator, and will usually exist as a number 
of differently named mirror sites. Should all versions of the forum go down (as happens from time 
to time) the mailing list enables members to locate it easily at its new URL when it returns. All 
materials disseminated through the site are hosted on multiple locations, to which many dozens of 
separate links are provided. A major activity on jihadi forums - indeed, one of the most relaxed 
forms of social interaction to take place on the forum itself - is the provision of mutual assistance in 
finding downloadable versions of older jihadi materials.
433
  
As will be explored below, jihadi forums have, over their history, displayed variable degrees of 
openness to public viewers. 
434
 Typically, however, a forum’s pages can be viewed openly without 
any need to log in. Moreover, joining a jihadi forum is often relatively easy - one fills out a form 
similar to any other network - providing one’s email address, nickname, time zone and (optionally) 
some personal information and is sent a link which enables one to log on. Occasionally, jihadi 
forums (like other forums) close registration to new members. But even when membership remains 
open, internal barriers exist in the forum itself. Access to the private messaging system is 
conditional on a member having made a certain number of posts (100 on Madad al-Suyuf, for 
example). And within the forum there is a section reserved for the management (id!ra) which is 
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inaccessible to an ordinary member. To reach this, it is necessary to send a request directly to the 
management by email, explaining why one believes that one should be allowed access. Thus jihadi 
forums (like web forums and bulletin boards generally) embody a certain procedural hierarchy: 
there are ordinary members, who may merely lurk, ‘active members’, ‘senior members’, moderators 
and administrators.  
While jihadi forums incorporate the same basic structure built in to the format of a web forum, they 
are also self-consciously Islamic online spaces, and try to maintain themselves as such. Indeed, the 
‘terms and conditions’ for membership embody a mixture of ‘cyber’ and Islamic ethics which can 
perhaps be understood best through the notion of ‘cultured technology’
435
. To take a typical 
example, many of the conditions for membership in the forum Al Fallujah are purely practical – 
users are asked not to repeat posts, to post subjects in the appropriate part of the forums and so on. 
Moreover, users are warned against widely used but frowned upon online community tricks such as 
‘sock puppeting’ (registering as more than one user).  On the other hand, pictures of women are 
forbidden ‘even if there is justification’. Posters are asked to respect ‘Islamic manners, and manners 
in general’, and not to post anything which could cause fitna (dissent) among Muslims, and to make 
sure that any a'!d&th are cited correctly. In keeping with strict wahhabi and salafi views, music is 
forbidden on the grounds that it is banned by Islamic shar"‘a law. Members are also warned against 
‘speculation into the unseen – especially Sufism’.  
Perhaps most interesting, however, are the exhortations against activities which one might imagine 
would be an important part of online jihadism. Users are asked not to hack other websites, nor to 
use the forum to distribute materials on how to make bombs. They are also asked not to ‘preach’ on 
other websites, except with the express permission of the management of the forum.
436
 The first two 
of these conditions do not seem to be taken very seriously in practice. Instructions on how to make 
a bomb or hack a website can still be found from time to time on Al-Fallujah forum, and it may be 
that such exhortations are merely disclaimers (such as the one the forums often make about the 
content they host not necessarily expressing the views of the management). And yet it does seem to 
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be the case that jihadi forums today emphasise physical military preparation less than some sites in 
the past which devoted whole sections to the topic.  
Indeed, the basic organisation of content in jihadi forums is worth briefly setting out.
437
 Present in 
virtually all jihadi forums
438
 are (1) a ‘general’ forum, primarily for articles posted by members; (2) 
a section for ‘communiques and releases’ (bay!n!t and i%d!r!t) which posts links to new 
propaganda items from mujahidin groups; (3) at least one primarily religious section - called, for 
example the ‘forum for shari‘a  discussion’ in Al Fallujah and the ‘forum for tawhid and jihad’ in 
Ansar al-Mujahidin; (4), a news and current affairs section, often called, or subtitled forum for 
discussion of the condition of the Islamic Ummah, (5) a forum for ‘Islamic video and audio’ 
materials and (6) a ‘technical section’ dealing with topics such as computer programmes, graphic 
design and on occasion ‘the Islamic mobile phone’. Sometimes, these forums (also called sh!sh!t - 
i.e, boards) are grouped into higher level categories. Shumukh al-Islam for instance, has a ‘jihadi 
channel’, a ‘communiques section’, a ‘general section’, a ‘technical section’ and a ‘management 
section’. Mujahidin Electronic Network has a ‘media and political section’, ‘jihadi sections’, 
‘Islamic sections’, ‘general sections’, ‘computer equipment and technical matters’ and, again, 
‘management’.  
The self-organisation of topics in jihadi forums represents, in outline, a number of the tensions of 
jihadism which we have already encountered: the uncomfortable, often messy organisational 
divisions between technology and technique on the one hand (audio, video, mobile phone, graphic 
design, ‘channel’) and content on the other (again the tripartite scheme of militancy, Islamic law, 
current affairs); and between the primacy of the forum management, the forum members and the 
mujahidin themselves.  
This relationship is further compounded by the complex and indeterminate relationship between the 
‘Islamic Network’ as a jihadi entity unto itself, and as a platform for material produced by 
mujahidin groups. As is often the case where matters of global jihadism are concerned, determining 
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whether such entities are best understood in terms of strategic calculations by political entities 
(whether conceived as movements, networks or something more formally constituted), or through 
more organic processes of interaction is as much a matter of which perspective one chooses to 
adopt as it is of different empirical realities.  
5.2 Emergence of Jihadi Forums 
Thus, the history of jihadi forums can be written either from the perspective of the ‘strategic’ 
propaganda needs of mujahidin groups, or of the gradual development of a grassroots jihadi 
movement on the Internet - even prior to September 11th. It is on the former perspective that most 
Western discussions have been premised to date. Brachman
439
 has chronicled the various 
propaganda materials produced by militant Islamic groups even prior to the availability of the 
Internet - a practice which, for the case of the GIA’s magazine Al Ansar has been illustrated in the 
memoirs of Nasiri.
440
 Kohlmann has observed, further, how producing videos of operations was a 
practice which developed in the Caucasus prior to the dissemination of such material online.
441
 
After September 11th, interest grew in sites which seemed to be in some sense affiliated to Al 
Qaida, such as al-Neda
442
 and Azzam.com
443
. Following the closure of these sites, and a burst of 
new jihadi activity resulting from the invasion of Iraq, jihadi groups began to turn to sympathetic 
web forums as a means of disseminating their operation videos and other materials.
444
 Among these 
was a forum called Al-Ansar, which had the honour of being logged onto by Abu Maysara Al-Iraqi, 
press secretary to leader of Al Qaida in Iraq, Abu Mus‘ab Al-Zarqawi – an event which elevated 
Al-Ansar forum, and in particular its principal administrators – two electronic jihadis who went by 
the online handles of Irhabi [‘terrorist’] 007 and Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi to legendary status 
in the online jihadi community.
445
 After the closure of Al Ansar (for reasons to be discussed 
shortly), a number of new forums were created in its stead.  
A useful alternative to this ‘top down’ account is the one presented by Madad al-Suyuf 
administrator Abu Harith al-Mihdar in a lengthy post to this forum entitled ‘Jihadi Forums: What 
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They Have, What They Need’.
446
 This figure is, it is worth pointing out, very controversial in jihadi 
circles. Notable for his scathing and often ad hominem attacks on other jihadi ideologues – most 
particularly Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and another ‘jihadi’ shaykh, Hani Siba’i of the Al 
Maqreze Centre in London, who, stepping in to lend support to Maqdisi found himself accused of 
working undercover for British intelligence.
447
 Al Mihdar himself is no stranger to such 
accusations. A post on the salafi forum ‘I Am a Muslim’ claimed that he had been thrown out of 
countless forums in the past for his disagreeable behaviour and, on one occasion, for logging in 
with an Israeli IP address.
448
 Taking this further, a post in the forum Al Buraq presents an elaborate 
biography, claiming that the whole identity of Al-Mihdar is a front for a Jewish imposter by the 
name of Nadhim al-Maghribi.
449
 A ostensibly more likely account is offered by the journalist 
Sayyid Zaid who, writing in Islam Online, claims that Abu Harith al-Mihdar is actually an Egyptian 
Islamic scholar by the name of Hani al-Shadhili, who founded Medad al-Suyuf after unsuccessful 
attempts to establish himself as an Islamic authority in London.
450
  
Notwithstanding such controversies, and the question of what bearing they may have on the 
accuracy and level of bias in Al Mihdar’s account, his post nonetheless represents a useful window 
into the subjective impressions of someone who is, unquestionably, a highly experienced Internet 
jihadi.  According to Al Mihdar, the history of jihadi forums can be traced from the activities of 
proponents of violent jihad on the earliest Arabic web forums of the mid-to late 1990s. These 
included what are still some of the major Arabic forums today, including al-Sahat al-‘Arabiyya
451
 
and Shibkat Ana al-Muslim (I Am the Muslim Network).
452
 Al Mihdar describes the scene at the 
time in the following terms:  
Arabic forums started to appear approximately ten years ago, and the first one to appear was al-Sahat, as I 
recall. In 1999, ‘Ana ‘Arabi’ [I am an Arab] appeared, which the Saudi intelligence bought, and renamed ‘Ana 
al-Muslim’. [I am the Muslim]. At the same time Al-Sahab website appeared, which was Islamic in the 
beginning. In 2000-2001, the website Islam Online appeared. The writers on the Internet at that time went in 
different directions. I moved on to the website ‘Jawab’. There was a chatroom mainly for Egyptians. And the 
groups that were taking part in dialogue on the Net were generally limited. There was ‘Ali al-Qurani, who 
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debated against the Rafidi Shiites in al-Sahat, and against him there was a man called Al-Malak al-Tair [the 
flying angel], and with him speedbird, and a group of people who were supposed to be Sunnis. On the other 
hand there was audio chat in PalTalk. Most of this was Muslims against Christians. And the strange thing was 
that all these forums, except Islamway, remain online up till now. Others came and went and didn’t leave 
much effect other than on a few people.   
Al Mihdar’s account goes on to corroborate the view already expressed by Western commentators 
as to the significance of the Al Ansar forum in the development of jihadism online. What is 
significant, however, is the way in which he offers a perspective not from the strategic propaganda 
needs of Al Qaida or its affiliates, but rather from the online actions of individual enthusiasts. For 
Al-Mihdar, the emergence of jihadi forums is the product of a gradual process of engagement 
whereby people with jihadi tendencies moved from general interest forums such as the Arabic 
Realms, through Islamic forums such as Al Qala‘a
453
 or Islah,
454
 before finally producing the first 
properly ‘jihadi’ entities on the Web.  
This account does not so much contradict the one set out above it, as provide the other half of the 
picture - offering an online world with its own characters and heroes. In practice, of course, setting 
up an online jihadi enterprise necessarily arises from the coming together of both offline and online 
jihadi experiences. This can be seen in the following post, concerning the establishment of a new 
website which appeared in 2009 on the forum www.swalif.net/soft - an Arabic forum specialising in 
technical computer matters. Here an ‘active member’ calling himself ‘Castle of Palestine’ informs 
members: 
Peace be upon you, dear brothers, I have vowed to disseminate these materials on the Internet, wherever I have 
membership, and especially on sawalif-soft. The brothers of the mujahidin in Palestine want to establish a 
website for themselves, and they need the following: 
1. News scripts for jihadi news 
2. Scripts for articles with photos, where biographies of the souls of martyrs can be disseminated 
3. Unique anashid scripts which could include albums and videoclips 
4. Hosting on a Russian server, so that the Jews can’t hit it.  
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5. Support for an email server 
6. A flexible mail menu script – so that we can send the members the latest news 
 
Frustrated at a slow response, ‘Castle of Palestine’ later complains: 
 For shame! 23 viewers and not one reply? 
At last, however, constructive responses begin to appear. A member, who claims, in his electronic 
signature, to run an Arabic computer magazine responds saying ‘I am able to give you the scripts – 
the rest is for the other brothers’. Another responds that he is ‘happy to do the whole website – the 
design, hosting and the programming’. ‘Castle of Palestine’ arranges to continue the discussion with 
these two via email and messenger.  
Others are more sceptical; ‘I hope that this website doesn’t serve the takfiri ideology of the 
followers of Bin Laden’ opined one. ‘Castle of Palestine’ responds in the affirmative. 
Dear brother chat UAE – I said that the website is ‘jihadi’ so ‘the letter can be known by its title’. Whoever 
would like to help, they are welcome. If you don’t like it, just say a word of goodness and pray for your 
brothers in Palestine.
455
 
Apart from the interesting insight which this discussion provides into the conceptualisation of what 
is meant by ‘jihadi’ to different people, it is possible to read from the exchange here both a sense of 
how the foundation of a jihadi forum fits into a wider understanding of the meaning and purpose of 
online activity, and some of the practical actions which such a development involves. For ‘Castle of 
Palestine’ the foundation of a jihadi forum is an extension of his existing activities in 
‘disseminating these materials’. It is, so it would seem, a way of deepening his ‘vowed’ 
commitment to do so.  
5.3 Security Concerns 
Another point highlighted by this post is the extent to which jihadi sites are perceived (not 
unreasonably) as under constant threat from their enemies.  The validity of this level of suspicion 
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was confirmed when it turned out that an important jihadi forum - suspected to have been Al 
Hisbah, the most important of the four ‘major’ jihadi forums that existed up to the end of 2008
456
 - 
was revealed by the Washington Post
457
 to have been run all along as a Saudi/American intelligence 
front. One of the most interesting things about this revelation, however, was the fact that it appears 
to have caused more consternation among Western analysts than it did among jihadis - who had 
already long appreciated the level of intelligence infiltration into forums. Posts on the jihadi forums 
where the story seems to have been appeared Madad al-Suyuf
458
 and Hanayn
459
 and the Salafi 
forums such as Muslm.net,
460
 Alfetn.net
461
 simply referred back to the original story, with relatively 
little discussion. On Muslm.net, where the news generated most interest, one poster observed 
simply that all jihadi forums are penetrated. Another insisted, to the contrary, that the very fact that 
security services had had to create their own forum and then resorted to hacking others indicated 
that they had been unable to penetrate the ‘Al Fajr Media Centre’ at its highest level.
462
  
Both comments, in their different ways, indicate to the default assumption of Internet jihadis that all 
sites, however useful, must be assumed suspect. Indeed, so fundamental and so perennial is the 
issue of security on jihadi forums that it can be argued that discussion of the topic has moved 
beyond mere practical considerations about how best to stay safe online, and become an implicit 
statement on the very nature and purpose of being online as a jihadi at all. This can be illustrated 
through consideration the example of following ‘guide for participants in forums on the Internet’ 
provided by qmagreb - the official website of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.  
It is no longer unknown to anyone how important are chat rooms on the Internet, and the effect achieved in 
international communications, so that it has come to pass that by means of them major newspapers and satellite 
channels seek out and publish the jihadi news  (they contain). And the mujahidin have benefited from the 
Internet, and in particular from this application, a benefit praised in particular for the ending of the … and the 
breaking of the Zionist/Crusader stranglehold over the media which has constrained the mujahidin for long 
years.  
Intelligence apparatuses in all their varieties have become sensible of this danger [i.e, the propagation of jihadi 
news via Internet forums], as if they saw in these chatrooms an irreplaceable chance to trap whomever they 
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may of the ‘terrorists’, or whoever is opposed to this or that institution. And they have made great efforts to 
break into the chatrooms, inserting their members to trip up whomever they can thereby, or by putting pressure 
on the owners of those chatrooms to cooperate with them in such things, and indeed the CIA announced lately 
on the channel CNN that it was planning to set up Arabic language chatrooms to trap ‘jihadis’. 
The document goes on to give ten rules for would be participants in jihadi forums to keep 
themselves secure that are, summarizing somewhat:  
1. Remember that people you meet on the Internet may not be who they say they are 
2. Use a proxy whenever using a forum  
3. If logging on from an Internet café, use several, a good distance from where you live 
4. Always delete ‘history’ after finishing, and disable cookies.  
5. Be careful about files offered for download on a forum  
6. If asked to download software in order to browse a forum, never do so 
7. Never have email contact with anyone outside the forum; never give away your email address 
8. Use different passwords for different forums 
9. Never reveal anything about personal identity 
10. ‘If you just want to chat and make friends, jihadi forums aren’t for you!’463 
And yet, if jihadi forums are not secure platforms for operational planning, and they are not to ‘chat 
and make friends’, then the question arises as to what they are ‘for’. Al Mihdar states this point 
more bluntly when he comments: 
People ask: ‘are these forums intelligence fronts?’ The answer is, no – whether al-Hisbah or al-Ikhlas or even -
---------, which fell lately. The brothers who work on it are not intelligence.
464
 Another question proceeds from 
this. Are these forums safe? The answer is no. And I include in that Madad al-Suyuf and every other forum in 
the world. The reason is that the forum might be penetrated or not. And the penetrations mean that the forum 
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will be harmed – just like what happened to Muhajiroun, Hisbah and others. Some ask: does Al Qaida know 
this? The answer is yes – just like you or I do. 
In other words - notwithstanding the idea of jihadi forums as social media - as, ‘Al Qaida’s 
MySpace’
465
, the reality seems to be that jihadi forums are not - or are no longer - understood to be 
safe places for unfettered socialisation.  
5.4 Purpose of Jihadi Forums 
If Jihadi forums are not the thriving hubs of terrorist activity they have sometimes been suggested 
to be, then what explains their continued attraction?
466
 One possibility is that jihadi forums - even if 
they are not ideal for ‘operational planning’ are nonetheless vibrant communities in which jihadis 
can talk to one another and form social bonds. It is certainly the case that forums are spoken about 
by jihadis in profoundly affectionate terms. Al Hisbah, for instance, was nicknamed ‘our green 
castle’,
467
 and we shall see later how the experience of a forum being closed produces a shocking 
sense of loss and exile in its members. And yet, it is not clear that a great deal of obvious 
conversation actually takes place on forums - at any rate, not on the forums themselves. Posts on 
jihadi forums are very rarely followed by serious comments. Rather, they are responded to visually 
and performatively: jihadis offer ‘prayers’ to those who post well, through the formula ‘God give 
you good’ (jazak allah khayr), which is sometimes reproduced in animated and elaborately 
decorated characters. It seems, thus, as if it is not so much conversation which is important on the 
forums, as the feeling of virtual presence. Indeed, the lack of meaningful discussion on jihadi 
forums is something Al Mihdar finds particularly vexatious. As he writes:  
I prepared a study of the forum Al Hisbah with the help of a team from Al-Madad. They gave me the number 
of members registered online daily. Then we calculated the number of members who genuinely contributed 
posts to the forum. Then we calculated the number of members who participated by making a comment. Then 
we calculated the number of members who say nothing but ‘God give you good.’ So we saw that the members 
who have their own posts were not more than 1.34% of the total number of members. And the ones who placed 
comments after these, were approximately 21% of total members. And of those 21%, not more than 0.6% said 
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something useful. I wished to give a message to those brothers suggesting that they put all of their ‘God give 
you goods’ together in a single post – i.e, this brother and that brother and the other brother all say ‘God give 
you good’ instead of having ten pages of these posts so that whoever is searching can’t find anything useful. 
After this we made another search for those who have placed their own posts (of the 1.34%). We found that 
75% post subjects from Hamid al-Ali, Abu Basir or Dr Hani Siba’i. Of the other 25%, 24% posted subjects 
originally posted by others. This left us with 1%. Half of this consisted of insults. The other 0.5% was Abi Abd 
al-Razaq and his like. In Al Hisbah, they noticed this, and they made a forum specially for Abi Abd al-Razaq. 
This means that [overall] the forum is nothing more than a place where news of mujahidin is disseminated. 
As hard quantitative data, it is questionable as to whether we can take this seriously. In October 
2008, towards the end of its life (and at the height of its popularity) al-Hisbah claimed a total 
membership of 11,474.
468
 Based on the figures claimed above, this would suggest that the total 
number of people on the forum offering original and constructive contributions was less than one. 
As a general reflection on the lack of meaningful interaction within the bulletin board space, 
however, its broad accuracy can be confirmed simply by visiting any similar forum. Perhaps as a 
response to this, the jihadi forum Ansar al-Mujahidin, for instance, has begun to distinguish the 
ritual use of ‘jazak allah khayr’ with a category of its own. Next to a new topic on the forum it is 
now possible to see not just the number of responses, but also the number of ‘prayers’ which have 
been offered to the poster.  
All this helps to corroborate Al Mihdar’s basic claim, which is that the fundamental purpose of 
jihadi forums is not so much to form close-knit communities for the further practical development 
of jihad, as to provide platforms for the dissemination of jihadi material.  
Forums are either about disseminating ideology, like al-Madad (and this is what it was meant to be from the 
beginning), or forums for dialogue, in which there are replies and proofs and questions, and there are only a 
few of these. Examples of forums which spread ideology include the forum of Sheikh Nasir al-Fahd, God have 
mercy on him. He used to put theological research on it, and didn’t discuss anything. And now there is al-
Athari, which aims to expose the disgrace of Madkhalism. There is also the forum of the Egyptian Jama’a al-
Islamiyya. These do their work successfully and achieve their aims, though we have our differences with them. 
The dialogue forums are very few and rare. They include, for example, al-Sahat al-Hurra, and to establish a 
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forum like this requires experienced moderators, who delete whatever is unnecessary from the point of view of 
whoever is behind the forum. So if somebody adds to a forum a post which consists of nothing but  swearing it 
is deleted, and if somebody makes a post which presents a good argument they leave it, even if it is against the 
opinions of the moderators. 
Accordingly, he advances a particular argument relating to the question of whether forums should 
be openly accessible to the public, or closed. Al Mihdar sees closing forums and having only 
‘membership by referral’ as a recipe for disaster, not just because it defeats the object of making 
jihadi material widely available, but also because it produces a clique which, inevitably succumbs 
to bitter factional infighting - leading ultimately to the end of the forum.  
Nor - he insists - do such measures even work in the interests of security.  
As far as I know they [al Ikhlas] never fell into the trap of registration by referral. What does this mean? It 
means selective registration. This is a dubious strategy, which I have no doubt was originally suggested by 
intelligence. Besides which, it has a problem. Why? Here’s why. Why do you close a forum? If you think that 
it is to prevent intelligence from entering, I say: how do you know that there aren’t intelligence already among 
the members? If you say that you know them all individually, I say: then why do some of them subsequently 
get ejected? Anyway, Al Hisbah used to use this method, with open membership for the media agency. In the 
end, all these secrets are available to any foreigner in a foreign country, as long as he has an email address with 
a foreign or Arabic newspaper or television channel he will be able to get into the forum. 
We can see some of this disillusionment reflected in the experience of ‘Talib 21’, who complains 
thus on the ‘Politics, Jihad and Current Affairs’ section of the intermittently English language 
Islamic forum Islamic Awakening. 
 AlSalamu Alaikum 
Sorry brothers, but these websites are very fanatic I have ever seen, I was a member of al-Eklass, one day I 
posted a thread asking about innocent people killing in Iraq and Afghanistan because of suicide bombing, they 
didn’t answer me but they kick me out. That means you can not benefit from this kind of web sites because 
you can not see different point of views, only the administrator point of view and his friends. 
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This post was met with little sympathy, with others replying that it served Talib 21 right. ‘Don’t 
blame them for banning you’ Abumuwahid, another forum member replied, ‘they must be sick and 
tired of those type of questions’. Perhaps more tellingly, ‘Traveler’ a senior member ended the 
discussion with the opinion that: 
I didn’t ever believe those websites were running for the purpose of debate. Their task is clear for them. 
Debates happen on other sites. Their job is to propagate and disseminate information from the Mujahidin.
469
  
The idea that jihadi forums are simply dissemination platforms now seems to be taken for granted. 
As much can be illustrated by the fact that a post by ‘Song of Terror’ - an active member of Al 
Fallujah forum - is entirely premised on using statistics available from Alexa.com to demonstrate 
‘why Al Fallujah is number one’.
470
 The implicit assumption behind this claim is that the size of a 
forum’s readership is the only consideration which matters in assessing its success. And yet, 
plainly, this view is not - or at least has not always been universal. For those who have been 
members of forums offering only ‘membership by referral’, there was, presumably, a different 
rationale. Of course, since the most prominent such forum was Al Hisbah, this rationale may well 
ultimately have been to entrap jihadis into revealing information or fomenting online plots. And yet, 
even so, the actual members of this forum must have had rationales of their own.  
A useful way to examine this issue is to consider an emergency dicussion that took place on Al-
Hisbah in September 2008. Just previous to this, the other three ‘first tier’ jihadi forums (Al Ikhlas, 
Al Buraq and Al Firdaws) had mysteriously closed down, for reasons which were, it seemed 
unknown to the jihadis themselves, given the various people who were blamed - including Shiite 
hackers, Israel and the CIA. Jihadi forums come under attack quite frequently, and periodically 
become inaccessible. However, given the scale of the loss, and the uncertainty (so it seems) about 
when and indeed if the forums would ever reappear, the event caused great consternation. 
Thousands of the members of the now defunct forums attempted to ‘emigrate’ - to the last forum 
standing - Al Hisbah. Indeed, such individuals were described as having ‘emigrated’, or become 
‘exiled’ - using the same word used to describe the prophet Muhammad’s hijra from persecution in 
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Mecca to set up a new community in Medina. However, al Hisbah was at the time a referral only 
forum, which meant that it was inaccessible to these new arrivals. For this reason, a public thread 
was opened on 22nd September in which members of the forum discussed the important question of 
whether or not to open registration. The contentiousness of the question suggests that the view 
expressed by Al-Mihdar and Song of Terror was far from universally held at this time, and in this 
online place. The thread opened with a member called Abdullah al-Harbi commenting:  
It is impossible that we should be unaware of the stopping of our forums, and their delay in returning. And 
because of that, it behoves us to work with this situation as we find it. Before a time, a long time ago, there 
was Al-Buraq forum, from among the most active of our forums. And after it was stopped for a long period, 
many of its active members fled to al-Ekhlas forum, and we said to ourselves: ‘maybe it is for the best’. For 
Al-Ekhlas was one of our most beloved networks. And it was a trusted site. But now three chief forums have 
been taken down, and these are Al Ikhlas, the blue Al Boraq [as opposed, presumably, to the red one, which 
serves the Islamic Army in Iraq] and Al-Firdaws. We ask God to reply to them with something good. And at 
the same time, the time is imminent for the concession of Al-Hisbah to the opening of its pages to visitors. 
What is the solution? Where will members of our networks congregate? And this is no small number. Indeed, 
the membership of Al Ikhlas was more than 57,000 members, including the members of Al Buraq and Al 
Firdaws after Ramadan. And the word is that they will be slow in returning. The word is their members despair 
of their return. And this drives them to search for other forums, possessing of the upstanding spirit of our 
forums. But perhaps they will flee to forums not known from the lists where it is not known who stands behind 
them – but perhaps cracked forums – and the list continues – penetrated by national intelligence with a view to 
placing our brothers, the Ansar, among their company.  
  What is the solution, in your opinion?
471
 
In the lively discussion that followed some members calling for a temporary opening of the forum 
to registration by new members, others for membership to remain closed, and yet others for some 
kind of compromise. Ironically, in the light of recent revelations, members expressed fears of 
penetration by ‘spies’ and ‘intelligence’, but also by ‘malicious individuals’ who would cause 
‘headaches’ or ‘dissension’ – (i.e, fitna) in the community. A particular issue here seemed to be 
regarding the actions of the Islamic State (Al Qaida) in Iraq.  
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In other words, the protectionist view of the forum taken by Al-Hisbah members was essentially the 
obverse of Al-Mihdar’s. For them (or at least for some of them), membership by referral was not 
about inviting factionalism and contention, but rather about walling out contention, in the service of 
a tighter community. Indeed, apropos of this, it is worth mentioning the personal slogan of 
Abdullah Harbi’s account, which read - in diametric opposition to ‘Song of Terror’s’ fixation on 
marketing statistics - that ‘the forum is not [made] by the number of its members, but by their 
closeness [r!bi#a]’.  
5.5 Al Sayf: ‘Reading’ a Forum 
Thus far, we have been concerned with the ‘big picture’ with regard to jihadi forums: their overall 
structure, history, ways of organising material and (according to jihadis who help to run them) their 
ultimate purpose and the criteria for judging their success in achieving it. And yet we have still not 
really discussed the basic stuff of jihadi existence online - what we might call ‘the jihadi quotidian’. 
In part, this is because it is a difficult, insubstantial thing to grasp. Being an ordinary jihadi on a 
jihadi forum is a practice which, on the whole, acquires form and meaning only in aggregate. While 
there are notable jihadi writers publishing primarily online who are capable of producing pieces 
worthy of admiration in themselves (Lewis Atiyatallah might be an obvious example here, see al-
Rashid,
472
 Stout,
473
 Brachman
474
; Bunt,
475
), and perhaps also a figure such as Ahmad Bawadi, for 
most jihadis, contributing to a forum involves primarily the act of compilation: sharing with 
members interesting pieces of news, jihadi items, theological opinions and, perhaps with growing 
confidence, occasional self-written pieces on political, moral or strategic topics. It is not so much 
the individual post which matters as the larger text produced by the combined effect of such little 
gestures.  
Perhaps the easiest way to move beyond such generalities without simply turning the discussion 
into yet another analysis of jihadi content is to consider a jihadi forum in its totality. The example 
which will be used here is that of Al Sayf Jihadi Forums. Al Sayf was a relatively small forum of 
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what might be called the ‘second tier’ which lasted from July 2006 to July 2007. Informal 
comparison with sections of other forums (Ansar al-Mujahidin, Al Fallujah, Al Mujahidin 
Electronic Network, Madad al-Suyuf suggests that its basic content and structure was broadly 
similar to other ‘jihadi’ forums. Its relatively small size however (786 original threads in total) 
means that reviewing it in its entirety is a viable project for a single researcher.
476
 
Al Sayf’s posts were dominated by a handful of main members. ‘Wajih al Qamar’ was the pre-
eminent the forum in terms of sheer volume of posting, contributing 597 posts and 478 original 
subjects over the active life of the forum. While Wajih al-Qamar’s posts ranged across every 
subsection of the forum, from bomb making instructions on the ‘Encyclopedia of Preparation’ to 
hacking tutorials on the ‘jihadi hacker’ forum to heartwarming or harrowing tales of sin and 
redemption in the ‘forum for Da‘wa to God’ to Ramadan greetings on the ‘general’ forum. 
Compared to others, however, Wajih al-Qamar showed a disproporationate interest in moral issues. 
Next in volume was ‘Al-Muhannad’. In contrast to Wajih al-Qamar, the dominant interests reflected 
in this member’s posting record were ‘military strategy’ and ‘preparation’. Farid Lutfi, another 
relatively prolific poster, was notable as the forum’s in-house designer. A fourth member, Abu 
Khattab al-Dalimi was the only member of the forum who apparently claimed active affiliation with 
a fighting group, being a member (so he said) of the Islamic Army in Iraq.  
Overwhelmingly, the main activity on Al-Sayf consisted of reposting. By far the most common 
category of post, accounting for fully 40% of all posts on the forum, were copies of the 
‘communications and reports’ released by mujahidin groups – particularly in Iraq. Posting official 
materials of these groups, then, represented the ‘core consumption activity’ of the forum – the one 
around which all other content was ultimately oriented.  
Around this backbone of content relating to the regular achievements of the mujahidin against a 
variety of opponents of varying degrees of externality and internality (Crusaders, Jews, Shiites, 
apostates, spies) the wider ‘text’ offered by the aggregate of the forum’s posts becomes readable. 
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The community of the mujahidin stands between two other levels of community, between which it 
can be seen, in a sense, to mediate. Above and beyond the mujahidin is the Muslim Ummah as a 
whole – on whose behalf the mujahidin fight, and fighting for whom is the highest aspiration of the 
individual Muslim. On the other hand, at a more intimate level than the external battles of the 
mujahidin is the ‘jihadi’ community of support for the mujahidin – and most specifically the 
community of the forum itself. Each of these communities must face its enemies, and each depends 
in its way on the other. The mujahidin face the external enemies of the Ummah: Crusaders, Shiites, 
Jews and apostates. There is no defeat for the mujahidin. There is only progress in the form of the 
slaying of enemies or progress in the form of martyrdom. But there can be betrayal. And this arises 
from the lack of solidarity in the wider Muslim community: from those who are idle (qa‘idun), or 
‘defeatist’ with regard to the jihad. There is also betrayal for the online community, through its 
penetration by spies or ‘researchers’, or through strife between members. A notable example of 
each of these occurred in the lifetime of Al Sayf forum. In the first case, a member called ‘mujahid 
12’ whose somewhat critical response to a post entitled ‘how we can destroy the house of Saud’ led 
him, apparently, to being identified by the forum administrator as ‘a spy from among the general 
researchers’ and ‘not a real Muslim’. In the second, a member called ‘Muhammad’ ended up 
leaving the forum after criticizing a poem posted by Abu Khattab al-Dalimi in praise of ‘Saddam 
the hero’ – a comment which saw Abu Khattab engage in vitriolic backbiting with Wajih al-Qamar.  
These three community identifications at the same time stood as the central point in what might be 
termed ‘individual’, ‘community’ and ‘cosmic’ levels of discourse. Thus posts ranging from a 
lesson in how to prepare poisons and deliver them to Americans living in Saudi Arabia to 
discussions about the health benefits of walking to Mosque to a consideration of how one could use 
electronic da‘wa as a shortcut to gaining religious ‘benefits’ (hasanat) have in common their focus 
on a personal sphere of action. On the other hand, discussions ranging from the existence of 
knowledge on planetary orbits in Islam through to the principles of modern asymmetric war share a 
concern with the overall purpose and meaning of individual and collective action. Within this 
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context it is notable how individual – and especially ‘da‘wi’ posts seem to relate to quite 
recognisable personal difficulties and fears (fear of ill health, fear of death, fear of wasting one’s 
life in trivial and meaningless preoccupations, fear of dissolution of community solidarity) and how 
the discourse of preparation for jihad seems, in a sense, to offer what Hebdige might call a 
‘magical’ solution to these problems through its emphasis on physical training, embracing 
martyrdom, and eschewing earthly pleasures. 
Of course, ‘reading’ a forum in such a way cannot be used to rule out the possibility that material 
on the obligatory nature of violent jihad, or on the means of preparing explosives from household 
materials might play a significant role in leading to genuine examples of violence. But such a 
reading of the forum as text does appear to suggest that, within the forum community itself, the 
meaning of such contributions may have a purpose other than that which is explicit. Al-Sayf’s posts 
to the forum subsection entitled ‘Encyclopedia of Preparation’ conformed to the observations made 
by Stenersen regarding the generally unsystematic nature of such material.
477
 Material on ‘how to 
construct a secret camp’, ‘fighting and attacking in Taekwondo’ or ‘easy to make poison gas to 
torment the enemy of religion’ seemed to be posted altogether haphazardly, without any particular 
understanding of pedagogical scheme on the part of the poster. On the other hand, the potential 
merit that might accrue to the poster by virtue of contributing to the forum in these sorts of ways 
was clearly a significant motivation. Wajih al-Qamar observed as much in an admonition he wrote 
for forum members as follows:  
 First, I would like you to pose some of the questions to yourselves 
 
 Why do you write in the forum?  
 
 Why do you participate with your reply? 
 
 And do you read what is written in the forum? 
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 Secondly: 
 
I bring to some of these questions what is seen in reality. Many people participate in the forum for the sake of 
participating alone. Or they post however many times simply to increase the number of times they have posted. 
Or there are people who post in order to hear the replies which delight their ears or which please them. And there 
are among them those who enter forums and do not even read the thread that has been written and reply to his 
friend in order to wait for a reply from him. There are places where people want to enter and reply without even 
looking at the subject. And many of the threads are not read in any case. Or he will know who wrote the post and 
he will enter flattery for him with a nice reply.  
 
5.6 Splits and Dissolutions 
The broader case of Al Sayf forum is also interesting for the insight it offers into the apparent 
paradox on jihadi forums of sociality without obvious meaningful interpersonal interaction. In view 
of this the episode resulting in the exit of forum member ‘Muhammad’ is illustrative in two senses. 
First, it helps to demonstrate the pitfalls of being a jihadi on the Internet - the extreme narrowness 
of tolerated opinion, and the ever-present threat of violating these bounds. Second, however, it 
shows how the sociality of forums, to a significant degree, actually occurs through such ostensibly 
disagreeable instances of strife.  
Thus, in jihadi forums, there is a tendency for what might be called the basic ethics of Internet 
culture to become inextricably bound up with religious and ideological issues, to the extent that 
regulation of the one necessarily becomes discussion of the other, and vice versa. As a further 
illustration, we might take the following complaint, posted on Al Buraq forum by a member called 
‘Abu Muhjin al-Thaqafi: 
 Peace be upon you and the blessing of God 
 Very important 
 My brothers who are members in Al-Ikhlas forum  
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 There is a member in Al-Ikhlas who is called ‘Hello Muqawama’, and just to clarify, I am not  the owner of 
that name. I have stuck to a membership in Al-Ikhlas for almost a year, and I was carrying the identity 
‘mokawama’ [this name is written in Roman characters in the original]. And on account of this, I ask the 
members present in Al-Ikhlas network to inform the  management that I am not the owner of this name ‘Hello 
Muqawama’, even if it causes me  problems, and possibly fitna among the members. Thanks.
478
  
‘Abu Muhjin’s’ complaint quickly turned - in the discussion that followed - into a discussion about 
the merits of Al-Ikhlas and other jihadi forums. For the first respondant - who called himself ‘Lover 
of the Group’ (Muhibb al-Jama’a), Abu Muhjin was simply making himself difficult. ‘God be 
praised’, he remarked ‘either you can’t stand the brothers or they can’t stand you. For God’s sake, 
they are witnesses of this world and the next. Be agreeable to all, and they will be your neighbours 
in heaven’. The respondant urged Abu Muhjin to reconsider the merits of the jihadi community 
across its various forums, mentioning particular well known online jihadi figures known to the 
subject author as positive examples. Others, however, took the post as an opportunity to express 
their dissatisfaction with the forum in question. Laughing at the apparent triviality of the problem in 
question, one nonetheless observed that he disliked the members and the management of ‘these 
forums’, saying that ‘the ideas I hold have caused me many problems’. Another was more blunt. 
‘Al-Ikhlas forum - witnesses of the next world? Ha ha ha. Those God-damned people have no 
scruples [la yista'aq"n]. They are excellent only in takfir and cursing and insulting.’ 
What is interesting here is the way in which the values of online community and Islamic 
redemption seem to become conflated. An argument over nicknames is interpreted as risking fitna - 
discord in the Islamic community. And the question of the adequacy of the management in dealing 
with the situation seems inextricable from their policy with regard to takfir. The online community 
is, it seems, no longer just a conditional vehicle for spreading the propaganda of the righteous 
community. Rather, it has become the righteous community itself.  
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This helps to explain why the bounding of jihadi communities through restricted entry to forums 
has the potential to become so contentious - as illustrated in the following exchange from Al 
Fallujah forum, in which a member named ‘Algerian Companian’ wrote:  
Brothers, for years I have tried to register in Al Hisbah forum, and when I am in it, It is of great benefit. But I 
have not been able to [register]. So I’m asking of the brothers of the place that they accept my request and 
carry it out, and the benefit is from God. Or if anyone knows a way that will allow me to register – and God 
bless you, especially in the network which presents juristic rulings on legal affairs which are beneficial, with 
God’s permission, and God bless you all.  
He was responded to by an ‘Abu Mu‘izz al-Hamdani’ as follows: 
Hahahahahahahahahaha! By God, brother, God almighty, just before a bit, I was talking to someone I didn’t 
know by messenger, and in that conversation he informed me that he got a login to al-Hisbah, and he was able 
to come by it by buying it off one of the companions on the forum. And he showed me the idea, and what my 
profile would look like if I were to buy a membership, so that he could inform his friend. And the price was 
three cards for the contact! Hahahahaha! God, I sat down and laughed at that affair. I told him no way – I’ll 
stay with the free forums, thank you very much. With thirty dollars, I’ll buy myself a supply of machine gun 
bullets. By God, it’s a strange, funny story.
479
 
It is typical, then, that these issues are not only discussed, but also performed in a post on Madad 
al-Suyuf forum entitled ‘Jihadi Forums in the Balance’ written by the ‘mujahid shaykh’ Abu 
Qudama al-Hami. The opening is worth quoting at length: 
 We do not deny the truth and the value of the Islamic media in general and the jihadi media in particular,  and 
what its value is to the Ummah in terms of service by means of Internet networks. And it is an appreciated 
effort [juhd], and those who carry it out will be rewarded for it, and many of those heroes have sacrificed  for 
the service of Islam and Shari‘a  and Jihad and it is a blessed effort. We pray their hands may be strengthened 
and we praise the good deed of publicising the shari‘a  and the jihad in the various countries of Islam. And this 
is the face of the sunrise of the Islamic media and the jihadi media, and no one denies it  except an ignoramus 
[j!hil] or an ingrate. 
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However, in the development of the Islamic media and the jihadi media, some of the forums have experienced 
crises emerging as a result of narrowness of perspective and a superficial image of their work. And this malaise 
does not differ much from the development of other  forums, except that it has an Islamic or jihadi colouring, 
and those forums did not adopt Islamic or jihadi colouring with respect to the principles  of openness and 
freedom without fetters. But rather, in many of the secular forums and others the freedom of thought and 
imagination which is enjoined in the principles of shari‘a  is greater than the freedom of thought and 
imagination in some of the forums which consider themselves to be Islamic or those that support the jihad and 
enhance its benefit. 
 
The truth of the matter is that there are some forums which are nothing more than sounding boards for the 
transmission of the communiques of the mujahidin and the intermingling of communities for the purpose of 
building themselves by means of specific pictures - not to give the completeness of understanding and 
imagination and work to the shari‘a  and the agreement of the requirements of  religion and the foundation of 
Islam. That is to say that some of the managements have not reached the stage of maturity and awareness, and 
they lack understanding of the nature of shari‘a  and jihad, and they lave not paid attention to the wishes of 
their their companions towards the understanding of  Islam as a complete vision [ta%awwur] leading to work 
with data and contradictions grounded in reality and far from fanaticism and the partiality of people, and 
desires, and money and dissipation. And there have returned to us the ills of the  old schools of thought in 
which factionalisation prevailed, and there is manufacture of opinion and decisions preceding the shari‘a  texts 
and the man!hij of Islam. And there is a reduction of the purity of Islam and the obligation of moving by it and 
working by its  appropriate man!hij, and the titles which are the adornments of going by these  appropriate 
procedures, and the titles for addressing people and the breakdown of the man!hij of the order of the heavens 
which order God almighty wanted there to be to him “His is the creation and the command. Blessed is Allah, 
lord of the worlds”. (Al-A’raf) and the Almighty said: “and who arranges every matter” (Yunis). The words 
became  - those by which God Almighty commanded his prophet Ibrahim, the master of the righteous nation, 
and by which he ordained the the apostle, prayer upon him, and peace on the most perfect face, these words 
became reduced to individual personalities, and they became the manhaj, and they became the ‘aq"da, and they 
became the taw'&d and the jih!d, so that the purity of the shari‘a  and tawhid  and jihad and da‘wa went away 
to whims and the learning of the shari‘a  was misrepresented  and the man!hij of jihad were distorted.
480
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Al-Hami’s discussion here is a perceptive analysis of many of the issues we have just discussed: the 
narrow, restrictive ideological boundaries of jihadi forums, the tendency for them to become ends in 
themselves, their tendency to conflate these ends with those of the perceived interests Islam and 
jihad as a whole. At the same time, however, it is important to note that this piece, just as it is a 
diagnosis of the problems of cyber fitna in the online jihadi community, is also in itself a not 
inconsiderable contribution to the very problems it identifies. For, as the piece continues, it 
becomes clear that it is not just a general discussion of the problem of certain ‘personalities’ taking 
over and distorting online Islamic communities for their own ends, but actually a direct attack on 
the jihadi shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi - a figure whom, as we have already observed, is a 
particular enemy of Madad al-Suyuf’s management. The irony, then, is a profound one. On the one 
hand, it relates directly to the nature of online social experience as textually constructed reality. 
Since reality is text, all text is performative. And thus even attempts to diagnose the problem of 
factionalism are unable to escape the process of the production of factionalism. But this is 
complicated yet further by the dimension of religion. Since religious righteousness can be 
manifested only in the harmony of the community, disharmony can only be understood as a 
religious failing.
481
 And yet the very practice of talking about religion (which is, perhaps, the only 
religious action which can genuinely be peformed online) is intrinsically productive of the 
disharmony which denies the validity of one’s path, revealing it to be merely man-made vanity, 
rather than God-ordained truth. 
For a jihadi online community, ultimate failure is elimination. This may come at the hands of 
outsiders - Zionists, Shiites, Crusaders are always massing to assault the virtual citadels of 
monotheism and jihad. A site may be hacked, or it may be penetrated, it may simply be suspended 
by its host. Aaron Weisburd, a freelance investigator of jihadi sites on the Internet claimed, at one 
time, to have been responsible for the removal of over a thousand sites simply by making their hosts 
aware of what they were hosting.
482
 Certainly it is a routine part of jihadi existence for one’s 
favourite sites to disappear, perhaps temporarily, before returning under a different URL. At other 
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times, forums disappear due to the arrest of prominent members - something which Awan and Al-
Lami suggest was the real reason behind the closure of Al-Ikhlas, Al-Buraq and Al-Firdaws.
483
 
Alternatively, forums may close for reasons which, on the surface at least, seem remarkably trivial. 
An informed police source - who was responsible for investigating the case of Younis Tsouli claims 
that the much loved Al Ansar forum went down simply because Tsouli did not have enough money 
to pay for its continued hosting, and became distracted by other matters.
484
  
In the light of such possibilities, it is interesting to consider Al-Mihdar’s diagnosis of the failure of 
Al-Ansar which, in contrast (or perhaps, as a complement) to the explanation just offered, attempts 
to equate the failure of the forum as a whole to the failure of its community. For him, this is the 
ultimate indictment of his hated practice of ‘membership by referral’. As he asserts: 
When they closed the membership in Al-Ansar there was a total disaster, as I mentioned before, because 
membership was limited to a certain type of people. And thus they opened the door to factionalism and 
splitting inside the forum. Not only that, but people were even afraid of writing frankly. And the situation 
continued like this for a period. Then the website was closed and removed forever. But in the last days of Al 
Ansar, some were able to open another forum – Al-Ikhlas.  
Presumably, there is at least some subjective truth to Al-Mihdar’s claim about factionalism and 
splitting - even if it was not the efficient cause of the forum’s end. Whatever the ultimate reality, 
however, it is perception here that matters. For Al-Mihdar’s view ties, it seems, closely to the same 
view set out as a poetic lament in the following chapter by the ‘Poet of Al-Ansar’: the intensely 
affective cycle of creation, collapse, flight and rebirth in which is found the meaning and power of 
the jihadi forum.  
This returns us, then, to the question of why jihadi forums exist. If the purpose of forums is 
discussion and debate then, as we have seen, this is better accomplished outside the narrow bounds 
of specifically ‘jihadi’ forums. If the purpose is to act as a platform for operational planning, it now 
seems to be widely agreed that this is a dangerous, naive and ill advised activity. But even if, 
indeed, as it is said to be by the jihadis themselves, the purpose of jihadi forums is simply to 
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disseminate jihadi material, this end seems already to be served at least as well by those places 
where content is often, ultimately, hosted in any case: Archive.org, YouTube and similar sites. 
These leads to one last possible strategic explanation: the role of the forums in authenticating 
releases.
485
 Al-Mihdar, however, is sceptical even about this need.  
A release gets out of Afghanistan somehow with someone from Al-Sahab foundation. It is then uploaded in a 
country which is not under American control, such as Iran or the tribal region of Pakistan. He then gives a link 
to where it is hosted, through the email of a certain known person. This person uploads the record with a 
number of active brothers in several websites. He then gives a file out containing links to a person called the 
‘Al Fajr media centre’. If you don’t know, Fajr is the old name for Al-Hisbah, so it goes from Fajr to Hisbah to 
the rest of the forums. They may hire agents in some forums, depending on the people who are behind Al-
Hisbah. And I laughed a lot when I was told that there are authorised centres for spreading films – as if the 
Americans are able to get an impersonator of Shaykh Usama and to spread a film of him! Or as if somebody 
would risk his reputation by spreading news of jihad that would subsequently turn out to be fraudulent. 
Authorised centres are just options for certain people, and are not there to stop anyone else from spreading 
material. The materials which we have have the Al-Hisbah logo, whether they come from Al-Hisbah or 
another forum. In the end it’s the same material. 
This attitude may help to explain why, as we saw earlier, the discovery that Al-Hisbah was 
inauthentic all along has done little, so it seems, to alter Internet jihadis’ commitment to their own 
forums.  
5.7 Analysis: Geeking the Jihad?  
How then, to explain jihadi forums? At one level, jihadi forums need little explanation. They are, if 
anything, striking for their resemblence to Web forums and bulletin boards on other subjects. The 
question, rather, is how to explain the gap between the idea of jihadi forums as representing a real 
and important contribution to the efforts of the mujahidin and the seeming reality. For in fact, as we 
have seen, jihadi forums offer neither logistical bases, nor vibrant spaces for debate and conversion, 
nor even necessarily the only or best option for disseminating mujahidin propaganda onto the Web. 
This suggests that the underlying reasons for the formation and persistence of jihadi forums may 
 148
actually have rather little to do with the functions which they are supposed to perform. And yet 
jihadi forums, whatever else they do, persist. As a postscript to this chapter, many of the forums it 
refers to (Al-Fallujah, Ansar al-Mujahidin, Madad al-Suyuf) disappeared following the 
dissemination of the English language magazine of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Inspire. Al-
Fallujah had, for a long time before been only intermittently available and this may have been the 
final straw for this forum. By December, however, Ansar al-Mujahidin had bounced back, with a 
triumphal message posted on the 1
st
 of Muharram – the Islamic New Year.
486
 Regardless of their 
actual strategic value, jihadi forums seem to fulfil some important need for the jihadis who inhabit 
them. But what exactly is this need?   
One model which jihadi forums seem to fit well is that which Robert Kozinets, in relation to other 
types of Web forum, calls the ‘geeking community’.
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 These, he describes as ‘online gatherings 
where the sharing of information, news, stories and techniques about a particular activity is the 
community’s raison d’être’. Geeking, Kozinets argues, is not predominantly about social 
relationships, but rather about ‘informational’ relationships and (following Tapscott and Williams) 
about ‘prosumption’.
488
 As such, this model would explain the seeming paradox that jihadi forums 
appear to offer their members a powerful, affecting experience even though there is little activity 
which is obviously ‘social’, and in fact most activity seems to consist of little more than the 
amassing of data by cut and paste. Indeed, such an observation might help to fill out the interesting 
notion of ‘infospiritualism’ which Knowles identifies as a core part of ‘Islamist neorealism’.  
Thinking in such terms invites us to consider jihadi Web forums as having an emotive effect for 
members which is greater than the sum of their parts. While individual posts may seem to exhibit 
relatively little creative investment on the part of members, their aggregation – and the very fact of 
there existing thereby a ‘jihadi space’ on the Internet seems to produce an emergent sense of - to 
use the words of the jihadi writer Abu ‘Amru al-Qa‘idi - ‘jihadi ambience’ (ajwa’ jih!d").
489
 Indeed 
Al-Qa‘idi’s opinion on forums serves to summarise a good deal of what this chapter has said.  
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And ultimately the jihadi forums - and this is what distinguishes them - convey news of the mujahidin, and 
their releases, and their literature, and this is their breathing space and their place. This is the jihadi forum. You 
find the agencies of the jihadi organisations and the brothers in the media, who are effectively members (i‘$!’ 
fi‘lan) of the organisations, and brothers from the Islamic State of Iraq. And you find in them that of someone 
who used to post with you,  they then announce the glad tidings (yazaf#na khabr) of his martyrdom. And you 
find in them brothers who have been in the jihad for real previously and then returned, and you see in them 
workshops, ideas and suggestions for assisting jihad and the mujahidin...  
The only inconvenience of those forums is that they are - sorry to say it - the target of all the world’s 
intelligence services, and the source for all the planet’s researchers... And therefore we urge the brother that he 
never say anything concerning an operation or not indicate towards that in those forums, or to try to contact 
someone by private messenger. All of this is dangerous for them. [ie, the two communicating with  each other - 
‘them’ is given in the dual  form]... and we urge that the moderators and the members not  allow in them the 
entry of  murji’a, and the murjif"n, and the troublemakers (muthaba#&n), and they must purify their  subject 
threads. They must understand that it is all about da‘wa, and perhaps a word or a communication from a 
brother will motivate a new brother onto the path.  
The seriousness of the commitment to jihadi da‘wa - and indeed Al Qa‘idi’s wider views as to the 
role of the Internet in recruitment - will be examined in a later chapter. At present, however, it is 
important to consider the implication of Al Qa’idi’s words. He wishes for persuasion, but will not 
admit the possibility of dialogue. He emphasises the power of forums in bringing sympathisers in 
contact with authentic representatives of the jihad, but recognises that they are full of spies, and will 
not hear of them being used as platforms for ‘real’ operational activity. In other words, he 
subscribes to a view of the forums which is about performance more than about speech, and about 
speech more than about authenticity. In other words, about speech as performance. As he says, 
about ambience.  
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6. 
Being a Jihadi on the Internet 
 
6.0 ‘Jihadis’ on the Internet 
 
The idea that there exists a tension between the overt purpose of jihadi online communities – 
supporting the mujahidin – and the actual set of pleasures which motivate people to engage in 
online jihadism would seem to demand that we delve deeper into the question of what it means to 
be ‘a jihadi’. In the fourth chapter, it was observed that there do exist ‘jihadis’ on the Internet who 
refer to themselves as such. While in practice those who may be described as ‘jihadis’ may more 
commonly refer to themselves with terms such as ansar al-mujahidin (a term which, as we shall 
see, carries its own ambiguities), or, equally problematically, muj!hid"n i‘l!miy"n,
490
 the fact that 
the term ‘jihadi’ is used self descriptively by some ‘jihadis’ represents a potentially interesting 
problem. Why, after all, would one refer to one’s self as a ‘jihadi’ rather than as a mujahid?
 491
  
 
Linguistically, the notion of ‘a jihadi’ implies not someone who is an actual practitioner of jihad, 
but rather, someone who has an ideational relationship with jihad: a person who is ‘jihadi’ in the 
same way that a website or a video may be ‘jihadi’. Thus there would seem to be, built into the very 
idea, a sense of virtuality – to employ the word as Levy does when he defines it as ‘a kind of 
problematic complex, the knot of tendencies or forces that accompanies a situation, event, object or 
entity, and which invokes a process of resolution: actualisation’.492 A jihadi is, by the very 
admission of being a jihadi, someone who declares her or himself to be in a process of becoming: 
not someone who is actually doing violent jihad, but rather a seeker towards it.   
 
A peculiar consequence of this, however, is that there would seem to be something significantly 
more natural to the idea of ‘being a jihadi’ on the Internet than there is to that of, say, ‘being a 
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Muslim’. To be a jihadi is to manifest one’s self in terms which a mediated environment clearly 
affords - through images and words. By contrast, ‘being a Muslim’ on the Internet entails the 
creation of ways of practicing which, in turn, appear to require some notion of embodiment.
493
 Of 
the five practices which form the basic ‘pillars’ of Islam, only one can unambiguously be performed 
online: the practice of zak!t, or alms giving. Another - shah!da - the declaration that there is no 
God but God and Muhammad is the prophet of God is a matter for scholarly debate - particularly 
given that it is the enunciation of this phrase before competent male witnesses that makes one a 
Muslim. Some scholars hold that this act of conversion can take place by a person declaring the 
shahada (whether orally or textually) via the Internet. The remainder can take place only 
metaphorically, if at all. As Derrickson reports, electronic rituals of prayer (%al!t) and pilgrimage to 
Mecca ('ajj) have been constructed in virtual environments such as Second Life. But the experience 
here - though compelling - is clearly ersatz. As she observes in her discussion of her experience in a 
representation of the Haram al-Sharif in Mecca, prayer ‘in’ an electronic Mosque does not appear 
to be equivalent to the obligatory prayer mandated by Islam, since it is impossible to adequately 
embody thereby certain specific physical steps, such as ritual ablution. Moreover, given that the 
creators of Second Life’s Haram al-Sharif have openly welcomed non-Muslims to take part in the 
enactment of the Muslim Hajj it affords, this, too argues against any notion of real life 
equivalence.
494
  
 
And yet, the very fact that it is possible to be a ‘real’ jihadi via the Internet in contradistinction to 
the impossibility of living out a complete Muslim life in virtual space carries with it paradoxes of its 
own. For behind ‘the jihadi’ there still lies (or at any rate, is imagined to lie) the reality of jihad. 
Authenticity, even if it makes little difference to the quality of jihadi experience online, must be 
seen to matter. Thus the question arises: are ‘jihadis’ simply engaged in representing jihad (in both 
senses of the word ‘represent’), or are they in some sense actually engaged in performing what is 
(to one who is ideologically ‘jihadi’) a real Islamic obligation?
495
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In asking what it means to be a jihadi on the Internet, one is thus asking two potentially quite 
different questions. On the one hand, there is the explicit question - what functions does the Internet 
have for a ‘jihadi’. This question turns on the larger one of what it means to be a jihadi at all. The 
second question is ‘what online processes are involved in the action of manifesting one’s self as a 
jihadi. Let us take these two questions one at a time. 
 
6.1 The Jihadi Manhaj 
 
For ‘jihadis’, jihad is to be understood primarily as violent struggle. As the ‘jihadi’ scholar, Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi defines it, it is ‘fighting the unbelievers for the exaltation of the word of 
God, and assistance to that’ (qit!l al-kuff!r, li-i ‘la’ kalim!t Allah, wa-l-mu‘!wana ‘ala dhalik).
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Indeed (as we shall find in the following chapter), mention of the ‘greater jihad’ or the ‘spiritual 
jihad’ among Internet jihadis is a good way to be laughed (or insulted) out of court. Moreover, jihad 
is in the present age an individual obligation (far$ ‘ayn). Which means, in principle, that every real 
Muslim is committed to practicing violence as a religious duty - on pain of risking his (and, to a 
lesser degree, her) status as a Muslim at all.
497
 And yet, as al-Maqdisi himself observes, not all can 
fight directly. Some must also provide ‘assistance’. Conceived as a military campaign - particularly 
in the modern sense of ‘full spectrum’ warfare, it is plainly not necessarily the case that every 
‘soldier’ must see front line duty. War can be ‘fought’ with words and with money as well as with 
weapons. Moreover, soldiers cannot spend all their time in actual fighting. They must spend some 
of their time training, organising and preparing.
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 And since all these activities are ultimately 
component parts of the overall violent struggle, they are, in a sense all ways of fufilling the 
obligation of jihad. The analogy is, to some degree an apt one. After all, real armies are vast 
agglomerations of practices, many of which have little directly to do with the actual business of 
fighting. The American army - through its provision of universal health care and opportunities for 
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college education - is of course in some ways the image of the expansive welfare state to which 
conservative Americans are so opposed in general. But the problem is that jihad - unlike service in 
an actual military institution – is not presented by jihadi thought as a collective activity, but 
precisely as an individual obligation which one does not only for the good of the community, but 
ultimately for the good of one’s own soul. There is, therefore, and in principle, no overall 
organisational mechanism to determine whether a particular activity is a genuine contribution to the 
collective objective of violent struggle. In the absence of this, determining whether non-violent 
‘assistance’ or ‘preparation’ activities are real jihad or not becomes a troublesome question.  
 
This potential paradox can be seen strongly in evidence in a very popular jihadi text, 39 was"la li-
khidmati al-jih!d wa-l-muj!hid"n f" sab"l Allah. This is normally translated into English as ‘39 
Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad’,
499
 but the original Arabic title is rather less certain about 
whether the actions it describes actually constitute participation in jihad, meaning literally ’39 
means to the service of jihad and the mujahidin in the path of God’. Nonetheless, the text makes 
clear that the danger of falsifying one’s Islam through relinquishing the obligation of jihad can be 
obviated through nothing more than the sincere, internal intention of taking part in a ‘raid’: that is, 
to translate the words used as closely as possible: ‘the innermost decision ('ad&th) of the self (nafs) 
towards raiding (ghazu’) cancels out (yanfi ‘an) from a person every aspect (%ifa) of hypocrisy’.
500
  
 
What is remarkable about the doctrine of intentionality as set out by Al-Salim is the way in which it 
seems to mirror, even to recreate, the very notions about faith and apostacy traditionally seen as one 
of the keystones of the Islamic community of belief.  Just as, conventionally, a Muslim might hold 
that: ‘As to the question of a person being in fact a believer or not, it is not the task of any human 
being to decide it. This matter is directly to do with God, and it is He Who shall decide it on the day 
of Judgment,501’; so, similarly, Al-Salim seems to be arguing that provided one has made the 
internal decision to participate in jihad, one is on that account a legitimate Muslim.  
 155 
 
This is despite the fact that being prepared to judge the condition of Muslims on the basis of 
behaviour is precisely what is normally held to form the basis for the jihadi position.
502
  Jihadis are, 
after all, supposed to be the ones who presume to be able to pronounce takfir on Muslim rulers 
because they impose laws other than the shari‘a . And yet, by placing the emphasis he does on the 
decision to take part in jihad, Al-Salim seems to be subtly altering the criterion for falling within the 
charmed circle of Islamic legitimacy from correct practice (upholding the laws and central 
obligations of Islam), to correct doctrine (espousing a belief in the necessity of jihad).  
 
In doing this, Al-Salim seems to reveal a paradox in the jihadi system which invites it to be inverted 
entirely. Instead of producing a situation in which the entire body of Muslims are urged to 
participate in violent struggle, he appears to imply a situation in which a narrower body of ‘jihadis’ 
(those who have, internally, ‘made the decision’ to participate in jihad) participate in a set of 
activities which are aimed not directly towards advancing Islam, but rather, towards the 
advancement of Islam’s jihad. Thus, even while insisting that jihad is far$ ‘ayn, the actual practice 
of, specifically, violence becomes, in effect, far$ kifaya.
503
 Or, alternatively, even while insisting 
that jihad is fighting, the proliferation of ways of supporting fighters becomes in effect a kind of 
‘greater jihad’, in which one’s struggle with one’s heart, one’s tongue and one’s prayers is 
vicariously offered as a kind of violence by proxy.
504
  
 
In fact, 39 Ways offers a comprehensive path of jihadi practice, short of actual participation in 
physical violence. The one who ‘serves jihad and the mujahidin’ is to pray for the mujahidin, to 
yearn for martyrdom (which, if yearned for honestly enough, will reward the yearner with the status 
of the martyr ‘even if he dies in his bed’).
505
 She is to give her money to the mujahidin, to help 
outfit them, to support his family, to collect donations for them - even to give the zakat for them. He 
is to praise the mujahidin, to commemorate their exploits, to urge others to follow in their footsteps, 
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to encourage them, to verbally defend them and attack their detractors (the hypocrites), to offer 
them advice, to distribute news of the mujahidin, to publish fatwas for them, to inform scholars and 
preachers about them, to acquire various physical skills: marksmanship, first aid, physical fitness, to 
raise children to love jihad and, (at number thirty-four) to practice ‘electronic jihad’.  
 
Thus, while never abandoning the ideal of participation in real, physical violence, the possibility 
seems open in the jihadi literature for jihadism as a self contained community - for a movement 
from the path of jihad to what the Muslim Public Affairs Committee described - apropos of the 
publication of the English language jihadi magazine ‘Jihad Recollections’ as the ‘jihadi lifestyle’.
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In keeping with the general themes of 39 Ways, the first edition contained a typical mixture of geo-
political analysis, fitness training, military technology (a speculative article on the potential 
battlefield value of pulse weapons), battlefield memoirs of former mujahidin and a dose of relevant 
theology.  
 
As flippant as the notion of a ‘jihadi lifestyle magazine’ may be intended to be, the concept of 
‘lifestyle’ in English arguably finds a serious Islamic equivalent in the notion of manhaj. 
Commonly translated as ‘method’, or (especially in modern fundamentalist types of Islam) as 
‘methodology’, the word derives from the verb to ‘approach’. The word minh!j appears once in the 
Qur’an, (5:48) ‘we have made for you a law and a clear way’.
507
 For Sayyid Qutb, the manhaj is 
understood as operating at the systemic level as the ‘method’ or ‘procedure’ for establishing the 
Islamic society.
508
 Commonly, however, the word is applied to the details of everyday living, as in 
the claim that ‘Islam is even a method [manhaj] for living ordinary life’.
509
 For salafis, salafism 
means living by the manhaj of the salaf - the pious predecessors of the first generation of Islam. 
This is seen as an all-encompassing way of living individual life. For instance, Salman al ‘Awda 
observes that: ‘The question of the manhaj is an important question relating to the stabilisation of 
the career of a person, whether it was a career of knowledge, or of work; and whether it was the 
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person individually, or in a group’.
510
 Likewise, Farid al-Ansari insists that the concept of manhaj 
applies to the individual Muslim’s practice of remaining on the ‘straight path’ enjoined by God.
511
 
In practice, salafis believe that the question of manhaj relates to almost every detail of life, from 
travelling to eating, to marital relations and personal hygiene.  
 
The notion of a specifically jihadi manhaj is, then, an intriguing one. A mention of such a concept 
can perhaps be found in the work of Abdullah Azzam, in which he describes the mujahidin’s 
establishment of primary schools in Afghanistan, and the curriculum selected for them, as an 
‘Islamic and jihadi manhaj’.
512
 And even here, this reference seems to carry with it some of the 
potential ambiguity of the term. For if, generally, a manhaj amounts to the ritualisation of ordinary 
life, then a jihadi manhaj would seem to imply such a thing at second remove; something like a 
‘ritual militarisation of ordinary life’. If the conventional requirements of Islamic piety are to be 
subordinated to the greater need of a ‘jihad’ which necessarily is made up of what might be 
otherwise seen as secular activities; and if this set of activities then serves, itself, as the justification 
for another set of essentially secular activities, then it would seem that what has been effected is a 
double secularisation. Instead of, for instance, blogging (an everyday activity), ‘for Islam’ (a 
transcendent goal), one is now blogging ‘for the jihad’ which in turn is fighting ‘for Islam’.  
 
In fact, an apparent confirmation of this inference can be found in a post to the forum ‘Muslm.net’ 
entitled ‘The Salafi Jihadi Manhaj with Regard to Changes in Egypt’ (manhaj al-salafiyya al-
jihadiyya li-taghayyur fi mi%r).
513
 Here, the author argues that ‘jihad is now an individual duty (far$ 
‘ayn) upon each of us.’ However, since - as he posits - Muslims, particularly in Egypt are in a state 
of weakness (that is, they are musta$a ‘f&n), the time is not right for actual violent action. Instead, 
he argues ‘f& '!lat ‘ajiz al-$u‘f ‘an al-qiy!m bi-l-jih!d, yu%bi' al-i‘d!d far$ ‘ayn’, that is ‘in a 
condition of incapacitating weakness with regard to the establishment of jihad, preparation 
becomes an individual obligation’. And preparation, in the view of the author, is to be understood as 
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self-education (tarbiya), and improving one’s mind (tazkiyat). This latter word is important, since it 
seems to imply not just acquisition of traditional Islamic knowledge (‘ilm al-shar"f as the author 
calls this), but also knowledge which will stimulate the mind generally.  
 
This could be read as a prescription for a de facto return to quietist salafi activity (which, after all, is 
itself only tactically quietist - seeking to purify the Ummah as preparation for the reconstitution of 
the Islamic state and the righteous jihad).
514
 But the author refuses such a reading. For, in his view, 
so fundamental is the importance of jihad, that it actually trumps all the normal practices of Islamic 
piety. As he writes ‘the sin of abandoning jihad is greater than any sin. And the damage of 
abandoning jihad returns to the whole Ummah.’ From this, it follows that ‘even if all the people 
were adulterers who drank alcohol, but who practiced the jihad in the path of God, it is still better 
than that they were adulterers who drank alcohol but did not practice jihad - which is as obligatory 
to them as prayer or alms giving’. The statement here is, in fact, simply a logical corollary of the 
belief that jihad is a far$ ‘ayn. After all, drinking alcohol and committing adultery - though sinful - 
are not, from a salafi point of view, foundations of religion such as to render the one who practices 
them an infidel. Whereas jihad - if it really is ‘as obligatory as prayer or alms giving’ - is. But the 
shocking openness with which the conclusion is drawn is remarkable.  
 
This brings to mind the now quite well established notion of jihad as a way of reconciling Muslims 
to the cultural conflicts resulting from emigration or the arrival of globalisation and technological 
modernity - as may have been the case with regard to the much discussed fact that members of the 
‘Hamburg Cell’, after accepting their mission, resumed the ‘Western’ lifestyles they had previously 
rejected. Here, while undoubtedly there was a ‘strategic’ purpose to doing so, in helping to avoid 
making the project conspicuous, the actual facts of what happened suggest that to some extent the 
terrorists’ return to this way of life was not merely a front - evidenced, for example by the fact that 
one of the hijackers, Ziad Jarrah, maintained a serious long term relationship while in the United 
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States with his German girlfriend Aysel Senguen, travelling to see her, ‘making hundreds of phone 
calls, and communicating frequently by email’.
515
 
 
The point here is not - it should be stressed - to reiterate the often crudely advanced notion that 
jihadis are necessarily religious ignoramuses who are hypocritically lax in their observance of 
traditional Islamic practices. The rather lurid idea that jihadism is a creed for justified sinners who 
exploit the clean slate offered by martyrdom to indulge in every sort of worldly activity has been 
put forward succinctly by Oliveti, for example.
516
 And indeed, for different contexts, Sageman
517
 
and Hegghammer
518
 have shown that those involved in violent, ‘salafi’ jihad often do not have a 
high level of formal religious education.  
 
There are, however, two obvious problems with extrapolating a simplistic argument from these 
facts about the relationship between jihadism and religion. First, such arguments seem directed 
against a straw man. No one but the crudest kind of Islamophobe would think that as a Muslim 
becomes more religious, so he or she would necessarily become more likely to get involved in 
violence. If jihadis are compared, generally, to Muslims with a high level of religious learning, then 
they will naturally tend to be seen as unlearned. Seen in its own terms, however, jihadism is better 
understood as one of a number of options for Muslims at all levels of religiosity. For instance, 
according to ‘Abu ‘Amru al-Qa’idi’, the author of A Course in the Art of Recruiting, jihadism must 
vie for recruits with ‘salafism’, and with political Islamic ‘movements’ such as (presumably) the 
Muslim brothers.
519
 In this environment, it is better to go after unreligious Muslims, as Muslims 
who are already committed to a movement are less likely to be persuaded into another one. Given 
such a state of affairs, one would expect to see a hierarchy of religious knowledge within jihadism, 
with highly knowledgeable jihadi shaykhs at the top, and only marginally knowledgeable ordinary 
jihadis at the bottom. But this in itself says nothing about the Islamic credentials of jihadism as 
compared with any other grouping.  
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Secondly, the argument that jihadis lack formal religious credentials may be a circular one. Jihadis 
understandably lament what ‘Isa al-‘Awshan calls the ‘Desertion of the Scholars’.
520
 And if the 
traditional - heavily state monitored - centres of Islamic learning will not permit jihadi thinking, 
then it is scarcely more fair to accuse jihadis of lacking formal qualifications than it would be to say 
that a Lutheran pastor is unqualified because he has not attended a Catholic seminary.  
 
More useful than to try to measure jihadism by Western or traditional Islamic notions of what 
constitutes authentic religiosity, is to examine what jihadi thought actually achieves by means of its 
emphasis on the concept of jihad. Firstly, without overtly downplaying the importance of 
conventional piety, the jihadi position does elevate practical ‘activism’ as a religious activity 
relative to the liturgical and ritual requirements of Islam. This point is made by ‘Al Qa‘idi’, when 
he suggests that one source of potential recruits for jihadism are former members of Islamic 
‘movements’ who have since embraced salafism, but may remain frustrated by the lack of activity 
this seems to involve.
521
 In this sense, it is consistent with the Islamist project initiated by Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani which aimed to find a way of fusing Islam with contemporary technology and 
scientific knowledge. Al-Afghani noted the irony that one could (in his day) study the thought of 
Aristotle at a traditional Islamic madrasa, while one had to attend a European model military 
college in order to study the work of Galileo.
522
 Under the rubric of activities such as i‘d!d 
(preparation), advising, and electronic jihad, a jihadi can, it seems, acquire ‘ilm (knowledge) and 
tarbiya (education) in both secular and traditionally religious senses of the word.  
 
At the same time, however, and in contrast to the collective approach implied by the Islamism of al-
Banna, Rida or even Qutb, jihadism - through the very fact of its being premised on support for 
violent and forbidden activity - precludes itself from turning into a conventional political 
movement. In this sense, it resembles Roy’s notion of Islamic ‘neofundamentalism’ or the salafi 
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movement as described by Wiktorowicz
523
 which, turning its back on attempts to gain power 
through formal political process, instead seeks to change things at the level of culture and society.
524
 
Indeed, jihadism is in principle even more radically individualistic, for while neofundamentalists try 
to create Islamised zones at the community level through means such as al-amr bi-l-ma‘r#f wa-l-
nahy ‘an al-munkar.
525
 The actions which constitute the practice of jihadism take place not in the 
parliament, on the street or even in the school, but rather within the activities of everyday life. An 
illustration of this may be provided by a post which appeared on website ‘jihad1.com’ on January 
2009.  
 
 ‘I desire jihad, but the government has stopped the way to jihad.’ Are you constantly coming across this 
 thinking? I believe that every respectable, decent person who won’t stand for justice and shame thinks about 
 jihad. And in any case: “who did not do jihad or decide in his heart to do jihad died with a portion of 
 hypocrisy”. The main point in the subject: do you want to be sure that you really desire jihad? And what stands 
 in the path of your jihad? The government systems, not the desires of the soul. Put it another way: welcome to 
 this field of jihad: 
 
1. Stop smoking: mainly American cigarettes 
2. Boycott products which support Zionism: “Starbucks” and so on 
3. Boycott products which support American Zionism: Pepsi, Kentucky, McDonald’s and so on... 
4. Give a little time when you go shopping to read the sources of products and if they are American, discard them, 
and even if they are manufactured in an Arabic country under an American franchise, because the benefit will 
return to America and then to Israel to kill your brothers.  
5. Did you disapprove of Israel’s attacks on mosques? The least reply we can make is to develop our own safe, 
empty mosques, especially at the dawn prayer. (How can you make war on the enemy, and you can’t even make 
war on sleep and the blanket at dawn???) 
6. Du‘a, du‘a, du‘a (and ask yourself before you sleep, did you do du‘a for your people in Gaza today?)
526
 
 
The point here is precisely not that jihadism encourages laxness in the normal ritual practices of 
Islam in favour of radical violence, but rather that it draws on these as elements of normal everyday 
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behaviour, rather than demanding the progressive Islamisation of different aspects of daily life and, 
secondly, it directs these towards the end of jihad. Rather than forcing an undending and 
burdensome Islamisation of daily life, jihadism offers, so it seems, the jihadisation of ordinary 
practice.  
 
Indeed, by focusing on the object of jihad, there is an apparent tendency in jihadism towards 
substituting the theoretically transcendent virtues of Islam for the concrete virtues of the mujahidin. 
Apropos of this, it may be worth noting in passing the extent to which the ways of assisting in jihad 
offered by al-Salim are reminiscent of the fundamental practices of Islam itself. The supporter of 
the mujahidin is asked to donate money (indeed, to actually make the mujahidin the object of 
zak!t), to pray for the mujahidin (the word here is, of course du‘a - a supplementary Islamic 
practice with no precise Christian equivalent - rather than the obligatory Islamic %al!t), to engage in 
a certain degree of self-denial (the author lists ‘abandoning luxury’ as a way of contributing) and - 
via various types of possible verbal practice - to declare support for the mujahidin. Indeed, the 
theme of the physical self-denial of the mujahidin is (as we shall see later) an important theme in 
jihadi writing, and its vicarious appropriation is an important device for the assertion of online 
jihadis’ own worthiness.  
 
Thus, far from offering nothing to the adherent beyond a sterile and endless struggle towards a final 
utopian state which is never properly described or defined,
527
 and in which the interests of the 
individual are continually sacrificed to the good of the group
528
 jihadism offers the individual 
something extremely worthwhile and practical in the here and now: a solution to the question of 
how a Muslim (or indeed a non-Muslim) is to live within the quotidian practices of the modern 
world. The problem with jihadism lies not at the individual level, but at the strategic level, which 
must, somehow, escape the jihadi paradox by finding a way to translate the everyday practices of 
jihadism into real life ‘victories’ for the mujahidin. In order to do this, a difficult balancing act must 
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be achieved. On the one hand, jihadis’ contribution must be appreciated. But on the other, it cannot 
be over-appreciated, lest the non-violent practices of support become an end in themselves, and a 
new form of bloodless jihad by the back door.  
 
6.2 Electronic Jihad? 
 
Such a balancing act seems to be apparent in al-Salim’s account of ‘Electronic Jihad’. Despite using 
the precise term ‘electronic jihad’ (al-jih!d al-iliktr#n"), the author is ambivalent here about 
whether use of the Internet can constitute actual jihad, as opposed to support of jihad. Indeed, after 
using the form as a heading, he immediately qualifies it by saying ‘and this term has spread among 
the people for those who support the jihad on the Internet’. Nonetheless, the author appears to offer 
a possible exception to this. He divides ‘electronic jihad’ into two categories. The first - which he 
gives most of his attention to - is the ‘forums project’ (mashr#‘ al-muntadiyy!t). With regard to the 
second, however - ‘the hackers’ (for which he uses the English word) he says ‘this is the true 
electronic jihad, and in it is the language of power’ (lughat al-quwa). This latter formula is rather 
curious, and may reflect the author’s struggle to determine whether hacking constitutes real or 
figurative violence. The word he uses for strength - quwa - might recall its usage in the Quranic 
verse (Al Anfal: 60) often quoted in jihadi materials, which runs: ‘and prepare against them 
whatever you are able of power and steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of God and 
your enemy’. In general, the formula ‘lughat al-quwa’ carries the same idiomatic meaning as the 
English ‘the language of power’ as in the sentence (in this case a quote from Syrian president 
Bashar al-Asad from the newspaper Al Quds) ‘Israel understands only the language of power’.
529
  
 
This argument is taken a great deal further by ‘Abd al-Rahman Salum Al-Rawashdi - the author of a 
book entitled Media Jihad: Foundations and Practice (Readings in The Jihadi Media in Iraq). Here 
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- in contrast to al-Salim’s position, the case is made for thinking of use of the media - including use 
of the Internet - not just as a way of supporting jihad, but as a way of carrying out jihad.  
Rawashdi’s argument for this position is eclectic, drawing on a number of different lines of Islamic 
reasoning which do not always sit very comfortably together. For a direct Islamic justification for 
use of the media as a form of jihad, he draws on a hadith of the prophet (related by Abu Dawud) in 
which he urges ‘fight the polytheists with your possessions and yourself and your tongue’. He also 
draws on the Quranic verse in the Surat al-Tawba (122), which says ‘it is not for the believers to go 
forth all at once [k!ffatan]. For there should separate from every division of them a group to obtain 
understanding in the religion and warn their people’.  
 
However, Rawashdi’s main argument does not draw heavily on either of these approaches - indeed, 
if anything, it contradicts the latter entirely. The concept of ‘jihad of the tongue’ - dependent, as it 
is, on a single hadith would seem rather uncomfortably weakly attested, in comparison to other 
forms of jihad - that is, jihad in person (jihad bi-al-nafs) and jihad with one’s possessions (jihad bi-
al-m!l), both of which are directly called for in the Quran itself. And indeed Rawashdi is no less 
adamant than other jihadi writers that specifically violent jihad is a far$ ‘ayn - at least, for him, 
within the specific field of American occupied Iraq. Therefore, rather than attempt to make a 
detailed case for non-violent forms of jihad, he instead attempts to explain why use of the media 
can be understood as way of participating in violent conflict.  
 
As Rawashdi points out, modern war is fought by modern armies in a full spectrum of different 
ways - one of which is through use of the media. In this, he seems to be drawing implicitly on US 
military doctrines about information operations. Indeed, ironically, given the common lament 
among NATO generals that ‘they’ are better at information operations than ‘we’ are, Rawashdi 
complains that years of media domination by oppressive governments have left Muslims ill-
equipped to compete in this new field. He is thus able to draw on the Quranic verse (Al-Tawba: 36) 
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that declares ‘fight the unbelievers entirely [or ‘collectively’ - k!ffatan] as they fight you 
entirely’.
530
 For Rawashdi, this is an injunction for Muslims to fight in every way possible - 
including (since it is one of the ways the enemy claims to fight) through use of the media.  
 
Thus, in Rawashdi’s argument, the Muslim ‘i‘l!m"’ (user of the media) can be understood not just 
as a person with a role in supporting the mujahidin, but as a person actually partaking in jihad itself. 
Indeed, this notion that online activity can be understood as genuine participation in violent jihad 
seems to be a widespread theme of online jihadi writing. As another example, we might consider 
the justification used on a website described by Hamid bin ‘Ali as dedicated to ‘fiqh of jihad’ - 
Jih!duka Ma#l"b (ie, ‘Your Jihad is Demanded’).
531
 Here - after quoting the familiar verse 
mentioned above calling for the believers to ‘prepare against them whatever you are able of power 
and steeds of war’, the site urges: 
 ...dear brothers, we are not asking from you jihad with your selves or your possessions (which is  obligatory to 
 us all). We are asking for something far less than that: a jihad which will not cost you anything, and which 
 you can carry out from your homes.’ Nonetheless, this is a ‘jihad which is sure  to lose Israel more than it lost 
 in the wars. It is an easy jihad, without any need to go anywhere, but with great strength and efficacy. It is 
 electronic jihad, which terrifies the enemy of God whenever he looks at the huge losses he could sustain.  
 
In this case, the electronic jihad in question is to consist of hacking Israeli websites. But the motif 
of electronic jihad as violence extends very much to those carrying out propaganda activities - as, 
for instance, in the ‘media jihad battalion’, an entity responsible primarily for disseminating videos 
of the Islamic State in Iraq on sites such as YouTube and Archive.org.
532
  
 
The adoption of media jihad as a form of jihad in its own right does, however, create the problem of 
distinguishing between the supposedly distinct categories of jihad and da‘wa. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, ‘Islamic’ materials - such as nashids - apparently envisage the ‘jihadi’ and the 
‘da‘wi ’ content genres as overlapping but distinct entities. A jihadi perspective, however 
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necessarily rejects the notion (put forward by, for instance, Jama‘at al-Tabligh
533
 or, implicitly at 
least, Yusuf al-Qaradawi in his Fiqh al-Jih!d, where he calls for an ‘army of preachers’ to take the 
place of violent militarism in promoting Islam),
534
 that da‘wa (preaching) is jihad. How then, is it 
possible to argue that use of the media - or words, rather than direct violence - can be jihad after all? 
Rawashdi attempts to solve this problem by acknowledging da‘wa via the Islamic media, and media 
jihad via the jihadi media, as distinct obligations. Islamic media work is itself a collective obligation 
of the Ummah (far$ kif!ya), and indeed for certain Muslims (for instance, those with special 
qualifications in the media profession) Islamic media activity may even be a far$ ‘ayn. Indeed, the 
need for Islamic da‘wa provides the ultimate justification for violent jihad itself, whose purpose 
(Rawashdi here reiterates a familiar argument) is to remove obstacles which prevent people from 
being able to honestly and impartially appraise the merits of Islam. Indeed, just as jihad is 
subordinate ultimately to da‘wa (which nonetheless relies upon it), so too is the jihadi media to be 
understood as a subcategory of the Islamic media in general. Jihadi media does, however, have a 
very specific and clearly defined function: namely (retaining Rawashdi’s own emphasis):  
 
We may know the jihadi media, because it supplies the masses with the truths of jihad and its goals and its 
heritage, and it conveys the news and the reality and the information pertaining to it with a true and disciplined 
picture inside the Islamic Ummah and outside of it, and thus replies to the distortions and fabrications and 
rumours which arise around it to slander it and its people, and to  stimulate the Muslims to become 
involved in it and to support it 
 
And yet, in spite of Rawashidi’s definitional efforts, the problem remains unresolved (indeed it may 
be unresolvable, for it would seem to be a problem of infinite regress). For the existence of a 
‘jihadi’ media must still be predicated on the existence of a ‘jihad’, which may, in turn, include 
media use as one of its constitutive practices. Indeed, for all Rawashdi’s insistence on da‘wa and 
jihad as complementary practices, their online coexistence, at any rate, is not always so happy - a 
theme illustrated in the following ‘dialogue’ posted by the blogger ‘joadalfajr’.
535
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 ‘Mujahid’ said to ‘Defeatist’: we are calling for Jihad until victory or martyrdom 
 The Defeatist said: Your way is rugged and in our path there is delight and happiness 
 The Jihadi: Fie on the life of injustice and prostration under the pillow.  
 The Defeatist: This is just poetry and fanatical speech  
 The Jihadi: With fanaticism and the refusal of injustice unbelief will be banished and polytheism will  be 
left overturned.  
 The Defeatist: We shall explain by dialogue and reach the truth by politics 
 The Jihadi: Dialogue with the aggressor is stupidity and a stroke of idiocy  
 The Defeatist: Perhaps a portion of the infidels are towards us and returning [to their religion], and 
 they have waited passively for the good.  
 The Jihadi: To trust in the infidels is like leaving your chicken in care of the son of a jackal.  
 The Defeatist: Politics is the most expedient way, and our path will lead to liberation and the assertion of 
 sovereignty.  
The Jihadi: You disobey God and request his victory. By my life, this is a fatuous project. And to work by 
official channels under the rule of the Jews is unbelief and more.  
KNOW THAT JIHAD AND PREPARATION IS AN INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION ON ALL MUSLIMS 
AND A SERVANT [of God] WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT ON THE DAY OF THE RESURRECTION. 
AND GOD WILL SEE WHICH OF YOUR SOULS IS GOOD WITH  PREPARATION AND JIHAD IN 
THE PATH OF GOD ALMIGHTY. SO CARRY OUT WHAT IS REQUIRED BY GOD. IT IS 
INCUMBENT UPON YOU NOT TO BE FOOLED BY THE  MULTITUDE OF THE DOOMED SO BE 
HAPPY WITH ADMONITION, AND ITS LIKE. 
The irony here of course is that what is actually represented (and the uncertainty as to whether the 
first of the speakers is to be considered a ‘mujahid’ or a ‘jihadi’ may be significant to this), is not a 
debate between a fighter and a preacher, but rather between two types of preacher - an adherent of 
da‘wa and an adherent of da‘wa for jihad.  
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These difficulties provide a useful starting point for considering what is perhaps the single most 
important work relevant to the question of what it means to be a jihadi: Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s The 
Global Islamic Resistance Call. In fact, the highly distinctive approach taken by al-Suri in this work 
can be understood to a great extent as a response to precisely the paradoxes just discussed. In 
contrast to other ‘jihadi’ writers, Al Suri does in fact make specific and deliberate use of the term 
‘jihadis’ (jih!diy"n). Indeed, Al Suri is particularly careful about explaining his use of ‘terminology’ 
(i%#il!') in the book.  
 
Perhaps the single, fundamental distinction which Al Suri makes - indeed the one which underpins 
all of his subsequent language - is between religion as a generality, and specific historical and 
political trends within it. This is represented in language through his distinction between Islam, and 
what he calls the Islamic Awakening (al-%a'wa al-isl!miyya),
536
 which he views as an originally 
twentieth century phenomenon. An ‘emergent phenomenon’ within this Awakening is the jihadi 
current (al-tay!r al-jih!d" - a concept with a fairly broad acceptance among jihadi writers 
including, for instance, Abu Bakr Naji).
537
 The ‘jihadi current’, for Al-Suri is at once a very ‘broad’ 
term which includes all occurrences of armed jihad. But at the same time, it is a historically specific 
one. Within the ‘jihadi current’, Al Suri makes further distinctions - distinctions which, he is at 
pains to point out, are themselves ‘academic’ (dur#s") rather than ‘theological’ (‘aqd").
538
 These are 
between the ‘jihadis’ (whom, somewhat confusingly, he also says are directly equivalent to 
members of the ‘jihadi current’), and the mujahid groups (jama‘!t muj!hida). The former are to all 
intents and purposes ‘jihadists’ as they are known in English. They subscribe to the practice of al-
wala wa-l-bara (dissociation from non-Muslims) and combat the governments of Muslim countries 
whom they see as apostates. The latter, by contrast, fight the ‘original’ enemies of God - the Jews, 
Christians and Pagans.
539
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What is remarkable about Al Suri’s use of language is his original approach to the basic paradox of 
‘being a jihadi’. Rather than attempting to ignore the existence of a distinct category of ‘jihadis’, in 
favour of universalist Islamic categories such as mujahidin, Al Suri instead posits a bounded and 
explicitly ‘academic’ and non religious concept of jihadi groups as a way of avoiding having to 
make universalist (and therefore potentially divisive) claims to a monopoly of Islamic piety. Indeed, 
this approach can be read in the very title of his book, which, unusually for a ‘jihadi’ employs not 
the word jihad, but the more secular and nationalistic sounding term of ‘resistance’ (muq!wwama).  
 
Al Suri’s use of ‘resistance’ as a way of gaining an intellectual space which, distinct from that 
commanded by jih!d is accessible to his own political reasoning means that he does not have to 
wrestle directly with the same questions as Al-Salim and Rawashdi in his analysis of the role of the 
media, which can now be seen as a mobilisation device, without having to have a deeper, salvific 
meaning. This lightens the burden for his use of Islamic evidence in justifying his ‘Media Theory of 
the Global Islamic Resistance Call’, which he opens with a quotation from the Quran (Al Anfal: 65), 
in which it says: ‘O prophet, incite ('arri$) the believers to fight; if there are twenty patient men, 
they shall become two hundred. If there are a hundred, they shall become a thousand’. For Al-Suri, 
the question whether ‘incitement’ to jihad is jihad can be read as secondary to the fact that it is 
absolutely an integral part of the ‘global Islamic resistance call’. And yet - as in the rest of his work, 
Al-Suri does not quite sidestep the issue of the Islamic status of media activity. Rather, he asserts: 
 
 The task of fighting is an individual obligation for every, every Muslim. He demarcates  his sphere of activity 
and makes his effort to his ability. God does not place a soul except in  its sphere, and it is incumbent upon him 
to raise up this sphere by preparing his self, and cooperating with trusted Muslim brothers. And as for the task 
of incitement it is a task for everyone on its account, and it is an obligation on every person, even if he is 
excused from jihad.
540
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Is, then, incitement to jihad, jihad? Like Al-Salim, and to a lesser degree Rawashdi, Al-Suri, it 
seems, leaves the matter ambiguous. For to resolve it either way would be to place the author on 
one horn of an insoluble dilemma.  
 
6.3 Inhabiting Jihadi Ideology - Online Jihadi Identity 
 
There is, then, a gap at the heart of jihadi thought - a fundamental, paradoxical and therefore 
irresolvable contradiction which would seem to offer within it a possible space for a practice of 
jihadism ulitimately distinct from the ideals upon which it is premised - a jihadism concerned, in 
reality, not with advancing the strategic interests of the ‘global jihad’ but rather with, as de Certeau 
has put it, ‘how to create oneself?’.
541
 
 
Having determined the possibility of such a space, however, the immediate problem raised is how 
to go about looking for it. Since, naturally, no jihadi can openly express that his ultimate object is 
other than the ‘victory’ - though this is a word we must come back to - of the jihad, the existence of 
such a phenomenon can only be inferred indirectly.  
 
One place to look may be in the way Internet jihadis relate to potentially competing agendas within 
the ‘global jihad’ itself. For instance, there is on the one hand Al Suri’s ‘global Islamic resistance’ 
model, whereby Muslims everywhere are encouraged to participate in ‘terrorist’ violence (irh!b). 
On the other hand, for regional ‘mujahidin’ insurgencies there may be - it can be suggested - a 
strategic interest in regulating and limiting the types of violent practice undertaken by supporters. 
Notwithstanding the strategy advocated by al-Suri, there are some indications that acts of ‘amateur’ 
terrorism are not always considered by more ‘professional’ mujahidin to be an unalloyed good. This 
seems, for instance, to be the message of a 2009 document produced by the Chechen Kavkaz 
Centre, which declares: 
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 In Internet forums you can quite often read posts like “I want to go to Jihad, who will help me? Where can we 
meet?” They are either posted by agents provocateurs from security services, or by sincere, but naive Muslims. 
And we want to address this work to such [naive] brothers. Jihad is a personal  duty but, as prayer, it demands 
the fulfilling of certain conditions. What would we say about a man who stands for prayer in his swimming 
trunks, in a filthy place, without performing ablution, justifying it by the fact that prayer is obligatory and the 
time has come? But some brothers, who have realised the obligation of Jihad, allow themselves to spend much 
time in front of a computer display, while they do not prepare themselves at all morally, physically and 
intellectually for war in God’s path.  
 
At the same time, today’s jihad is a surveillance and sabotage activity, which, in all armies of the world, is 
carried out only by specially selected, elite fighters. Do you imagine a special forces soldier who does  not 
know even his multiplication tables, can hardly pull himself up five times, doesn’t know how to shoot, is not 
even familiar with his weapon, is not able to perform first aid to a wounded person, and does not  fulfil the 
requirement of security?
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As ambivalent as this work is about those who confine themselves purely to Internet jihad (who, 
one might suggest, seem more to be scorned for their lack of physical prowess than for failing to 
actually fight), it is more ambivalent about the kids trying things at home. What is particularly 
interesting, though, is the analogy upon which it attempts to build its argument (which incidentally, 
if viewed as actual theological analogy, or qiy!s, is poor theological practice, from a salafi point of 
view).
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 Reading between the lines, the ‘certain conditions’ which need to be fulfilled for 
acceptable jihad are military strategic conditions. A person who is weak and ill trained will not be a 
good candidate for advancing the jihad - particularly given that it is presently a ‘surveillance and 
sabotage’ activity. This implies that an important criterion for taking part in violent jihad is that 
there be a reasonable chance of success.
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 And yet this is not at all how jihad is necessarily talked 
about by jihadis, for whom jihad is an obligation even though the unbelievers will in reality never 
be comprehensively defeated, but against whom true Muslims must nonetheless struggle until the 
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end of time.
545
 It is hard to see how such reasons of expediency can be understood seriously as an 
obstacle to the fulfilment of religious obligations.  
 
The question is, then, not just why statements of this sort would be issued, so to speak, from above, 
but also why (and if) ordinary jihadis would find them convincing. And yet, this particular 
statement (which was located as a re-posting on the jihadi forum Ansar al-Mujahidin) was clearly 
seen as relevant by the Internet jihadis who disseminated it, and praised the disseminator for posting 
it. Indeed, seemingly ‘ordinary’ jihadis sometimes say similar things themselves. An example of 
this can be seen in the response of jihadi members of the forum Muslm.net (a group which will be 
discussed in detail in a later chapter) to the martyrdom of the Jordanian double agent ‘Abu Dujana 
al-Khurasani’. As in other online jihadi circles, this news of an Internet jihadi who had progressed 
on to martyrdom was greeted with a frenzy of posting by members eager to claim some online 
relationship, or to reveal some new angle to the story. It might be imagined, then, that the event 
would prompt a measure of reflection by such Internet jihadis on the need for Internet jihadis to 
move on to more direct involvement. At least on this forum, however, it was not clear that this was 
the case.  Indicative of the mood is the following, much praised post by ‘the leader, Usama’.  
 
 ...The hero-brother, the martyr, we reckon him, and God is his reckoner to have been from among the most 
 intelligent men, and his level in the standardised test was 97%. And this indicates something. It indicates that 
 his intelligence was outstanding.  
 
 Before I get into this subject, my warning to the brothers is that I would like to pose some questions far from 
 the outcome.  
 
1. Were the Jordanian Intelligence and the CIA involved in planting the brother Abu Dujana, may God 
accept him, among the mujahidin?  
2. Were the mujahidin involved in planting the brother, may God accept him, in the American and 
Jordanian intelligence apparatuses? 
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3. Was the brother from the beginning trying to be in control of himself and who then was in charge of 
coordinating with the mujahidin and who then set up the operation?  
 
 If it was the first of these, then the brother rendered unsuccessful these intelligence services in changing the 
 opinion of a person and this also compels us to pay attention.  
 
 We have warned those who participate in forums in general, and in jihadi forums in particular, because it is the 
 goal of these intelligence services thus.  
 
 We advise the brothers not to trust anyone of the participants on the forums and at the same time not to doubt 
 them, because it is easy to get involved.  
 
 As for if it was the second, this indicates towards the extension of the information which arrives to the 
 mujahidin to the domain of the security and intelligence services, and this is would mean to them that the war 
 has begun to take on a trend of a security dimension with the penetration of the strongest intelligence apparatus 
 in the region and the world, and we ask God to bring them victory in this war of intelligence.  
 If it was the third, and this is the most likely in my opinion, and God knows the truth, this is the aim of my 
 post, and I would like to warn the brothers about it.  
 
 Concerning the operation of penetration, it is imperative that the brother who wishes to penetrate a security 
 apparatus not try to penetrate it on his own.  
 
The brother Abu Dujana, of whom we do not know the details of his penetration into the security apparatus, 
possessed a stock of information which we cannot estimate and intelligence which he was able to employ in 
order to arrive in the position he arrived in, in addition to logistical and information support from the Taliban 
of Pakistan, and the coming together of these two facilities helped bring about success in the cracking of great 
security which was gained by an unparalleled media blackout. Therefore we advise the brothers not to 
improvise work like this unless it was coordinated with specialists from the mujahidin and their 
organisations.
546
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This post appears to use the theme of the overwhelming virtues attributed to Dr Humam Khalil al-
Balawi (aka Abu Dujana) in an interestingly double-edged way. On the one hand, it displays the 
poster’s affiliation to the jihad, his reverence for this shahid and his possession of expert knowledge 
on the subject. At the same time, however, these very virtues are used not as an admonition to 
others, but rather as a barrier to participation by those less fortunate. It comes across, in other 
words, as a tactical play which at once advances the poster’s online jihadi credibility, while 
continuing to maintain a barrier between this and the need to move on to physical engagement.  
 
Another useful place to examine the apparent tension between the ‘strategic’ interests of the global 
jihad, and the interests of individual jihadis is in the much heralded ‘Open Meeting’ of January 
2008, in which Ayman al-Zawahiri received questions from the four main jihadi forums. Quite a 
number of these related to the subject of participation in the jihadi media. And many seemed to be 
angling for the Shaykh’s approval of the activity - or even simply celebrations of it. Interestingly, 
the specificities of the questions posed and the generalities of the answers received revealed an 
interesting gap between how the activity was perceived by the Internet jihadis themselves, and the 
Al Qaida leadership.
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 To take a notable example, one poster asked: 
 
 ... what is your advice to the youth who continue to excel in the role of the recipient and don’t want to become 
 effective in the electronic jihad on the Net? And which is more appropriate: that he suffice with his activities 
 on the ground in terms of distributing materials specific to jihad or that he take part in electronic jihad on the 
 Net? Or do you see the two things both to be necessary at once?
548
 
 
The question here is quite exact in what it means. Nonetheless, Zawahiri apparently interpreted it as 
a query about the validity of Internet jihad in general: 
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 I advise the youth and the rest of the Ummah’s classes and groups to join the individual obligation of Jihad 
 first. But if they are unable to do that and the Mujahideen haven’t assigned them to other duties, then they must 
 do all they can to aid Islam in all spheres, including what you referred to.
549
  
 
Such tensions betray the subtle but important distinctions which seem to exist between the cultural 
attitudes of ‘mujahidin’ such as Zawahiri, and ‘jihadis’ such as the questioner here. As such, it is 
possible to read ‘online jihadism’ as possessing a set of styles and practices with a certain, albeit 
only implicit, independence premised not so much on the practice of jihad, but on the practice of 
admiring the mujahidin. One way of looking for this is to consider the quite specific ways in which 
jihadis seek, through the textual means available, to actualise themselves online. This implies 
turning towards the second question posed at the outset: what is done on the Internet in order to 
manifest jihadi status?  
 
6.4 Presenting as Jihadi 
 
In practice, as with other online social contexts, online ‘jihadi’ identities are carefully constructed, 
and abuse of the possibilities the Internet affords with regard to manifestation - for example, by 
‘sock puppeting’ with multiple aliases - is carefully guarded against (something which shall be 
considered more in the following chapter). On the Web forums that account for much of the most 
visible online ‘jihadi’ activity, jihadis make extensive use of every marker of individuality that this 
medium (and the rules of individual forums) afford. The basic format of the web forum offers – 
outside of the content of posts themselves – essentially four opportunities for presenting one’s self 
as ‘jihadi’ - through one’s name, one’s personal information, one’s ‘avatar’ (a small image next to 
the name) and, lastly, through the visual ‘signature’. To this may be added decorative features 
which are frequently added to forum posts in addition to their actual (often limited) semantic 
content.  
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- Nicknames 
 
Nicknames are, of course, the most basic element of online identity (as indeed Al-Salim observes in 
39 Ways). But even with something as apparently basic as the one or two words that go into naming 
someone in an Internet community, there is considerable room for self-expression. As Bechar-
Israeli noted, on the basis of her study of an IRC chatroom, people are both possessive and playful 
with their online names which, far from being blank masks which conceal identity, almost 
invariably communicate something about the people who choose them.
550
  
 
Given its clandestine nature, nicknames of course play a particularly important role in jihadi culture 
in a broad sense. ‘Nasiri’,
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 describes how, on entering a mujahidin training camp in Afghanistan 
in the 1990s, he was asked to adopt a new name. For the entire year he spent there (so he claims), 
he never discovered the true name of any of his comrades.  
 
The naming traditions of mujahidin who passed through the training camps of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan draw heavily on the traditional Arabic naming tradition of the kunya, (by which a parent is 
named after his, or her - potentially fictional - oldest son), and the nisba, which is frequently a 
toponymic.
552
 Thus one finds, among prominent recent figures in contemporary global violent jihad 
Abu Mus‘ab Al-Zarqawi (the father of Mus‘ab from Zarqa), Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, Abu Hafs al-
Masri, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and so on. It is worth 
noting that these kunyas frequently refer to distinctively archaic sounding names from early Islamic 
and Arabic history (Hafs, Hamza, Hudheifa, Mus‘ab and so on) - analogous, perhaps, to the 
tendency among some religious Protestants to employ relatively obscure biblical first names. Jihadi 
names thus have both a practical and a symbolic significance, since they serve simultaneously to 
protect the real identity of the bearer, but also to confer on the community a sense of the virtues of 
the earliest generations of Muslims.  
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How far do such conventions replicate themselves on the Internet? In the previous chapter we saw 
how rights to names are jealously guarded on jihadi forums (just as on the IRC chatrooms described 
by Bechar Israeli), and how perceived violations to their uniqueness and integrity can form the basis 
for more lasting disputes and dissatisfactions. So much so, in fact, that a jihadi forum may now 
include within its terms and conditions specific limitations with regard to name choice. On the 
forum al-Lay#th, for example, these are as follows:  
Generally, for members, there is freedom of choice of the nickname that seems suitable. Preferably it should be in 
the Arabic language, and that it should not consist of more than two parts, and that it should not exceed fifteen 
letters. It is utterly forbidden to name with the following: 
! The names of people of immorality or freethinking 
! Facetious or mocking names 
! Names with a sinful meaning 
! Names of sinful personages except to those who actually have that name 
! Names which resemble names of the viewers and active participants in the network 
! Names which resemble names previously registered in the network, for example by adding a space or a dash or 
two dots on the ta marbuta etc.  
! Vague names (like letters or numbers or punctuation marks) 
! The names of the companions (may God be pleased with them) and the names of the Ulama of the Ummah 
! The name of a website or an publicity company, with an advertisement for it, except with permission of the 
management of the network
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Some of these injunctions are placed in context if we consider what names are actually adopted on 
jihadi forums. Broadly, these fall into three categories.
554
 First, there are names which are simply 
ordinary Arabic/Muslim names – ‘Safyah’ or ‘Ahmed29’ for example. Second, there are names 
which, though they adopt the form of normal Arabic names, appear to be in some way evocative. At 
its mildest, this can simply mean adoption of the traditional kunya-laqab form as just discussed, 
particularly with an archaic name. A stronger statement may seem to be made when a name seems 
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to constitute a tribute to a particular heroic figure, whether medieval or contemporary. This is, of 
course, ambiguous. Almost any common Arabic name could be a reference to someone, and in the 
case of names such as Abu Khattab, Abu Mus‘ab, Abu Hafs it is unclear whether the reference is to 
specific mujahid, or just invoking a generically ‘salafi’ aesthetic. The same goes for toponyms. If a 
forum member uses ‘Al-Maqdisi’, is this a reference to the theologian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
(which is itself an alias)?
555
 Or is it (which would also be evocative in a different way), to the Bayt 
al-Maqdis – Jerusalem? Thirdly, there are names which are more directly self-descriptive. Here too 
there is a degree of ambiguity. For example, it is fairly common to use the names of animals 
considered fierce or noble (lion, lion cub, falcon). But these too (Layth, Saqr) can sometimes occur 
as Arabic given names in ‘real life’. In most such cases, however, the descriptive intent is 
unmistakeable, as, for example, with names such as ‘Great Commander, ‘Lover of the Islamic 
State’. ‘Seeker of Truth’, or ‘Killer of Jews’. This in turn illustrates the two key themes to be found 
within such self-descriptive names: allegiance to Islam, and its positive qualities; and violence 
against its enemies.  
 
There is, however, a deeper distinction which can be made among jihadi name choices. This is 
between those names which we might consider (and the rules stipulated by Layuth forum would 
support us here) to be ‘respectable’, and those names which have a more playful, even somewhat 
frivolous import. The former include, of course, the properly ‘salafi’ names – ‘Abu Tamim al-Libi’, 
Abu-Dhirr al-Baghdadi’ and so on. The latter include those names which violate the bounds of 
propriety by directly adulating revered forefathers (‘Ibn Taymiyya,’ ‘daughter of Umar’), draw on 
English or popular culture ‘Song of Terror’, ‘Irhabi001’ (yet more complex, of course, as a 
reference to the media mujahid Irhabi007), or simply brag (‘player of bullets’, ‘top drawer 
terrorist’). What is striking of course is that the latter (which would seem to include some of the 
most active and best known Internet jihadis) are conspicuously fan names. They operate at a 
remove from the conspicuous piety of the more ‘salafi’ names, elevating the mujahidin themselves, 
 179 
the violence of jihad and the media poses it strikes above the immediate representation of Islamic 
propriety.
556
  
 
- Personal Information 
 
Personal information on jihadi forums echoes the conventions of any Web forum. But its fields are 
often used subversively or rhetorically. Fields such as ‘occupation’ or ‘country’ are given as ‘seeker 
of knowledge,’ or ‘mujahid’ on the one hand, and as ‘the land of jihad’, or as a particular ‘Islamic’ 
versions of specific countries (always, seemingly, equivalent to their contemporary boundaries) 
such as the land of Kanana (Egypt), or the land of rib!# (Palestine). The tension expressed thereby 
is somewhat complex. Jihadism, after all, might implicitly be expected to support a view of the 
world in which contemporary states have been replaced by a single Islamic Caliphate. So the 
standard question implied by asking one’s dawla is necessarily ripe for subversion. More odd, then, 
is that the forum should ask this question in the first place as if either inviting a response defying 
contemporary geography, or somehow representing contemporary political geography as (in spite of 
the contrary presumptions of the forum’s content) a built in necessity of the medium.  
 
- Decorative Text 
 
Posts on jihadi forums are – as observed in the previous chapter – seldom responded to with 
extensive comments. Rather, members generally offer a limited range of ritual forumulas of well 
wishing such as the ubiquitious ‘jazak Allah khayr’. These repetitive comments are, however, often 
subject to a high level of visual embellishment. The simplest form this can take is the use of 
different colours to make emphatic points. A post on al-Sayf forum specifically demanded the 
introduction of this feature in order to ‘make the forum more attractive’. At a more sophisticated 
level, words are represented both calligraphically and sometimes also as flash animations. The 
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author recalls seeing examples on more technologically limited media of Roman characters being 
used in elaborate combinations to form calligraphic representations of Islamic formulae. The 
Islamic tradition of calligraphy as an alternative to representational art (a classical Islamic 
prohibition which online jihadis and other Internet Muslims – incidentally – seem to have few 
qualms about flouting) is, of course, famous. But in terms of contemporary function this tradition of 
creative individual expression through text seems strongly reminiscent of Danet’s notion of 
‘cyberplay’.
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 This would imply a sense in which jihadis use the possibilities of the medium to go 
beyond its primarily textual presumptions, producing aesthetics of membership and solidarity which 
are not expressible in ordinary words.  
 
- Visual Customisation: Avatars and Signatures 
 
Graphic designs have two main places on a forum profile. The ‘avatar’ in a Web forum is a passport 
photograph style image, which therefore invites the viewer to interpret it as a picture of the person 
who is posting. This convention has, however, been played with so extensively that it might be 
suggested that it has largely broken down. Where jihadi profiles include such images, these 
generally consist of pictures (sometimes composite) of favoured mujahidin such as al-Zarqawi, of 
group logos, or of more complex composed images. In these cases, these can be discussed together 
with the category of the ‘signature’ (tawq&‘) which sometimes follows a jihadi forum post.  
 
Visual customization both through avatar and signature may, of course, combine with nickname and 
personal information to form a unified sense of a forum member’s identity. For instance, a forum 
member with the name ‘Mu!ibb Ab" Tam#m al-Azd#’ (a deceased leader of Al Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula) might provide as his avatar the image of this mujahid, and as his signature a 
larger expression of his admiration for this figure as below.  
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In considering the significance of jihadi forum ‘signatures’, it is important, however, to recognise 
not just the design of such composite images, but also the process by which they are ordered and 
made, and the role this plays in the sociality of the forum as a whole. As an illustration of this, let us 
turn to a thread on the forum Ansar al-Mujahidin, dating from 28th July 2009 in which a member 
advertised his services as a graphic designer and creator of signatures.
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At the time of writing, the 
thread runs to forty-six pages, making it remarkably long by the standards of the forum. Essentially, 
the thread consists of members’ - often highly specific - requests for signatures to be designed for 
them by a character who, it appears, has taken on the de facto role of the forum’s resident designer.  
 
The thread opens with the following post:  
 
 Peace upon you and the mercy and blessing of God 
 Thanks to God and prayer and peace on the messenger of God and on his family and his companions all.  
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 Gracious brothers and sisters of Al Ansar 
 
 Order your signature and your brother will give it to you God willing.  
 
 To order a signature:  
 
 You have to answer these questions so your brother in design knows what to do.  
 
 Do you want the addition of the name of a specific forum?  
 Do you want the addition of a specific sentence? 
 The name that you want to be written in the signature 
 Do you want a picture of a leader from among the leaders of the mujahidin - and who? 
 Do you have anything else, an idea, for example, a thing which you would like in the signature?  
 
 I promise to assist you with God’s permission.  
 
One point of interest here is the way in which the need to derive visual content from verbal 
description has here helped to impel the conceptualisation of a standardised anatomy of the visual 
form in question. Just as an external content analyst might perform a preliminary breakdown of the 
signature, so too jihadis, in their signature requests, understand the signature form as fundamentally 
a composite of interchangeable elements: the name of the jihadi himself (or herself), the 
background image(s), and the slogan.  
 
Individually, these elements are highly stereotypical - a point which can be illustrated with 
reference to the extensive gallery of the designer’s previous work as displayed below this post. As 
we saw above with jihadi naming conventions, the visual images, and even the slogans which 
accompany them show little room for individual creative expression. They are chosen from a 
narrow range of symbolic images - indeed, a surprisingly narrow range. For example, even the 
visual code of ‘leaders of the mujahidin’, is conventionally restricted to a very narrow range of 
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actual individuals. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abu Mus‘ab al-
Zarqawi and Khattab crop up again and again. Other mujahidin leaders occasionally requested as 
the post continues (such as, to provide an example from a post which shall be considered 
immediately below, Abu Mus‘ab ‘Abdul-Wudud - the leader of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb), 
appear so rarely as to imply, perhaps, that their inclusion is intended not to reflect glory on the 
jihadi who thus advertises them, as to promote a personal hero through association with the publicly 
acknowledged greats.  
 
The question of how jihadis themselves understand the significance of signature images is further 
illuminated with reference to the responses to this offer. First, it is quite clear that jihadis are 
particular about their online image, and equally clear that this image is constructed from a 
vocabulary of images which is well mutually understood. Thus, terms such as ‘the banner of the 
Islamic state’, are unmistakably references to a particular image. Secondly, however, there is an 
interesting question of taste. Jihadi posts (which are generally exceptionally polite),
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 after 
specifying what is wanted, frequently add the (presumably disingenuous) qualification that the 
requested details are only suggestions, and that the designer must ultimately fall back on his own 
taste and artistic judgement. And indeed, artistic judgement is clearly not just an empty formula for 
the designer himself, who, in this case, offers a member a second, alternative signature on the 
grounds that he is not happy with his work in the first.  
 
What criteria govern signature choice at the individual level? Although there is little in-depth 
discussion of such matters, a post on this thread does provide an intriguing indication of how one 
kind of distintion may be understood. In this case, the poster asks for three signatures: two to be 
‘na%r&’ and the third ‘da‘w"’. These two words are highly significant. The word na%r means 
‘victory’. However, its cognate ‘an%!r’, is the word used of the companions of the prophet 
Muhammad. It therefore has implications both of being a ‘supporter’ of something in the moral 
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sense, and also of actively helping to bring victory to a cause. Both meanings are used extensively 
in the jihadi context. Indeed, the name of the forum on which this thread is to be found is itself 
‘Ansar al-Mujahidin’ - that is, supporters of the Mujahidin. At the same time, jihadi contexts 
constantly use the word na%r or nu%ra in formulaic sentences or the form ‘may God give victory 
(yun!%ir) to the mujahidin’. In this post, the two ‘nasri’ signatures ordered are described as follows: 
 
 With respect to the banner - the State of Islam, may God bring glory to it. You could use a horseman who 
carries the banner of the state, rather than the banner on its own. Likewise, the logo of the organisation of Al 
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, may God bring them victory if you could find a  clearer picture of it. 
 
 The second: The name, Abu ‘Ali al-Sadiq.  
And behind, the picture  - my Shaykh the lion of Islam, Usama. And the governor of the Ummah, Zawahiri, 
and the mark of Abu Yahya al-Libi.  And our commander, the leader Abu Musab Abdul Wudud, with the 
writing: preferably, if these words were to the commander Abu Musab Abdul  Wudud [whatever happens in 
our darkest hours, as long as the lions are running... however tyranny and corruption domineer... whatever the 
dwarves and the slaves do, if they pine for killing and they threaten, will they stand in the way of the victory of 
Islam???  No!!! We shall remain always singing hymns to its dawn, and without doubt, tomorrow will come’]. 
 
 The third: And this one is da‘wi   
 The name: Abu ‘Ali the Somali Salafi Jihadi 
 Embellish this signature with the best appearance which you can see.  
 
The two na%r& signatures here are clearly militant in their imagery, and display affiliation to specific 
groups and specific (albeit in three cases generic) mujahidin. The last, however, is markedly 
different. It lacks specific mandated image content, but declares far more with the name it uses. In 
doing so, it seems to underline the distinction between jihadism as an online activity, and jihadism 
as a virtual state of being. Indeed, by searching for ‘Abu ‘Ali al-Sadiq’ and for ‘Abu ‘Ali the 
Somali Salafi Jihadi’, it is possible to discern that there is, apparently, a distinction between the way 
in which these two identities are used. Abu ‘Ali al-Sadiq appears on a spectrum of jihadi forums, 
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including Al-Fallujah, Shumukh al-Islam, Ma’arik al-Salafiyya, the Palestinian salafi-jihadi site Al-
Amana and the Somali jihadi forum Al-Qimmah.
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 But the signature ‘Abu ‘Ali the Somali Salafi 
Jihadi’ seems to apply specifically to those occasions in which he posts particular content, as 
opposed to simply congratulating another poster’s thread.  
 
6.5 Internet Jihadi Perspectives on the Internet Jihadi - Irhabi007 and Muhibb al-Shaykhayn 
al-Tunisi 
 
While examinations of jihadi self presentation on the Internet can provide a general sense of how 
‘ordinary’ Internet jihadis understand the significance of their own activity (or want others to 
understand it), a little more ingenuity is needed to gain access to the question of how jihadis 
understand the value of their online activity in comparison to the physical practice of jihad. 
Naturally, jihadis cannot explicitly promote Internet jihad as a serious alternative to physical 
activity in general. To do so would be to deny their very jihadi identity. Nonetheless, it is possible 
to look for hints of tension between physical and virtual alternatives by examining the way in which 
Internet jihadis celebrate other Internet jihadis’ contributions.  
 
We have already noted, for instance, a tendency of Internet jihadis to choose names making 
reference to ‘Irhabi007’, in homage to a famous Internet jihadi who, by virtue of being in prison, 
can be argued to have some ‘martyr’ credentials in his own right. It is, of course, well known that 
Younes Tsouli (irhabi007’s real life name) confronted the paradox of being a supporter of violent 
jihad in distant lands who did not, himself, move far from his own computer screen when he 
lamented to an online associate, Wassim Mughal: ‘It sucks that we are here and not there. But I 
suppose someone has to be here.’ Mughal replied: 
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This media work is very, very important... A lot of the funding that the brothers are getting is coming because 
of the videos. Imagine how many have gone after seeing the videos. Imagine how many have become 
shahid.
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Later on, Tsouli lamented that his mother’s prayers for his safety were to blame for his failure to 
achieve martyrdom, condemning him instead to a lengthy imprisonment. And indeed, it is a normal 
part of the formal language of jihadi forums for members to wish martyrdom upon each other.  
 
Given that (while he may well have aspired to) Tsouli never succeeded in participating in physical 
violence, it is instructive to consider how he, and other well-known Internet jihadis are remembered 
by their successors. For in doing so, it might reasonably be expected that we could gain access to 
the ways in which such Internet jihadis think about themselves and their own activities. Thus it is 
interesting to note that irhabi007 and a contemporary of his, far less well known in Western media 
but very nearly as notable in the online jihadi context, Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi
562
 are to a 
significant degree the object of tributes and memorabilia. For instance, ‘Song of Terror’ - a highly 
active member of the jihadi forum Al Fallujah posted on one occasion ‘completely complete file on 
the brother Irhabi007’.
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 This is essentially just a large collection of (predominantly) mainstream 
media articles and photographs put together by an active member on Fallujah forum, and 
subsequently copied onto a number of other Arabic forums. As a gesture however, it appears 
significant. In putting in the work required for this ‘completely complete’ compilation, it is hard to 
escape the inference that ‘Song of Terror’ is making a statement both about his own status as an 
Interet jihadi (implicitly a successor to Irhabi007?); and, by implication a statement about the status 
of Internet jihadism in general.   
 
Another example would be the creation by an apparent Saudi hacking enthusiast
564
 of a tribute 
video to irhabi007 - the ‘greatest Muslim hacker known in history, who cracked American 
governmental sites’.
565
 The video combines (in the idiom particularly of one of the jihadi flash 
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videos encountered in the previous chapter), a dark, shadowy sequence of pictures, in which a 
ghostly picture of Younis Tsouli (in his most visually Islamic aspect), is superimposed over the 
backdrop of a dark prison cell - following the convention of the prisoner support video encountered 
in the previous chapter. Behind him is a prison guard in an American uniform (Tsouli is actually 
imprisoned in the UK). As the video continues, light floods in through a barred window, very likely 
symbolising the presence of God’s salvation in the darkness of the earth’s injustice. The word 
‘hacked’ then appears over the whole screen (quite possibly lifted from one of Tsouli’s own 
attempts), with cross hairs over the letter ‘c’ before, finally, Tsouli’s face appears surrounded 
entirely by light. The video ends with the nickname of its maker and the words ‘we will not forget 
you, beloved brother Irhabi 007’ (the 007 is, unusually, written in Arabic characters), ‘we follow in 
your path’), below the formulaic call ‘God break your imprisonment’. In the mournful nashid which 
accompanies the montage video  a chorus sings ‘which shall remember you in our prayers... we 
shall remember our faithful brother’. The languishing of the subject in prison is lamented ‘my 
prison, my bonds are till death’ (an exaggeration in this case), and the singer anticipates the possible 
future imprisonment of himself and his listeners, and the resolve they shall show in this event.  
 
A similar tribute can be found in the work of a character whose name translates as ‘poet of Al-
Ansar’, the author of a poetical tribute to irhabi007’s colleague, Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi, 
entitled Tears of the Two Eyes for the Lover of the Two Shaykhs (the meaning of Mu'ibb al-
Shaykhayn).
566
 The poem expresses a powerful sense of both the fellowship the author found in his 
fellow members of Al Ansar forum - the forum which Muhibb al-Shaykhayn and Irhabi 007 helped 
establish, and the relevance and meaningfulness of this form of jihadi activity to the miltary activity 
of mujahid heroes of both distant and recent past. Thus it looks both inwards, as, for example in its 
nostalgic account of how:  
 
 Al Ansar fell  
 But the Ansar did not fall 
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 And moved, flying like a hurricane 
 I remember the day we met 
 In Al Ikhlas 
 In the second outlet of the media 
 I remember the day we made a date  
 with the esteemed,
567
 the leopard, the terrorist 007 
 With the esteemed Abu ‘Umar ‘Ali 
 May God release you from imprisonment 
 We were four people 
 I remember the day I tired 
 Both of us with Shaykh Abu Mus‘ab  
 If only he and you and Abu Mus’ab 
 Returned to me so I could be happy 
 And I wrote your name in the search bar 
 And when I pulled my eye away from the piece 
 I found the shahada
568
 on the pages 
 The pages of glory and pride 
 
And forwards to future military redemption, both of the subject of the tribute from his 
imprisonment, and the whole Muslim world (by allegorical association, perhaps, from its 
imprisonment).  
 
 From behind the darkness and the walls 
 Even though you are chained 
 The manacles make love to your wrists 
 And the prison loves your sides 
 They don’t know. They don’t know 
 Monotheism is your company 
 And the book of God is your companion 
 They have humiliated and humiliated 
 But if the falcon of Quraysh
569
 were to return to us 
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 To raid the Levant to free you 
 He would desire you as one of his soldiers 
 To build with you another Andalus 
 And if the glorious Qutuz
570
 were to return to us 
 To raid the Levant
571
 and release you 
 He would want you for one of his soldiers 
 So that the Arabs might stop the Tatars 
 And should Salah al-Din
572
 return to us 
 To raid the Levant and free you 
 He would want you for one of his soldiers 
 To free Al-Aqsa and the path of Muhammad to the heavens
573
 
 If Abu Mus‘ab returned to us 
 To raid the Levant and free you 
 You would indeed be of his soldiers 
 
The geography here is, of course, entirely meaningless in a physical sense. Muhibb al-Shaykhayn 
(real name Mohamed Ben al-Hadi Messahel) was sentenced to imprisonment in Morocco - nowhere 
near the evocative Sh!m mentioned in the poem – although it is possible that there is an allusion to 
this when the poem later says.
574
  
 
 We have quivered up our arrows...  
 with these we shoot, by the name of God we strike  
 from the Mashriq to the Maghreb. 
 
But factual precision seems hardly to be the essential point here – any more than are the precise 
circumstances of Tsouli’s imprisonment in the video previously referred to. Both Tsouli and 
Muhibb al-Shaykhayn have become icons – in Tsouli’s case, almost to the level of a Khattab or an 
al-Zarqawi. Jihadis have invested in them, so it seems, the very idea of Internet jihad as a 
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worthwhile activity – as one which partakes of some measure of the glory that accrues to the 
mujahidin themselves.  
 
And yet, in an odd sense, the relationship between the idealized forms of Muhibb al-Shaykhayn and 
Tsouli does not run purely in one direction. As we can see in the comparison between these two 
sections, the nature of Internet jihadism is such that – curiously – the notion of the concrete reality 
of the mujahidin as opposed to the virtuality of Internet jihadism is actually reversed. For Internet 
jihadis, the jihad itself is an abstract – but the experience of engaging in jihadism on the Internet is 
very real. Indeed, as a striking illustration of this we are offered, in the course of the thread which 
follows this poem what is, in a sense, a ‘physical’ relic of Muhibb al-Tunisi ‘himself’, in the form 
of an original fragment from the now defunct Al-Ansar forum in which he discusses meeting up 
with a number of people, including Irhabi007 for a ‘chat’ at a certain hour going by French time. 
Remarkably, this piece of purely electronic data - both by virtue of its reference to another, 
synchronous Internet medium which therefore moves in real time, and its physical testimony to the 
mythologised individual being described, seems to carry with it a striking sense of weight and 
authenticity. Indeed, it is as if the virtual - for Internet jihadis - has a concreteness, a sense of 
realisation and detail far greater than the ‘reality’ of the violence they celebrate; as if, on the 
Internet, it is the companionship of Internet jihad that is real, and the reality of violence that is 
merely rhetorical and virtual.  
 
Indeed, a tribute to irhabi007 by another jihadi poet whom we encountered in the previous chapter - 
the self styled ‘poet of al-Qaida’, provides a similarly vivid portrayal of the powerful emotional 
reality of jihadi relationships.  
 
 The letters scattered for missing you 
 And the sadness started to move in my clothes 
 As if I hadn’t talked to you for nights 
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 And I hadn’t read the sahab posts 
 As if you were like a candle playing with the wind 
 And the sun doing a magical disappearing act 
 Ah Younis! I did not feel upset or miserable with the colours of problems, with being away from  home, and I 
 couldn’t be away from terrorism 
 But your disappearance from among us is the reason for my torment 
 If you went to Ikhl!% one day, your steps were crying ‘O best of youth!’  
 For you is the increase of longing 
 And Ikhl!% is for you - in the best of places 
 And every day is a memorial to you 
 Remind us of colours and shades of torment 
 You made terrorism a path for us 
 And you terrorised the pagan dogs
575
 
 
By identifying figures such as these as, so to speak ‘jihadis’ jihadis’, it might be argued that Internet 
jihadis are exercising the ‘distinction’ which is a central feature of all subcultural media 
engagement. By becoming exemplars for a particular set of excellences, Internet jihadis may 
comfort themselves that they, too, may realize such excellences through diligent Internet jihad. The 
following quotation perhaps makes this point with particular clarity: 
 
Supporters of the jihad - those who do not mobilize to the lands of jihad and who have not associated with an 
organization, and our words are about them, those who have mobilized or served the jihadi media and not 
asked for flight, and especially our words are about the best, and most famous among them. We must know 
that it is, thanks to God our jihadi media today, and after this stage of formation its expression cannot be 
carried out by individuals, but rather is the responsibility of groups with our information the presence or 
absence of which is of great Younis Tsouli Irhabi 007. And after the affairs of his life, and what we have read 
about him, I think that the whole lot of us know with what skill he advanced our jihadi media at the early 
stages of its development, and after a long period of the victory which he brought to our jihadi media, and we 
shall see why the brother became famous and advanced what he advanced, and we esteem him, and may God 
esteem him.  
 192
6.6 Conclusion  
 
The previous chapter concluded by positing a powerful aesthetic relationship between the jihadi and 
the jihadi text, without having much to say about this relationship itself. In this chapter, I hope, this 
gap has to some extent been filled. Accordingly, it now becomes possible to engage with the 
question not just of how jihadi communities on the Internet may work as communities, but, more 
specifically, how jihadism as a set of ideas and themes may work for people who practice it online.  
 
Readers of this chapter (in particular) will have had cause to sicken of the word ‘paradox’. But I 
have had cause to use it so often because Internet jihadism, closely examined, really does seem to 
seethe with paradoxes.  
 
1. That it insists on the obligatory nature of jihad, while insisting (implicitly) that its pracitioners are 
not, themselves, mujahidin.  
2. OR, that it insists that jihad is violence, while legitimating a wide range of non-violent activities 
as participation in jihad. 
3. That, precisely because it is a virtual activity, it is more real to its participants than the authentic 
external reality which forms its participants’ claim to legitimacy.  
4. That, in order to function, it must expressly deny any connection to the authentic reality which 
forms its participants’ claim to legitimacy.  
5. That (a point that will be expanded on in the next chapter) the more enthusiastically its 
participants express their allegiance to the mujahidin, the less true they become to the cause of 
the jihad.  
 
It may be posited, however, that jihadism on the Internet works not in spite of these contradictions, 
but actually because of them. The day that an Internet jihadi says that he (women - a subject too 
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large to go into here, have more room for manoeuvre) is uninterested in the prospect of joining the 
mujahidin and becoming a shahid is the day that he ceases to be an Internet jihadi. But without such 
an impenetrable boundary, the non-violent online practices which Internet jihadis take part in would 
cease to work. Jihadism derives its meaning as an online practice precisely from the fact that it can 
never quite be reduced to a merely virtual activity, to the fact that it can never quite be absorbed and 
accommodated.   
 
And yet at the same time, it would seem that many Internet jihadis are, so to speak ‘of the devil’s 
party without knowing it’, for they write, so to speak, ‘in fetters’ when they discuss the actual 
practices of the mujahidin in the field, which are treated in remote, stereotypical terms; and in 
achingly immediate, specific terms when they speak of their experiences online. Of course, it is the 
virtual world that they know best. And yet this cannot fully explain the aesthetic. After all, there is 
no need, even for those who have never taken part in hostilities to write about them in such a 
stylised manner. Nor is there a necessary reason why online experiences must be related in such - to 
use the Maffesolian term - ‘paroxysmal’ terms.  
 
Indeed, the very fact that mujahidin heroes are so unassailable would seem, perhaps, to make them 
all the more useful as vessels and for the kinds of emotional crescendo collectively produced by the 
online experience. For example, it might be noted how the posting record of Al-Sayf forum member 
Wajih al-Qamar (as encountered in the previous chapter) contains numerous entries labelled as, for 
example, ‘a story that made many people cry’, ‘a story that made Usama bin Ladin cry until he 
fainted’, ‘eight matters that made me cry’, ‘situations that made (the second Muslim Caliph) ‘Umar 
bin al-Khattab cry and then become silent and then become angry’.
576
 In such cases it would seem 
that even the act of cutting and pasting a story serves as an invitation to a moment of imagined, but 
intense solidarity. In this sense engagement with the mujahidin can be understood as a personal 
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investment – equivalent to other types of ‘fannish engagement’ which helps to give meaning and 
purpose to otherwise very ordinary practices of life.  
 
To sum up: other than borderline illegality, Internet jihadism, as an experience, does not obviously 
have very much in common with the vibe at a rave. It is hard to imagine a less loved up and 
inclusive image than the snarling, gun-toting visage of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi. And yet the idea of 
the ‘clubculture’ which was used to discuss the postmodern, fragmentary situation in the late 1990s, 
in which people from all sorts of backgrounds could melt into the spontaneous, almost ritual 
experience of house music and ecstasy is in a sense equally applicable to that of Internet jihadism. 
Ironically, in their quest for authenticity, Internet jihadis are forced - so it seems - to substitute a 
world of surfaces for a world of ‘real’ encounters. Since Internet jihadism is, practically speaking, 
defined solely by the visual index of engagement with jihadi texts, and since offline jihadism is 
necessarily a secretive activity, there is no reason why the jihadi may not simply enter and leave as 
she or he pleases. In this sense, like the conventions of behaviour at a rave which made it possible 
for a stockbroker, a rock star, a supermarket worker, a new-age hippy and a punk to spontaneously 
sink their differences into a single social experience, so the strict rules which govern how one goes 
about ‘being a jihadi’ can be seen to conspire to produce the powerful collective experience of 
jihadism on the Internet.  
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7.  
Jihadism and its Discontents 
 
7.0 Jihadi Da‘wa 
 
There remains some unfinished business. In chapter five, we left Abu ‘Amru al-Qa‘idi explaining 
that the main purpose of the jihadi forum is da‘wa. Indeed, da‘wa remains clearly the best argument 
left for there being a rational purpose to jihadi activity on the Internet. After all, it has been said 
many times that we are confronted with a ‘war of ideas’, and that ‘they’ are better at information 
operations than ‘we’ are.
577
 In the open meeting with Ayman al-Zawahiri, jihadis expressed great 
concern about whether Al Qaida was managing to get its message across, and about distortions of 
its image by the mainstream Arabic and Western media.  
 
But do jihadis actually do much ‘da‘wa’ on the Internet? How do they understand the concept of 
da‘wa as a jihadi activity, and does such a conception reflect what jihadis actually do online? We 
have already encountered the tension between da‘wa and jihad on the one hand, and, on the other, 
between 'nu%ra', and jihadi da‘wa. As we saw with the previous chapter’s example of the 'Salafi-
Jihadi from Somalia', it is possible that na%r& and da‘w " identities - or, perhaps better, roles, may 
represent two distinct spheres of identity for an Internet jihadi. Indeed, such a situation seems 
almost inevitable given the apparently tiered structure of jihadi propaganda distribution, with the 
jihadi forums serving as the initial gateway for new releases, which then make their way onto other 
forums and types of social media.  
 
In fact, this is more or less the view put forward by Abu ‘Amru al-Qa’idi. For him, there are 
basically two kinds of Internet activity which one might use to strengthen the resolve of a 
prospective ‘recruit’ for forming a jihadi unit. The first of these has already been discussed, and 
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entails enrolling one’s protege in a jihadi forum. It is important to note that this is only after (in Al-
Qa’idi’s vision) an extensive period of face to face socialisation between the recruiter and his mark. 
 
Alternatively, Al Qa’idi offers this tactic:  
 
Make the suggestion of practicing as a mad ‘# [a practitioner of da‘wa] in his own way [tay!r]: that is, that  he 
become an electronic mujahid, and that he participate in da‘wa on the Internet. And this is so that, when he 
knows that jihad is a far$ ‘ayn, and that the governments are apostates, then it cannot be otherwise than that he 
will take a practical step - and it is not possible to compel him with the idea of forming a unit now - never.   
But say to him that the least thing by which we can advance the jihad and the mujahidin is that we publicise 
theirreleases and their operations, and we defend them and clarify to people the goodness of the truth about 
themand the purity of their actions. And thus you do not let him turn a corner towards cooling down his 
involvement after having learned the truth. But rather, you move towards the goal step by step, even if it is 
only a small step. And this through the dissemination of releases and posts of the greatest influence, and the 
defence of his brothers through knowledge, and this, naturally, helps you [ie, the recruiter].
578
 
 
‘Al Qaidi’s’ careful use of language here well displays the underlying tension behind the notion of 
‘jihadi da‘wa’. On the one hand, it must be allowed that it represents a way of doing jihad. On the 
other, it cannot be allowed too great a role. Jihadi da‘wa is an activity which provides a way of 
keeping someone involved in the process of being a jihadi, but cannot be considered a worthwhile 
and satisfactory course of action in itself. For if da‘wa itself were too effective, this would 
potentially undercut jihad entirely, while if jihadi da‘wa were accorded too high a status, it would 
potentially undercut Al Qaidi’s primary explicit aim, which is to mobilise (tajn"d) people into 
violent action.  
 
Like other jihadi primers, Abu ‘Amru’s course stops short of giving instruction on actual 
involvement in violence. Its final end point is with the formation of a ‘unit’ or saraya, at which the 
author leaves off and hands the reader over to Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s Global Islamic Resistance 
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Call, the contents page of which is provided for the reader at the end of the book. And yet, for Al-
Suri, as we saw in the previous chapter, media activity, carried out in an organised fashion, is in 
itself one of the forms of action to which a jihadi saraya may devote itself. Presumably, Abu ‘Amru 
al-Qa’idi does not envisage the final stage of the candidate for radicalisation being yet more media 
work. And this may, in fact, account for his hesitancy in bestowing the term sar!ya on such 
activity. Other followers of al-Suri are less scrupulous, however. As one post on ‘media jihad - how 
to be a saraya by yourself’ puts it: 
 
We are in need of an army of preachers so that we can enlighten the people and  repair the path of the disputes 
of the refuseniks. And as the mujahid, (Abu Mus‘ab  al-Suri) said - may God watch over his family - (a 
condition of crisis and difficulty is  necessary for every brother who acts as a unit and raids in the name of 
God).
579
   
 
Quite clearly, the glory of being a unit which practices raiding (ghazu’) in the name of God is here 
assumed to accrue to the Internet jihadi just as to the mujahid in the field.  
 
What is jihadi da‘wa supposed to entail? In 39 Ways to Serve Jihad and the Mujahidin, Al-Salim 
provides precise instructions for how his 'forums project' is to be conducted. The participants in 
electronic jihad are to form groups of three people - one of whom is designated project 
administrator. These people are then to 'post on threads which discuss jihad and seek to advance it', 
while at the same time responding to the assaults of those who insult the mujahidin. This, 
necessarily, seems to envisage the jihad as an outreach activity.
580
 And in fact the point seems to be 
proved by the fact that Salim lists which exact forums he recommends as the venues for the project: 
Al-Islah, Al-Fawa’id, Ana al-Muslim, Sahat al-Arabiya, Al-Hisbah (which, judging by the others on 
the list means not the (in)famous and now defunct jihadi network, but rather a religious forum by 
the same name).
581
 All of these are (or were) large and notable Arabic language bulletin boards, and 
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all (except for saha.com, which as we saw in chapter 4 is a venerable multi-topic forum), have in 
common that they are religious, salafi leaning communities, without being jihadi forums per se.  
 
A still clearer manifesto for what Internet jihad is supposed to be is offered by ‘Abi Khaythma al-
Libi’ - a member of Ansar al-Mujahidin forum. Al-Libi asserts: 
 
 It is known that the jihad of the tongue is considered to be one of the types of jihad, and it is defence of the 
 Muslims and their lands from those that let them down and those that blemish them from among the 
 unbelievers and the  hypocrites, who have come in a great flood... ‘the faithful one practices jihad against the 
 unbelievers with his sword, and with his tongue against the unbelievers and others of the apostates and the 
 aimless party through the use of argumentation and the deployment of proofs and so on’.
582
  
 
From this, it seems quite clear that jihad of the tongue is to be understood not just as the 
dissemination of media among communities of fellow-travellers, but as the use of persuasive 
argumentation as a way of bringing new people over to support for the jihad.  
The problem, of course, with such an approach is that it necessarily requires engagement with an 
other - something which potentially threatens the very closeness, or nu%ra which jihadis so treasure.  
This, indeed, may be the reason why one of Zawahiri’s questioners complained:  
 
 Perhaps the Shaykh has noticed the gaffes of many of the jihadis in dealing with those who differ in some 
 matters, or in manhaj generally. And we find the one who displays another tendency, and we find that he 
 excuses everyone who differs, even if he was blatantly attacking the Sunnah. So what is the advice of the 
 Shaykh to the jihadi youth and the mujahidin themselves concerning the way to deal with those who differ in 
 opinion?
583
  
 
7.1 Jihadis Confront the Other 
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Thus, at the heart of the problem of the status of jihadi da‘wa lies another, deeper problem in 
jihadism. Namely, the conceptualisation of the relationship between jihadis and others. Given jihadi 
commitment to violent jihad as a religious obligation, and furthermore to the notion of seclusion of 
the righteous community from outside contacts advanced in Al Maqdisi’s understanding of al-wala 
wa al-bara
584
, jihadis there might, theoretically, be a sense in which attempts to engage with those 
who are not already jihadis might be seen as futile, since firstly such people are already, ipso facto 
at the very least hypocrites, (mun!fiq"n) and possibly apostates (murtadd"n) to boot. Further, if 
talking to such people made a difference (as more quietist strains of salafism assert), this might 
obviate the need for a jihad in the first place.  
 
In order to escape from this radical takfiri trap, jihadis have had to develop a conceptual vocabulary 
for talking about people who fall between jihad and apostacy. Thus, jihadis speak of the ‘inactive’ 
as qa‘id#n (a rather confusing term, since it could also mean ‘partisans of al-Qaida), ‘defeatists’ 
(inhiz!m"#n)
585
 - a term we encountered in the previous chapter in the ‘dialogue between a jihadi 
and a defeatist’, or - as in the post above, ‘the aimless party’ (al-fariq al-za’igha). Such people are 
assumed - so it seems - to remain Muslims in spite of their failure to join the jihad - accounted for 
either by worldly distractions, ignorance or a pessimistic (perhaps cowardly) fear of failure. Indeed, 
since jihadi thought (not withstanding its language of removal from society, and the ‘alienation’ of 
true believers), requires the notion of there still remaining latent Muslim masses capable of being 
wakened to action, jihadism (perhaps like any ideology) is better able to deal with the idea of 
apolitical innocence than with considered and principled non-involvement. If taken to its logical 
conclusion, however, such an attitude still limits the possibilities jihadis have for real engagement 
in debate with other points of view. Is, then, a true jihadi da‘wa really possible?  
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To examine this question, we shall now consider how the subject of jihad (and indeed of jihadism) 
is actually discussed in Muslm.net: one of the forums which Al Salim recommends as a venue for 
the ‘forums project’ of his conception of ‘electronic jihad’.  
 
7.2 ‘I Am the Muslim Network’ 
 
Muslm.net - or, to give it its full name, the ‘I Am the Muslim Network for Islamic conversation’ 
(shibkat ana al-muslim li -l-'iw!r al-isl!m&) is a large Islamic forum
586
 - generally described as 
‘salafi’ in orientation, but with a substantial jihadi tendency. There was, for instance, some interest 
on the forum itself when, in 2007, ‘Internet Haganah’, a private consultancy which specialises in 
monitoring Islamist forums, listed Muslm.net, in spite of being ‘generally regarded as a salafi 
forum’ within its top ten jihadi sites on the Internet - ‘with good reason’.
587
 Members of the forum 
did not altogether reject the claim. Indeed, the ambiguous character of the forum is well represented 
by its appearance. In contrast to the vivid and sometimes fiery colours of a typical jihadi forum, 
Muslm.net’s main page is a contemplative blue, shading at the top of the page into clouds, and the 
delicate pink of sunrise: symbolic of spiritual, metaphysical aspirations. And yet, riding through 
these clouds, to the top right of the page is a silhouetted horseman. His cloak streams out behind 
him, and he bears a banner. There is nothing blatantly militant about the image; but it is suggestive 
of the more obviously martial horseman motifs of militant jihad.  
 
Abu Harith Al-Mihdar, in the history of jihadi forums quoted in chapter five asserts that Muslm.net 
was early on taken over by Saudi intelligence: a case, some (including some on Muslm.net would 
no doubt argue) of the pot calling the kettle black.
588
 But it is certainly of interest that such a 
potentially controversial forum is to this day hosted in Mecca itself
589
 - suggesting, at the very least, 
a significant amount of government oversight of a forum which has - at the very least some militant 
connections.  
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This has meant that it has occasionally faced accusations of inappropriate closeness to violent 
groups. For instance, when the Al Qaida ‘triple agent’ Humam Khalil al-Balawi carried out a 
suicide attack on a CIA station in Afghanistan, the site was accused by the Jordanian government of 
posting information about him which was not, at the time, publicly available.
590
 Whether this 
accusation is true or not, it is certainly the case that the forum has at least one connection to Al-
Balawi. His widow, Dafna Bayrak, is openly a member.
591
  
 
All of this adds weight to the notion that Muslm.net has some kind of intelligence gathering 
function for the Saudi government. But it would be much too simple to suggest that the forum is 
merely a front operation. Rather, the fact that a prominent salafi forum can continue to openly host 
such clearly jihadi content may point towards the continuing complexity of Saudi internal politics. 
Some of these apparent contradictions can be seen the forum’s ‘general administrator’ (al-musharrif 
al-  ‘!m) - a character called ‘Al Sarem al-Maslool’, rumoured, at least, to be ‘A’id al-Dawsari’,  - a 
lecturer in Islamic studies at the college of education of  King Sa’ud University in Riyadh.
592
  
 
An examination of the posting record of ‘Al Sarem al-Maslool’ reveals that he is quite prepared to 
contribute his support to threads relating to violent jihad. For instance, when ‘Abu ‘Ayna’, a long 
time member of the forum was reported to have died in service of the Islamic State of Iraq,
593
 
members on the forum were upset to note that the newspaper ‘Al Haya’ described his action as a 
‘suicide operation’ (‘amiliyya inti'!riyya), rather than a martyrdom operation. Al Sarem al-Maslool 
had this to say: 
 
If a dancing girl praised and congratulated one of you, would he celebrate and be pleased? On the contrary, 
there would be vilification and criticism of him as a person celebrated by prostitutes and salacious people. This 
is the condition of the newspaper Al Haya. If it had praised and congratulated Abu ‘Ayna, its praise would 
have been vilification. But it tried to criticise him, so its vilification is praise.
594
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Thus, the forum’s chief administrator is not shy of (albeit somewhat obliquely) voicing his support 
for a suicide attacker with an Al Qaida affiliate group. And yet, at the same time - at least as of 
2002 - he was still clearly expressing his support for the Saudi monarchy.  
 
Indeed, this can be illustrated usefully with reference to a particular episode concerning this site 
which occurred in 2002. Mohamed Al Hassan, a chemistry professor at King Abdul Aziz University 
in Saudi Arabia, became disenchanted with the anti-Shiite views which his son reported being 
taught at his school in Riyadh, in particular by a certain teacher. Unsatisfied with her response when 
he challenged her on this, he posted an account of the episode on his website.
595
  
 
This prompted a response from ‘Al Sarem al-Maslool’, who posted the following ‘fatwa on spilling 
the blood of the atheist reprobate Mohamed Ja‘far’ 
 
Dr Mohamed Ja’far al-Hassan, whereas he displayed, concerning some of those in positions of responsibility 
in the country, criticism and assaults on their reputation, and among them some friends of his Royal Highness, 
impugning their ability, may God curse him, and also attempt to plant fitna in this fragrant country and the 
influence of the primitive grunting among those with whom he associates, daring even [to impugn] the 
mujahid sister Nura Qahtani may God agree with her. And he didn’t even stop at entering the best website on 
the Internet – the ‘I am a Muslim network for Islamic conversation’ and got up the noses of the sons of Islam 
and the blessed pioneers of the forum with his malodorous stink. So we issued a  fatwa to spill the blood of this 
apostate lout, may God curse him. So whoever finds him, let him slaughter him with a Shari‘a  slaughtering. 
And if one of you met him on a journey and did not manage to slaughter him, let him spit in his face may God 
curse him and damn him. May God preserve the guardian of the two holy shrines and his brothers and sons and 
ministers and those in his care and all those who love  him. And we don’t forget to thank the guardian of the 
two shrines and the crown prince and his extension of the shrines. He said, and he wrote it: mercy upon the 
Shaykh of the Ulama, may God lengthen his span
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The key point to be noted here is the combination of violent and intimidating language with appeals 
of loyalty to the royal family - an apparent paradox that is, in fact, readily resolved in view of 
Hegghammer’s work on the generally global rather than internal concerns of Saudi jihadi-
salafism.
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Certainly, it is hard to imagine that Al-Sarem al-Maslool - whatever roles he may play - would be 
able to sustain so large and successful a forum if members (who, after all, are at least as capable of 
drawing the same deductions as we are), believed him to be entirely fraudulent in his jihadi 
commitments. On the other hand, nor is it the case that Muslm.net is simply a jihadi forum with a 
slightly different appearance. Nor, for that matter, is Al-Sarem al-Maslool necessarily best 
described as a ‘jihadi’ per se, within the context of this forum. Rather, the difference between the 
administrator and other, more plainly ‘jihadi’ members (and between the forum and other more 
plainly ‘jihadi’ forums) has less to do with stated beliefs, and more to do with the range of issues it 
covers. While Al-Sarem al-Maslool is prepared to offer his praise to mujahid martyrs in Iraq 
(which, after all, is not an uncommon position in the Middle East), his online identity does not 
appear to be primarily oriented around support for the mujahidin.  
 
This can be contrasted with an example of a more explicitly ‘jihadi’ member. To consider one such 
(chosen as an instance of an ostensibly typical, rather than outstanding case), let us take ‘al-!atf2’ 
(that is, ‘Doom 2’). Al Hatf2 apparently displays his affiliation, like many seemingly ‘jihadi’ 
members of the forum by using as his ‘avatar’ the banner of the Islamic State in Iraq - a strikingly 
simple design consisting of white, rather primitive looking Arabic letters derived from the design of 
what is believed to the seal used by the prophet. 
 
Al-Hatf2’s presence on the forum, as a sound but relatively inconspicuous jihadi is, in fact, 
instructive not only for the window it gives into the typical concerns (and, therefore, distinguishing 
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features) of a ‘jihadi’ on Muslm.net, but also for the insight it offers into the gradual process of 
engagement which a jihadi may go through in order to become an accepted member of the 
community. Thus, Al Hatf2 apparently begins to contribute to posts in early 2009.
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 For a long 
time, however, his contributions are minimal - without being quite so minimal as never to go 
beyond the standard formula of ‘may God give you good’. After a few months, Al-Hatf starts his 
own thread: an uncontroversial repost of a propaganda release from the Islamic State of Iraq.
599
 
Presumably on account of his little-known junior status and the uncontroversial nature of the item 
(though better known members posting similar material are better acknowledged), he receives only 
two responses. Remaining careful to stay tactfully on the right side of a number of unpleasant 
factional disputes, Al-Hatf 2’s opportunity finally comes up to make a more serious contribution 
with the flurry of interest surrounding the martyrdom of Abu Dujana al-Khurasani. Avoiding the 
fate of a previous poster who is castigated for a lack of references to the material he uses, Al Hatf 
produces a careful piece in which he uses the work of Mossad whistleblower Victor Ostrovsky to 
strategically analyse Abu Dujana’s success.
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Muslm.net is not, however, an environment which is unanimously supportive to violent jihad. Nor 
are its supporters of jihad homogeneous. Indeed, there have been and still are intense disputes 
among partisans of Al Qaida, the national jihadi groups in Iraq and Hamas on the one hand; and 
between pro-Al Qaida critics of excessive violence in Iraq on the one hand, and apologists for it on 
the other. Moreover, there is what appears to be an increasingly active set of members who are 
highly critical of Al Qaida.  
 
In spite of this, the major orientation of jihadi activity on the forum seems to be more towards those 
conventional for a more straightforwardly jihadi forum. ‘Jihadi’ members post propaganda material 
from mujahidin groups and news stories from mainstream media selected so as to reveal the 
successes and worthines of their cause and the excesses, losses and unworthiness of its crusader and 
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apostate oppenents, and for the most part are responded to with simple affirmations of approval by 
others. Engagement with those who do not share the same enthusiasm are the exception rather than 
the norm. Nonetheless, such encounters are revealing when they do occur, as we shall now see, 
through an examination of four contentious discussions within the forum.  
 
7.3 Example 1: Criticism of an Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb Hostage Ransoming
601
 
 
On New Year’s Day, 2009, a member of the forum called ‘Ibn Badiya’ posted a story from the 
newspaper El Mundo about Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb demanding a ‘seven million dollar’ 
ransom for the release of a number of Spanish citizens.
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 The title of his thread queried whether 
this was ‘terrorism or business’? ‘I am not by way of being an ‘alim or a shaykh’, be pointed out, 
‘but this deal seems to depart from the learning of Islamic shari‘a  for the following reasons: 
 
- Those captured were civilians and not combatants 
- These civilians were abducted after they had entered a Muslim country and taken a security 
contract (‘ahd al-aman) from the Muslims 
- The reason for abducting them was to obtain money.’ 
 
Jihadi members of Muslm.net responded rapidly to this attack on the integrity of an Al Qaeda 
affiliate. Indeed, the second reply to the post provided what was, to a significant extent, a summary 
of the jihadi arguments that followed.  
 
- a. do you know them personally? What of the famous Lawrence of Arabia (he was a combatant, but seemed 
to be a student of archaeology. 
- b. They entered whether you liked it or not, Mr Security. In Morocco, there are occupied cities up to now 
(Spanish settlements) Ceuta and Melilla. 
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- c. If it was like that [ie, if the primary goal of the kidnapping was indeed to obtain money], there isn’t a 
problem. Why did the companions of the prophet raid caravans of the Quraysh? And they released infidels 
from captivity and received a ransom.  
 
In other words, the jihadi response was premised on (1) a rejection of the ‘civilian’ status of those 
kidnapped, either because they were nationals of a country at war with Islam (through its part in the 
‘war on terror’ and – as here – its occupation of parts of Morocco),
603
 (2) a rejection of the right of 
the legitimacy of the Moroccan government with regard to its ability to issue ‘contracts of security’, 
and (3) the alleged Islamic precedent for raiding and ransoming hostages for money.  
 
A key point about the argument that followed over fourteen pages and 125 posts was the lack of a 
meeting point for argument between the two sides. For those opposed to the action, the terms 
‘combatant’ (mu'!rib) and ‘civilian’ (madan") came up again and again. For those in favour, these 
distinctions were spurious in this case or even meaningless in general. This basic distinction – 
which seemed insurmountable by any amount of argument – informed everything else. So, for 
supporters of the ransoming, the hostage ransomings of the prophet’s companions after the battle of 
Badr, or the raids of Qurayshi caravans that preceded it provided a precedent. For those opposed, a 
decisive objection was that these were combatants, and therefore subject to the laws of war. The 
point is that, notwithstanding fleeting attempts by members either side to move beyond this 
deadlock, the dispute ran, for the most part, at cross purposes. So again, for supporters of Al Qaida, 
Al Qaida’s actions were legitimate because of the legitimacy of its jihad against the unbelievers, not 
the other way around. For opponents of Al Qaida, the vary fact that this entity consisted of ‘gangs’ 
(‘a%!’ib) rather than a properly constituted state meant that its action in ransoming prisoners could 
only be interpreted in a commercial (and therefore criminal) light.  
 
In consequence, much of the debate actually amounted to ad hominem arguments. For the jihadis, 
attacks on the mujahidin were immediately seized on as evidence of treachery by people presumed 
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to be in the pay of RAND corporation or, at the very least, friends of the crusaders and the Jews. 
Taunts along these lines were, therefore, constant and inevitable for anyone who questioned the 
legitimacy of the action. Indeed, the ultimate fallback argument (advanced, in fact, by Al-Hatf2) 
was that even were it the case that the mujahidin could be found to have slipped in some way in 
regard to the correct Islamic procedures, this was nothing in comparison to the entirely 
unscrupulous methods of the infidels they were fighting.  
 
Another occurrence common to such debates which was exhibited in this case was for jihadis to 
attack errors in Arabic spelling and grammar made by their opponents. For example, after 
correcting a mistake in the gender of a possessive pronoun, Al-Hatf 2 posted: ‘Learn Arabic, then 
snipe at those who sell themselves and their possessions for God’.  
 
For their part, opponents of the hostage ransoming occasionally attempted to widen the argument by 
pointing to Al Qaida’s record of killing Muslim civilians, and its lack of any viable plan for a real 
Muslim state. Towards the end of the dispute, this culminated in a challenge laid down to the jihadi 
member ‘Faylaq ‘Umar’,
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 to whom the poster of the thread posed a challenging question: ‘Do you 
know how many of the Islamic caliphs – in the understanding of Al Qaida – ascended after the 
righteous caliphs?’ 
 
After initially evading this question, Faylaq ‘Umar, however, was able to twist the situation back 
onto his terms by quoting a speech of Bin Ladin’s in which he praised the Ottoman Empire for its 
resistance of Western Imperialism, and denigrated the ‘complicity’ of Arab leaders such as Sharif 
Husayn and Abdul Aziz al-Sa‘ud with Britain in bringing about the regime’s demise. ‘Where is 
even a superficial resemblence’, Faylaq ‘Umar demanded, ‘between the Ummayad and ‘Abbasid 
and Ottoman states and the Islamic states of today’. 
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What is worthy of comment regarding this discussion is not that actual points made (which, of 
course, are the familiar differences between ‘jihadi’ and ‘mainstream’ Islamic positions). Rather, 
the interest lies in the emotional investments which seemed to underpin the dispute, and to sustain it 
through fourteen pages of – essentially – the same intellectual content. For those opposed to the 
ransoming, the starting point seemed to be the abstract notion that Islam (as an undefined 
generality) is ‘merciful’ or ‘noble’ and therefore that actions interpreted a priori as thuggish, 
mercenary, or criminal must violate its sanctity. For those, on the other hand, who supported it, the 
investment in the mujahidin was paramount. Those who opposed the mujahidin were guilty of the 
moral failing of ‘sitting down with women’, rather than travelling out to fight the jihad.  
 
7.4 Example 2: A Dispute over Targeting in Iraq
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On the thirteenth of April, 2009, ‘Sayf Sa’ad’ - a member who frequently reports on events in Iraq - 
was delighted to post a story about a bombing - claimed by the commander of the faithful - which 
had recently taken place against a cafe in Baghdad owned by Yazidis. The Yazidis, for 
information’s sake, are followers of an imperilled minority religion found primarily in Iraq. 
Adhering to a form of manichean theology whereby the world is understood to be governed on 
behalf of a sublime and distant creator God by an angelic figure called Malak Taus or, sometimes 
Shaytan, they are widely thought to be Satan-worshippers by Muslims, and have historically been 
persecuted on theat account. In 2007, this persecution was re-ignited by an incident in which a 17 
year old Yazidi girl, Du’a Khalil Aswad was stoned to death for having, it was believed, an affair 
with a Sunni Muslim boy.  
 
While the post was generally well received, one ostensibly ‘jihadi’ member called ‘Abu Harun’ 
(who displayed as his avatar the logo of the Islamic State) expressed dismay.  
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 Have they not stopped killing them? Does the State intend a massacre of the Yazidi sect?606  
 
This prompted a response ranging from bemusement to outrage. As the original author of the thread 
put it:  
 
 We are concerned with servants of Satan. You say ‘does the State intend to massacre them!!!’ Is worshipping 
 Satan a form of unbelief? What, Abu Harun - are they breaking your heart? 
 
Others on the forum were rather less polite.  
 
You fawning dog. (kalb al-ibtah). Are Yazidis of innocent blood!!! Are Yazidis innocent of killing Du‘a, or 
were they complicit? Did  you see the video you dog, and how many participated in the killing of Du‘a? 
Fawning dog, I ask God that he kill you like the Yazidis before, dogs, dogs dogs. You are dogs and in the state 
of a dog, O dogs, Islam will come back. Your councils and your fronts are nothing but dogs and fawners, the 
banner will not be raised for you. People of the world (dunya), may God kill you. 
 
Undeterred, Abu Harun began to defend his position, observing that Zoroastrians, and even pagans 
were – in the view of some scholars – eligible for dhimmi status. This perhaps surprisingly liberal 
argument, for a self-styled jihadi member of the forum prompted further recriminations.  
 
It was at this point that ‘Unidentified’ entered the discussion with a revealing observation.  
 
This is the condition of many of those who call for jihad on the Internet. They use support for the mujahidin as 
an attempt to claim manliness and false strength. Abu Harun is trying to discuss the matter and its religious 
basis and there is no reply to him.  
 
While it might not be entirely true that there was no attempt by those who supported the bombings 
to justify their position on religious grounds, the notion of Internet jihadis as looking to ‘claim 
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manliness an false strength’ appears to reflect on both sides in the debate. For both the angry 
bravado of the one, and the disappointed idealism of the other point in the same direction: towards a 
personal identification with the embodied values of the mujahidin going well beyond the 
ideological case advanced for their actions.  
  
7.5 Example 3: An attack on detractors of the jihadis
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On 17th March 2010, a jihadi member of the forum called ‘Abu al-Husayn’ posted a poem, under 
the title of ‘the forum will curse you, and you will be consigned to the dustbin of history’. Posted 
under a fluttering representation of the banner of the Islamic State, The poem was dedicated:  
 
 To all who are of our work, and the work of the Ummah, with regard to its greatest concern,  
 with subjects which do not end... disputes and misrepresentation and exchanges of accusations and 
 recrimination without equal... 
 
The poem was a bitter attack on those who would seek to disrupt the work of the ‘lions of the jihadi 
media’ on the forum, of whom it was accused:  
 
 Because of the shortness of your vision we missed seeing our dream.  
 You have made us an Ummah groping about in the sea of forgetfulness 
 You have made us live in a world of false promises.  
 You have killed our celebration 
 You have spitefully impugned our innocence 
 O you who slander our bodies 
 It’s time for you to leave 
 
The piece was remarkable not just for its invective, but for the in-built vision of jihadi community it 
offered. The lions of jihadi media - ‘the respectable people’ were called on to ‘reject them... their 
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dealings, their mendacity, their clamour’. The writings of such people were deemed to be ‘empty’. 
As the writer insisted ‘even if you write thousands of lines, you write without benefit’ - a comment 
which echoed the more generally salafi dichotomy between 'aqq (truth) and b!#il - a word which 
literally means ‘the void’; or again, a term sometimes used by jihadis to describe those who 
disagree with them - ‘followers of air’ (a%'!b al-hawa). Indeed, as one user of this term made in a 
discussion on the same forum in 2007, ‘even if their intentions corrected, (and what intention is 
there to correct from air?) their work would be bad and corrupt.’ Nothing that is built without 
foundation can stand. Or again - more pragmatically, as one of the commentors on the post put it:  
 
 I become paralysed with pain every time I see my brother from the companions of the jihadi media entering 
 polemics and replies fomented by that dirty clique. O brothers, believe me the lack of reply to their posts and 
 leaving them to the removal of pages sends our a stronger message and is more destructive than the reply 
 which you will write, if it is a reply which will make you think that you have put it in its place, but rather the 
 opposite - these people are practicing a good exercise and they have sold life for a number of dirhams. 
 
The fundamental emptiness - the loathsome vacuity of the words produced by the jihadis’ 
opponents was, of course to be contrasted with the profound meaningfulness and solidity of the 
jihadi project - a project indeed, which was said to be premised on the making real of words, their 
interlinking with meanings (the emphasis below is mine).   
 
 We seek a return to the book of history 
 so that an Ummah of Islam should appear on the list of names 
 Every part of the land of Islam forms a part 
 Of our souls, and we are not prepared 
 to die as cowards die 
 Come, soldiers of God in the land 
 Leave them, their mules die 
 They are not worthy of your consideration 
 Or that you waste your time on their like 
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Even though the ‘lions’ that are addressed are lions not of the battlefield, but ‘of the jihadi media’, 
they acquire physical characteristics in this discourse. They have ‘bodies’ to be slandered. They 
inhabit a ‘land’ in which they are ‘soldiers’. Ultimately, in fact, their lives are at stake. And while, 
of course, the life of a jihadi may very well be at stake in a perfectly real sense (as we have seen, 
there appear to be real martyrs who have inhabited the jihadi community of Muslm.net), the sense 
here is that the ‘lives’ are to be understood in a poetically.  
 
The online jihadis are made real here, paradoxically, by their supposed non-commitment to the 
petty trivialities of life on the forum (a claim which, of course, the very existence and the very 
invective of the poem refutes).  
 
Leave us and go far away from us, for there is no benefit from you except polemics.As for us, we turn our gaze 
far away, there where our gaze rejoices in the sight of the Al Aqsa mosque. There in Baghdad where we raise 
our banner - ‘there is no God but God... Muhammad is the prophet of God’... there in the mountains of 
Khurasan... in the Caucasus and Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, there, rather than towards the Kremlin and the 
White House. 
 
Indeed, the notion that it is supposedly the worldy project of jihad, rather than the textual 
foundation sought by conventional salafism which provides jihadism with its sense of solidity is 
reinforced by the refrain of the poem which, interestingly, is a quotation not from the Qur’an or the 
hadith, or even from classical Islamic history, but from the modern secular Palestinian poet 
Mahmud Darwish’s 1988 work: ‘O those who pass between fleeting words’ (ayuha al-m!r#n bayna 
kalim!t al-‘!bira). 
 
The post was warmly received; not just through the playful, graphical means of elaborate, flashing 
‘God give you good’s, but also through more colloquially enthusiastic sounding responses: ‘what a 
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great post!’ And the usual vilification of those from ‘RAND’ and the fitna they were determined to 
stir up on the forum. It also prompted a remarkable outburst from a member who called himself 
‘Abu Dhirr al-Shami’. Accusing Abu al-Husayn of being a liar, he went on to relate a summary of 
the acrimonious “dissent” (khilaf) as a result of which, he said ‘I shall now cease my activities on 
the net’.  
 
Abu Dhirr’s disillusioning experience of the forum related in part to differences of opinion. He 
admitted to having argued that ‘a limit had come to the explosions’. But far more significant in his 
account was the duplicity of members of the community. For his part, he defended himself against 
implicit allegations if having acted inappropriately through the use of multiple identities (indeed, 
‘sock puppeting’ and identity theft are both important wider concerns on the forum and - as we have 
seen, among Internet jihadis in general). While admitting that he had adopted particularly online 
aliases in order to criticise particular jihadi figures (including Al Maqdisi), he insisted: 
 
 And I in truth do not like to write except under a single identity. But the pressure of brother Abu  Buthayna 
made me use the identity of Ibn Hazim and Ahmad Bawadi is the one who put the pressure on me by writing as 
himself or as ‘Ibn al-Lahham’ for the limitation of my posts with respect to Al Maqdisi. And I have not 
criticised his person, but I have shown how I differ from him. 
 
He also claimed to have had a face to face meeting with the author of the thread, the details of 
which encounter had been misrepresented:  
 
And on one occasion you came to my house and we had a discussion about this subject and I said to you, had 
you read what I wrote? And you said to me no, however, I passed over it and you did not realise the tenor of 
the words, and I said to you, show me where I was in error, and God willing I will stop writing and excuse me 
that I was in error and it was a post of Hamid al-Ali - he his subject was what was separating us - and from 
then there came a question of Malik al-Ansari and from then a session and and argument, and from then you 
quoted the dissent n the forum, but you did not mention to the brothers the details of the session,  and with 
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regard to praising you, I am one of those who say: good things have happened, bad things have happened, and 
I challenge you to find a post in which I praise you and where I subsequently stabbed you in the back as  you 
claim. 
  
Finally, the author revealed his ‘true’ identity: 
 
 And now I have let you know who I am. I am ‘The Leader Usama’, and by God I have not registered in this 
 network except under the identity of ‘The Leader Usama’, but one of the brothers gave me this identity, as I 
 have explained the truth of the affair, may God bring good to him. 
 
Indeed, ‘The Leader Usama’ is (or, at any rate, was) a major jihadi figure on Muslm.net. The issue 
of duplicity, of multiple identities, and of the sense of violation pruduced by the theft of another 
person’s online identity is, of course, hardly unique to the jihadi context. But what is more 
important here is the story that can be read about how dissent happens in jihadi contexts. That is to 
say, the individual in question here - rather than using his distinctively jihadi persona of ‘The 
Leader Usama’ to voice his misgivings about the legitimacy of some of the actions of Al Qaida, had 
instead created his own, distinct, online characters. The management of this had however - so he 
claimed - been subject to ethical regulation. As the poster claimed: ‘... some of the brothers 
informed me that you said to them that you required that I swear by God that I use the identity of 
Ibn Hazem for good things, and I swore to that.’ He also claimed in his defence that ‘your shaykh 
read everything I wrote and he knows that you are a liar now because I did not write the dissent 
which occurred’.  
 
Thus, what can be observed here - arguably - is the negotiation of two different rule sets: on the one 
hand, a specifically ‘jihadi’ way of acting; on the other, an ‘Islamic’ or ‘salafi’ set of behaviours 
which is presumed to ultimately encompass the ‘jihadi’ one, but which, in fact, relates to it in a 
somewhat uneasy fashion. The ‘jihadi’ lives as an online identity. Indeed, the preposition employed 
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in the Arabic to describe the use of a particular online nickname is f" - ‘in’, implying that the 
nickname or identity is actually inhabited by the offline person. This notion of an identity being 
something lived can be shown to be a more generally applicable idea in contemporary Islamic 
jurisprudence by the remarkable argument made for the acceptability of using representative images 
of humans (normally forbidden in Islam) for participation in virtual environments such as Second 
Life. This is that a virtual world persona is not an image as such, but rather can be likened to a set 
of clothes which the Muslim user puts on in order to explore the virtual environment. The logic of 
the user here seems to be that there are certain things which a jihadi - by virtue of being a jihadi 
cannot say, but which the Muslim who inhabits him must.  
 
7.6 Example 4: A Jihadi Response to a Critical Challenge
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Thus far, we have looked at examples which represent three out of four positions in what we might 
think of as a grid: we have seen a jihadi response to criticism of the mujahidin by non-jihadi 
Muslims on a substantive issue (Example 1). We have seen what can reasonably be described as a 
dispute among jihadis on a substantive issue (Example 2). We have seen the response to a jihadi 
attack on the detractors of the online jihad (Example 3). One space remains to be filled. We have 
yet to see the response to a direct attack on the Internet jihadis themselves.  Such a thing occurred 
on Muslm.net on 18th March, 2010, when a member of the forum called ‘Hamil al-Risala’ (Bearer 
of the Message), posted a thread entitled: ‘why are the supporters of Al Qaida afraid to debate us on 
the forums?’ This was, in fact, a repost of the same comment made two days earlier on another 
forum - Al Jazeera Talk, which - as a forum representing a much broader spread of Arabic opinion - 
represents a useful comparative example for this case.
609
  
 
Going on, predictably enough, to answer its own question, the post listed eight reasons:  
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 1. Because they are unable to debate in a focused way so you see them employing insults and slurs 
 2. Because Al Qaida has been able to brainwash them to such an extent that its members do not believe anyone 
 but themselves 
 3. Because they live in a vacant reality which is difficult to understand 
 4. Because they try to paint the situation in religous colours rather than terrorist colours 
 5. Because they are unable to justify the killing of innocents 
 6. Because they are unable to obtain consensus from the Muslim ulama specialising in Shari‘a  judgements to 
 build a manhaj for themselves 
 7. Because they don’t understand their religion, and their extremism (ghulu) renders them blind 
 8. Because God is with us and the Ummah is behind us 
 
Uniquely on Muslm.net (perhaps due to the Islamic nature of the forum), the poster added:  
 
 I am a Muslim, like you, zealously proud of my religion. But the difference between me and you is that I 
 don’t believe in the killing of civilians and terrorism and efforts to cheat my brothers, and I refuse to 
 believe that our wise religion permits this sort of action. I am a Muslim believer. 
 
…And threw down the gauntlet - declaring: ‘now that you know about us and our creed, maybe you 
will be willing to reply to our questions?’  
 
We have already seen that the game of debating jihadis online is about rhetorical manoeuvre rather 
than the actual advancement of different arguments and positions. And here it is, of course, quite 
clear that this statement is not intended to offer a serious critique to the jihadi position. Like the 
jihadis’ statements, it speaks not to the jihadis themselves, but to an imagined audience of fence-
sitters (literally ‘sitters’, or qa‘id"n in the jihadi terminology). All of the points are simply verbal 
attacks, some of which are so vague as to make it hard to conceive of how they could be answered 
even by someone honestly trying to do so. The intent of the statement is, therefore, not to produce a 
debate at all, but rather to force a certain kind of speech action. On the one hand, it seeks to wrest 
control over certain areas of intellectual terrain: the claim to conventional Islamic piety, for 
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instance. On the other, it seeks to attain supremacy in certain moral areas: particularly, courage and 
openness. The question in the title of the post is, of course, the classic rhetorical gambit of the 
‘when did you stop beating your wife?’ variety, building in the unexamined assumption that the 
jihadis’ opponents have offered a debate, and that the jihadis are afraid of taking it up.  
 
The ingenuity of the gambit is, of course, that it is premised on the very tendency of the jihadis - as 
we have already observed - not to engage with their detractors. By refusing to do so on this 
occasion, so it would seem, the jihadis risk appearing to validate the various insults levelled at them 
in the post. Indeed, the trickiness of the challenge could be seen in the diversity of the responses 
that were offered. On the one hand, many of those who replied took the familiar line of challenging 
the worthiness of the poster and his words. For some, this involved invoking the superior moral 
qualities of the mujahidin.  
 
 Brother, we in Palestine do not see glory and surety except from God, and those men ask of God that he 
 preserve them with his preservation which you talk about.  
 
 Sit down and ask yourself: 
 Have you denied yourself like them? 
 Have you brought victory to this religion like them?  
 Have you left your family and your children like them? 
 Have you left your house and your possessions and your self like them?  
 Have you given yourself every day to God like them? 
 Do you have dust on your feet from the path of God like them? 
 Have you been wounded a wound in the path of God like them?  
 Have you, some days, slept in fear like them?  
 
 What is greater than the decadence of the present time!!! 
 
This theme of decadence was even more strongly expressed later on.  
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 ‘Companion of the Message’, they are the organisation of Al Qaida, and you are the organisation of the table 
 (Al Maida). They are sitting and building the firm base and the first blocks to establishing the righteous 
 caliphate on the path of the prophets, whereas as you are filling your bellies with the leftovers of the idolators. 
 You are thus building big, fat bellies. Maybe you sat down during the dawn prayer. It is enough for the 
 mujahidin to be proud that you are in one trench with the zoroastrian heretics and the Jews and Christians and 
 the Hindus and all those outcase apostates, and these are the enemies of the Al Qaida organisation. 
 
Perhaps recognising that the primary focus of the attack was not on the mujahidin themselves, but 
rather on their online supporters, others sought to impugn not the supposed physical qualities of the 
poster, but rather his online qualities. One offered members of the thread ‘one of the posts of this 
filthy person’. Another familiar line of response (particularly, in this instance, to the post of 
‘Firas_H’, another opponent of Al Qaida) was to criticise the quality of the poster’s Arabic - 
thereby reinforcing the notion of foreignness, ignorance and weak Islamic credibility. Oddly (in 
view of the critique offered), posting in Egyptian colloquial Arabic, ‘Khattab 76’ offered the 
following: 
 
How are we to reply to a donkey? (He makes the subject into a genitive and also uses a nun with an idafa). 
And not just this. This was in the title of his post. And he says that he wants to debate concerning the blood of 
the Muslims. Go and learn to write first, you donkey and afterwards come and debate. You’ve got failure 
coming  to you! What you say does not deserve the dignity of a reply. 
 
Or, as another said simply: ‘we do not debate with the ignorant’. For several others, indeed, the post 
was to be considered so unworthy as not even to deserve a verbal reply.  
 
And who are you to debate with people, hahahahaha, do you want to place the beloved members of the forum 
with Al Qaida? I am not from Al Qaida, I am from reality, (al-waqi’a), but I will reply to you with this picture. 
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The picture is a cartoon much favoured by jihadis on the Internet, in which a politician is shown 
speaking into a microphone fixed to a podium. The wires which trail out of the microphone are 
transformed at their other end into sewage pipes pouring directly into the gutter.  
 
Disdainful attempt to brush off the challenge were also prevalent in the Al-Jazeera Talk posting of 
the same subject. Jihadi members of this forum (who - apparently due to greater freedom in this 
environment for visual expression, displayed themselves with typically lavish use of signature 
images and avatars of the sort discussed in the fourth chapter). One member (who tactfully, in the 
light of previous splits, called himself Abu Mu’sab al-Maqdisi) simply insisted that the poster read 
some jihadi books before making such claims. Another simply said that such charges were 
‘impertinent’ (safiyya), and that silence was the best response to them.  
 
For others, however, the familiar ad hominem tactics were apparently insufficient. The challenge to 
a debate could not go entirely unanswered.  
 
Most straightforwardly, some simply attempted to take on the substantive elements of the critique 
of the mujahidin directly. ‘Khattab al-Najdi’ for instance, produced an argument - buttressed by the 
fatwa of Shaykh Shu’aybi on the legitimacy of suicide bombings killing civilians in Iraq. But most 
were not prepared to engage so directly. Rather, they sought assurances that the challenge was 
serious.  
 
 Do you want to debate in order to explain the truth, or is what you have the truth and you won’t believe in 
 anything else? Or are you really serious with the subject - that you want the truth, and you follow it, and if you 
 were convinced you would believe in it?? We want a reply. Seriously, are you in earnest or not? 
 
Others saw a more sinister purpose behind the post: 
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1.This thread of yours is a trap, and all who enter to defend Al Qaida will thereby reveal that they are of it, and   
this as global combat has taught and whoever is revealed on account of it is fated to spend time in prison.  
 2. You don’t debate, you entrap.  
 3.  Your mission is really dirty and whoever tries to trip up muslims is tripped by God thereby.  
 4. It was enough for you to say a debate with the companions of the contemporary jihad and that  would have 
    been broad enough for you to find many who would debate you. 
 5. What are they going to debate? A subject to any benefit other than to clear out the liquid sewage?  
 6. They are cleverer than you, and whoever wants to elevate the importance of his posts will show       
     and say to people about how he is a writer and attacks the mujahidin.  
 6. I repeated number 6 because donkeys learn by repetition. 
 
Yet others were prepared to take up the challenge - but with conditions. Indeed, it was objected that 
to the contrary, it was the jihadis who were willing to debate, while their opponents sought to evade 
or cheat. ‘How many times,’ one asked, ‘have jihadis come onto non-jihadi forums to debate only to 
find their posts deleted the next day.’ For his part, he was perfectly prepared to debate - but only on 
condition that the facts used in the discussion came ‘not from the media, but from the words of Al 
Qaida itself.’ For his part, ‘Carrier of the Message’ responded to this with the remark that he had 
been surprised to find such courtesy in a jihadi, and would happily take on the debate - but on 
condition that murderers and takfiris were not brought into it. In other words, an impasse.  
 
On the Al Jazeera forum (an example, perhaps of the sort of non jihadi forum meant by this poster), 
there were similar responses. ‘If you want a debate,’ said one, ‘we’re waiting’. Only one member 
(who, perhaps tellingly, did not display conspicuous jihadi iconography) was actually prepared to 
engage in debate on the forum itself. This was in response to a post from another member in which 
it was asserted: 
 
 The sun does not need evidence that there are Muslim people and others who have been killed in the World 
 Trade Centre towers. Who killed the Algerians, and still does in the blowing up of a hotel, and the graveyard in 
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 Morocco. Who killed  the people in Riyadh and the Land of the Two Shrines. Who destroyed the hotel in 
 Amman over the heads of those who were in it. Who brought down the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan? ... 
 There is no Muslim country safe from Al Qaida, just as there is no country safe from crusader occupation 
 
The reponse - the single example of such in both forum threads - was a serious, point by point 
attempt to answer this challenge. And yet even here, it often seemed that what were at issue were 
fundamental assumptions as much as debatable interpretations. There were, the responder asserted, 
few or no Muslims in the World Trade Centre. Most of those killed in Riyadh were American 
soldiers. Those who weren’t were working for them. The bombers in Amman didn’t mean to target 
a wedding party - it was just that the roof collapsed on them from an upper floor. It wasn’t the 
terrorism of Al Qaida that brought down the Taliban - it was the terrorism of America. Beheadings 
are not ‘horrible’, (as the previous poster has later said), they are Islamic.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
The common denominator to all of these examples is of course the general inability of the jihadis 
and those who disagree with them to meaningfully engage online. Notwithstanding the jihadis’ own 
claims that they are online in order to defend and bring victory to the mujahidin, jihadis, with only a 
few exceptions, seem ultimately more interested in creating homogeneously ‘jihadi’ online spaces 
than they are in actually arguing the case for the mujahidin - even in forums which are not overtly 
‘jihadi’ in makeup. Because jihadis are validated in their existence as jihadis with reference to the 
necessity of jihad and the moral excellence of the mujahidin, critics can be understood only as 
traitors - sell outs to the Jews and the Crusaders; hired dogs of RAND corporation, and never, or 
only exceptionally, as debating partners. Moreover, devoid of the guarantee offered by vicarious 
association with the physical prowess and ‘real world’ worthiness of the mujahidin, the words of 
the jihadis’ opponents are so devoid of meaning and substance as to be almost impossible to engage 
with. They are, literally ‘void’. This in turn means that, if jihadis have difficulty engaging with their 
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critics, their critics are little better at engaging with jihadis. Disputes over points of Islamic history 
or theology are meaningful on their own terms. But when they are translated to present day 
situations, the vocabulary becomes so contested as to be almost unusable. Notions of ‘terrorism’, 
‘mujahidin’, ‘kidnapping’, ‘raid’, ‘trade’, ‘caliph’ are applied so rhetorically as to leave little room 
for discussion by either side.  
 
It is easy enough to dismiss the self-contained reason of jihadi discourse as, in a sense, cult-like. 
Caught up in a circle of self-reinforcing belief, jihadism can only interpret failures (whether of the 
mujahidin themselves or of the online jihadi community) as the product of sinister external forces. 
Of course, such beliefs are not necessarily without foundation. It is not paranoia, as the familiar 
saying goes, if they really are out to get you. But at the same time, it seems that even were there not 
efforts by Western and Arab governments to disrupt the online jihad, it would be necessary for the 
jihadis to invent them. Indeed, it is possible to read a perfectly lucid jihadi discussion of an 
endogenous split in the community followed immediately by a reference to the nefarious and 
omnipresent activities of RAND Corporation in sowing dissent. Such can be seen, for instance, in a 
2007 discussion about (apparently) the divisions between the Al Qaida affiliate Islamic State of Iraq 
and the non-Al Qaida affiliate Islamic Army of Iraq.  
 
 ...the one true jihad is almost the jihad of Al Qaida, not other than it, and the fighting of the rest is for the 
 benefit  of their nations and peoples and we do not know what. If it is hurt, the source of the hurting is the 
 Jews and the Christians for the separation of Al Qaida - or the Islamic state - from the rest (the rest of the 
 factions in particular and rest of the Muslims in general)! 
 
Within a single sentence, the poster here offers a perfectly valid explanation for why there may be 
division between Al Qaida and others. (That is, Al Qaida is not nationalist, but others are). At the 
same time, however, it is seemingly impossible that Al Qaida could ever be separated from the 
Muslim people at large by anything other than the influence of Jews and Christians.  
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A little later on, the point becomes even clearer. The poster is calling for unity. And yet he is 
seemingly incapable of recognising that the ‘unity’ he is calling for is actually another type of 
partisanship in disguise.  
 
Al Qaida is the hope of the Muslims - no other - and the state is the foundation for the coming Caliphate. The 
words of monotheism come before unification. (It is as if the rest are polytheists of people of innovation). 
 
Or, as he continues in a later post: 
 
 I ask God almighty that he unite the mujahidin under the banner of tawhid, innocent of any disreputable 
 factionalism.  
 
The rhetorical equivalence he offers between taw'&d (that is, monotheism) and tawa''ud (that is, 
unification - but linguistically carrying a near identical meaning of ‘making one - wa'ad - of) is 
particularly striking here. The poster claims to be calling for ‘unification’ between on the one hand, 
the pan-Islamist jihad of Al Qaida and on the other the nationalistically inflected jihad of the 
Islamic Army. But the only ‘common’ ground he has to offer is the ‘oneness’ of Islam and, 
therefore, the complete abandonment by the latter of its nationalist accretions. And indeed as much 
is made plain by the latter comment in which he urges unity under the ‘banner of tawhid’. For this 
is not just a general Islamic call, but iconically speaking a call for the Islamic Army and similar 
factions to abandon their flag in favour of the flag of Al Qaida - the black and white shahada 
banner of jihadis on the forum, and of the Islamic State of Iraq.  
 
But to lampoon Internet jihadism for its seemingly closed reasoning (which, if one is being fair, is 
not necessarily more or less closed than that of its detractors) is to miss the point about how such 
reasoning contributes to its virtual subsistence. This is because what is ultimately at stake is not 
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simply being right or wrong, but rather the possibility of continuing to exist within a jihadi persona. 
The issue matters, because in the absence of possession of a jihadi profile, words always risk losing 
their power and solidity -  ‘thorns in the throat of the unbelievers’ and becoming mere words again. 
It is possible to eschew being a jihadi as such in Muslm.net. One can simply present as a Muslim 
who sometimes supports and sometimes critiques the mujahidin on their Islamic merits. But to do 
so requires the painstaking acquisition of the kind of book learning – ‘talk’ as opposed to ‘action’, 
as he jihad media battalions put it – escape from which is precisely the point of joining the jihad, 
whether electronically or otherwise. Indeed, it is probably not accidental that relatively major 
figures who, in practice, do support the mujahidin with some claim to ‘shaykhdom’, such as, say, 
Ahmad Bawadi, do not seem to need the same visual paraphernalia of the jihadi (the banner of 
tawhid, for instance). By being a jihadi, by practicing online support for the mujahidin, once invests 
culturally in the mujahidin’s ability to transcend the emptiness of language. By ceasing to be a 
jihadi - or worse, by failing to be a jihadi - by being unable to negotiate the complex and shifting 
requirements of being a jihadi, one’s hard work in collecting, distributing, reading, relating 
crumbles to nothing.  
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8. 
Conclusion 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
Fans form communities by inserting themselves into texts, by ‘making of’ those texts something 
which was not necessarily intended by their authors. Fan communities and fans in general therefore 
have an ambiguous relationship with those who produce the texts on which they rely. Texts become 
metaphors for fan communities and fan communities become metaphors for texts. When the texts 
are found wanting, fans re-assert control over them, remaking them in the image of their own 
collective and personal experience.  
 
As Matt Hills points out, the concept of fandom is not fixed. It is not to be rigidly defined as a 
single, bounded set of practices in relation to particular categories of text. Rather, it is a concept 
which ‘does, culturally’ – something which the researcher can ‘do things with’.
610
 In this sense, 
perhaps, the notion of fandom is just a little like the notion of terrorism. By thinking of a violent 
phenomenon as ‘terrorism’ (as opposed to ‘insurgency,’ for example, or ‘risky activism’) one 
performs a certain conceptual operation upon it. One foregrounds certain aspects of practice, and 
plays down others. Fandom does likewise.   
 
In this dissertation I have been concerned with how jihadism works on the Internet, and - in so far 
as it is possible to discern - what ‘ordinary’ Internet jihadis seem to get out of what they do. I have 
tried to argue that jihadism on the Internet is most readily identified as a consumption activity, 
rather than as being defined by a particular set of theological or political beliefs, although certain 
beliefs are an implicit requirement of engagement in jihadi texts at a social level. We know who 
‘jihadis’ are, first and foremost, because they engage in the consumption of ‘jihadi’ texts on the 
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Internet - most prestigious of which are the official productions of fighting groups of mujahidin. In 
consuming these texts, they also engage in jihadism by collating, collecting and authoring texts of 
their own. In doing so, they bring together a wide range of different forms of knowledge, genre and 
technical and artistic expertise. Reading nomadically, they make use of everything from Noam 
Chomsky
611
 to Bin Baz, and from management texts to chemistry texts.  
 
Equally important, however, is what I have intentionally not looked at, in looking at Internet 
Jihadism as fandom. Culture, especially popular culture, as John Fiske frequently points out, is 
constantly regarded as being trivial. It matters only to those who engage in it. And those who 
engage in it too deeply risk ridicule for doing so. By contrast, other things such as politics and 
(more problematically), religion are deemed to matter profoundly. They are things of public 
importance. Those who take an interest in them rarely have to justify doing so.  
 
For this reason, cultural theorists are continually struggling to show how their work is, in fact, 
political. As one important scholar of popular culture, Lawrence Grossberg, is supposed to have 
said: ‘if studying popular culture isn’t political, then what good is it?’
612
  
 
In this dissertation, I have tried to make the opposite move. As I said I was going to in the first 
chapter, I have tried as far as possible to deal with jihadism on the Internet as one finds it: in other 
words, as the production and consumption of media. In doing so, I have taken a subject which is 
deemed by many to be of the utmost significance, and tried to treat it as if it were not necessarily 
any more (nor any less) important than, say, watching Star Trek or moshing at a rock concert. For 
doing this, I risk being accused of a profound and grotesque frivolity. But I would like to stress that 
I have not been trying to argue that jihadism is not appropriately a matter of great political 
significance. I have not tried to claim that engagement in jihadism on the Internet have not 
sometimes played a part in those same people going on to commit acts of terrible violence against 
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civilians (or sometimes - it ought to be said - uniformed soldiers carrying out operations of 
questionable legality). Rather, as I argued at the end of the opening chapter, what I have tried to 
sketch out is what Internet jihadism might look like if we removed our focus from those parts which 
seem so very important to us, and instead considered the visible, non-violent and often humdrum 
practices which make up much of the actual practice of jihadism. At the same time, it may be worth 
raising the possibility that – if we subtract the often paramilitary or guerilla activity going on in the 
‘lands of jihad’ and focus on that wrong violence in the wrong place which is more readily labeled 
as terrorism – that what ultimately requires explanation is indeed not why there is so much of this 
violence, but why there is so little. US government sources, we are told, estimate that in the single 
year of 1970, when the anti-war movement was at its height, the US experienced – according to FBI 
estimates – more than 3,000 incidents of domestic bombing, and 50,000 bomb threats.
613
 While of 
course there are important differences between the two movements and the types of violence that 
arose from them, it is hard to see how such an observation can fail to put the recent record of 
jihadist violence not only in ‘the West’, but in most Muslim countries as well into perspective.  
 
8.1 Internet Jihadism and Radicalisation into Violence 
 
The idea that there exists a significant number of people who spend their time engaging in one way 
or another with jihadism, without necessarily ever becoming violence is by no means an original 
one. As Brachman has observed, what he calls a ‘jihobbyist’  
 
 ...  may be an enthusiast of the global Jihadist movement, someone who enjoys thinking  about and watching 
 the activities of the groups from the first and second tiers, but generally they have no connection to al-Qaida 
 or any other formal Jihadist groups. And it is unlikely they will ever actually do anything that directly 
 supports the movement.  
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 So Jihobbyists may do it from the comfort of their home computer or their local coffee shop, but  they are still 
actively seeking to move forward the Jihadist agenda. By hosting Jihadist websites, desgining propaganda 
posters, editing al-Qaida videos, recording soundtracks (nashids) for those videos, compiling speeches from 
famous Jihadist shaikhs and packaging them into easily downloadable files or writing training manuals, these 
individuals help to form the base that keeps the movement  afloat. Some become obsessed with the brutal 
beheading, sniper or explosives videos. Others would rather spend their time reading thousand-page books 
about the history of the movement.
614
  
 
The problem with this perspective is that, at the same time that it recognises the existence, and the 
(probably large) numerical preponderance of these ‘jihobbyists’, it simultaneously restores the 
focus to the (violent) ‘movement’, which the jihobbyists’ activities are deemed to ‘keep afloat’. In 
doing so, it would seem to do something analogous to what Hebdige and other subcultural 
researchers are accused of doing by Muggleton.
615
 It takes a few of the most conspicuous examples, 
and assumes that these are really what the wider phenomenon is about. It fails to draw the obvious 
conclusion that it is not normal for jihadis to behave in violent ways and, therefore, that becoming 
violent is (behaviourally speaking) an aberration in the general trajectory of being jihadi. 
 
One outcome of this is to prevent questions being asked about the significance of jihadism as a 
phenomenon beyond issues of ‘violent radicalisation’. And yet, even if our concern is purely with 
knowing how it is that people become involved in jihadist forms of violence, a failure to think about 
jihadism in its wider context would seem to represent a lacuna in our approach. By always and only 
posing the question ‘what made this person become violent?’, we turn jihadism into a backdrop to a 
different set of questions about ‘pathways’ into violence 
616
 and ‘radicalisation processes’.
617
 While 
recognising that this is a process which most will never complete, we nevertheless get into the habit 
of seeing the place of engagement with jihadism in the same literal terms presented by the jihadis 
themselves as a single ‘path’ with only one logical end point. We fail to ask the question: ‘how do 
most jihadis manage not to be violent?’ By what cultural manoeuvres do they continue to resolve 
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the contradictions of insisting on, but not practicing, violence? And what follows from this: why do 
some people ‘fail’ in this negotiation? 
 
Indeed, even in so far as the Internet has played a seemingly important role in some people 
becoming involved in jihadist violence, one point that I have tried to make is that types of online 
behaviour may be as important a factor to look out for as the beliefs which those engaging with 
Internet jihadism express and consume. Stephen Ulph has provided a detailed model for how a 
putative ‘moderate’ Muslim would be comprehensively indoctrinated by the jihadist content on the 
Internet.
618
 But apart from the question as to whether those who engage in jihadi content necessarily 
start out with the ‘moderate’ views which Ulph presumes, it might be suggested that it is still 
necessary to show how the actual practices of Internet jihadism may or may not provide a pathway 
towards engagement in violent behaviour. The notion of an Internet jihadi being able to go through 
an extensive sequence of acts of engagement such as collection of new or obscure jihadi materials, 
use of such knowledge to establish a reputation either as a forum re-poster, or as a helpful figure in 
the ‘problems and solutions’ section or a forum; graduation to production of content and at some 
point gaining access to restricted, managerial sections of a forum but only actually engaging as a 
result of a fortuitous opportunity appars to be a plausible trajectory.  This, for instance, seems to 
have been the path of Humam Khalil al-Balawi/Abu Dujana al-Khurasani.
619
  
 
This would suggest a need for deeper exploration of the presence of absence of behavioural bridges 
to engagement built into the set of online activities available to the Internet jihadi. One potentially 
useful concept here in relation to the Internet may be that of ‘affordance’ – as originally formulated 
by Gibson.
620
 Hutchby has argued in a sociological context that, rather than being wholly open to 
cultural shaping, the morphological characteristics of Internet applications may inherently promote 
or constrain certain types of behaviour.
621
 Taylor in turn has proposed that there are respects in 
which the Internet may be a ‘criminogenic’ environment with respect to certain particular sorts of 
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offence.
622
 For instance, the way in which its intuitively explorable, clickable environment may 
encourage the download of certain sorts of material access to which would otherwise be 
constrained. But such an argument may work the other way as well. For if use of the Internet does 
not bring the user any physically closer to a situation in which violence becomes a practical 
possibility, then the behaviours it affords may perhaps lead away from this particular type of crime 
as easily as toward it.   
 
Another issue is that, by conflating engagement in jihadism with ‘radicalisation’ towards 
engagement in violence, there is a tendency to unnecessarily present people’s arrival at the point of 
being interested at involvement in jihadist violence as a puzzle in need of solution. In a recent 
review article on radicalisation, Anje Dalgaard-Nielsen has usefully identified two broad trends in 
research into this area.
623
 On the one hand, sociologists of contemporary Islamic societies such as 
Roy, Kepel and Khosrokhavar identify violence as being embedded in a complex cultural response 
to loss of identity. Those who prefer what is, broadly, a ‘resource mobilisation’ model, such as 
Nesser or Sageman, instead stress the importance of factors such as social entrepreneurs and small 
group dynamics.  
 
What seems to be missing from both perspectives is that they do not have much to say about the 
positive aspects of engagement in the cultural forms of jihadism, the very considerable pleasures it 
appears to generate. Neither perspective offers room for jihadis as other than, in a sense, victims - 
either as people unable to adjust to the modern world, or as cultural dupes who get taken in by 
manipulative authority figures. This is potentially a real problem for counterterrorism. For instance, 
in a letter to Nature, Scott Atran and Jessica Stern have suggested: 
 
 Given the increasing role played by the Internet, efforts should foster alternative peer groups in cities and cyberspace, 
 showing the same commitment and compassion towards their own members as terror groups seem to offer, but in 
 life-enhancing ways and also towards others.624 
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Engagement in jihadism does not on its own make one a terrorist, nor do Atran and Stern say it 
does. But in speaking of ‘alternative peer groups’ offering ‘commitment and compassion’ they 
appear to be subscribing implicitly to a view which would seem to hold that one subculture is really 
as good as any other, that engagement with jihadism as opposed to, say, boxing or Sufism or hip 
hop or quietist Salafism is, in a sense, accidental. Jihadi culture in this analysis becomes a sort of 
black box, a ghost within the machine of small group dynamics. And yet such a view would seem to 
imply that there is no need (echoing the simplistic charge sometimes thrown at researchers into 
popular culture), to investigate the unique properties of jihadi content – to consider what particular 
things this complex of cultural meanings may have to offer.  
  
Additionally, and in passing, it may also be worth observing that there are some ways in which 
jihadism or even the ‘global jihad’ would seem to represent a problematic candidate for analysis as 
a social movement in its own right. Tilly has observed that violence is usually found not as a stand-
alone phenomenon, but rather as part of a repertoire of tactics used by a wider political 
movement.
625
 As such, analysis of a ‘global jihad movement’ as a standalone entity, divorced from 
other forms of Islamic activism, would seem problematic. Indeed, such a perspective would seem to 
contradict even the world view propounded by jihadi strategists such as Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri who - 
as we have seen - thinks in terms of a ‘jihadi current’ located within a wider ‘Islamic awakening’.  
 
This in turn might bring to mind Michel Wievierka’s notion of the ‘social antimovement’, which he 
considers to be the outcome of an ‘inversion’ in a social movement, whereby a group turns in on 
itself and abandons commitment to the political practices of the movement as a whole.
626
 It is out of 
this - Wieviorka believes - that the phenomenon of terrorism arises. As such, one might perhaps 
think of jihadism on the Internet as a ‘social antimovement’ which has outgrown the narrow, 
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constrained context in which Wieviorka locates it and, in the process, perhaps set off on the path of 
becoming something else.  
 
8.2 Jihadism as Fandom 
 
In turning to theorise Internet jihadism through the lens of fandom, however, there are a number of 
knotty conceptual issues which must be confronted, and which cannot simply be waved away with 
the helpful slogan that fandom is as fandom does.  
 
1. If jihadis are ‘fans’, what are they fans of? 
2. How can one incorporate jihadis’ presumed and explicit religious and political beliefs into the 
perspective without falling back into the same ‘pathological’ stereotypes of fans that fan research 
has sought to move away from? 
3. How can one pursue the fan studies project of closing critical distance with subjects and taking 
native accounts seriously when no jihadi would (presumably) accept an account of her activities 
as a type of fandom.  
 
It will be observed that all of these are questions which have already been partially answered in the 
preceding chapters. However, it is important that we make the thinking explicit.  
Firstly, it is a misunderstanding of fandom to assume that fans are necessarily fans of just one thing. 
As Jenkins points out, ‘I can’t be a Muslim and a Jew at the same time... But I can be a Blake’s 7 
fan and a Babylon 5 fan and a Buffy the Vampire Slayer fan and a Survivor fan all at the same 
moment. I’m not being disloyal to one in order to express a commitment to the others’.
627
 As a 
‘nomadic’ activity, fans proactively plunder from particular texts, genres or even media of 
particular national or cultural origin in search of the fulfillment of particular needs. As such, there is 
an interplay between underlying world view (a broad belief in the possibility of ‘progress’ for 
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example, or a self perception as possessing a particular social status), and the consumption of 
particular texts as a way of negotiating and living this.  
 
But does not this solution undermine the entire thesis by returning me to a conception of jihadism as 
grounded in ideological belief, rather than in textual and aesthetic practice? First, fandom is not 
simply about imposing on texts a single, totalitarian ideology, but rather about a process of 
negotiation between the meaning imbued in the fan’s consumption of the text, and the meaning 
which the fan wishes to construct through the text. Secondly, there is an oblique relationship 
between the broader values that seem to be expressed via certain sorts of fannish engagement with a 
text, and the values relevant to the fan community that engagement expresses. In engaging 
‘fannishly’ with Star Trek a person may be expressing a belief in the possibility of reason and 
technology to perfect humanity, rather than destroy it. But through such utopian sentiment, she is 
also expressing solidarity and shared purpose with the fan club or the online community. In the 
same way, through the idolisation of, for instance, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, a jihadi can - as we saw 
in the sixth and seventh chapters - express solidarity not just with the global jihad, but with a 
particular online community, to which is attributed equivalent virtues to that of the object of 
admiration. In this way, both mujahidin and objects of more conventional fandom act as ways of 
objectifying and exemplifying values which might otherwise seem distant, abstract or impossible to 
live up to. At the same time, the ‘weekend world’ of fan community or jihadi forum may represent 
a possibility of purifying escape from the compromises and routines of everyday life.  
 
In approaching the first problem set out above, it will be seen that I have already made some 
headway with the second. Expressing admiration for, for example, Usama bin Ladin or Abu Mus‘ab 
al-Zarqawi naturally seems to carry with it certain assumptions about one’s theological and political 
beliefs. And indeed once one enters into ‘salafi-jihadi’ online circles, the specifics of belief clearly 
become an important matter. But holding certain views and engaging in jihadi texts in certain ways 
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is by no means the same thing. In abstract theory, being a jihadi-salafi rules out being an ‘ikhw!n"’. 
But in real life a person who believes that the jihad of the Islamic State of Iraq is legitimate may 
participate with other aspects of Islamic life online than those indicative of jihadi nu%ra, while, for 
that matter, a prominent Internet jihadi may attend meetings of the Muslim Brotherhood.
628
 
 
Thus, to say that jihadis are like fans is not to say that Star Trek fans literally believe in the 
existence of Klingons, or think that, by re-enacting Klingon tea ceremonies they can bring about the 
utopian human society of the Star Trek world. Rather, it is to say that just as fans of the real, but 
highly mediated figure of Madonna or Elvis make use of their engagement with the object of their 
fandom in order to accomplish some practical life purpose, so too do Internet jihadis seem to 
accomplish similar ends through their engagement with mediated representations of the mujahidin.  
 
The third problem  - (ie, that of whether it is legitimate to treat jihadis as fans in spite of the fact that 
they would presumably reject this usage) - is perhaps a little more weighty. And yet - as I have 
previously observed - fandom research has itself increasingly moved to engage with types of 
cultural consumer who would not normally wish to describe themselves as fans.  
 
Perhaps more significant, however, is the fact that the concept of the ‘jihadi’ fan is actually one 
what exists within ‘jihadi’ online discourse itself. Consider, for instance, the following (2007) post 
on muslm.net, in response to a discussion about ‘those who attack Al Qa’ida at the instigation of 
RAND Corporation’.  
 
 We must look at things from another angle... 
 
 The majority of the good people calling for nu%ra of the mujahidin - on the forums - are taking up their  roles 
 in a very full on way - to the benefit of RAND corporation, of course.  For all their cursing and  insult and 
 treachery is directed towards the Islamic army [of Iraq] - especially - and others in general... 
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So this “work” is dear to them - whether they mean to or they don’t mean to - and [so] they are penetrated by 
the enemy’s schemes through the Agency - and if they were calling for support of the mujahidin (and there  is 
no place for credulity) and God knows the hands that are behind this affair.  
 
 In reality, the net is 90% ignorant people, and this facilitates the activity of conniving Jews or of  spiteful 
heretics with the dissemination of words overflowing with da‘wi enthusiasm for the support of these - and 
what is broadcast by means of this except poison of a type: Al Qaida is the hope of the Muslims - no other - 
and the state is the foundation for the coming Caliphate. The words of tawhid before unification. (It is as if the 
rest [of the armed groups] are polytheists of the people of innovation). The nature of the path and so on goes 
over to the ringing statements which guide thereby the minds of the “fans”  of whom more than 90% have no 
knowledge of fiqh, to capture them with marketing slogans like teenagers. Indeed, the majority of them were 
yesterday were fans of a football team, and think that this business is the same thing under a different name’. 
(And if looked towards the differences, we  would have seen them merely as differences in affairs of ijtihad! 
(these which build upon each one his wala and his bara!) And it is no wonder that there should be those who 
attack the Islamic army like those who go by the information on the Al-Hurra channel or Al-Arabiya) and all 
of the calls and fabrications and aspersions cast upon it by the believers and followers of air. (the support for 
air and not for knowledge and fiqh of religion).  
 
So when will these brothers come to their senses from this dirty role which they have been placed in, with all 
skill - and I am sorry to say it - he is not an idiot who penetrates the plans of his enemy and  knows what  they 
are! And with apologies, some of the forums are thus set up behind this affair.  
 
 The Americans receive the worst of their work. And even if their intentions corrected, (and what  intention is 
 there to correct from air?) their work would be bad and corrupt.  
 
 And this cannot be denied concerning some of the decisions leading to this isolation favouring its 
 sidelining, but this is not the place to talk about it) and some of these tabla players aren’t fooling  themselves. 
 And the matter is not about fanship in a football game, as is the condition of some!
629
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What is interesting about this statement in relation to these ‘fans’
630
 is the way in which it 
reproduces the very same stereotypes about media consumers that fandom researchers set out to 
dispel - the fans are basically well meaning, but ignorant. They are therefore easily ‘captured’ by 
marketing slogans -‘Like teenagers’ (who in point of fact are often among the most savvy and 
discerning consumers). In search of an explanation for why people who profess to support the jihad 
would act in such a seemingly counterproductive manner, the poster is forced - like Adorno and 
Horkheimer - to appeal to their helplessness in the face of the enemy.  
 
Indeed, from their different perspectives, both Jarret Brachman and ‘Al-Suwa’iq al-Mursila’ 
express familiar cliches about ‘fans’. For Brachman, jihobbyists are ‘obsessed with the brutal 
beheading, sniper or explosives videos’. For ‘Al-Suwa‘iq al-Mursila’ (poster of the above 
comment), they are naive and ignorant, readily duped into pursuing the Machiavellian agenda of the 
Crusaders and the Jews, cheering for their side just like a football team, and introducing splits and 
dissent by intemperately attacking the other one.  
 
As such, it might be argued that jihadi ‘fans’ have been stigmatized both by jihadis and by Western 
analysts in much the same way as more straightforward types of fan have been.  
In the second chapter, we saw how Jenkins, in setting out to rethink the meaning of fandom, 
identified a number of negative stereotypes by which fans are characterised: 
 
- Brainless consumers who will buy anything associated with the show and its cast 
- [People] who devote their lives to the cultivation of worthless knowledge 
- Are feminised and/or desexualised 
- Are infantile, emotionally and intellectually immature 
- Are unable to separate fantasy from reality 
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Almost every one of these stereotypes has also been levelled at people who participate in jihadism 
via the Internet. Internet jihadis are supposed to be: 
 
From the non-Jihadi Point of View From the Jihadi Point of View 
Ignorant, lost victims of a pernicious ideology Unquestioning followers 
Suffering from ‘obsessive repulsive disorder’
631
  More concerned with displaying their loyalty 
to the mujahidin than addressing the 
underlying requirements of the jihad. 
Losers whom we can only thank for not getting 
physically involved 
 Lacking in physical prowess. 
‘Utter dolts in their Mommy’s basement’
632
  Ignorant of Islamic shari‘a  
Mistakenly believing that they are part of a 
heroic struggle against evil.  
Mistakenly believing that they are being 
mujahidin just by sitting at their computers.  
 
These views of the jihadi ‘fan’ are seemingly premised on the assumption that the only explanation 
for jihadis ‘failing’ to act in a manner appropriate from the standpoint of wishing to make a real 
contribution to the effectiveness of violent global jihad is naivety, laziness and ineptitude. They fail, 
therefore, to consider the possibility that the real reason why jihadis might act as ‘fans’ is that they 
are skilled cultural operators who simply happen to be pursuing a set of benefits which are not the 
same as those which self appointed strategists of the global jihad might wish them to pursue.  
 
8.3 What Might Jihadism Do? 
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In this dissertation, I have tried not to speculate too much about the ‘real lives’ of Internet jihadis, 
and I have done my utmost (not always, I admit, successfully) to avoid entering big debates about 
the contemporary development of Islam. I have also tried to avoid speaking in any clearly 
politicised sense about ‘resistance’, mainly because I wish to avoid being unduly speculative about 
what it is that people who go online to engage in jihadism are resisting.  
 
At the same time, I do wish to invoke the work of Michel de Certeau with relation to what can be 
seen as online jihadi ‘ways of using’ and ‘making do’.
633
 Indeed, there are two clear senses in which 
jihadism ‘inserts itself into’ a larger ‘strategy’. On the one hand, jihadis clearly appropriate non-
‘jihadi’ and indeed non-Islamic texts in order to produce new jihadi content. We have seen how 
‘AlHatf2’ drew on Israeli ex-spy Victor Ostrovsky for his analysis of intelligence work, and ‘Wajih 
al-Qamar’ on management texts (perhaps following the advice of Abu Bakr Naji). Elsewhere, one 
may find Islamic State of Iraq supporters name checking Western anti-war figures such as Noam 
Chomsky or Michael Moore or, alternatively, far eastern martial arts.
634
 
 
Indeed, in some of its textual appropriations, jihadism actually moves into the territory of science 
fiction fandom. A member of the general forum ‘bramjnet’ seems to post with equal enthusiasm 
books such as Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet or Al-Suri’s The Global Islamic 
Resistance Call, and classic science fiction, such as HG Wells’ The Time Machine.
635
 In some 
English language material, the investment in such literature is even clearer. Indeed, with regard to 
English language material, Brachman has observed the reception of a blog posting of his, in which 
he referred to jihobbyists as ‘orcs’.
636
 It transpired that some (English language) jihadis were 
actually fond of The Lord of the Rings, which they saw as encapsulating their own epic, binary 
struggle against the powers of evil. Hurt by Brachman’s remarks, they produced their own satirical 
video in which a scene (indeed DVD only outtake, no less) from the film version of The Lord of the 
Rings was overdubbed, presenting members of Tolkien’s fellowship of the ring as mujahidin and 
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Brachman himself as the ‘mouth of Sauron’.
637
 To take another English language example, one of 
the songs by the Muslim rap group ‘The Arab League’ is entitled Death Star.
638
 Rapped over music 
sampled from John Williams’ original soundtrack, the video features a tribute to Star Wars 
complete  with carefully created CG space ship backdrops and a lightsabre duel between figures 
representing George W. Bush and the eponymous ‘Arab League’. 
 
What is interesting about such material is that the subversion does not seem to be directed at the 
science fiction and fantasy texts themselves (even though, for instance, The Lord of the Rings can 
be read as flagrantly hostile to Middle Eastern culture). The rhetorical move is not to spoof and 
mock the texts in the manner of the ‘anti-fan’, but rather, in the manner of the true fan to 
appropriate and inhabit them - using their moral oppositions for one’s own purposes. This in turn 
suggests the possibility that other aspects of jihadi discourse may be read as, in a broad sense, a 
kind of science fiction - for instance, as mentioned in chapter five, posts relating to futuristic 
weapons and methods of combat. If so, then one role of jihadism may be equivalent to that 
identified by Jenkins for ‘utopian’ Science Fiction: the creation of a space in the future for the 
consumer and his values.
639
 In support of such a reading, it is worth at this point quoting Devji’s 
observation that:  
 
 The great battles of the jihad in Afghanistan also took on the appearance of media narratives about epic wars 
 between rival principles. The vast technological and numerical superiority of the airborne US-led troops 
 deployed against Al-Qaida and the Taliban then, quite inadvertantly replays media set pieces about the war 
 between robots and humans, airborne and earth-based power, that are familiar from films such as Dune, 
 Terminator and The Matrix. In such epic confrontations, naturally, it is the very peculiarity and even savagery 
 of the holy warrior that renders him more human than the American soldier who looks and behaves like a 
 robot.
640
  
 
The second sense in which jihadis ‘poach’ upon texts is the more problematic one with which this 
dissertation has been primarily concerned: the appropriation by a distinct, but unspoken ‘Internet 
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jihadi’ culture of the discourses and propaganda materials of the global jihad. Unlike the powers 
ranged against it, the global jihad is not obviously a ‘strategy’ in de Certeau’s sense.
641
 Indeed, in so 
far as de Certeau’s talk of ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’ is itself a trope drawn from guerrilla warfare, it 
would seem that the global jihad is itself an instance of the cunning underdog who triumphs by 
seizing the moment, perceiving the single weak spot by which the giant may be slain. 
 
But the ‘global jihad’ rules itself out of de Certeau’s conception of the tactic by the very fact that it 
possesses a discourse; indeed, ironically enough, it possesses this discourse. By virtue of the very 
fact that it sets itself up as a collective project with a particular purpose, so - theoretically at least - it 
admits the possibility of its subversion by the silent practice of individuals. It is important, at this 
point, to remember de Certeau’s emphatic rejection of what he sees as Bourdieu’s conception of 
people and culture as ‘coherent and unconscious’. This would appear, at first, to rule out the idea of 
jihadi activity as subversive with respect to the ‘global jihad’ – since presumably (that is, assuming 
that the jihadis one encounters on the Internet are sincere), any such subversion cannot be 
undertaken consciously. And yet, in rejecting this stance, it does not seem that de Certeau thought 
of people’s tactical practices as knowingly amounting to an overthrow of the system within which 
they occurred. For if this were so, they would no longer be silent, but would, instead, amount to the 
very discourse that de Certeau insists practice cannot be. At the same time, it can be argued that at 
the microlevel, Internet jihadis seem very much self aware of their own practice - as, for example, 
when they take great trouble over the details of a new forum signature.  
 
The logic of Internet jihadism as something distinct is, of course, one of paradox - a point explored 
to exhaustion in chapter six. It works only through the space created by the contradictions of the 
two main overt discourses of global jihad - that is, to use al-Suri’s terminology, the ‘jihadi’ or 
‘terrorist’ discourse which demands universal violent action, and the ‘mujahidin’ discourse, which 
insists on violence only in specific theatres of jihad. As such, Internet jihadism can make space for 
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itself only by insinuation and double entendre. For example, such a space might be found in so 
called ‘neo-Zarqawist’ tendency as represented by scholars such as Abu Harith al-Mihdar and the 
Madad al-Suyuf forum. This is presented by, for example Mohammed Ali Musawi, as representing 
a particularly insidious and dangerous permutation of jihadi ideology, in so far as it argues that the 
fighting mujahidin are better able to make religiously appropriate decisions than are ‘armchair’ 
scholars. And yet the implications of such a stance 
642
, when they are thought through, would seem 
- certainly now that Zarqawi himself is long dead - to work to the detriment rather than to the 
advantage of mujahidin in the field, who presumably need fatwas which say that specifically what 
they did was right, not simply rubber stamps on their actions simply because they are mujahidin. On 
the other hand, the neo-Zarqawist stance makes perfect sense in terms of the cultural disputes of 
Internet jihadism, as a means of increasing the cultural capital of those who base their online 
superiority on their unswerving loyalty to the cause of those who fight, rather than talk.  
 
8.4 Whither Internet Jihadism?  
 
Devji insists, interestingly, that the extremity of the violence of the global jihad may perhaps be 
accounted for in the deeply ethical nature of its underlying vision - the instability which seems to 
place it always on the edge of non-violence.
643
 The paradox of Internet jihadism, on the other hand, 
would appear to mean that, even while most Internet jihadis may manage to avoid being ensnared in 
their own calls for violent jihad, Internet jihadism will not be able altogether to sever its dependence 
on some measure of continued violence. While a complex system of commution and virtualisation 
may exist, jihadi cultural capital is not completely free floating. It is at least supposedly backed up 
by the currency of the valour of the mujahidin, upon whose blood the jihadi online community must 
feed and so renew itself. This is why the appearance of a new martyr - particularly someone like 
Abu Dujana al-Khurasani with prior Internet jihadi credentials - provokes a frenzy of interest in 
which jihadis attempt to assert their association to this gold standard of authenticity in whatever 
way they can.  
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At the same time, the directness of this link need not be overstated. Hamsawi ‘jihadi’ content 
retains its currency even though this organisation has engaged in relatively little direct violent 
activity since 2006. And even bloodless operations, such as the ‘Abdullah Azzam Battalions’ recent 
attack on a Japanese oil tanker can generate significant interest. In this case, an attack which 
apparently achieved very little real damage to its target nonetheless provided an opportunity for an 
elaborate justification in terms of economic globalisation which reveived a warm reception on the 
forums.
644
 A similar, still more recent example of how the ‘economic jihad’ argument can serve as a 
pretext for commuting the supposedly insatiable bloodlust
645
 of jihadist violence might be read from 
the third issue of the AQAP magazine Inspire, in which one factor apparently offered as informing 
the decision to place explosive packages on freight aircraft as that the only casualties would be the 
pilot and co-pilot of the aircraft. This did not, of course, amount to a rejection of earlier acts of mass 
casualty violence. Nor does it mean that this was even the true intention of the operation, which was 
suggested by US sources to be aimed at a Jewish community centre in Chicago. But the very fact 
that limiting casualties in favour of economic damage figured as a potentially effective justification 
– even post hoc – seems potentially telling.   
 
A yet more extreme example in this vein is offered by the Gazan group Jund Ansar Allah’s 
attempted horseborne suicide attack on the border crossing between Gaza and Israel, on June 8th 
2009.
646
 According to the Israeli Intelligence and Information Centre, this was an attempt ‘to 
perpetrate a combined showcase attack, not seen since the end of Operation Cast Lead, which 
would consist of blowing up IEDs, shootings, and possibly infiltration into Israeli territory and 
abduction.’
647
 It cannot, of course, be known to what extent the organisation really believed that 
they would succeed in carrying out such objectives (assuming that this reading of their intentions is 
accurate). And it certainly seems unlikely that the group intended its footage of the ‘implementation 
of the operation’ to be as anticlimactic as it actually is (notwithstanding the explanation on the 
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screen that footage was ‘held back for reasons of security’). Certainly, however, the group must 
have been aware of the high probability that, in a daylight raid on a fortified Israeli position, their 
attack would not only result in their deaths, but would also fail to achieve any significant damage 
against the enemy.
648
 As such, it may be considered to give a new sense to the term ‘suicide 
operation’, in that it was not only an operation the success of which depended on the deaths of its 
perpetrators, but actually an operation in which these perpetrators might reasonably have surmised 
that their deaths would in fact be the only achievement of the operation. 
 
Indeed, it is an irony of the reportage of the event that while Israeli sources have played up the 
extent to which the incident represented a militarily serious and dangerous attack, this angle is 
notably toned down in Jund Ansar Allah’s lengthy operation video, entitled The Raid of the 
Crossing (ghazwat al-bal!gh).
649
 In this film, virtually no mention is made of the purpose of the 
attack which the bulk of the footage sees members of the group preparing for. Indeed, sections of 
the video could be viewed almost more as a visual enactment of an Islamic sermon on the virtues of 
the horse than a piece of political communication. Large parts of the film are devoted to horsemen 
galloping around the Gaza landscape, either singly (usually in green areas), or in formation (in the 
desert). At one point, the camera is angled up to present a view of gently swaying branches and 
rolling clouds, as a voice over narrates a prophetical hadith about the virtues of the horse. The 
camera then angles down to show us a horse grazing at the foot of the same tree. As well as the 
Qur’anic aya often quoted in jihadi materials from Surat al-Anfal (8) in which Muslims are enjoined 
to ‘prepare for them whatever you are able to of force and of cavalry to terrify therewith the enemy 
of God and your enemy’, a more unusual passage, the S#rat al-‘Adiy!t is quoted three times, nearly 
in full.  
 
 By the racers, panting 
 And the producers of sparks striking 
 And the chargers at dawn 
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 Stirring up thereby dust 
 Arriving thereby in the centre collectively  
 Indeed mankind to his Lord is ungrateful 
 And indeed he is to that a witness 
  
But this is not to suggest that the video is purely about literalistic religious anachronism. If it were 
so, we might imagine, then the group members might as well have equipped themselves with 
swords and charged into battle after the precise model of the companions of the prophet. In fact, the 
video is deeply concerned with showing the care that went into the operation’s preparation. A 
section is devoted to ‘reconnaissance of the enemy’. Several sections relate to the training of horses 
for the demands of the attack. This includes scenes in which explosive panniers are strapped onto 
the animals and numerous scenes which (so the voice over explains) relate to preparing them to 
tolerate gunfire and explosions. In these groups of riders charge down a low hill in the desert 
directly towards an explosion. Other scenes describe how the group ‘initiated a course of training in 
the arts of war and fighting, by means of an intensive training programme.’ These show members of 
the group engaging in impressive-looking exercises with small arms. At the same time, elements of 
medieval (or even perhaps Eastern martial arts film) anachronism continue to intrude. A scene of 
troops advancing at night in single file shows a group in which one bears a large and conspicuous 
oblong banner. The language is confusing: are we supposed to read the modern war-film language 
of stealth, or the medieval language of heroic display?  
 
 Indeed, these sorts of ambiguities abound. The disquisition on the virtues of the horse - its 
‘constancy and courage and self-sacrifice’, its capacity to be trained to face the trials of war, its 
steadfastness even unto the Day of Judgement is surely to be seen as an animal fable made flesh, a 
sign from nature of which man is supposed to take note. Finally, even in the real-life chaos of the 
battle scene, which - for the most part - the cameraman fails to capture, the background talking of 
the fighters is in classical Arabic. Since Arabs, however religious, never use classical Arabic in 
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ordinary conversation, it would seem that even the moment of battle itself (at least, as produced by 
the editor of the video) was intended to be understood as a performance, rather than as a ‘real life’ 
event.  
 
Thus, in The Raid of the Crossing it would seem that we can witness the actualisation of the ‘jihadi 
manhaj’ as discussed previously. In the video, the acts of preparation are portrayed as goods in 
themselves, rather than as relating to any meaningful strategic goal. For, unlike in a production such 
as Baghdad Sniper, in which the group is at pains to explain why the sniper’s actions relate to a 
larger strategic purpose, here, for all the careful explanation about how and why, for example, the 
horses were trained in a particular way, nothing is said about what the group is actually trying to 
accomplish. Indeed, it may be worth mentioning that the very words ‘Zionist’, ‘Jew’, ‘Occupier’ or 
‘Israeli’ are not used at any point. The people against whom the raid is directed are simply the 
‘kuffar’ or the ‘enemies of God’. It is not that military activities such as small arms training or 
squadron level infantry operations are subsumed by religious imperatives, or that religion serves as 
a justification for military imperatives. Both are simultaneously drawn together as a single sacral 
practice, as a way of life.  
 
As such, we can perhaps after all see the coming to pass of Devji’s prophecy of ‘a suicide bombing 
in which the only life taken is the militant’s own’.
650
 And indeed, in the very fact of the reverse 
flow implied by Ghazwat al-Bal!gh - the actualisation of the mythical figure of the Islamic knight –
there seems to be a suggestion that the imaginative potency of jihadism may after all have the 
resources to become self-sustaining.  
 
8.5 Further Questions 
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In trying to treat of Internet jihadism as a cultural system in its own right, independent of the 
violence which it celebrates and to which it may sometimes lead, I have necessarily only dinted the 
surface of an immense and still almost untouched world. Naturally, I have produced only very 
partial answers, and left many questions entirely open.  
 
The research in this dissertation was more born of difficult necessities than ideal conditions. The 
fact that I did not have access to the ‘real world’ identities of those who engage in jihadism on the 
Internet profoundly informed the approach I took. And possibly the thesis is a more coherent work 
because of it. At the same time, it is of crucial importance that this gap in our knowledge be 
overcome. More and more people with experience of Internet jihadism who are willing and able to 
talk about it will no doubt appear as time goes by. A true history and ethnography of Internet 
jihadism is possible, and is yet to be written.  
 
At the same time, there is a vast amount of work that can still fruitfully be completed through 
Internet research. Forum profiles and posting records of Internet jihadis remain available for anyone 
who is prepared to trawl through the data. A deeper attempt to typologise different types of Internet 
jihadi and different forms of jihadi engagement on the Internet would add a great deal of substance 
to understanding about how Internet jihadism works.  
 
One possible product of such endeavours which would be of policy as well as academic interest 
would be any further light that could be thrown on the ‘lifecycle’ of an Internet jihadi. On the 
assumption that Internet jihadis will mostly end their engagement without becoming violent, it 
would be interesting to know how Internet jihadis end up ‘disengaging’,
651
 and which online and 
offline factors influence this process.  
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One particular issue which - because of its enormous depth and complexity - I avoided almost 
completely in this dissertation is that of gender. It is certainly the case that women (or people 
presenting as women) make up a very significant presence in Internet jihad, both in my own 
experience, and as widely documented elsewhere. Since it is not expected of women that they 
engage actively in violence, it might be argued that women are better able than men to negotiate the 
contradictions of Internet jihadism, and perhaps better placed as well to reap its rewards. 
 
8.6 Some final remarks 
 
The object of ethnography, customarily, has been not simply to say things about strange people in 
distant lands, but rather, through comparison with foreigners, to shed some light on the customs of 
one’s own people. Accordingly - perhaps presumptuously - it may be worth considering whether, 
having compared Internet jihadism to popular culture fandom, there is anything that we may 
perhaps learn about popular culture fandom from Internet jihadism.  
 
In discussing how we may think of engagements with jihadi texts (or with jihadi engagements with 
other texts) as fandom, I drew on the point that fans do not worship or literally believe in their texts, 
but rather use them as a means of living out and imaginatively engaging with things that they do 
seriously believe in.  
 
Indeed, for Jenkins (as for other fandom researchers), it is a matter of great importance that fans are 
not deluded, not unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality, but rather are able to use fantasy 
as a way of dealing with reality.  
 
Very tentatively, I have suggested that Internet jihadis may do something similar.  
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For Jenkins, however, the manner in which fans engage with texts would seem to be one which is 
essentially allegorical. The ‘real’ problems are in the real world. And the fantasy world provides 
illustrations of fictional people in similar situations, or of scenarios in which such problems may be 
seen to disappear. The teenager watches Buffy the Vampire Slayer, for example, and notices that the 
story is really talking about his own problems in arriving at adulthood, and at adults’ problems in 
dealing with teenagers. 
652
  
 
Jenkins is forthright in rejecting the arguments of Jewett and Lawrence in relation to The American 
Monomyth. And yet, in a rather subtler way, his argument still seems to be that of the ‘monomyth’ 
in Joseph Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces.
653
 In encountering myths, we are really 
encountering ourselves.  
 
In discussing how jihadism may work for people, I have suggested something a little different. 
Rather than the story offering an allegory for life, I tendered the thought that the ordinary 
experiences of life might, with the addition of a sense of jihadi purpose – of progressing through the 
steps of the jihadi manhaj – become an allegory for the jihad.  
 
This vision of fantasy need not imply that those who apply it thus to their lives are deluded, or are 
unable to separate fantasy from reality. The decision to overlay reality with the colour of myth may 
very well be a discriminating choice, made in order to survive modern life. But it is inevitably a 
darker vision than the enlightened one which scholars of fandom wish to offer, since, by proposing 
a sort of ‘enhanced reality’ of the kind now being experimented with by some computer games 
designers, it blurs the boundaries of the real and the imaginary. Returning to the work of Vladimir 
Propp, it takes, instead of the endless repetitions of morphology, the ‘multiformity, picturesqueness 
and colour’
654
 implied by the endless variations of mythical content.  
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We live in a terrifying world; sustained by machines we don’t understand, and faced with the 
creeping die-back of things which for millennia we took for granted. And this is as true in Baghdad, 
or Gaza or Jeddah or Cairo as it is in London, or Paris, or Copenhagen. Is it more realistic to believe 
that I, at this moment, at the reigns of my mare, ride for the field of Yarmuk, or that, to the 
humming synth bass from of my neighbour’s sound system, under the glow of a neon lightbulb, tap 
these final words into a perfect oblong of pure white light?  
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Appendix 1: Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
Wajih al-
Qamar 
30 Jul 2006 How to 
make a 
secret camp  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 secrecy/age
ncy 
 
 30 Jul 2006 Very, very 
simple way 
to make a 
bomb 
(copied 
from Abu 
al-Bukhari 
chat room).  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency/ever
yday life 
Jihadi  
 30 Jul 2006 Fighting and 
attacking in 
Taekwando 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 uprightness/
agency 
 
 22 Jun 2006 War with 
poisons - 
how to make 
lethal 
poisons 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
Discusses 
ways of 
delivering 
poison to 
Americans in 
the 
supermarket 
agency/ever
yday life 
vs 
Americans 
goal 
 19 Aug 2006 The 
experienced 
shaykh - 
unique 
minded - 
behind the 
organisation 
of small 
group 
warfare 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
Extract from 
Abu Mus’ab 
al-Suri 
agency jihadi direction 
 20 Aug 2006 Words from 
the heart to 
he who has 
a heart 
Da’wa Meditation 
on the vanity 
and 
emptiness of 
life 
aimlessness/
fear of 
death/ 
everyday life 
  
 22 Aug 2006 Lessons 
from the 
war in Iraq.  
General Comparison
s from 
Islamic 
history 
 Ummah precedent 
 22 Aug 2006 Half an 
hour in the 
grave 
General  fear of death  
 22 Aug 2006 Communiq
ues by 
mujahidin 
shura 
council 
Saturday 
Media   mujahidin progress 
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 22 Aug 2006 Just half an 
hour ago, 
the 
electronic 
battle 
started 
against the 
website 
muhammad
ani 
 
Jihadi 
hacker 
forum 
Trying to 
organise 
attack on 
anti-Muslim 
website by 
asking 
people to 
download an 
‘attack 
programme’ 
from a given 
website 
agency jihadi technology 
 23 Aug 2006 Al Ekhlas 
network 
presents Al 
Battar 
archive/cen
tre for 
researches 
and studies.  
Media  agency jihadi  
 24 Aug 2006 Website of 
Sheikh 
Hamid al-
Ali – 
download 
your copy.  
 
Media   jihadi  
 24 Aug 2006 Jihadi poem General  responsibilit
y/sensitivity 
Ummah/vs 
America 
 
 24 Aug 2006 Apologies to 
Baghdad by 
Dr Hakim al-
Matiri 
General  responsibilit
y/sensitivity 
Ummah & 
Iraq/vs 
natural 
environment 
 24 Aug 2006 A hundred 
pieces of 
advice for 
youth  
General  uprightness Ummah/yout
h 
 
 24 Aug 2006 A Saudi 
woman 
mourning for 
Abu Mus’ab 
General  sensitivity Ummah/Ara
b 
 
 24 Aug 2006 A statement 
from al-
kata’ib al-
muqaddis 
about the 
kidnapped 
journalist 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  Mujahidin/vs progress 
Appendix 1: Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 24 Aug 2006 Religious 
preparation 
for Sha’aban 
for the 
opportunity 
of the first 
day of 
Sha’aban 
Da’wa  ritual   
 25 Aug 2006 the library 
of Sheikh 
Suleiman 
Bugheith, 
God release 
him. 
Media   jihadi/vs 
authority 
 
 25 Aug 2006 Communiq
ues by the 
shura 
council of 
the 
mujahedin 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Exclusive 
on Abu al 
Bukhari 
network a 
newly 
released 
video ‘the 
lovers of 
houris’. 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 26 Aug 2006 A unique 
subject and 
a good 
idea.  
General A campaign 
to get a 
million 
people to 
make du’a 
against 
Israel 
ritual/agency Ummah/vs 
Israel 
direction 
 26 Aug 2006 The media 
division of 
Jund al-
Sham, in 
cooperation 
with Al-
Nusra 
network 
present: 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 31 Aug 2006 Film of 
Abu Omar 
al-Sayf, 
God have 
mercy on 
him 
Media   mujahidin  
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 31 Aug 2006 Don’t miss 
this lesson, 
for all 
reported 
Da’wa A fable 
about a 
fisherman 
who catches 
a precious 
pearl and is 
offered six 
hours in the 
prince’s 
treasury as 
payment, 
but sleeps 
and eats 
there and so 
misses the 
chance to 
gather the 
reward.  
corruption   
 1 Sep 2006 Lessons to 
learn for 
people who 
like music 
– please 
circulate 
Da’wa Stories 
about 
people who 
died 
listening to 
music  
fear of death  
 1 Sep 2006 Treatments 
for 
cataracts 
from the 
Quran 
General  health   
 1 Sep 2006 God is 
great! 
Soon, good 
news from 
Al-Sahab 
corporation
.  
Media   mujahidin progress 
 1 Sep 2006 Statement 
by the 
mujahidin 
shura 
council for 
Thursday 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 1 Sep 2006 Various 
useful 
subjects 
General Q&A on how 
to handle 
various life 
challenges - 
eg 
relationship 
uprightness   
 2 Sep 2006 Lessons for 
Mujahidin 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency  direction 
Appendix 1: Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 2 Sep 2006 The Islamic 
network of 
al zakreen 
and al 
zakirat 
Media   jihadi  
 2 Sep 2006 The treasury 
of good 
deeds 
General  ritual   
 2 Sep 2006 Hizballat 
play 10.39 
pm: I hope 
that the 
brothers 
will enter 
General  agency jihadi/vs 
Hizbullah 
 
 2 Sep 2006 How to 
become a 
military 
leader 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 uprightness/
agency 
 
 2 Sep 2007 Arrest – 
and how to 
face it. 
Important 
for all 
mujahedin 
in the face 
of the 
pagans.  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 uprightness/
agency 
jihadi/vs 
authority 
 
 2 Sep 2007 Now, 
download 
quickly the 
jihadi 
military 
collection/i
mportant 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 2 Sep 2007 Urgent – 
the 
complete 
address of 
the internal 
ministry’s 
dogs  
 
  agency vs authority  
 3 Sep 2006 to all 
members 
General request for 
everyone to 
go to the 
preparation 
forum 
agency forum  
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 4 Sep 2006 Communiq
ues by 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 4 Sep 2006 Very 
important: 
The 
mujahedin 
military 
deception is 
important. 
And the 
military 
arms and 
films.  
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 secrecy mujahidin  
 4 Sep 2006 Easy-to-
make 
poison gas 
to torment 
the enemy 
of religion  
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency vs kuffar  
 4 Sep 2006 Intelligence 
and 
security 
subjects 
important 
for 
mujahedin.  
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 secrecy agency  
 4 Sep 2006 Psychologi
cal war – 
important 
subject 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
  direction 
 4 Sep 2006 God is 
great! 
Download 
now plans 
for making 
hand 
grenades.  
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency   
 4 Sep 2006 Military base 
and the art 
of war 
Military 
Strategy 
  direction 
Appendix 1: Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 4 Sep 2006 The 
biography 
of Sayyid 
Qutb, God 
have mercy 
on him, the 
Shahid of 
Islam in 
audiotape 
format.  
General  uprightness Ummah  
 4 Sep 2006 A tape that 
shows the 
confession 
of three 
apostates 
who work 
for Franda 
company 
and judge 
over… 
Jihadi cell    vs apostates  
 4 Sep 2006 God is the 
greatest – 
download 
now 
instructions 
for making 
hand 
bombs 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency   
 4 Sep 2006 Encouragin
g Jihadism 
– very 
important 
for 
Mujahedin 
and qaedin 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
a list of 
encouraging 
Qur’anic 
verses 
 jihadi direction 
  Points 
about 
fighting 
techniques 
for 
destroying 
buildings 
and 
blowing up 
embassies 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency vs authority direction 
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
  The basics 
on 
kidnapping 
Jews and 
Americans 
– copied.  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency vs Jews and 
Americans 
direction 
 4 Sep 2006 A guide to 
attaining 
competence 
as a 
professional 
thief 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
WQ 
seemingly 
implies that 
he created 
this himself, 
and then 
climbs 
down, 
admitting 
that he only 
copied it.  
secrecy/age
ncy 
Ummah  
 5 Sep 2006 Interview 
with Sheikh 
‘atiullah by 
al-Hesbah 
network 
chatroom.  
 
General   jihadi  
 5 Sep 2006 Communiq
ues of the 
mujahedin 
shura 
council for 
Monday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 5 Sep 2006 Information 
that 
concerns 
you  
General Trivia - 
general 
knowledge 
fun facts 
? ? ? 
 5 Sep 2006 Poem about 
a prisoner 
General   mujahidin/vs 
authority 
 
 5 Sep 2006 Seven things 
you 
shouldn’t do 
immediately 
after eating 
General  health   
 5 Sep 2006 Several 
important 
things - 
send this to 
the one you 
love 
General     
 5 Sep 2006 To my dear 
sister - read 
this, then 
answer 
Da’wa Fable about 
a pearl and a 
rose 
uprightness   
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 5 Sep 2006 A gift to Abu 
Khattab al-
Dalimi 
General An anti-
Iranian file 
on 
Tawhed.ws 
 forum/ vs 
Iran 
 
 5 Sep 2006 Praying for 
the prophet, 
peace be 
upon him, its 
meaning 
General  ritual   
 5 Sep 2006 For the 
health of the 
forum 
members 
General  health   
 5 Sep 2006 Abu 
Qatada’s 
Website 
Media   jihadi  
 5 Sep 2006 Why don’t 
you use your 
sleeping 
time to 
worship?  
 
General a passage to 
read before 
one sleeps 
which gives 
one benefits 
while 
sleeping - 
rather like 
self 
hypnosis 
programmin
g 
ritual   
 5 Sep 2006 Hell, 300km 
-a very 
effective 
story 
Da’wa Creepy 
ghost story 
type tale 
about a 
group of 
boys on a 
road trip 
fear of death  
 5 Sep 2006 The 
fisherman 
and the fish 
- Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal 
General a folk tale 
reminiscent 
of one in the 
Arabian 
Nights 
uprightness   
 5 Sep 2006 Taq-Taq-
Taqiyya - 
God damn 
whoever 
knows its 
meaning and 
still recites it 
Da’wa   ritual (-)   
 6 Sep 2006 Sudden new 
release from 
the Islamic 
Army of Iraq 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 6 Sep 2006 Ramadan is 
an 
opportunity 
for young 
people 
General  ritual youth   
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 6 Sep 2006 Do you feel 
down after 
your 
enthusiasm 
after tauba?  
General  ritual   
 6 Sep 2006 A way to 
turn off the 
computer 
of someone 
who annoys 
you with 
messenger 
– without 
programmi
ng 
Jihadi 
hacker 
 agency  technology 
 6 Sep 2006 Dawa 
websites 
reporting in 
more than 
40 
languages 
internationa
lly 
Da’wa   agency Ummah  
 6 Sep 2006 Suggestions 
and 
thoughts 
about Dawa 
through the 
Internet 
Da’wa  agency Ummah  
 6 Sep 2006 Words that 
make a 
person who 
doesn’t pray 
pray 
Da’wa God 
abandons  
the one who 
doesn’t 
pray. 
‘between the 
man and the 
unbeliever is 
the 
abandoning 
of prayer’ 
various 
similar 
maxims 
ritual (-)   
 6 Sep 2006 God is 
great! The 
battle of 
Shaykh 
Muhammad 
bin 
Abdulrahm
an al 
Utaybi 
Media Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin progress 
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 6 Sep 2006 Establishm
ent of Al-
Boraq 
media 
foundation. 
Media Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin progress 
 6 Sep 2006 Confession
s of two 
members of 
the national 
guard – 
achieving 
God’s rule 
over them 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
General  mujahidin/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 7 Sep 2006 Communiq
ues of 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group for 
Wednesday 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin  
 7 Sep 2006 Why don’t 
you wear the 
hijab? 
 
 Girls say 
that they are 
religiously 
convinced 
but that they 
will wait until 
they are 
older.  
corruption   
 7 Sep 2006 My concern 
is for the 
patient who 
doesn’t 
know that 
the cure is in 
his hands 
 A post about 
the 
hypocrisy 
behind 
common 
religious 
formulas 
corruption   
 7 Sep 2006 How to learn 
to be 
forgiven for 
good  
 A lesson in 
how to 
repent 
properly 
ritual   
 7 Sep 2006 Health 
benefits of 
walking to 
Mosque 
General  Based on a 
study saying 
that walking 
half and 
hour every 
day reduces 
blood 
pressure 
health   
 7 Sep 2006 Ashura the 
mujahedin 
council for 
Thurday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 7 Sep 2006 An audio 
by Abu 
Hamza al 
Muhajer  
 
Media Communiqu
es 
 jihadi  
 8 Sep 2006 Interview 
with Dr 
Ibrahim al-
Shambari – 
official 
spokesman 
of the 
Islamic 
Army in 
Iraq 
 
Media Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin  
 8 Sep 2006 God is 
great, God 
is great, 
good news 
for 
Muslims 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
A martyrdom 
operation by 
the majlis al-
shura in 
Baghdad to 
avenge Abu 
Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi 
 mujahidin/u
mmah 
progress 
 8 Sep 2006 Communiq
ues by 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group for 
Thursday 
14th of 
Sha’aban.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin progress 
 8 Sep 2006 What’s 
beautiful in 
the Universe 
General To worship 
God, not 
kings, rocks 
or trees; to 
be a good 
Muslim, not 
a kaafir; to 
give your 
heart to 
God, etc 
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 8 Sep 2006 Those 
banned from 
beholding 
God 
 Those who 
have broken 
God?s 
covenant 
and have 
little faith, a 
governor 
who was 
negligent in 
his charge 
and didn?t 
take account 
of people?s 
poverty, the 
adulterous 
shaikh, the 
false king  
 
 Ummah/ vs 
authority/bet
rayal 
goal 
 8 Sep 2006 Some of the 
reasons why 
[people] stay 
on the 
straight way, 
God willing 
Da’wa A list of 
ways of 
remaining 
religious: 
frequent 
du’a, finding 
an upright 
friend, 
keeping 
one’s 
distance 
from anyone 
who isn’t like 
that, even if 
a relative, 
reading the 
book of 
God, 
keeping to 
obligations, 
requesting 
shari’ah 
knowledge, 
fear of sins, 
reading 
improving 
books, 
looking 
ahead, 
rememberin
g the enmity 
of Satan.  
uprightness   
 8 Sep 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council 
communiqu
es 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin progress 
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 9 Sep 2006 Thirty 
prayers for 
thirty days 
of 
Ramadan.  
 
General  ritual everyday life   
 10 Sep 2006 The latest 
news of 
Mujahedin 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 10 Sep 2006 Sada al-
Rafidayn, 
the 5th issue 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 10 Sep 2006 Wine and 
dates: a 
beautiful 
story that 
has the 
effect of 
bringing 
tears to the 
eye 
 
 Story about 
a shaikh in 
Britain 
whose 
Arabic 
student 
jokingly 
gives him an 
alcoholic 
drink at 
Ramadan 
breakfast 
and a British 
student who 
converts 
after seeing 
the shaykh’s 
response 
uprightness/
corruption/re
sponsibility/
sensitivity 
Ummah  
 10 Sep 2006 For 
Ramadan 
153 doors 
of goodness 
 
General  ritual everyday life   
 11 Sep 2010 The knight 
of Islam – 
Abu Musab 
Al-
Zarqawi, 
God have 
mercy on 
him 
 
Media   mujahidin  
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 11 Sep 2010 The 
excuses 
people 
make for 
not going to 
jihad 
 
General A discussion 
of various 
attachments 
(children, 
possessions
, etc) and 
why they are 
invalid 
reasons  
corruption   
 11 Sep 2006 The 
battalion of 
Abi 
Dajjana al-
Ansari 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 11 Sep 2006 Ramadan 
flash 
Da’wa  ritual Ummah  
 11 Sep 2006 Communiq
ues of 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group for 
11th 
September 
2006  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 11 Sep 2010 Communiq
ues of the 
jaysh al 
mujahedin 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 11 Sep 2006 New video 
of jaysh al 
mujahedin 
called ‘the 
storms’  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 11 Sep 2006 An 
interview 
with 
Ayman al 
Zawahiri 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 12 Sep 2006 Al 
Mujahedin 
Shura 
Council 
9/11 
operation 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 13 Sep 2006 Mujahidin 
Shura 
council 
statement 
12th 
September 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 13 Sep 2006 A story that 
made many 
people cry 
Da’wa on the last 
days of the 
prophet 
sensitivity Ummah precedent 
 13 Sep 2006 Warning: the 
more you 
participate in 
this chat, the 
more sins 
you get  
  ritual  technology 
 13 Sep 2006 From the 
pearls of the 
righteous - 
dedicated to 
my brother 
in God Sayf 
al-Islam 
   forum  
 14 Sep 2006 New 
videoed 
operations 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 14 Sep 2006 Letters to 
the 
mujahidin 
of Iraq 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 14 Sep 2006 Communiq
ues and 
good news 
– God is 
great! 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 14 Sep 2006 The 
complete file 
of Ramadan 
- hundreds 
of audio 
recordings 
Da’wa  ritual  technology 
 15 Sep 2006 mujahidin 
shura 
communiqu
es 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 16 Sep 2006 Videoed 
operations 
of Mujahidin 
Shura 
council 
Media   mujahidin  
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 16 Sep 2006 The word is 
the word of 
the sword - 
an answer 
from the 
Mujahidin to 
the Vatican 
Media   mujahidin/u
mmah/ vs 
pope 
 
 16 Sep 2006 Good news 
– the 
Sheikh Abu 
Yahia al-
Libi in 
jihadist 
poems 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 16 Sep 2006 A story that 
made 
Osama bin 
Laden cry 
till he 
fainted 
 
General  sensitivity mujahidin/u
mmah 
oppression 
 16 Sep 2006 The whole 
collected 
poems of 
Abu Yahia 
al-Libi 
Media   mujahidin  
 16 Sep 2006 The 
drunkennes
s of death 
 
General  fear of death  
 17 Sep 2006 All the 
parts of the 
Russian 
Hell in 
Chechnya 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 17 Sep 2006 The 
battalion of 
the 20th 
revolution 
– two video 
operations 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 17 Sep 2006 Communiq
ues of 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 17 Sep 2006 Finding the 
body of a 
Palestinian 
in Abu 
Dsheir 
district 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
 kidnapping 
story 
Arab/Umma
h/vs Shiites 
oppression 
 17 Sep 2006 The tribes 
of Iraq 
threaten 
[bad 
consequenc
es] if any 
flag is 
raised apart 
from the 
Iraqi flag 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  Iraqi/Arab/vs 
American 
 
 17 Sep 2006 The Islamic 
Army of 
Iraq claim 
responsibili
ty for the 
destruction 
of an 
American 
tank in 
Baghdad.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 17 Sep 2006 A family of 
al-jihad 
district 
relate their 
terrifying 
experience 
at the hands 
of the Al-
Mahdi 
army.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs Shiites oppression 
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 17 Sep 2006 The village 
of Hambas 
in al 
Miqdadiyya 
is destroyed 
by the 
occupation 
forces and 
the national 
army 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs 
Americans/v
s apostates 
 
 17 Sep 2006 Romania to 
withdraw 
its forces 
from Iraq 
within two 
months 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  progress 
 17 Sep 2006 Saudi 
Arabia 
plans to 
make 
fences and 
electronic 
barriers 
along the 
Iraqi border 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs authority  
 17 Sep 2006 Destroying 
a car 
belonging 
to the 
internal 
intelligence 
and killing 
its 
occupants 
in Samra.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
intelligence 
progress 
 17 Sep 2006 Finding 
fifty bodies 
of Sunni 
Shuhada in 
Baghdad – 
children 
among 
them.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs Shiites oppression 
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 17 Sep 2006 Good news 
for 
Muslims in 
general and 
mujahedin 
in 
particular 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 17 Sep 2006 Seizure of 
4kg of 
drugs in 
nasiriyya 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
 corruption vs 
Americans 
 
 17 Sep 2006 Iran wants 
to rebuild 
the Iraqi 
intelligence 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs Iran/ vs 
intelligence 
 
 17 Sep 2006 Washington 
puts 20 
million 
dollars into 
surveillance 
of media 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
 secrecy vs 
Americans 
technology 
 17 Sep 2006 Killing of a 
family by a 
sniper of 
the 
occupation 
forces at 
Ramadi 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs 
Americans 
oppression 
 17 Sep 2006 American 
defence 
ministry 
hides the 
truth – 
more than 
10,000 
Americans 
killed 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs 
Americans 
progress 
 17 Sep 2006 The Mahdi 
army 
attacks at 
Batha 
mosque in 
Nasiriyya 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs Shiites oppression 
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 17 Sep 2006  bank 
account in 
Israel 
belonging 
to the head 
of the 
government 
of Iraqi 
militias.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs Shiites/vs 
Israel 
 
 18 Sep 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council in 
Iraq 
communiqu
es 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 19 Sep 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council in 
Iraq 
communiqu
es 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 19 Sep 2006 Sada 
Rafidayn – 
the sixth 
issue 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 19 Sep 2006 Statement 
issued by 
leadership 
of ansar al 
sunna about 
the pope’s 
communiqu
es 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs pope 
 
 19 Sep 2006 Statement 
for al-fajr 
media 
centre 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 19 Sep 2006 Ansar al 
Sunna 
statement 
for Tuesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 19 Sep 2006 The ultimate 
encyclopedi
a of 
outstanding 
thought on 
managing 
asymmetric 
warfare 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency  direction 
 20 Sep 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council 
statement 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 21 Sep 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Wednesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 21 Sep 2006 Al Qaeda 
and the 
production 
of red 
mercury  
 
General   mujahidin technology/
direction/pro
gress 
 22 Sep 2006 Islamic 
collection 
 
General by GIMF 
celebrating 
the career of 
Sayf al-Din 
al-Kanani 
 mujahidin purpose 
 22 Sep 2006 The 
mujahedin 
shura 
council 
communiqu
es 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 22 Sep 2006 Instructive 
examples 
from the 
lives of 
wise men  
 
Da’wa  uprightness   
 22 Sep 2006 How to 
make a fake 
passport – 
copied 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 secrecy/age
ncy 
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 22 Sep 2006 A new film 
from 
Chechnya 
 
Media   mujahidin/U
mmah 
 
 22 Sep 2006 The 
programme 
that 
infuriated 
the 
foremost 
hackers 
 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
hacker 
 agency  technology 
 22 Sep 2006 How to fake 
a passport 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 secrecy/age
ncy 
 
 22 Sep 2006 Lessons in 
hacking 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
hacker 
 agency  technology 
 23 Sep 2006 The latest 
Jihadi news 
for Friday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin progress 
 23 Sep 2006 Reliving 
the ways of 
our 
forebears in 
dealing 
with 
unbelievers 
 
Media   Ummah/vs 
Kuffar 
precedent 
 23 Sep 2006 Shortcomin
gs in 
thought and 
manhaj of 
the present 
jihadi 
current 
 
Military 
Strategy 
A piece 
drawn from 
Abu Mus’ab 
al-Suri 
 jihadi direction (-) 
 23 Sep 2006 Libya – we 
didn’t 
fight? 
 
General   mujahidin progress (-) 
 23 Sep 2006 A reply to 
those who 
prohibited 
jihad in 
Iraq.  
 
General   Ummah/defe
atists 
 
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 23 Sep 2006 Making a 
team a 
collective 
achievemen
t 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 agency Jihadi progress 
 23 Sep 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Saturday 
 
   mujahidin progress 
 23 Sep 2006 Basics of 
planning 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi direction 
 24 Sep 2006 Exegesis on 
‘Foundatio
ns of 
Takfir’ by 
Sheikh Abu 
Basir  
 
General   Ummah/kuff
ar 
direction 
 25 Sep 2006 Mujahedin 
Shuran 
council 
communiqu
es for 
Sunday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 25 Sep 2006 Sada 
Rafidayn – 
7th issue 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 25 Sep 2006 Eulogy of 
heroes of 
Chechnya 
 
Media  uprightness mujahidin direction 
 25 Sep 2006 A word by 
the shahid 
sheikh abu 
hasan al 
hijazi, God 
have mercy 
on him – 
please 
disseminate 
 
Media  uprightness mujahidin  
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 25 Sep 2006 The shura 
council of 
Iraq 
statement 
about an 
exclusive 
secret 
programme 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
On the 
misrepresent
ation of the 
mujahidin on 
a particular 
satellite 
channel 
secrecy mujahidin/jih
adi 
direction 
 25 Sep 2006 The 
preparation 
of al-
mujahed 
generation 
1 
 
Jihadi Cell 
Forum 
 uprightness/
agency 
mujahidin direction 
 25 Sep 2006 Download 
lessons by 
Abu Musab 
al-Suri  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency Jihadi direction 
 26 Sep 2006 Good 
news/all the 
issues by 
the 
organisatio
n of the 
Arab 
peninsula 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 26 Sep 2006 Al 
mujahedin 
communiqu
es for 
Tuesday/ 1 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 26 Sep 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
communiqu
es for 
Tuesday/2 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 26 Sep 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Tuesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 27 Sep 2006 I seek the 
faith in you 
O muslim 
Da’wa  uprightness   
 27 Sep 2006 Don’t be 
tempted by 
those who 
practice 
unbelief in 
the country 
 
Da’wa  uprightness   
 27 Sep 2006 I seek the 
faith in 
you, O 
sister 
 
Da’wa about the 
currents of 
Westernisati
on 
devastating 
our women 
uprightness   
 27 Sep 2006 135 ways to 
gain 
benefits 
(copied) 
 
General eg 
repentence, 
sincerity, 
Umrah, 
reading and 
memorising 
the Qur’an 
ritual   
 27 Sep 2006 The habits 
of our 
forebears in 
Ramadan 
 
General   Ummah precedent 
 27 Sep 2006 The 
difference 
between 
insha-allah 
and in sha 
allah – a 
very 
serious 
subject 
 
General Insha’ Allah 
means ‘we 
have created 
God’ not 
‘What God 
wills’  
ritual   
 27 Sep 2006 At the 
doors of 
Ramadan, 
here where 
you gain 
lessons 
 
Da’wa On benefits 
available to 
Muslims at 
the outset of 
Ramadan 
ritual   
 27 Sep 2006 Look to the 
Gharqad 
tree 
 
General Concerning 
the tree that 
will not 
speak out 
against the 
Jews 
 Ummah/ vs 
Jews 
goal 
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 27 Sep 2006 Fiqhi 
puzzles 
 
General  ritual   
 27 Sep 2006 Audio by 
the 
commander 
of Islamic 
jihad of 
Iraq on the 
occasion of 
Ramadan 
 
Media   mujahidin/u
mmah 
 
 27 Sep 2006 Shura 
jihadi 
council 
communiqu
es for 
Wednesday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 28 Sep 2006 Condolence
s from the 
Global 
Islamic 
Media 
Front for 
the death of 
our brother 
Sayf 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
The person 
in question - 
Sayf al-Din 
al-Kanani - 
is said to 
have been a 
founding 
member of 
the GIMF. 
He longed 
for 
martyrdom 
and so, 
‘even if he 
died on his 
mattress’ he 
will be 
reckoned a 
martyr.  
 mujahidin  
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 28 Sep 2006 Dialogue 
between an 
ignorant 
‘jaami’ and 
an honest 
mujahid 
about 
Zarqawi 
 
General Zarqawi is 
accused of 
being a 
Kharajite. 
The 
‘mujahid’ 
asks 
whether the 
Saudi army 
is a Muslim 
army. He is 
told that it is. 
But it kills 
Muslims. 
Whereas 
Zarqawi 
fights 
infidels. So 
who’s the 
Kharajite?  
 mujahidin/ 
vs authority 
direction 
 28 Sep 2006 Faith based 
preparation 
and 
psychologic
al 
preparation 
before 
military 
preparation 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
On being 
personally 
committed, 
giving of 
one’s 
money, etc, 
for the jihad 
agency/upri
ghtness 
jihadi  
 28 Sep 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Wednesday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 28 Sep 2006 A word 
from the 
amir of the 
al Qaeda 
organizatio
n in the 
land of the 
two rivers 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 29 Sep 2006 The 
mujahedin 
shura 
council 
communiqu
es for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 29 Sep 2006 Ansar al 
sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Friday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 29 Sep 2006 Advice  
 
General General life 
advice - 
don’t get 
caught up 
with the past 
or the future, 
take 
exercise, do 
du’a, sin is 
the origin of 
sadness, 
don’t move 
all the time 
from one 
activity to 
another - 
that’s a way 
of not 
achieving 
anything.  
uprightness/
corruption 
 
 29 Sep 2006 A way of 
seeking 
knowledge 
– yusuf 
al’iri 
(copied) 
 
general On the 
importance 
of seeking 
knowledge 
alongside 
jihad 
uprightness/
corruption 
knowledge/a
gency 
 
 29 Sep 2006 Who’s 
knocking? 
(copied) 
 
  uprightness/
corruption 
virtue/everyd
ay life  
 
 29 Sep 2006 Make 70 
angels pray 
over you, 
and if you 
die, you 
will die as a 
shahid 
 
Da’wa More 
forumulas 
ritual/agency everyday life 
/fear of 
death 
 
 29 Sep 2006 17 ways for 
you to get 
rid of sin 
 
Da’wa Various 
Islamic 
formulas 
which 
produce this 
effect  
ritual/agency everyday 
life/fear of 
death 
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 30 Sep 2006 Situations 
that made 
umar bin 
al-khattab 
cry and 
become 
silent and 
angry  
 
Da’wa  uprightness Ummah precedent 
 30 Sep 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
communiqu
es for 
Friday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 30 Sep 2006 Ayman al 
Zawahiri/b
ush/Vatican 
pope/darfur 
and wars 
 
General   mujahidin/ 
vs pope/ vs 
Bush/ vs 
Darfuris 
 
 30 Sep 2006 Greeting 
and 
appreciatio
ns to the 
Sheikh, the  
leader abi 
hamza al 
muhajir 
with 
support and 
encourage
ment 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
Ramadan 
greetings 
and a 
biography of 
the new 
leader of the 
Mujahidin 
Shura 
Council in 
Iraq 
 jihadi  
 30 Sep 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 2 Oct 2006 Sada al –
Rafidayn – 
7th issue 
 
Media   mujahidin  
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 2 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
for 
Sunday/1 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 2 Oct 2006 The way of 
victory film 
by ansar al-
sunna army  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 2 Oct 2006 Abu Obeid 
al Bashiri – 
a part of his 
biography  
 
Miltiary 
Strategy 
 mujahidin direction 
 2 Oct 2006 The new 
biggest 
electronic 
battle in 
Ramadan 
 
jihadi hacker 
forum 
calling on 
people to 
take part in 
a ddos 
against 
‘zionist’ 
websites 
agency jihadi technology/
direction 
 3 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council 
statement 
for Sunday 
pt 2.00 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
for Monday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3 Oct 2006 Three video 
lectures by 
sheikh abu 
talal al 
qasim – 
God release 
him! 
 
Media   jihadi  
 3 Oct 2006 Ansar al 
sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Monday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
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 3 Oct 2006 Important 
and useful 
information  
 
General a lengthy 
series of 
fairly well 
known facts 
about the 
Qur’an 
 everyday life  direction 
(validity of 
religion)  
 3 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
statement 
for Tuesday 
pt 1 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 4 Oct 2006 Chechen 
mujahedin 
film 2006  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 4 Oct 2006 A new 
message by 
Abi Yahia 
God protect 
him – the 
unbelievers 
of Karzai’s 
regime  
 
Media   mujahidin/vs 
authority 
 
 4 Oct 2006 A statement 
by tandhim 
qaedat al 
jihad – the 
state of 
Palestine – 
the 
statement 
of rational 
people 
 
Media   mujahidin direction 
 5 Oct 2006 The media 
dept of 
mujahedin 
shura 
council 
presents: 
sniping the 
American 
soldiers 
 
Media   mujahidin/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 5 Oct 2006 An open 
interview 
with Dr 
Ibrahim al-
Shammari  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
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 5 Oct 2006 The Sheikh 
Abu Omar 
Abd al 
Hakim 
Hasan’s 
website – 
God protect 
him 
 
General General  jihadi  
 8 Oct 2006 The 
mujahdin 
shura 
council 
statement 
for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin progress 
 8 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
group 
statement 
for Friday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
Communiqu
es 
 mujahidin progress 
 8 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
for 
Saturday pt 
1 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 8 Oct 2006 Destroying 
a hummer 
in the south 
of Baghdad 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
statement 
for 
Saturday pt 
2 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 8 Oct 2006 An 
interview 
with the 
mujahid 
leader abu 
nasir al 
qahtani – 
God protect 
him  
 
General   mujahidin  
 8 Oct 2006 An 
invitation 
for 
Ramadan 
important 
for all 
members to 
open  
 
General Sermon on 
forgiveness 
of sins in 
Ramadan 
ritual   
 8 Oct 2006 The study 
of Islamic 
victory  
 
General Discussion 
for 
download of 
the 
mujahidin in 
Afghanistan 
 mujahidin precedent/di
rection 
 8 Oct 2006 These links 
for those 
who want 
to spread 
goodness 
and Dawa 
to God.  
 
Da’wa  agency Ummah technology 
 8 Oct 2006 A way of 
hiding from 
night 
cameras 
and infra 
red cameras 
(copied)  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency/secr
ecy 
 
 9 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
communiqu
es for 
Sunday pt 1 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 9 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
communiqu
es for 
Sunday pt 2 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 9 Oct 2006 The Islamic 
department 
presents: 
destroying 
a car 
belonging 
to the 
pagan 
guards in 
Baghdad.  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Oct 2006 Keeping to 
the straight 
and narrow 
road.  
 
Da’wa  uprightness   
 9 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Sunday 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Oct 2006 Advice 
from the 
tongue of a 
madman. 
The last 
comment 
from 
Ahmad bin 
Hanbal 
 
Da’wa Sermon 
about an 
irreligious 
man who 
learns to 
pray after 
being chided 
by a 
madman 
corruption/u
prightness/ri
tual/health 
  
 9 Oct 2006 Three 
letters that 
make hearts 
shiver 
 
Da’wa Sermon on 
death  
fear of death  
 10 Oct 2006 How to 
become an 
electronic 
mujahid 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
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 10 Oct 2006 If you want 
to become a 
rocket 
engineer 
download 
this file 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
 10 Oct 2006 A new 
active link 
to DNT 
(copied) 
 
  agency jihadi technology 
 10 Oct 2006 Al Fallujah 
lightning 
storms film  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 10 Oct 2006 Rocket 
attack on an 
American 
base in 
Khoust 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 10 Oct 2006 Effective 
moments 
from the 
life of wise 
men 
 
Da’wa On the 
redemptive 
agency of 
prayer 
ritual   
 10 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council 
statement 
for Monday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 10 Oct 2006 Dialogue 
between a 
wahhabi 
and a rafidi  
 
General   Ummah / vs 
Shiites 
direction 
 10 Oct 2006 A weakness 
of hadith 
that was 
corrected 
by Al-
Albani 
 
General the hadith is 
one that 
states - ‘who 
wishes to 
advise the 
sultan, must 
not do it 
publicly’ 
 Ummah/ vs 
authority 
direction 
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 10 Oct 2006 Lessons in 
making 
rockets 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
 11 Oct 2006 How to 
know laylat 
al qadr 
 
General  ritual   
 11 Oct 2006 Mujahidin 
statement 
for Tuesday 
pt 1 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 11 Oct 2006 A meeting 
between al-
sahab 
establishme
nt and the 
mujahid 
faruq al-
iraqi (God 
accept 
him).  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 11 Oct 2006 Media 
corporation 
presents: 
destroying 
the pagans’ 
wheeled 
vehicle in 
Baghdad 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 11 Oct 2006 Media 
corporation 
presents 
destroying 
a car 
belonging 
to the 
American 
intelligence 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 11 Oct 2006 Toward the 
summit: the 
best 99 by 
sheikh 
hamid al ali 
 
General  uprightness   
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 11 Oct 2006 Preparation 
for hacking 
the 
unbelievers 
and the 
apostates: 
the 
complete 
chapters 
 
Jihadi 
hacker 
forum 
Encyclopedi
a of Hacking 
by Irhabi 007 
agency vs kuffar/ 
apostates 
technology 
 11 Oct 2006 The orbit in 
Islam  
 
General   knowledge/c
ommunity 
direction 
(validity of 
religion)  
 11 Oct 2006 The miracle 
of the 
Quran 
 
General    direction 
 11 Oct 2006 Humour of 
the 
companions 
 
General  uprightness Ummah precedent 
 11 Oct 2006 It’s time to 
return, 
youth of the 
Umma 
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
 youth  precedent 
 11 Oct 2006 Du’a Du’a 
Du’a  
 
General  ritual   
 11 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
group 
statement 
for Tuesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 11 Oct 2006 A free 
channel for 
all 
 
Da’wa   community  
 12 Oct 2006 A study on 
how to make 
rockets 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
 12 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council 
statement 
for Tuesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 12 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Wednesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 12 Oct 2006 God is 
great enter, 
brother – 
much 
useful 
information 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 12 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council in 
Iraq: 
Giving the 
good news 
to the 
Umma on 
raising 
‘allahu 
akbar’… 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 13 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
Thursday, 
pt 1 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 13 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
Thursday pt 
2 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 13 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 13 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
Friday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 14 Oct 2006 God is the 
greatest – 
explode it 
and make 
history 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 14 Oct 2006 The media 
corporation 
of the 
mujahedin 
shura 
council 
presents the 
assassinatio
n of one of 
the spies 
 
Media   mujahidin/ 
vs 
intelligence 
progress 
 15 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
Shura 
council 
statement 
for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 15 Oct 2006 Download 
the special 
issue “the 
good news 
of victory 
of the 
falling 
hawk of the 
Islamic 
army” 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 15 Oct 2006 These are 
detailed 
maps and 
important 
for 
Mujahedin, 
especially 
rocket and 
mortar 
department 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 agency mujahidin direction 
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 15 Oct 2006 Jihad 
preparation 
episodes – 
a great 
electronic 
book  
 
Preparation  agency jihadi  
 15 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
give the 
good news 
to the 
Umma, 
announcing 
the rise of 
the state of 
Iraq  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress/dir
ection/goal 
 16 Oct 2006 Sada 
rafidayn, 
9th and 10th 
issues 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 16 Oct 2006 Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
for Sunday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 16 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Sunday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 17 Oct 2006 A word 
from the 
acting 
leader Abu 
Hafs al 
Urduni, 
God protect 
him 
 
Media   mujahidin direction 
 17 Oct 2006 Where are 
the strong 
ones, O 
ansar?  
 
General  corruption jihadi progress (-) 
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 18 Oct 2006 Al Fursan 
magazine 
the news of 
the 
mujahedin 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 18 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Tuesday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 18 Oct 2006 Absolving 
the men of 
the Islamic 
State of 
Iraq.  
 
General Letter from 
Zarqawi’s 
people 
admonishing 
the group for 
not 
supporting 
the Islamic 
State of Iraq 
 mujahidin/ 
vs division 
direction 
 18 Oct 2006 The latest 
news from 
the 
mujahedin 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 19 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Wednesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 19 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 19 Oct 2006 Statement 
by the 
media 
ministry of 
the Islamic 
State of 
Iraq for 
Wednesday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 20 Oct 2006 The video 
translation 
and the 
written one 
to the 
speech 
announcing 
the Islamic 
state of Iraq 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 21 Oct 2006 Latest news 
of the 
mujahedin 
and the 
precise date 
of Eid 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/u
mmah 
progress 
 22 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 22 Oct 2006 A statement 
from the 
media 
ministry of 
the Islamic 
state of Iraq 
for 
Saturday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 22 Oct 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Sunday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 23 Oct 2006 Here to 
congratulat
e on the 
occasion of 
Eid al Fitr 
 
General   forum/umma
h 
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 24 Oct 2006 Statement 
of the 
minister for 
media of 
the Islamic 
state of Iraq 
for Sunday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 24 Oct 2006 Baghdad 
sniper – 
part 2 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 24 Oct 2006 Second 
issue of the 
eulogy of 
al-anbar 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 24 Oct 2006 Videoed 
operations 
of the 
mujahedin 
army in 
Iraq.  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 25 Oct 2006 Media 
minister 
statement 
of the 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
for Tuesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 25 Oct 2006 An urgent 
letter that 
cannot 
under any 
circumstanc
es be 
delayed to 
the brother 
 
General A warning to 
a mujahid in 
Afghanistan 
called Nasir 
al-Qahtani to 
stop 
communicati
ng in his 
own name 
because 23 
people have 
been 
arrested 
because of 
him  
 mujahidin operational  
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 26 Oct 2006 Media 
minister 
statement 
of the 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 27 Oct 2006 The media 
ministry of 
the Islamic 
state of Iraq 
statement 
for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 27 Oct 2006 The media 
ministry for 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– a video 
release, 
emptying 
the veins of 
the 
unbelievers
.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 27 Oct 2006 media 
exuberance 
 
Media   jihadi progress (-) 
 27 Oct 2006 A vidoed 
operation 
by Ansar 
al-Sunna 
for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 29 Oct 2006 Now 10 to 
28 Islamic 
State of 
Iraq, the 
news report 
for the state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
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 29 Oct 2006 Beware of 
this word 
 
A hadeeth 
which warns 
one not to 
curse the 
age, as this 
is like 
cursing God 
 ritual  the age 
 31 Oct 2007 Al-Albani – 
what is for 
him and 
what is 
from him 
 
Religious 
library 
by Abu 
Qatada 
 jihadi direction 
 1 Nov 2006 The ruling 
on dealing 
with pagans 
for money 
 
Religious 
library 
  direction 
 1 Nov 2006 Tawhed 
book by 
Kudeir bin 
Ali al 
Khudeir 
 
Religious 
library 
  direction 
 1 Nov 2006 How to 
become a 
good 
speaker in 6 
minutes 
 
Religious 
library 
 agency Ummah  
 1 Nov 2006 How to 
explain 
hadiths (al-
Khudayr)  
 
Religious 
library 
 agency Ummah  
 1 Nov 2006 Mustadrik 
al Hakim 
with a 
summary 
by al-
Dhahabi (v 
useful) 
 
Religious 
library 
Concerning 
the sins of 
the Shiites 
(rawafid) 
 Ummah/ vs 
Shiites 
 
Appendix 1: Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 1 Nov 2006 The 
meaning of 
the phrase 
‘memoriser 
of hadith’ 
can only be 
known in 
this way 
 
Religious 
library 
 agency Ummah  
 1 Nov 2006 The voice 
of jihad 
presents al 
Hiyari’s 
instructions 
on the 
lawfulness 
of taking 
Christian 
blood in the 
peninsula.  
 
Religious 
library 
 Mujahidin direction 
 1 Nov 2006 The voice 
of jihad 
presents the 
court of the 
signs of 
victory of 
the 
celebrated 
Abu Ras al-
Dosari ‘the 
signs of 
victory’ 
 
Religious 
library 
  progress 
 2 Nov 2006 The 
separation 
of 
Mukhalifun 
(jihad 
refuseniks) 
among the 
people of 
the Sunna 
in the 
Quran.  
 
Religious 
libarary 
 Ummah/jiha
di 
direction 
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 2 Nov 2006 The Islamic 
army in 
Iraq – good 
news, the 
production 
of the 
ground to 
ground 
Abeer 
rocket.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 2 Nov 2006 the Islamic 
State of 
Iraq/ the 
news report 
of an 
operation 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 2 Nov 2006  The 
Islamic 
State of 
Iraq, the 
news report 
of Baghdad 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3 Nov 2010 Now, al-
Sahab 
presents: 
sins that 
won’t be 
erased by 
Sheikh… 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 3 Nov 2010 Important 
definitions 
 
General A selection 
of jihadi 
‘cards’  
 Jihadi  
 4 Nov 2010 Ansar al-
Sunna 
group 
statement 
for Friday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 4 Nov 2010 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 4 Nov 2010 The 
treatment 
of souls and 
reforming 
of ethics 
 
Religious 
Library 
 uprightness/
agency 
 
 5 Nov 2010 The Islamic 
state of 
Iraq/the 
report for 
Diyali state 
for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 5 Nov 2010 The Islamic 
state of 
Iraq/ the 
report for 
al-Mosul 
state for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 5 Nov 2010 Sada 
Rafidayn – 
11th issue 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 6 Nov 2010 The third 
video of 
‘al-rimah al 
awali’.  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 6 Nov 2010 Islamic 
state of Iraq 
an 
announcem
ent from 
the media 
ministry 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 6 Nov 2010 A media 
announcem
ent from Dr 
Ali Naimi, 
media 
spokesman 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/co
mmunity 
progress 
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 7 Nov 2006 The media 
voice of the 
Caliphate 
presents… 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 7 Nov 2006 Al-Jihad 
film in East 
Turkestan 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 7 Nov 2006 Communiq
ues of the 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/pr
ogress 
progress 
 7 Nov 2006 Communiq
ues of the 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
for Tuesday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 8 Nov 2006 The news 
summary of 
the 
revolutiona
ry 
battalions 
of the 20th 
for the 
month of 
Aylul 2006 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 8 Nov 2006 Special 
subject for 
brother 
Abu 
Khattab al-
Dalimi I 
would like 
all the 
brothers to 
take a look 
at. [very 
important]  
 
General A prayer 
offered 
concerning 
Abu 
Khattab’s 
absence 
from the 
forum 
ritual forum  
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 8 Nov 2006 The 
explanation 
of al-
Aaqida by 
ibn 
Aathaymin  
 
Religious 
library 
  direction 
 8 Nov 2006 The 
curriculum 
of 
preparation
s of the 
mujahedin 
for the way 
of God 
 
Religious 
Library 
Primarily 
about the 
merits of 
tawhid 
uprightness/
agency 
mujahidin direction 
 9 Nov 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Wednesday 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Nov 2006 Video 
lectures of 
Sheikh 
Abdullah 
Azzam – 
God have 
mercy on 
him  
 
Media   mujahidin direction 
 10 Nov 2006 A new 
audio from 
Sheikh Abu 
Hamza al-
Muhajir  
 
Media   jihadi direction 
 11 Nov 2006 Islamic 
state of 
Iraq, report 
of Baghdad 
state for 
Friday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 11 Nov 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Saturday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 12 Nov 2006 Wanted – 
new 
recruits to 
be trained 
as 
mujahedin 
for al 
Qaeda 
organisatio
n 
 
General  agency mujahidin direction 
 12 Nov 2006 Islamic 
state of Iraq 
report of 
Baghdad 
statement 
for 
Saturday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 12 Nov 2006 My soul is 
pushing me 
to commit 
sins – what 
do I do?  
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
 uprightness/
corruption 
 
 12 Nov 2006 The story 
of three 
questions 
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
A joke like 
tale about a 
doubter in 
God being 
slapped in 
the face  
belief/unbeli
ef 
Ummah/vs 
kuffar 
direction 
(validity of 
religion) 
 12 Nov 2006 Read it, 
because it’s 
great 
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
Story of 
redemption 
about 
drunkard 
uprightness/
corruption 
 
 12 Nov 2006 Al Battar 
military 
camp and 
how to use 
howitzers 
and 
information 
on making 
‘sawaa’.  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 12 Nov 2006 An 
invitation 
to join the 
ranks of Al 
Qaeda 
 
General  agency mujahidin  
Appendix 1: Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 12 Nov 2006 An 
intelligent 
way for cell 
members to 
communica
te  
 
Military 
strategy 
forum 
Article on 
codes 
secrecy jihadi  
 12 Nov 2006 Important – 
for 
mujahedin 
a sniper 
book (M.I.I 
sniper) 
video 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency mujahidin  
 12 Nov 2006 New 
members 
wanted to 
be prepared 
as 
mujahedin 
for the Al 
Qaeda 
organisatio
n (copied)  
 
General  agency mujahidin  
 12 Nov 2006 How to be 
a sniper 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency   
 12 Nov 2006 The library 
of Abu 
Musab al-
Suri  and 
Umar Abd 
al Hakim 
Setamariam 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 12 Nov 2006 The book 
of Sheikh 
Hassan al-
Qattani 
 
Religious 
library 
 jihadi  
 12 Nov 2006 No jihad 
without an 
Imam 
 
Religious 
Library 
 Ummah direction 
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 12 Nov 2006 The 
explanation 
of the 
summary of 
the prophet, 
peace be 
upon him 
by Imam 
al-Albani  
 
Religious 
Library 
 Ummah direction 
 12 Nov 2006 70 mistakes 
of Rabiaa al 
Madkhali 
and his 
followers 
 
Religious 
Library  
 Ummah/ vs 
Madhkalis 
direction 
 12 Nov 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Sunday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 13 Nov 2006 Islamic 
state of Iraq 
communiqu
es for 
Sunday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 13 Nov 2006 Khattab – 
God have 
mercy on 
him! 
 
General  uprightness mujahidin precedent 
 13 Nov 2006 Lectures by 
Sheikh 
Yusuf bin 
Salh al-
Ayyiri – 
God have 
mercy on 
him! 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
preparation 
 agency jihadi  
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 13 Nov 2006 Preparation 
for battle, 
preparing 
the Umma 
for Jihad, 
and for 
what 
follows 
 
Military 
strategy 
 agency jihadi/umma
h 
direction 
 13 Nov 2006 The 
developme
nt of 
satellites 
 
General   mujahidin technology/a
spiration 
 13 Nov 2006 A 
collection 
of Jihadi 
books will 
be 
continued 
by God’s 
permission 
– press and 
download – 
don’t miss 
it.  
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
  jihadi  
 13 Nov 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Monday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Nov 2006 Sada 
Rafidayn – 
12th issue  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 14 Nov 2006 Khattab 
‘the ruling 
is for God’  
 
General   mujahidin direction 
 15 Nov 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Tuesday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 15 Nov 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 
Wednesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 16 Nov 2006 Islamic 
state in Iraq 
statement 
for 
Wednesday 
for Anbar 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 16 Nov 2006 Islamic 
State of 
Iraq, 
communiqu
es for 
Wednesday
, state of 
Baghdad 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 16 Nov 2006 Islamic 
State of 
Iraq, 
communiqu
es for 
Thursday, 
state of 
Baghdad 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 7 Dec 2006 A press 
conference 
with the 
lion of 
Islam 
sheikh Abu 
Musab al-
Zarqawi 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 7 Dec 2006 Islamic 
state of Iraq 
communiqu
es for 
Wednesday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 7 Dec 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Thursday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 9 Dec 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
communiqu
es for 
Saturday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 12 Dec 2006 A new 
video of the 
blessed 
battle of 
Bildruz 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 12 Dec 2006 Film of a 
rocket 
attack on an 
American 
base in 
Kost 
region.  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 12 Dec 2006 Sada al 
Jihad, 10th 
issue 
 
  mujahidin  
 26 Dec 2006 A film of 
the 
American 
massacre at 
al-Hashim 
village 
 
Media   Ummah/Iraq
/ vs 
Americans 
oppression 
 26 Dec 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Monday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 26 Dec 2006 Jihad, Jihad 
against the 
crusading 
Ethiopia! 
 
General   mujahidin/ 
vs Ethiopia 
goal 
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 3 Jan 2007 An audio of 
the amir of 
the Islamic 
army in 
Iraq.  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 3 Jan 2007 A video 
titled: the 
one who 
was 
justified 
among 
them  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 3 Jan 2007 Eid 
greeting for 
the Ummah 
of Tawhid 
by sheikh 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri, 
God protect 
him  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 6 Jan 2007 The 
Khawaarij 
of Du’a and 
the Marja’a 
with the 
Pagans  
 
Religious 
library 
 Ummah/vs 
Murji’ites 
direction 
 6 Jan 2007 Not 
obeying the 
governor  
 
Religious 
libary 
 Ummah/ vs 
authority 
direction 
 6 Jan 2007 Rise up to 
bring 
victory to 
your 
brothers in 
Somalia, by 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri, 
God protect 
him.  
 
Media   mujahidin/S
omalis 
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 6 Jan 2007 Secrets of 
the 
Mujahedin 
– 
programme 
– the first 
Islamic 
programme 
for safe 
communica
tion 
through the 
network 
 
General  secrecy mujahidin/jih
adi 
technology 
 6 Jan 2007 Nida al 
Haqq film 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 6 Jan 2007 Raising the 
banner of 
Islam 
[book]  
 
Religious 
library 
 jihadi direction 
 6 Jan 2007 A word 
from Dr 
Ibrahim al-
Shammari, 
the official 
spokesman 
of the 
Islamic 
army  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 6 Jan 2007 The 
Zoroastrian 
fire in the 
peninsula 
 
General    Ummah/Ara
bian 
peninsula/ 
vs Iran 
 
 6 Jan 2007 A videoed 
interview 
with the 
aunt of the 
student 
Marwa al 
‘Azzawi  
 
Media Girl who was 
kidnapped 
with three 
colleagues 
by Shiite 
gangs 
 Ummah/Iraq
/ vs Shiites 
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 27 Jan 2007 An address 
to the 
Algerian 
Muslim 
people  
 
Media   Ummah/Alg
erians 
 
 27 Jan 2007 The correct 
formula  
 
Media   mujahidin direction 
 27 Jan 2007 Blowing up 
an 
American 
tank in al-
Anbar state 
 
Media    mujahidin progress 
 27 Jan 2007 The 
Muslims’ 
joy in the 
rise of the 
Muwahhidi
n state  
 
Media   Ummah/muj
ahidin 
goal/progres
s/direction 
 22 Feb 2007 For the first 
time on the 
Internet – 
new visual 
lectures my 
Sheikh 
Muhammad 
al Fazazi  
 
Media   jihadi direction 
 22 Feb 2007 A great and 
important 
speech by 
Abu 
Qatada, 
may God 
release him, 
on the 
explanation 
of a certain 
verse 
 
Meda   jihadi direction 
 22 Feb 2007 A beautiful 
website to 
increase 
your 
physical 
fitness 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency/healt
h 
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 25 Feb 2007 A word 
from 
Sheikh Abu 
Hamza al 
Muhajir – 
for your 
sake, sister 
 
Media   jihadi direction 
 25 Feb 2007  
Destruction 
of an 
American 
hummer in 
the state of 
Baghdad 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 25 Feb 2007 Detonation 
of a high 
explosive 
bomb under 
a hummer 
belonging 
to the 
guardians 
of apostasy  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 4 Mar 2007 Advancing 
the 
argument 
 
religious 
libary 
 Ummah progress 
 4 Mar 2007 Enacting 
the rulings 
of God on 
the 
members of 
the internal 
ministry in 
Dyali state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 4 Mar 2007 A video by 
Sheikh abi 
al hasan 
Rashid al 
balidi, God 
protect him  
 
Media   mujahidin direction 
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 5 Mar 2007 Sada al 
Jihad 
magazine 
the 13th 
issue 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 5 Mar 2007 Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for Sunday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 6 Mar 2007 The hunters 
of kasihat – 
film  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 11 Mar 2007 The return 
to the 
mountains 
– film, 
coming 
soon, God 
willing 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 14 Mar 2007 Islamic 
State of 
Iraq, 
statement 
for Tuesday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Mar 2007 The 
number that 
puzzled 
scientists 
 
General   Ummah technology 
(validation of 
religion) 
 9 Apr 2007 Firing 
rockets at 
an 
American 
base in 
Balwara 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 An 
operation to 
blow up an 
American 
car in the 
state of 
Lojer 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
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 9 Apr 2007 The words 
of the Amir 
al 
Mu’mineen 
 
Media   mujahidin direction 
 9 Apr 2007 The Islamic 
state of Iraq 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 Spy film – 
Quyum 
Shammari  
 
Media   mujahidin/ 
vs 
intelligence 
progress 
 9 Apr 2007 Rocket 
attack on 
the 
apostates in 
Shankay – 
film  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 Destruction 
of an 
American 
tank in 
Mosul 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 The Just 
Punishment 
– film  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 A 
collection 
of fatwas 
from 
Sheikh Abi 
Muhammad 
al Maqdisi  
 
religious 
library 
 jihadi direction 
 9 Apr 2007 Demolishin
g Al-
Salaam 
hotel – base 
of the 
guards of 
the pagans 
in Fallujah 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
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 9 Apr 2007 Abu al-
Hasan al-
Shami 
replied 9th 
April 6.36 
pm  
 
   forum  
 9 Apr 2007 Battles 
between the 
American 
forces and 
the guards 
of apostasy 
of the 
people of 
the Sunna 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 The 
complete 
security 
collection 
 
Preparation  secrecy/age
ncy 
 
 9 Apr 2007 The knights 
of the 
neglected 
duty – Al-
Zarqawi 
and the 
Afghani 
Jihad 
 
Religious 
libarary 
 mujahidin precedent/di
rection 
 9 Apr 2007 The heroic 
operation 
on the 
American 
centre in 
Kanar state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 Blowing up 
and 
American 
car in 
Khost state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 Advice to 
the sheikhs 
of Lebanon 
 
General   ummah direction 
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 9 Apr 2007 A film of 
launching 
Saqr 20 
rockets at 
an 
American 
base in 
Khost state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 9 Apr 2007 A film 
called 
‘return to 
the 
mountains’  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 9 Apr 2007 The fourth 
video of the 
Jihadi Iraqi 
Asaib  
 
Media   mujahidin  
 9 Apr 2007 Satellites, 
the media 
war and the 
Islamic 
state 
 
General   mujahidin direction/tec
hnology 
 9 Apr 2007 Videos of 
the 
mujahedin 
army in 
Iraq 
 
media   mujahidin  
 10 Apr 2007 Invitation 
to join the 
ranks of Al 
Qaeda 
 
General A 
suggestion 
that people 
form jihadi 
cells on their 
own 
agency mujahidin direction 
 12 Apr 2007 The 
strongest 
dialogue I 
have ever 
read 
between a 
mujahid 
and a 
sheikh of 
the last 
days 
(copied) 
 
general Conversatio
n in which a 
young man 
embarrasses 
a shaykh  
agency jihadi/youth direction 
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 12 Apr 2007 A series on 
how to be a 
one-man 
cell, part 
one.  
 
Jihadi Cells  agency jihadi direction 
 14 Apr 2007 Islamic 
state of Iraq 
statement 
for Friday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 2 May 2007 Jihad films 
from 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovin
a 
 
Media   mujahidin/B
osnians 
 
 16 May 2007 Rocket 
attack on 
American 
base in 
Shankay  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 16 May 2007 The Politics 
of the 
Shari’a 
(book)  
 
Media   Ummah direction 
 16 May 2007 Burning 
and 
American 
tank in 
Diyali state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 The 
Tawhed of 
Al-Saud 
and the true 
Tawhed – 
Abu Yahia 
al-Libi 
 
Media   Ummah/ vs 
authority 
direction 
 8 Jun 2007 The lovers 
of death in 
the way of 
God – a 
great film  
 
Media  uprightness mujahidin  
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 8 Jun 2007 Fath al 
Islam, give 
them 
victory, 
God have 
mercy on 
you! 
 
General   mujahidin  
 8 Jun 2007 Destroying 
a hummer 
belonging 
to the 
pagans’ 
gods in al-
Ghazzaliya 
district  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 Destroying 
one of the 
crusaders’ 
hummers, 
and the 
death of 
those in it.  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 An attack 
on the 
apostates’ 
base in 
Dabaqi in 
Khost state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 Destroying 
a striker 
class tank 
and killing 
eleven 
people  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
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 8 Jun 2007 Pictures of 
what 
remains 
from a 
super-cobra 
plane, shot 
down by 
the soldiers 
of the 
Islamic 
State 
 
Media    mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 The 
revenge 
battle for 
our 
hostages in 
Fallujah 
 
Media   mujahidin/vs 
Americans 
progress/op
pression 
 8 Jun 2007 A battle 
and the 
taking 
hostage of 
three 
American 
soldiers 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 Questions 
about the 
latest 
explosion 
in Algeria 
 
General   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 Destruction 
of al-Darak 
pagan base, 
and two 
explosions 
within the 
pagan army 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 Hunt to 
sweep a 
crusader 
landmine in 
Fallujah 
state 
 
Media   iraqi/mujahid
in/vs 
American 
oppression 
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 8 Jun 2007 The blessed 
booty that 
your 
brothers, 
the lions of 
the South 
got 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 They sold it 
for God (al-
Furqan 
productions 
presents a 
distinguishe
d video)  
 
Media  uprightness mujahidin direction 
 8 Jun 2007 Good news 
– the 
website of 
tandhim al 
Qaeda in 
the Islamic 
maghreb 
 
Gemeral    mujahidin  
 8 Jun 2007 Songs: 
Embracing 
the Martyrs 
 
Media  uprightness mujahidin  
 8 Jun 2007 Destroying 
and burning 
a hummer 
belonging 
to the 
apostate 
guards by 
detonating 
a bomb 
near Kirkuk  
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 Sniping a 
crusader in 
Diyali state 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 8 Jun 2007 Shooting at 
Balwara 
base and 
scoring a 
direct hit 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
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 8 Jun 2007 A video 
from the 
elementary 
manager of 
the 
organisatio
n of Al 
Qaeda in 
the Levant 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 8 Jun 2007 An 
explanation 
of what 
happened 
against the 
Ahl- al-
Sunna 
regions 
 
General 
forum 
 mujahidin direction 
 8 Jun 2007 A word of 
the brother 
mujahid 
Adam 
Yahia 
Gadan 
“Azzam” – 
God protect 
him  
 
Media   jihadi direction 
 13 Jun 2007 Revisions 
of Jihad – 
facts that 
cannot be 
questioned 
 
General   jihadi direction (-) 
 12 Jul 2007 Listen to 
your voice 
– by the 
mujahedin 
of Qa’adat 
al Jihad 
(the base of 
jihad) in 
Khurasan 
 
General   mujahidin  
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 12 Jul 2007 Destruction 
of a 
checkpoint 
of the 
pagan 
guards with 
casualties 
inflicted 
 
Media   mujahidin progress 
 12 Jul 2007 An ambush 
on an 
American 
caravan in 
Zabil state 
 
Media    mujahidin progress 
        
        
Abu Hafs 16 May 2007 Download 
files on 
preparation 
by the direct 
download 
links from 
the website 
of the 
brother 
OZOOO 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 16 May 2010 Film about 
the martyrs 
of Bosnia - 
the second 
release 
Media   mujahidin/B
osnians 
oppression 
 7 Jun 2007 Documentar
y film about 
sniping - 
direct link 
with high 
resolution 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency/ jihadi  
 5 Jul 2007 Website of 
the brother 
ozooo 
 
General   jihadi  
  Download 
these files - 
don’t miss 
them! 
 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
films on 
bomb 
making 
agency jihadi  
  The Global 
Islamic 
Resistance 
Call 
General  agency jihadi direction 
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Nasir al-
Tajdid 
19 Jan 2006 How we can 
destroy the 
house of al-
sa’ud 
General Strategic 
study of the 
main 
strengths of 
the House of 
Saud 
(Amrican 
support, oil, 
the state 
scholars and 
the 
intelligence) 
and how to 
strike at 
these. A 
character 
called 
‘mujahid 12’ 
writes a 
critical 
response 
below. He 
will later be 
ejected from 
the forum.  
 vs authority direction 
        
        
abo_khataa
b 
2 Aug 2006 Jihadi 
websites 
forum for the 
jihadi cell  
 jihadi  
 2 Aug 2006 real jihadi 
websites  
 
forum for the 
jihadi cell  
 jihadi  
 11 Aug 2006 urgent - the 
truth about 
the rawafid 
in the 
Lebanese 
war - this is 
the truth 
about the 
rawafid 
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs Shiites  
 2 Aug 2006 Jihadi 
websites 
forum for the 
jihadi cell  
 jihadi  
 2 Aug 2006 Abdullah al-
Janabi, a 
mujahid 
shaykh who 
seeks to 
glorify his 
religion in 
spite of the 
noses of 
traitors 
   mujahidin/ 
vs traitors 
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 2 Aug 2006 Martyrdom 
operation 
against the 
Shiite 
interior 
ministry 
forum for the 
jihadi cell  
 mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 11 Aug 2006 Jund al-
Sahaba 
group 
announces 
an explosion 
in Najaf this 
Thursday 
 
forum for the 
jihadi cell  
 mujahidin progress 
 11 Aug 2010 The pride of 
the leaders 
of the jihadi 
groups in 
Iraq - to all 
who are 
jealous in 
the cause of 
the 
mujahidin 
General   mujahidin  
 2 Aug 2006 Take care, 
who wishes 
to benefit 
from use of 
the Internet 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
Forms of 
hacking 
secrecy/age
ncy 
 technology 
 2 Aug 2006 Warning and 
look out 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
 secrecy jihadi  
 2 Aug 2006 The truths of 
their fighting 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
 vs jews  oppression 
 2 Aug 2006 Announcem
ent to all 
who care 
about the 
situation of 
the 
mujahidin 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
 jihadi  
 2 Aug 2006 Thanks and 
estimation 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
 forum  
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Muhammad 27 Jul 2006 Membership 
request 
general I am from 
Syria and 
would like to 
join an 
organisation 
of the 
mujahidin in 
Iraq, bearing 
in mind that I 
live in a 
region close 
to Iraq, 
please help 
me. 
(Muhammad 
will later 
leave after a 
spat with 
Abu Khattab 
over his post 
‘Saddam the 
hero’).  
agency forum/mujah
idin 
operational  
        
Abu 
Othman 
4 Aug 2006 News of the 
mujahidin 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 27 Jul 2006 Film from 
the 1920 
revolution 
battalions 
   mujahidin progress 
 21 Jul 2006 Military 
tactics 
Military 
Strategy 
  direction 
 16 Oct 2006 Da’wi flash - 
please 
disseminate 
Media   Ummah  
 16 Jul 2006 Websites for 
the 
mujahidin 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  jihadi  
        
        
Abou Sami 31 Aug 2006 How to 
those able to 
hack 
websites 
and destroy 
them 
General Call to 
destroy 
website 
insulting the 
prophet 
agency Ummah/ vs 
kuffar 
technology 
 2 Aug 2006 Security 
advice for 
frequenters 
of chat 
forums 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
hacker 
same 
document 
previously 
found on 
qmagreb 
secrecy jihadi technology 
 2 Aug 2006 Jihadi 
websites 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
 jihadi  
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Abu 
Khattab al-
Dalimi 
12 Aug 2006 Exalt the 
forums, for 
victory is 
near 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
   
 12 Aug 2006 To whoever 
loves news 
of the 
mujahidin 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
For whoever 
loves or will 
love 
practicing 
jihad and 
news of the 
mujahidin, 
here is a 
large 
numberof 
jihadi 
websites 
agency jihadi  
 12 Aug 2006 Have some 
of the youth 
changed?  
General About young 
people 
among the 
Arabs and 
especially 
the Iraqis 
who are 
betraying 
the call for 
jihad 
 youth/defeat
ists  
direction (-) 
 12 Aug 2006 The Shi’ites 
and Hizb-
Iblis which is 
called 
Hezbullah 
General   vs Shiites  
 12 Aug 2006 Arrived, 
arrived more 
than a 
hundred 
sound jihadi 
websites, 
pray for me 
to get the 
shahada 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
 uprightness jihadi goal 
 12 Aug 2006 Worthy 
things done 
by the 
brother Farid 
Lutfi  
General   forum  
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 12 Aug 2006 Agreement 
with the 
brother Farid 
Lutfi 
Suggestions 
and Thanks 
I agree with 
the brother 
Farid Lufti - 
the 
outstanding 
participant - 
and I 
advance an 
urgent call 
to the 
administrato
r of the 
forum to 
change his 
name from 
‘tanzim’ to 
‘al-sayf’ on 
its own so 
that we 
don’t get 
into 
problems 
 forum  
 12 Aug 2006 Request for 
an urgent 
reply from 
the 
managemen
t of the 
forum, may 
God bring 
good to you 
Suggestions 
and Thanks 
Could the 
managemen
t of the 
forum reply 
urgently to 
what I and 
the brother 
Farid Lutfi 
discussed in 
terms of 
developing 
the 
managemen
t of the 
forum? 
 forum  
 14 Aug 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna group 
kill a 
member of 
the Army of 
the Dajjal in 
Mosul  
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006 Killing a 
policeman in 
his civilian 
clothes and 
ramming his 
car in Mosul 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006 Good news  Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 14 Aug 2006 Communiqu
e of the 
Mujahidin 
Shura 
Council 
about the 
last attack of 
the rawafid 
on the 
people of 
the Sunna 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
 
 14 Aug 2006 Ansar al-
Sunna 
announces 
and attack 
on Zayuna 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006 Recent - the 
downing of 
an American 
helicopter 
on Al-Bakr 
base 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006 Recent - 
That which 
will draw 
you closer to 
the victory of 
God has 
greatened 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006 Dear brother 
Farid Lutfi 
concerning a 
request for 
pictures of 
fighting 
General These 
pictures 
were present 
on Al-Ikhlas 
network and 
I will contact 
you about 
how to 
register on 
this forum  
 community  
 14 Aug 2006 Thanks for 
brother Farid 
for making a 
graphic 
design with 
my name  
General   community  
 14 Aug 2006 The legion of 
Umar 
announce 
the 
liquidation of 
seven 
members of 
the army of 
the dajjal in 
rasafa 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
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 14 Aug 2006 The recent 
destruction 
of a hummer 
of the 
occupying 
American 
forces in 
Dulu’iyya 
General   mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006 Good news 
of victory: 
Filmed 
operations 
from the 
land of the 
two rivers 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006  The bi-
weekly news 
from the 
mujahidin 
shura 
council  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 17 Aug 2006 The legion of 
Umar 
announce 
the 
liquidation of 
seven 
members of 
the army of 
the dajjal in 
rasafa 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 17 Aug 2006 The 
mujahidin 
shura 
council 
announces 
the placing 
of an 
explosive 
package on 
a car  
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 17 Aug 2006 Come with 
me and 
witness a 
secret 
American 
report -the 
Iraqi 
resistance is 
winning  
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
Americans 
progress 
 17 Aug 2006 More than a 
thousand 
pictures of 
the 
mujahidin 
General   mujahidin  
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 18 Aug 2006 This is what 
america 
fears to 
publish 
 
 Look and 
see what we 
did to 
America - us 
lions of the 
two rivers 
 mujahidin progress 
 20 Aug 2006 Jihadi 
advice from 
the Shaykh 
Dr Mujahid 
Abdullah 
Azzam (God 
have mercy 
on him) 
   mujahidin precedent/di
rection 
 20 Aug 2006 To Saddam, 
the Hero 
general   Iraqi/Arab precedent 
 20 Aug 2006 Letter from 
the wife of 
shaykh 
Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi 
(God have 
mercy on 
him)  
 
general   mujahidin  
 22 Aug 2006 Operation of 
the Islamic 
Army in Iraq, 
Monday 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 22 Aug 2006 Urgent to 
the brother 
‘Muhammad
’  
General I swear by 
God, if you 
had a tenth 
of what 
Saddam 
Hussein had 
of manliness 
and 
courage, 
you wouldn’t 
have 
criticised the 
thread, and 
by God I 
haven’t seen 
an Arabic 
leader like 
him, even 
though he 
was 
oppressive. 
He made 
war on the 
apostate 
Shiites 
corruption forum progress (-) 
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 22 Aug 2006 download a 
film of the 
enforcement 
of the law of 
God on an 
internal 
apostate 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 killing of four 
crusaders in 
an attack on 
their patrol 
in haditha  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 injury of four 
crusaders 
from the 
explosion of 
a packet in 
haditha  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 ansar al 
Sunna the 
killing of a 
crusader at 
the hand of 
a sniper in 
haditha  
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 attack on 
the house of 
a rapist 
whom the 
crusaders 
took to their 
headquarter
s in haditha  
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
 corruption Iraqi/ vs 
crime 
 
 22 Aug 2006 attack on 
the 
headquarter
s of the 
crusaders in 
haditha, 
causing a 
great loss of 
soldiers  
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 ansar al 
sunna - the 
sniping of a 
crusader in 
the city of 
haditha  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
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 22 Aug 2006 ansar al-
sunna - 
large attack 
on the 
American 
forces in 
haditha  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 the sniping 
of two 
crusader 
soliders in 
one 
operation in 
the city of 
haditha  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 american 
dogs snap 
at the heroic 
hadithans  
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  Iraqis/ vs 
Americans 
oppression 
 22 Aug 2006 mujahidin 
shura 
council 
reports 
clashes with 
...  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 the 
mujahidin 
shura 
council 
announces 
the striking 
of the 
crusader 
headquarter
s in haditha  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 mujahdin 
shura 
council - 
firing grad 
rockets at a 
base  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 mujahedin 
Shura 
council 
announces 
the sniping 
of two 
soldiers in 
haditha 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 22 Aug 2006 heroes of 
haditha  
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  iraqi/mujahid
in 
progress 
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 23 Aug 2006 To brother 
Wajih al 
Qamar 
general talking about 
Muhammad 
and his 
dispute with 
him  
 forum progress (-) 
 23 Aug 2006 To the 
shining 
character 
Wajih al-
Qamar  
general general 
greeting  
 forum  
 23 Aug 2006 This is the 
heroism of 
the people 
of haditha - 
the lions of 
tawhid  
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  iraqis progress 
 23 Aug 2006 Explosive 
martyrdom 
operations 
by women in 
Iraq 
general   mujahidin/w
omen 
progress 
 23 Aug 2006 Announcem
ent from the 
foundation 
of Muslim 
Ulama in 
Iraq 
general   Ummah direction 
 23 Aug 2006 The 
mujahidin 
follow the 
treacherous 
battalion 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
Shiites 
progress 
 23 Aug 2006 Iraqi jihad 
units - film 
of the 
destruction 
of an 
American 
truck 
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
Americans 
progress 
 24 Aug 2006 Lions of 
tawhid 
capture and 
American 
marine and 
kill him 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Assassinatio
n of two 
members of 
the army of 
the dajjal in 
Baghdad 
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
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 25 Aug 2006 Overturning 
of a hummer 
and the 
killing of 
thee 
crusaders 
and the 
injuring of 
one in Abu 
Munisara, 
West 
Baghdad 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
crusaders 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Destruction 
of a GMC 
car of the 
American 
intelligence 
in South 
Baghdad 
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
intelligence/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Testimony to 
this 
operation 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Striking one 
of the 
military 
camps of 
the coalition 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs coalition 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Striking one 
of the bases 
of the army 
of the dajjal 
with a 
mortar 
bomb in 
Baghdad 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
Shiites 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Assassinatio
n of five 
members of 
the army of 
the dajjal in 
the 
townships of 
east 
baghdad 
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 Striking of a 
joint military 
camp of the 
occupation 
and the 
pagan guard 
in West 
Baghdad 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
occupation/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
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 25 Aug 2006 destruction 
of a car 
belonging to 
commandos 
of the army 
of the dajjal 
and the 
annihilation 
of those 
inside 
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 blow to the 
apostate 
pagan guard 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 blow to a 
joint military 
camp of the 
occupation 
and the 
pagan guard 
in yusufiyya 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
occupation/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 armed clash 
with a patrol 
of the 
occupying 
forces and 
the killing of 
two in al-
Mushahina 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
occupation/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 destruction 
the wheel of 
a hummer of 
the 
occupation 
forces in 
Baghdad 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
occupation 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 destruction 
of the wheel 
of a hummer 
of the 
occupying 
forces and 
the 
annihilation 
of those 
inside it in 
Haswa 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
occupation 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 destruction 
of a nissan 
car 
belonging to 
the pagan 
guard, and 
the 
destruction 
of those 
inside it 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/vs 
apostates 
progress 
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 25 Aug 2006 assassinatio
n of eight 
members of 
the army of 
the dajjal  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 ansar al-
sunna, 
detonation 
of a car 
bomb 
targetting a 
transport of 
the guards 
in south 
baghdad 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs authority 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 ansar al-
sunna, 
detonation 
of a car 
bomb 
targetting a 
police patrol 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs authoirty 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 striking of a 
base of the 
army of the 
dajjal with a 
120 mortar 
rounds, 
townships of 
south 
Baghdad 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs shiites 
progress 
 25 Aug 2006 striking one 
of the bases 
of the pagan 
guards with 
c5 rockets, 
south 
baghdad  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 26 Aug 2006 announceme
nts of the 
rashidin 
army  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 26 Aug 2006 suicide 
operation by 
the 
mujahidin 
shura 
council  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 26 Aug 2006 mujahidin 
shura 
council in 
Iraq 
announces 
some 
operations in 
Ramadi  
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 27 Aug 2006 urgent  - 
names of 
some people 
cooperating 
with the 
treacherous 
battalion in 
the district 
of al-jihad 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  vs treachery  
 2 Sep 2006 the best 
operations 
of faylaq 
‘umar 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 2 Sep 2006 the 
wounding of 
a leader of 
the army of 
the dajjal 
and the 
killing of 
three in the 
pagan army 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 15 Jul 2007 excuse me 
for the 
absence. I 
have 
returned to 
you 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  forum  
 29 Jul 2007 you shall set 
up  
general God willing, 
and with 
God’s help 
we shall 
soon set out 
to develop 
the forum. 
and change 
some 
hanging 
symbols if 
we contact 
the 
administrato
r we shall 
increase the 
number of 
those 
present. 
Excuse me 
for my 
absence.  
 forum progress 
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 29 Jul 2007 signature 
request from 
my dear one 
 
 to every 
dear one 
who can 
make a 
signature I 
hope that 
you will 
make one 
for me for I 
have 
returned to 
the forum 
and I hope 
that we shall 
be in 
contact.  
 forum  
 29 Jul 2007 Request of 
the 
managemen
t  
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
God give 
you strength 
for you 
eagerness 
over the 
forum  
 forum  
 30 Jul 2007 The truth of 
the study in 
Iraq 
concerning 
discriminatio
n by group  
general   Iraqi oppression 
        
        
aicha 4 Oct 2006 I want a film 
about how 
to make a 
car bomb  
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
        
rtj forever  27 Sep 2006 I suggest 
that we 
introduce 
instant 
messenger 
so that we 
can reply, 
and this will 
encourage 
members to 
participate 
   forum technology 
        
Al Gharib 14 Jan 2007 Now! A new 
release from 
the forum 
‘Islamic 
future’ - “O 
martyr!’  
media   jihadi  
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 12 Jan 2007 A 
conversation 
with shaykh 
Abdul Qadir 
‘Ali ‘Umar, 
assistant 
leader to the 
islamic 
courts 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
An interview 
with the 
deputy 
leader of the 
Islamic 
Courts 
movement in 
Somalia 
about 
progress 
made by the 
movement  
 mujahidin  
 10 Jan 2007 remaining 
steady in the 
rank  
Military 
Strategy 
 uprightness  direction/pre
cedent 
 10 Jan 2007 good news 
about the 
bringing to 
justice of a 
wrongdoer - 
urgent news 
from the 
Islamic State 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 10 Jan 2007 series on the 
preparation 
of a Muslim 
generation  
general virtuous 
qualities of 
the true 
believer 
uprightness Ummah  
        
        
Muhibb al-
Mustahil 
9 Sep 2006 Rare release 
from the 
salafist 
group for 
preaching 
and combat 
media   mujahidin  
 14 Nov 2006 The raid of 
Bak in the 
province of 
Khost  
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Nov 2006 Reply 
concerning 
the 
massacre of 
Bayt Hanun  
   Ummah oppression 
 9 Nov 2006 Series on 
the Arab 
martyrs in 
Iraqi 
Kurdistan 
general release by 
Ansar al-
Islam 
 Arab/Iraqi oppression 
        
        
        
Hussambik 26 Jun 2007 sections 
from death 
Religious 
library 
 fear of death  
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 26 Jun 2007 The islamic 
fleet in the 
battle of 
Dhat al-
Suwari 
Military 
Strategy 
 Ummah precedent 
 29 Mar 2007 A look into: 
a summary 
of the 
politics of 
wars 
   direction 
        
iocaws 29 Nov 2006 Communicat
e with others 
instantly 
using MSN 
Messenger 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
hacker 
  jihadi technology 
        
        
Al-Jihad Al-
Islami 
17 Apr 2007 request of 
the 
managemen
t  
suggestions 
and 
complaints 
to make the 
forum 
attractive 
and draw 
people in, 
please could 
the 
managemen
t add the 
following as 
soon as 
possible: 1. 
private 
messenger 
reply 2. 
coloured 
writing - and 
could it be 
bold, not 
light. This is 
a charge 
from the 
lessening of 
peace, and 
peace upon 
you 
 forum technology 
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  suggestion suggestions 
and 
complaints 
i would like 
to suggest 
that every 
time we add 
knowledge 
that we 
grace the 
media of the 
Ummah with 
matters and 
interpretatio
ns that 
protect the 
mujahidin. 
An extensive 
conversation 
follows. 
Some 
suggest the 
idea is 
impractical if 
it would 
apply to 
every post. 
Wajih al-
Qamar 
wants to set 
up a special 
forum solely 
for earnest 
and 
uncensored 
conversation 
on such 
topics.  
 forum/jihadi direction 
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Khattab al-
Yamani 
31 Dec 2006 Translation 
project  
Jihadi 
hacker 
forum 
a project has 
come from 
our brothers 
of the 
English 
language 
concerning a 
very 
dangerous 
American 
encyclopedi
a of 
computer 
sciences. 
We are 
looking for 
people to 
translate it. 
We will put 
out a part of 
it every 
week. I 
came to this 
forum 
because it is 
little 
publicised 
and it 
supports 
jihad. Polite 
responses. 
Finally Abu 
Hasan al-
Shami posts 
saying, 
please show 
us this 
encyclopedi
a, and we 
shall try to 
help in 
translating it, 
but it seems 
that this 
project has 
stopped 
rather than 
started.  
 forum/jihadi technology/
operational 
        
Khadim al-
Mujahidin  
1 Oct 2006 Film of 
weapons of 
mass 
destruction 
in Fallujah 
media   Iraqi/Arab/U
mmah 
oppression 
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MSK 18 Jul 2006 Request to 
join  
 I want to join 
you and 
train and 
practice 
jihad in the 
path of God. 
What must I 
do? But 
there is one 
problem. I 
am Egyptian 
and I don’t 
know iff 
(‘iza, spelled 
with a zayn) 
there is a 
branch of 
the 
organisation 
in Egypt. 
Munadhim 
al-Sayf says: 
‘I support 
you in your 
request. We 
await a reply 
from the 
brother 
‘tantheemals
aif’ 
Tantheemals
aif iinvites 
him - if he 
wants more 
information - 
to contaxct 
him by 
email. 
‘Meda’ 
suggests 
that he is in 
the 
intelligence.  
agency jihadi/forum  
        
        
        
Munadhim 
al-Sayf  
19 Jul 2006 Great flash 
for knowing 
about the 
prophet in 
several 
languages  
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
 Ummah  
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 19 Jul 2006 How to 
spread Islam 
merely at the 
touch of a 
button - with 
explanation 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
Imagine that 
there is a 
person who 
prays and 
fasts and 
remembers 
God and on 
the day of 
judgement 
you get the 
same 
benefits as 
he does. He 
is fasting on 
Thursday 
and 
Monday, 
and you are 
eating and 
drinking. He 
is up at 
night, and 
you are 
sleeping. He 
gives money 
to the point 
of trouble for 
himself, and 
you hold on 
to yours. He 
is serious 
about his 
religion, and 
you are 
frivolous. 
(The idea 
being that 
by doing 
da’wa on the 
Internet, you 
can get the 
same 
benefits).  
agency/ritual Ummah  
 19 Jul 2006 Very strong 
flash in 
English 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
 Ummah  
 19 Jul 2006 Some ways 
of 
communicati
ng da’wa by 
email  
 English 
phrases for 
da’wa  
agency Ummah  
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Usama 
Faris 
18 Oct 2006 Urgent - 
jihadi cell, 
from 
Palestine 
 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
cell  
For our 
beloved 
brothers - 
knights 
during the 
day, monks 
during the 
night’- an 
invitation to 
youth in 
Palestine to 
form a new 
group to be 
called the 
‘tawhid 
battalions’.  
 jihadi/youth direction 
        
        
Ridwan 
Abdulhakim 
8 Oct 2006 Who has the 
right to 
legislate in 
Arabic 
constitutions 
- Jordan, 
Egypt, 
Sudan?  
 
General Quotes 
sections of 
the 
constitutions 
of various 
Arabic 
countries 
giving the 
right to 
legislate to 
other than 
God 
 Ummah/ vs 
authority 
direction 
        
        
        
Abu al-
Hassan al-
Shami 
7 Apr 2007 Physical 
training in 
the 
prophetical 
Sunnah 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency/healt
h 
Ummah precedent 
 7 Apr 2007 Military 
matters in 
the Qur’an 
Military 
Strategy 
 Ummah precedent 
 7 Apr 2007 Military 
politics in 
the 
prophetic 
era 
Military 
Strategy 
 Ummah precedent 
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 5 Apr 2007 Elements of 
victory and 
its reasons 
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
The 
elements 
are: (1) That 
the 
mujahidin 
remain 
faithful to 
their religion; 
that the 
energy of 
the Ummah 
be 
mobilised. 
The first aim 
of this 
should be to 
terrorise the 
enemy of 
God - a 
policy which 
has many 
benefits for 
the Ummah, 
such as 
making the 
unbelievers 
unwilling to 
invade the 
Dar al-Islam 
 mujahidin direction 
        
        
        
Sayf al-
Islam 
13 Mar 2007 The 
Mujahidin 
brothers in 
Egypt 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 7 Feb 2007 Urgent call  suggestions 
and 
complaints 
call to set up 
a special 
forum for the 
mujahidin in 
egypt. WQ 
replies that 
the forum is 
not for Iraq 
lone but for 
all the 
muslims, 
and that 
communiqu
es from the 
mujahidin in 
Egypt will be 
welcome in 
the 
‘communiqu
es’ section.  
 forum/mujah
idin 
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 18 Jul 2006 New cell forum for the 
jihadi cell  
announceme
nt of the 
creation of a 
new cell - 
the Salah al-
Din Victory 
Battalions 
 mujahidin  
 3 Feb 2007 Mujahidin 
brothers kill 
five 
american 
soldiers 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 3 Feb 2007 Mujahidin 
brothers kill 
ten partisans 
of the army 
of the dajjal 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 3 Feb 2007 Communiqu
e of the 
Mujahidin 
brothers in 
the land of 
the two 
rivers 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Aug 2006 A snippet 
about the 
party for the 
protection of 
Islam 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
 11 Aug 2006 Communiqu
e of the 
party for the 
protection of 
Islam 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 19 Aug 2006 One of the 
websites of 
the victory 
battalions of 
Salah al-Din 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin  
  Why did 
Usama bin 
Ladin (God 
protect him) 
cry?  
 same story 
posted by 
WQ, above 
sensitivity mujahidin oppression 
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Tantheemal
saif 
10 Aug 2006 warning to 
the forum 
general the member 
mujahid 12 
was ejected 
from the 
forum, and 
he is a spy, 
of the 
general 
researchers. 
And if you 
are not a 
real Muslim 
you are 
against us 
and against 
the jihad, 
and you are 
a dog of 
dogs.  
 forum  
 7 Aug 2006 explosive 
chemicals  
Encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
 27 Feb 2007 from the 
mujahidin 
battalions in 
eritrea 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
Ummah 
 
 7 Dec 2006 Thaaaaaaan
ks brother 
al-
Muhannad 
General thanks for a 
signature 
 forum  
 31 Oct 2006 New section  religious 
library 
by special 
demand of 
Wajih al-
Qamar, who 
is 
extravagantl
y grateful.  
 forum  
 1 Aug 2006 Studies in 
training 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 1 Aug 2006 correct 
information 
about 
explosives  
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
 26 Jul 2006 the 
telescopic 
launcher on 
an RPG 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi technology 
 23 Jul 2006 series on 
preparation 
for jihad 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 20 Jul 2006 additional 
information 
on jihadi 
preparation 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 16 Jul 2006 destruction 
of a hummer 
in north 
baghdad  
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 14 Jul 2006 fifth 
complete 
encyclopedi
a of 
preparation 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
 16 Jul 2006 how to make 
an explosive 
belt 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency jihadi  
        
Al-
Muhannad 
8 Nov 2006 The 
Ummayad 
state 
 
general   Ummah precedent (-) 
 8th 
November 
2006 
Developing 
the 
effectivenes
s of tanks 
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/te
chnology 
 9th 
November 
2006 
How 
creatures 
worship 
their God 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
 Ummah validity of 
religion 
 8th 
November 
2006 
Military 
courage 
 
Military 
Strategy 
types of 
courage/milit
ary courage 
in Islam/how 
you can be 
courageous 
uprightness Ummah precedent 
 8th 
November 
2006 
The 
strategic 
principles 
of 
managing 
cooperative 
modern 
wars 
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/di
rection 
 10th 
November 
2006 
The role of 
the true 
believer in 
modern 
soldiery 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 Ummah aspiration/di
rection 
 10th 
November 
2006 
Islamic 
military 
doctrine 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 Ummah precedent/di
rection 
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 10th 
November 
2006 
The 
benefits to 
be derived 
from the 
chapters of 
the Quran 
 
religious 
library 
 ritual   
 10th 
November 
2006 
The 
soldier’s 
bequest and 
human 
rights 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 Ummah precedent 
 13th 
November 
2006 
Electronic 
military 
planes  
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/te
chnology 
 13th 
November 
2006 
Techniques 
in guerrilla 
warfare 
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/di
rection 
 13th 
November 
2006 
Finding the 
enemy 
before 
battle 
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/di
rection 
 13th 
November 
2006 
Cannon in 
wars 
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/te
chnology 
 13th 
November 
2006 
Land radar 
– technique 
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/te
chnology 
 13th 
November 
2006 
The 
fighting 
effectivenes
s of drones 
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/di
rection 
  14th 
November 
2006 
A new song 
– Baghdad 
sniper – 
great zeal 
 
media   mujahidin progress 
 15th 
November 
2006  
Remaining 
in the ranks  
 
 uprightness  precedent 
 15th 
November 
2006  
Modern 
leaders and 
leadership 
 
  agency  aspiration/di
rection 
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 17th 
November 
2006 
Leadership 
in 
preparing 
for war 
 
  agency  aspiration/di
rection 
 18th 
November 
2006 
Neglecting 
a promise 
to an 
enemy if 
you fear 
that they 
are 
cheating 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 mujahidin direction 
 23rd 
November 
2006 
Islamic 
army of 
Iraq accepts 
responsibili
ty for attack 
on green 
zone 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 23rd 
November 
2006 
The latest 
news from 
Chechnya 
by the 
voice of the 
Caucasus.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 23rd 
November 
2006 
Al 
Mahmudiah 
witness the 
killing of 
four 
American 
soldiers 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 23rd 
November 
2006 
A violent 
melee 
between the 
resistance 
and the 
occupation 
in Ramadi 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 23rd 
November 
2006 
A huge 
explosion 
shakes the 
Syrian-Iraqi 
border 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 23rd 
November 
2006 
Taliban 
attacks kill 
six Afghani 
police in 
Kandahar.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 23rd 
November 
2006 
In spite of 
the 
occupation 
the 
resistance 
destroy 
four tanks 
in al-
Haditha 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 23rd 
November 
2006 
The 
receptionist 
of Hell is 
spreading 
horror in 
Tel Afar.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
  24th 
November 
2006 
Al 
Mujahedin 
operations 
in Gaza, 
Palestine – 
films 
 
communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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  24th 
November 
2006 
Download 
the wishes 
of the 
shahida of 
al-qassam, 
Umm 
Muhammad 
with a 
video of an 
operation 
that 
involves 
the 
destruction 
of a tank.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/w
omen 
progress 
 25th 
November 
2006 
The 
American 
intelligence 
in the 
streets of 
Baghdad 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
video 
release by 
al-Furqan 
 vs 
Americans/v
s intelligence 
oppression 
  27th 
November 
2006 
Expectation
s of 
spontaneou
s American 
exit soon 
from Iraq.  
 
general 
forum 
  progress  
 29th 
November 
2006 
Video of an 
F16 plane 
being 
destroyed 
 
forum for the 
jihadi cell  
  progress 
 1st 
December 
2006 
And in hell 
we have 
many men 
and jinn 
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
 fear of death  
 1st 
December 
2006 
Aspects of 
rocket 
system 
developme
nt, and new 
generations 
of the 
technology 
 
General  agency   
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 2nd of 
December 
2006 
First issue 
of al-
mujahid al-
taqqi 
magazine 
 
media   mujahidin  
 3rd 
December 
2006 
God is 
great – the 
killing of 
approximat
ely 1,500 – 
2,000 
American 
soldiers 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
give the 
good news 
to the 
patient 
people 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– report the 
news of Al-
Anbar state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– a blessed 
martyrdom 
operation 
against a 
building… 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– blessed 
martyrdom 
operation 
against the 
pagan 
guards 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group ‘the 
start of the 
victory 
campaign 
for our 
teachers 
and 
students’ 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna ‘the 
killing of 
one of the 
members of 
the army of 
Dajjal who 
had been 
responsible 
for killing 
students…’ 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
Emirate of 
Afghanista
n website 
and voice 
of the 
Caucasus 
 
Media   mujahidin  
 3rd 
December 
2006 
Download 
film… an 
armed 
confrontati
on in Diyali 
region 
against the 
pagan 
guards 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 4th 
December 
2006 
The jihadist 
groups of 
Iraq 
statement 
for 4th 
December 
2006  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 4th 
December 
2006 
The Islamic 
State of 
Iraq – news 
report for 
Baghdad 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 4th 
December 
2006 
The Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– a blessed 
martyrdom 
operation 
against… 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 4th 
December 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group/ 
arresting 
and killing 
a member 
of the army 
of Dajjal in 
Qada.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 4th 
December 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group 
attacking 
the council 
of Diyali  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs authority 
progress 
 4th 
December 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group 
attacking 
and 
confronting 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs Shiites 
progress 
 5th 
December, 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
for 5th 
December 
2005 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 5th 
December, 
2006 
Islamic 
state of 
Iraq, news 
report for 
Baghdad 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 6th 
December 
2006 
Download/t
he army of 
Abu Bakr 
executes 
three 
apostates as 
revenge for 
the 
Palestinian 
women in 
Baghdad.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs apostates 
progress 
 6th 
December 
2006 
Statement 
‘70’ the 
armed 
forces 
‘ammuriya’ 
news.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 6th 
December 
2006 
The 
resistance 
increase 
their  
operations 
and 
replenish 
Hell with 
15 ‘alj.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 15 Apr 2007 Baghdad 
under fire/2 
‘6th 
December 
2006’ 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/Ira
qi 
oppression 
 8 Apr 2007 An 
electronic 
jihad group 
invites you 
to join  
 
Forum for 
the jihadi 
hacker 
 agency jihadi technology 
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 4 Apr 2007 Umm 
Ibrahim 
pays the 
dowry of a 
Huri for her 
son – at a 
cost of 
10,000 
dinars 
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
The story 
concerns a 
woman in 
Basra, 
facing 
invaders, 
who hears a 
sermon 
about the 
beauties of 
the hur 
al’ayn and 
therefore 
promises her 
son, and 
pays for his 
equipping.  
 mujahidin/U
mmah/wom
en 
hur al ‘ayn 
 17 Mar 2007 An 
operation, 
unique of 
its kind, 
destroying 
an 
American 
tank in al-
Anbar state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 17 Feb 2007 A video 
called – the 
losers’ 
harvest in 
the land of 
the two 
rivers 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 15 Feb 2007 The new 
Quran in 
Kuwait – a 
huge 
disaster, 
please enter 
 
Forum for 
Da’wa to 
God 
A piece 
about the 
‘true Furqan’ 
 Ummah direction (-) 
 7 Feb 2007 Two 
examples 
of how 
leadership 
is 
connected 
to 
obedience 
 
Military 
Strategy 
Islamic 
military 
history 
about 
Usama bin 
Zayd against 
the Romans 
agency Ummah precedent/di
rection 
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 4 Feb 2007 Command 
and control 
in Islamic 
battles  
 
Military 
Strategy 
More Islamic 
military 
history. 
‘Many have 
tried to 
suppress 
Islamic 
military 
knowledge 
and prevent 
it from being 
revived, and 
refused its 
being 
followed by 
Arabs and 
Muslims in 
all spheres - 
even that of 
military 
thought’... 
However, 
Islam 
originally 
had a 
comprehensi
ve military 
system 
 Ummah precedent 
 4 Feb 2007 The good 
characterist
ics of Abu 
Bakr al-
Saddiq, 
God be 
pleased 
with him 
 
Religious 
library 
 uprightness Ummah precedent 
 1 Feb 2007 On the 
same day a 
number of 
American 
intelligence 
operatives 
are killed 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
intelligence 
progress 
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 1 Feb 2007 Killing of 
more than 
10 
members of 
the 
American 
intelligence 
and the 
burning of 
more than 3 
cars 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
americans/ 
vs 
intelligence 
progress 
 1st February 
2007 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– news 
report for 
al-Ramadi 
city  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 1st February 
2007 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– news 
report for 
the south 
region –
Baghdad 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 1st February 
2007 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– news 
report for 
Fallujah 
state  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 1st February 
2007 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– news 
report for 
The city of 
Salah al 
deen 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 1st February 
2007 
Islamic 
state of 
Iraq, the 
spoils of 
the 
operations 
of the 
battalion of 
the mother 
of 
believers.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
  16th 
December 
2006 
Asaib al 
Iraq al 
Jihadiyya 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
  16th 
December 
2006 
State… 
Taliban – 
the news 
report for 
Friday  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
  16th 
December 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
group  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 15th 
December 
2006 
The Islamic 
Army in 
Iraq 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 15th 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
news report 
for 
Baghdad 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 11th 
December 
2006 
The 
direction of 
rocket 
developme
nt 
 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency  technology 
 15th 
December 
2006 
Lasers general an article on 
the physics 
of lasers and 
their 
possible 
battlefield 
uses  
 progress/tec
hnology 
aspiration/te
chnology 
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  9th 
December 
2006 
A statement 
regarding 
the ‘failure 
report’ 
issued by 
Beaker 
Hamilton’s 
committee.  
 
   vs 
Americans 
progress 
  9th 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
– 
condemnati
on of the 
crusaders’ 
crime in 
Al-Ishaqi.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs crusaders 
oppression 
  9th 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
news for 
Salah al-
Din state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
  9th 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
congratulat
es the 
victories of 
brothers in 
the Islamic 
courts 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 7th 
December 
2006 
Preventing 
the murder 
of Abi 
Daraa 
 
General About the 
kidnapping 
and rescue 
of an Iraqi 
Sunni  
 vs shiites progress 
 7th 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
State of 
Iraq news 
report for 
Baghdad 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 7th 
December 
2006 
The 
American 
holocaust 
in 
Khurasan 
 
media   mujahidin/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 7th 
December 
2006 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
statement 
6th 
December 
2006  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 7th 
December 
2006 
Islamic 
state of Iraq 
news report 
for 
Baghdad 
state 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 4th April 
2007 
Principles 
of 
engineered 
barriers 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 agency  technology 
  1st April 
2007 
A statement 
by the 
national 
Iraqi 
Islamic 
resistance 
office 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 21st 
February 
2007 
Instruction 
videos on 
bomb 
making 
 
encyclopedi
a of 
Preparation 
 agency  technology 
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  9th 
December 
2006 
Netwar in 
the digital 
battlefield  
 
Military 
Strategy 
essentially 
compiled 
from 
American 
ideas on the 
topic - 
‘today, the 
superiority 
of an army is 
measured 
not in terms 
of its 
firepower, 
but in terms 
of the 
circulation of 
information 
within it’ 
  aspiration/di
rection 
 28th 
November 
2006 
Firepower 
resources in 
ground 
forces 
 
 military 
strategy 
 aspiration/di
rection 
  25th 
November 
2006  
Time and 
its 
importance 
in military 
forces.  
 
   aspiration/di
rection 
 21st 
November 
2006 
The 
electronic 
war and 
IFF 
 
Military 
Strategy 
IFF = 
identification
, friend or 
foe 
  aspiration/te
chnology 
 18th 
November 
2006 
Aiming 
plastic 
rockets 
 
general  agency  technology 
 16 Nov 2006 The art of 
modern 
leadership 
 
Military 
Strategy 
 agency  aspiration/di
rection 
 16 Nov 2006 The 
effectivenes
s of 
technology 
on military 
strategy  
 
Military 
Strategy 
  aspiration/te
chnology 
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Farid Lutfi 14th 
December 
2006 
Sixteen 
names of 
returned 
hostages.  
 
general   Iraqi/Arab vs 
Shiites 
 
 30th 
November 
2006 
Film… the 
crusaders’ 
occupation 
of the East 
of the 
Peninsula 
 
media   vs crusaders oppression 
 26th 
November 
2006 
Photos of 
the three 
martyrs 
 
general   Iraqi/Arab/U
mmah 
oppression/
progress 
 26th 
November 
2006 
Labayk 
presents: 
photograph
s of the 
three 
martyrs 
 
general   Iraqi/Arab/U
mmah 
oppression/
progress 
 25th 
November 
2006 
Encouragem
ent 
 
general   -  
 7th 
November 
2006  
Series on 
the Arab 
martyrs in 
Iraqi 
Kurdistan 
 
general   Iraqi/Arab/ oppression/
progress 
 7th 
November 
2006 
A word 
from the 
leader 
Abdullah 
Turki God 
protect him 
for 
Muslims in 
Turkey 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin direction 
 17th August 
2006 
Two new 
banners for 
the forum  
 
general   forum  
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 17th August 
2006 
The new 
banner for 
the forum  
 
general   forum  
 15th August 
2006 
Satan’s ID 
card 
 
general   forum humour 
 15th August 
2006 
Some signs  
 
general Signs of the 
coming of 
the Dajjal 
 Ummah direction/ap
ocalypse 
 15th August 
2006 
A Shiite 
returns to 
the true 
Islam 
 
general   Ummah/ vs 
Shiites 
progress 
 15th August 
2006 
The idol 
 
general by ‘Abu 
Basir’  
ritual (-) Ummah  
 15th August 
2006 
The 
manners of 
the mujahid 
 
general historical 
examplar 
from the 
time of Umar 
bin al-
Khattab 
uprightness/
agency 
Ummah precedent 
 15th August 
2006 
Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
for Monday 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
 15th August 
2006 
Within the 
series of the 
American 
holocaust 
in 
Khurasan 
three 
rockets 
on… 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin/ 
vs 
Americans 
progress 
 15th August 
2006 
Mujahedin 
shura 
council 
statement 
for 
Monday, 
19.7.1426. 
(13.08.06) 
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
  mujahidin progress 
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 15th August 
2006 
Ijtihad on 
seeking 
jihad 
 
general quotations 
such as 
‘doing ribat 
for a night is 
better than 
praying 
laylat al-qadr 
by the black 
stone’, or 
‘doing ribat 
for a night is 
better than 
the world 
and all that 
is in it’ 
ritual Ummah direction 
 15th August 
2006 
Reasons for 
defeating 
enemies 
 
general god 
abandons  
the one who 
doesn’t 
pray. 
‘between the 
man and the 
unbeliever is 
the 
abandoning 
of prayer’ 
various 
similar 
maxims 
 Ummah direction 
 15th August 
2006 
One of the 
bases of 
takfir 
 
general   Ummah/vs 
Kuffar 
 
 15th August 
2006 
Belief and 
its contrast 
 
general on avoiding 
shirk 
 Ummah/vs 
Kuffar 
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 15th August 
2006 
The three 
foundations 
and their 
proofs 
 
general the three 
foundations 
are: ‘to know 
that God 
created us 
and raised 
us up, to 
know that he 
does not 
accept 
association 
with other 
than Him, 
and to know 
that the one 
who obeys 
the prophet 
and unifies 
God must 
only 
associate 
with others 
who do so. 
 Ummah/vs 
Kuffar 
 
 15th August 
2006 
The 
importance 
of the saved 
sect 
 
general by Abu 
Qatada 
 Saved 
Sect/vs 
Kuffar 
 
 15th August 
2006 
What do 
they hate 
about us? 
 
general piece about 
al- wala wa 
al-bara 
 Saved 
Sect/vs 
Kuffar 
 
 15th August 
2006 
The 
Muslims’ 
duty 
towards 
their 
hostages 
 
general story about 
Abu Bakr 
 Ummah precedent/di
rection 
 15th August 
2006 
Our advice 
to 
mujahedin 
 
general a piece on 
excess in 
takfir 
 mujahidin/U
mmah 
direction (-) 
 15th August 
2006 
When 
enemies 
surrender  
 
general historical 
examplar 
 Ummah/jiha
di 
precedent 
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 15th August 
2006 
Discoverin
g  some of 
the rules on 
the zenith 
of Islam 
[ie, jihad] 
 
general from 
tawhed.com 
 Ummah/jiha
di 
precedent/di
rection 
 15th August 
2006 
The truth 
about the 
rafida in 
countries of 
tawhid 
 
general anti the 
shiites in 
Saudi Arabia 
 vs Shiites  
 13th August 
2006 
Please - an 
exhortation 
to stop 
attacks 
general request to 
change 
name of the 
forum from 
‘organisation 
of the 
sword’ to 
‘the sword’ 
 forum  
 23rd July 
2006 
A film 
showing 
the 
suffering of 
the 
Chechens 
 
media   Ummah/ 
Chechens 
oppression 
 18th July 
2006 
Physical 
exercise 
before jihad 
– by the 
mujahid 
sheikh, the 
shahid, 
yusuf.  
 
general  agency jihadi  
 23rd July 
2006 
Very 
important – 
please, it is 
seriously 
dangerous, 
so read it 
and send it 
to others.  
 
Communiqu
es and 
Reports 
a piece 
about the 
‘true Furqan’ 
 Ummah direction (-) 
 16th August 
2006 
Give me 
your 
opinion 
 
general about some 
flash 
banners 
 forum  
Appendix 1: Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
 Date  Subject Chatroom Comment Individual Community Cosmos 
 27 Jul 2006 An urgent 
report  
 
general on crimes of 
Iran in Iraq 
 vs Shiites oppression 
 
Explanation of codes: 
 
Secrecy refers to information on how to carry out activities without being monitored or discovered. 
Posts dealing with issues of secrecy may be understood as reinforcing the sense of an elite, 
underground community, of its opposition to authority and of the possibility of individual agency - 
see below.  
 
Agency Refers to posts which emphasise the potential for an individual to make a difference 
through his or her actions - whether by preparing for jihad, carrying out a violent act, learning how 
to spread Islam through da’wa or acquiring more general abilities, eg leadership skills.  
 
Uprightness refers to a certain type of moral quality which can best be defined through that with 
which it is constantly opposed - giving in to the temptations of comfort and popular media 
entertainment such as music or celebrity culture. Occasionally, a post deals purely with the opposite 
of uprightness - aimlessness.  
 
Fear of Death applies where a post deals specifically with the premature death of an individual, with 
the horrors of death, with the fact of people being generally afraid of death, or with the brevity of 
life. It does not necessarily apply to posts about hellfire or judgement day in general, where a larger 
moral point is intended.  
 
Health likewise applies specifically where a post deals with ways of being healthy, with ‘Islamic’ 
health issues where the point seems mainly the medicine itself rather than the moral virtue of, say, 
early Muslims.  
 
Ritual applies where the concern is with a religious practice (eg du‘a) where the concern is not with 
some wider moral point that might apply across religions and cultures (eg, patience or 
steadfastness), but rather with specifically (and perhaps mechanically) fulfilling a ritual obligation 
simply in order to acquire divine ‘benefits’ (hasanat).  
 
Ummah applies where the community - or one of the communities being referred to seems to be 
that of Muslims as a whole 
 
Mujahidin applies where the reference is to actively operating organisations of fighters.  
 
Jihadi applies where the reference is to the community of those who support the mujahidin, without 
being directly engaged in the action themselves 
 
Forum applies where the reference is to the community of the forum itself.  
 
Versus - the above ‘in-groups’ are constantly faced with opponents of various kinds. These are 
broadly replicated in the codes. ‘Shi’ites’ is used in place of rawafid. ‘Apostate’ is used both for 
murtadd and for wathini, as this latter term is consistently applied not to actual ‘pagans’ but to Iraqi 
governmental forces, where it seems to be interchangeable with the former.  
 
Coding Sheet  for Al-Sayf Posts with Explanations Below 
Cosmos The term ‘cosmos’ as a whole refers to the overall justifications for the community’s 
existence and its activities, whether actually ‘cosmic’ (eg, vindications of Islam with reference to 
scientific findings about the universe) or ‘strategic’ discussions about the jihad.  
 
Progress is used for any post which implies that the mujahidin have actually achieved something 
positive (eg, launching a mortar attack on an al-Mahdi Army compound).  
 
Direction is used where a post seems concerned with the broader picture of the state of the jihad 
movement as a whole.  
 
Goal is used where an end state for the jihad is mentioned 
 
Precedent is used for a post which invokes Islamic or mujahidin history with lessons for the present 
 
Aspiration is used for a post which references strategic or advanced technological knowledge which 
seems not to be immediately relevant to the condition of the jihad movement, but which may inspire 
a sense of military fantasy regarding its possible future development.  
 
Oppression relates to posts concerned with the actions of external forces against the various in-
groups (Ummah, mujahidin etc.)  
 
Technology relates to the positioning of the various in-groups in relation to the field of technology - 
its mastery and their familiarity or ability to acquire familiarity with it.  
 
Natural Environment Relates to the expression of harmony between the in-groups (particularly the 
Islamic Ummah) and the natural environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Coding of Results of exploratory search for ‘jihadi’ web content 
Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
directory of 
websites 
content  yes blog Iraqi 
biography both yes content hosting Islamic State of 
Iraq 
treasury of jihadi 
followers 
content  yes blog   
salafi jihadism real no wikipedia   
golden collection 
of jihadi discs 
content yes jihadi forum  
centre of jihadi 
thought 
real no news site   
nasheeds content  yes forum   
encyclopedia content  yes Islamic site  
supporters of 
‘salafi jihadism’  
real no Islamic site  
supporters of 
‘salafi jihadism’  
real no Islamic site   
al majid jihadi 
units 
real yes content hosting  
network content  yes jihadi forum  
jihadi movements real no news site   
salafi jihadi 
groups 
real no news site   
leaders of ‘salafi 
jhadism’  
real  no  news site   
salafi jihadism real  no  news site   
jihadi condition  real  no  news site   
Egyptian jihadism  real  no  news site   
jihadi groups  real  no  news site   
salafi jihadis  real  no  news site   
military camp of 
jihadi groups  
real  yes jihadi forum  salafi  
jihadi Dechira real yes no  peaceful jihad?  
supporters of 
‘salafi jihadism’  
real no news site   
jihadi films content  yes yes  
jihadi forums real  no  no  
jihadi groups  real  no  no   
jihadi albums content  yes no  
salafi jihadi 
groups 
real  no  no   
jihadi operations 
release 
both yes yes  
jihadi movements real no no  
high leadership of 
the jihad 
real  yes yes  
salafi jihadi name real  no  no   
salafi jihadism in 
gaza 
real no  no   
Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
salafi jihadi 
current 
real  no  no   
jihadi network content yes yes  
jihad flash content yes possibly   
biggest jihadi 
websites 
content yes no  
jihadi details 
forum 
real  yes yes  
reminder of the 
types of jihadi 
movement in 
Palestine 
real  yes?  no   
high leadership real  yes yes  
salafi jihadi 
movements 
real  no  no   
operations both yes no   
salafi jihadism real  no  no   
jihadi channel content yes  yes  
jihadi operation 
images 
both  yes no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes no   
collection of jihadi 
nasheeds 
content yes no   
jihadi nasheeds content yes no   
operations 
releases 
both yes yes  
jihadi revisions real  no  no   
     
leader image  both yes no   
leader image  both yes no   
leader image  both yes no   
jihadi current  real  no  no   
Al Rawabi  content yes Islamic  
Al Rawabi  content yes Islamic  
the jihadi in south 
Lebanon 
real  yes yes Hezbollah 
media content yes yes   
thought real  no  no   
thought real  no  Islamic   
current real  yes yes  
current  real  no  no   
jihadi media  content yes no   
jihadi leader real  yes  yes Hamas 
jihadi media  content yes yes  
jihadi pages content no  no   
Islamic jihadi 
movement 
real  no  no   
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Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
jihadi manhaj real  yes no   
abu anas al jihadi both  yes no  Hezbollah  
jihadi nasheed content yes  no   
jihadi current  real  no  no   
jihadi violence real  no  no  
tourist museum  real  yes yes  Hezbollah  
tourist museum  real  yes yes  Hezbollah  
jihadi leader both yes no   
pictures of the 
jihadi march/crawl  
both yes no   
our jihadi work  real  no  no   
assistance real  yes  yes  Iraqi resistance  
voice  content yes no   
media  content  yes no   
media  content  yes paldf Palestinian  
salafi jihadi 
thought 
real  no  no   
abu anas al jihadi real  yes no  Hezbollah 
jihadi albums content yes no   
jihadi work  real yes no   
jihadi leadership 
images 
both yes  no   
jihadi media  content yes yes   
jihadi films content yes yes  
jihadi hacker real  yes no   
jihadi nasheed  content yes no   
jihadi project real  no  no   
jihadi media  content  yes no   
jihadi media  content  yes  paldf  
jihadi nasheed  content yes yes?   
jihadi hacker real  yes  no   
jihadi poetry  content  yes  Islamic  
role of the jihadi 
woman  
real  yes Islamic   
jihadi media  content  yes yes  Hamas  
jihadi album  content  yes  yes   
jihadi album  content  yes  no   
     
jihadi anasheed  content  yes no   
jihadi nasheed content  yes  no   
salafi jihadism real  no  no   
websites and 
forums 
content  unknown  unknown  
directory of 
websites 
content yes yes  
Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
jihadi releases  content  yes  no   
jihadi websites content  yes  yes   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  Islamic  
jihadi nasheeds  content  yes  no   
jihadi works  real  uncertain  Islamic   
jihadi releases  content  yes  Islamic Al Qaida  
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  Islamic  Islamic state of 
Iraq  
jihadi operations 
for sale  
real  no  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  Islamic  Islamic state of 
Iraq  
jihadi group  real  no  no   
operation release  both  yes  no  Islamic army of 
Iraq  
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi mission  real  yes  yes  Hezbollah  
Jihadi group  real  no  no   
jihadi battle both  yes  no  Ansar al-Sunna 
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi releases  content  yes  Islamic Al Qaeda  
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds  content  yes  no  Hamas  
jihadi nasheeds  content  yes  no   
jihadi websites  real  no  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi operation both yes  no  Hamas  
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi graphic 
design  
content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi releases  content  yes  yes  shabab al-
mujahidin  
jihadi films  content  yes    
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi operation both  yes  yes  naqshbandi army  
jihad cards  content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi film release  content  yes  yes  Al Qaeda  
jihadi verses  content  yes  no  Hamas  
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheed 
request  
content  yes  yes  Hamas  
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Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
jihad nasheed  content  yes  no   
collection of 
books  
content  yes  no   
nasheeds  content  yes  no   
     
jihadi video content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheed content  yes  no   
nasheed content  yes  Islamic  
nasheed  content  yes  paldf  
conversation 
between jihadi 
and defeatist  
real yes  yes   
jihadi journey  real  no  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  Islamic  
jihadi journey  real  no  no   
first Pakistani 
global jihadi?  
real  no  no   
jihadi al-husayn  real  unclear  unclear  unclear  
salafi jihadi 
moroccan  
real  no  no   
“jihadi” raises the 
american flag! 
real  no  no   
jihadi nasheed 
video  
content yes  no   
jihadi nasheed  content  yes yes  Al-Qassam  
jihadi poetry  content  yes  yes   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi journey  real  no  yes?  Shabab al-
mujahidin?  
jihadi nasheeds content  yes no   
video clip  content  yes  no   
jihadi poetry  content  yes  no  Al Qaida in Spain  
jihadi poetry  content  yes  no  Al Qaeda in Iraq 
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  yes   
jihadi park  real  yes  no  Hezbollah  
jihadi history  both  yes  no  Hamas  
jihadi leader  real  no  no   
jihadi forum  content  yes  yes   
jihadi album  content  yes  Islamic  
jihadi forum  content  yes  yes   
jihadi film  content  yes  no  Al Qaeda  
jihadi books  content  yes  yes   
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  no   
jihadi cocktail  real yes  yes   
jihadi films  content  yes  no   
Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
jihadi journey  real  no  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi flash  content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  Islamic  
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi book  content  yes  yes   
between the jihadi 
of the sahel  
real  no  no   
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  yes   
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  yes   
jihadi clip  content  yes  no   
jihadi star  real  yes  yes   
jihadi flash  content  yes  no   
jihadi work  real  yes  yes   
     
jihadi video  content yes yes  
nasheed content yes   
nasheed content yes   
dialogue between 
a ‘jihadi’ and a 
defeatist 
real yes yes  
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  no  
jihadi 
announcements 
both  yes no Al Qassam  
jihadi 
announcements 
both  yes no Al Qassam 
British jihadi 
revisionism 
real  no  no  Al Muhajiroun  
video  content yes yes Hezbollah 
jihadi politics real  unclear  no  
‘veiled jihadi’  real  yes no   
Salafi Jihadi’ 
organisation 
real  no no  
stubborn jihadi’ real yes yes  
Moroccan jihadi real no  no   
stubborn jihadi’  real  yes no   
jihadi nasheed  content yes no   
Moroccan jihadi real  no  no   
jihadi website content  yes no   
jihadi project  real  no  no   
jihadi resistance real  no  no   
salafi jihadi 
organisation  
real  no  no   
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  no   
jihadi qamishlu’  real  yes  no   
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Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
jihadi forum 
(multuqa)  
content yes  yes  Al Qassam  
94 jihadi 
nasheeds 
content  yes  no   
To all who know a 
jihadi website 
content/real  yes  no   
flash movies content  yes  yes  Al Qassam?  
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  no   
poetic jihadi 
sunrise 
content  yes  no   
jihadi beacon  real  yes  no   
jihadi poetry  content  yes  no   
jihadis  real  no  no   
my jihad’  real  yes  no   
Chinese jihadi 
organisation  
real  no  no   
jihadi directory  content  yes  yes   
jihadi video site  content  yes  no   
jihadi way  real  yes  unknown   
     
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  unknown   
jihadi websites  content  yes  no   
jihadi ‘snapshots’  content yes no  Iraqi resistance  
jihadi films  content  yes  yes   
jihadi nasheeds  content  yes  no   
jihadi operations real  yes  no   
jihadi films  content  yes  yes   
jihadi nasheeds  content  yes  no   
jihadi resistance  real  uncertain  no   
jihadi salafism real  no  no   
foundations, 
corporations, 
groups 
real  yes  Islamic  Ahwaz Liberation 
Organisation/Hez
bollah, Fatah 
foundations, 
corporations, 
groups 
real  yes  Islamic  Ahwaz Liberation 
Organisation/Hez
bollah, Fatah 
jihadi flash  content  yes  Islamic   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  Palestinian   
magazine  content  yes  yes  Al Qaida  
jihadi nasheed  content  yes  no   
jihadi judgements  real  yes yes  Al Qaida  
jihadiyya’  real  yes  no   
jihadi promises  real  no  no   
jihadi anasheed  content  yes  no   
jihadi anasheed  content  yes  no   
jihadi anasheed  content  yes  Islamic   
Context Content/Real Sympathetic?  Location Group, if 
apparent 
jihadi poem  content  yes  no   
jihadi anasheed  content  yes  no   
jihadis  real  no  no   
jihadi forum  content  yes  yes  Islamic Army in 
Iraq  
jihadi operations  real  yes  no  Iraqi resistance  
jihadi nasheed content  yes  no   
jihadi movements 
in Egypt  
real  no?  no   
jihadi dreams  real  yes  Islamic   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
Islamic video and 
audio, jihad 
section  
content  yes  Islamic   
jihadi operation real  yes  yes  Islamic State of 
Iraq 
nasheeds content  yes  no   
forum  content  yes  yes  Naqshbandi Army  
jihadi books  content  yes  yes   
jihadiyya (ie, jihadi 
content)  
content  yes  no   
jihadi expeditions  real  yes  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi nasheed content  yes  no   
jihadi fatwa  real  no  no   
jihadi poetry 
(chanted at 
football match)  
both no  no   
jihadi nasheeds content  yes  no   
jihadi excursion  real  yes  yes  Islamic Army in 
Iraq  
jihadi websites content  yes  Islamic   
jihadi flash  content  yes  no   
 
Past year only 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009
Jihad
* Al-Jihad
Al-Jihadiyya
“Jihadiyya” 
Al-Jihadi
Jihadi
Salafi Jihadism/
Salafi Jihadist
Operation
Nashid
Jihadis
Film
Movement
Website
Communique
Organisation
Jihadiyyat
Jihadi forum
Jihadi releases
Jihadi flash
Mujahidin
Car
Arabic Internet 
Users 
Of which past 
year 
Muhammad
1,240,000 2,200,000 2,220,000 2,110,000 2,030,000 2,050,000 2,150,000 2,180,000 2,190,000 2,190,000
24,000 122,000 202,000 221,000 204,000 305,000 528,000 849,000 1,210,000 1,930,000
14,300 15,900 19,000 31,800 59,300 107,000 159,000 276,000
564,000 213,000 2,050 2070 11,500 19,400 36,400 65,300 111,000 191,000
1,040 1,120 10,200 13,400 20,800 38,600 64,000 110,000
482,000 468,000 818 840 686 21,200 47,500 75,600 164,000 365,000
25,500+20,800 130,000 33,700 513 564 621 688 818 1,320 14,200 27,500
47,300 61,100 424 9 242 215 224 258 349 503 1001
61,000 17,800 73,200 507 502 525 780 1299 19226 43105 80,122
46,000+19,000 245+140 10 6 18 50 83 181 276 419
34,800 1810 + 1,230 649 3 2 10 75 118 177 328 521
9,910 27,200 68 71 57 41 64 117 231 307 403
9,900 18,100 381 26 8 27 31 55 100 198 335
16,800 2,680 6 0 4 5 5 3 5 5 7
6,980 8,820 125 3 3 8 23 36 65 95 183
8,620 16 1 0 1 5 8 8 7 7
1 0 4 11 60 84 99 175
0 0 0 5 6 8 33 124
3 3 4 8 46 46 55 71
5,280 5,580 5,960 17,900 28,800 34,700 59,800 83,600 178,000 288,000
33,400 109,000 214,000 261,000 345,000 595,000 1,100,000 2,060,000 2,250,000 2,230,000
3,284,800 11,000,000 26,300,000 63,240,946
9.8 42.1 23.9
8/5/2008 retrospective8/5/2008 real 16th Jan 2009 5 Aug 2010
137,000 247,000 572,000 565,000
214,000
Car’ total: 2,400,000 past year 2,270,000
2,760,000 2,730,000 2,660,000 2,580,000 2,590,000 2,670,000 2,690,000 2,770,000
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Appendix 5: Full List of ‘Jihadi Books’ from Hadhrmut Forum 
 
The Future of the Peninsula and Iraq by the Shahid – God Willing – Yusuf bin Salih 
al-‘Uyayri, may God accept him in the heights 
 
The American Presence in the Peninsula – Its Truth and its Aims – Yusuf al-‘Uyayri, 
may God accept him 
 
A Gift to the One Who Is Confused About the Permissibility of Killing Prisoners – 
Yusuf al-‘Uyayri 
 
Thus We See Jihad and Desire It – Hazim al-Madani 
 
The Creed of the Saved Sect – Abdul-Majid Muhammad al-Mani‘, may God accept 
him in the heights 
 
The Neighing of the Horses in Explanation of the Book of Jihad – Abd al-Rahim al-
Shafi‘i 
 
A Late Warning to the Most Important of Necessary Matters – ‘Izz al-Din al-Maqdisi 
 
The Individual Ninja for the Strong Mujahid – A Great Book – I don’t know the name 
of the one who wrote it, we ask God that he reward him with martyrdom in His path 
 
Bringing about Victory in the Land of the Two Shrines – Saqr al-Ghamidi, you are 
blessed living and dead O Saqr 
 
The Map of the Path of the Mujahidin… the Abu Hafs Battalions 
 
The Rafidi-Crusader Alliance in Iraq and its Influence on the Region – Abd al-
Muhsin al-Rafi‘i 
 
God is Great – America is Destroyed – by the imprisoned mujahid knight Shwil al-
Zaharani may God release him from imprisonment 
 
Unless the Victory of God is Near… the World is a Prison… Shaykh Salman al-
‘Awda, may God break his imprisonment 
 
The Meeting of the Quranic Armies Concerning the Crimes of the Crusader United 
States – Wassim Fatah-Allah 
 
Ibn Ladin, the Peninsula and I… Jamal Isma‘il 
 
Disquisition to People on the Virtues of Jihad… The shahid scholar Abdallah Azzam 
 
Announcement of Jihad… Abdallah Azzam my God accept him 
 
Questions, and their Jihadi Answers… Abdallah Azzam 
 
Hijra and Preparation – 1-2… Abdallah Azzam 
 
In Jihad there are principles and rules… Abdallah Azzam 
 
In the Midst of the Battle 1-2 
 
 
Follow the Caravan… Abdallah Azzam 
 
The Lost Minaret… Abdallah Azzam 
 
The Creed, and Its Influence in Building the Generation… Abdallah Azzam 
 
The Red Cancer… Abdallah Azzam 
 
Outstanding Aspects of the Martyrs of the Peninsula 
 
The Creed is Copied and the Situation is Lost… by the mujahid shahid Ayman al-
Zawahiri may God preserve him 
 
The Truth about the Crusader War… Yusuf al-‘Uyayri, may God accept him 
 
The Book of Ijtihad Concerning Calling for Jihad… Ibn Kathir 
 
Why Do we Fight, and Who Do We Fight?... Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi 
 
The Greater Middle East Project… the imprisoned scholar Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi – may God release him from his imprisonment 
 
How the Tatars Entered the Lands of the Muslims… Salman al-‘Awda 
 
Works Authored by Sultan bin Bijad al-Utaybi, may God accept him in the heights 
 
Matters and Misconceptions Concerning the Operations of the Mujahidin 
 
Merchants of War… Abdallah Azzam 
 
Poetry Among the Depths… Abdallah Azzam 
 
In the Shadow of Surat al-Tawba 1-2-3 
 
Words from the Line of Fire 1-2 
 
Copied from the post of the brother “Turahil” in Al-Ikhlas network 
 
International Relations in Islam – in the third Halaqa of the shaykh Faris Al Shwil Al-
Zahrani may God release him from his imprisonment 
 
Years of Treachery… Yahiya bin Ali al-Ghamidi (Sawt al-Jihad) 
 
Letter to Students of Knowledge by the pen of Abu Abd al-Rahman bin Sulayman al-
Mahmud (Sawt al-Jihad) 
 
Letter to the ‘Ulama and Du‘a by the pen of Abdallah bin Sulayman al-Mahmud 
(Sawt al-Jihad) 
 
Copied from the Contribution of the Brother Faris al-Tu‘an from Al-Ikhlas Network 
 
May God give them goodness in payment and God’s blessing on them and these 
books as a work in the balance of their good deeds  
 
 
 Ordinary 
Names 
Evocative 
names 
Kunya  
Islamic 
historical 
reference 
Jihadi 
personage 
reference 
Self 
descriptive 
names 
Animal 
Ordinary 
Toponym 
Evocative 
Toponym  
Virtual/Mythical 
place 
Islam 
Positive 
Support 
Combat 
Terror 
Enemy 
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Appendix 8: Translation Sample 
 
Peace be upon you and the blessing of God 
Often we hear, and it is said: 
Should we serve the jihadi media or mobilize for jihad and emigrate.  The absence of some 
of the members of the forums, or the media groups, has influenced many. The presence of a 
brother cannot be replaced in his field.  
And before beginning, and speaking on the subject, it is necessary that we distinguish 
between two things: 
1. Those media foundations and other [entities] which are founded by the mujahidin, and 
these, if it is said to them: go here or here or do this or that, these are with the 
mujahidin and our words are not about them.  
2. Supporters of the jihad of those who have not mobilized to the land of jihad and who 
have not associated with an organization, and our words are about them, those who 
have mobilized or served the jihadi media and not sought emigration, and especially 
our words are about the most experienced, and best known among them.  
We must know that conveying what is - by the grace of God - our jihadi media, today, and 
after this stage of formation, cannot be left to individuals, but rather is the responsibility of 
groups with our knowledge, the presence or absence of which is of great significance.  
We shall recall for example Younis Tsouli Irhabi 007, and some of the affairs of his life, 
and what we have read about him. And I think that all of us know with what skill he 
advanced our jihadi media at the early stages of its development, and, before long, of the 
victory which he brought to our jihadi media, and we shall see why the brother became 
famous and advanced what he advanced, and we esteem him, and we reckon him, and God is 
his reckoner.  
The brother Younis was not just a hacker or websites and administrator of a forum, but he 
was able to successfully manage a number of brothers and participate with them to great 
benefit for our jihad.   
The brother Younis, it can be recalled in summary, took part in the following matters: 
1. A great service to the jihadi media at a very early time of our modern media 
2. His desire to emigrate to Iraq for jihad 
3. His individual terrorism or individual jihad in his efforts with the groups which he 
contacted over the net as it was said, or otherwise, for the carrying out of operations 
against Europe and America and if we today we see the absence of communication 
(on account of the security known to be present in this field) in matters like this by the 
Internet according to the nature of the situation now, but we cannot know the detail of 
what occurred with the brother and how his recruitment happened and who worked 
with him in the field, and all of us know the story of the brother’s arrest and his 
imprisonment and the rest of the matters, may God end his imprisonment and that of 
his brothers 
4. His presentation of many studies – even the Media Front produced a book from his 
studies for teaching hacking.  
5. The brother wrote a will and published it on the Internet, and God Almighty knows 
but it was reckoned to indicate his presence on the way to jihad, or that he was close 
to a jihadi operation, or that he was afraid of imprisonment for one thing or another, 
and God Almighty is all-knowing, and consider how he thought of the benefit of his 
brothers and his determination.  
6. His humility and restraint with his brothers, to the extent that often he felt that people 
who had no experience were more knowledgeable than himself.  
7. He studied “information technology” 
8. He presented in the field of preparation and explosives what at the time was 
considered a rare treasure, and by God, a pearl from a lion.  
 
Hence, the media mujahid, and I speak of the most important of them and of most of them 
in terms of influence, and the majority 
 
Our duty is service to the jihadi media, with everything that we can do for it, and we do not 
suppose or consider that we are individuals, who may not be able to do any good or have any 
influence.   
 
Thus we must work to prepare ourselves well, and to train ourselves in the best way 
possible.  
 
Work and seek for emigration to the land of jihad, and we would benefit there more than 
you benefit by being in your house 
 
Work on individual jihad, and this is at the foundation of the work and it is necessary that 
we seek it together with seeking for emigration and jihad. 
 
And the truth is that preparing ourselves well, and seekimg for emigration, and for 
individual terrorism, if they all came together in us, could be a reason for service to the land 
of jihad or a big operation in your country, or that there will be destruction in America. And 
do not forget the stories of the heroes of September, and the lion Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 
may God free him from imprisonment and the base of jihad.  
 
The object is the complete transmission of experience to the Internet. It is true that one of 
our brothers is missing, and by God he has left a profound influence in the heart. But it is 
necessary that jihad not rely on any single person. And if we have experienced a loss, then I 
say as a media mujahid that we have not joined except so that we can experience 
imprisonment. We ask God for mercy and forgiveness. I ask God to accept us for recruitment 
to the lands of jihad and martyrdom. Right now, your duty is to have conveyed all your 
experience and all your information to others, whether in a manual, or forum threads, and you 
will have a reward, God willing, which will reach you after death and martyrdom. A brother 
who is inventive in the field of graphic design of videos or banners, if he presented a study, 
and tried to summarise the essence of what he knows will, God willing, complete the 
preparation of ten others beside himself. It is true that every brother has skills and creativity.  
But the transmission of information remains necessary, and it influences many. Another 
example: a brother who is a munshid, if he mentioned to us the programmes he uses and the 
useful programmes, and ways to record (but with the condition that this does not implicate 
him, or constitute a security risk), and this munshid brother has a voice and an outstanding 
way of singing nashids, but by this means there become known, and we see, twenty munshids 
who did not know how to get started. And always the words of the one who works in a 
certain field will have a place in people’s hearts.  
 
Have you seen the manual which contains the advice of the brother Younis (may God end 
his imprisonment).  
 
Have you seen the will of the brother?  
 
This is the condition of one who wishes for jihad and supports the jihadi media.  
There is no place in our jihad for secrets or for an individual to possess a capability which 
others do not know about.  
 
Urge towards the benefit of your brothers, and for knowledge, and we must be humble and 
take our brothers by the hand and encourage them, not making one of them feel that he is the 
most stupid person in the world, and God is our help.  
 
If only we would benefit from the biography of this lion, may God end his imprisonment.  
 
And he is a media mujahid par excellence 
And he is one of those who wanted to emigrate 
And he is one of those who wanted individual jihad 
And he is one of those who prepared himself and his brothers in the field of explosives 
And he is one of those who worked gently with his brothers, and who was able to work with 
tens of his brothers.  
And he was one of those able to found a jihadi cell (naturally here is not the place to discuss 
whether he carried out this matter by means of the Internet, or in a direct manner, or how, but 
it must be known that the times have changed, and it is not necessary to mix with this and 
start messaging each other today and mention information about ourselves).  
He is one who studied in the field which I love, and understood in it, and knew it, and did not 
spend years as did some since the imprisonment of the brother, and they say ‘who do we have 
like him?’ (And this is true and we know his ability well). But at the same time, they don’t 
think of studying computer science or of developing their ability in ways that are permitted 
and available.  
 
And remembering my beloved brother is not just about a section from the life of the brother 
Younis (may God free him from his imprisonment), but rather he is an example for us to 
observe of the media mujahid, and how he must be, and the best of the necessary conditions.  
 
Please read this poem, and by God, everyone who knew the hero, and all who knew the truth 
about the man and heard about what he presented, will feel like crying and remember our 
prisoners and our duty towards them.  
 
And I have not forgotten our situation when we said farewell!  
It was a condition for anyone who has loved someone departing.  
 
These are groans of longing for the present-absent 
 
Younis Tsouli – Irhabi007 
 
We shall not forget you, with God’s permission, O hero, and we are joining up behind you, O 
beloved one.  
 
And so to victory over the creatures 
And so to God in the everlasting 
 
 
 The letters scattered for missing you 
 And the sadness started to move in my clothes 
 As if I hadn’t talked to you for nights 
 And I hadn’t read the sahab posts 
 As if you were like a candle playing with the wind 
 And the sun doing a magical disappearing act 
 Ah Younis! I did not feel upset or miserable  
 With the colours of problems, with being away from  home,  
 And I couldn’t be away from terrorism 
 But your disappearance from among us is the reason for my torment 
 If you went to Ikhl!! one day, your steps were crying ‘O best of youth!’  
 For you is the increase of longing 
 And Ikhl!! is for you - in the best of places 
 And every day is a memorial to you 
 Remind us of colours and shades of torment 
 You made terrorism a practice for us 
 And you terrorised the pagan dogs 
 And you supported the jihad and you were on your own 
 As if you were in the battles, a lion of the jungle 
 And no, by God… we shall not forget you, O you who 
 Drew for us the path to the high ground 
 And we shall not forget you, O you who were a young lion 
 Brave in the pursuit of the riders 
 I saw you after you were imprisoned. If only, through my poetry 
 How much the heart longed to go 
 They think that the prisoner dies conquered 
 They didn’t know of the faith of the companions 
 And the age of youth does not last for long 
 And all the universe crumbles to dust 
These two things are not equal to us! 
 
On the one hand glory, or entering the maelstrom 
 
On the other the vigilance of foxes in the nights 
 
Or the howl that comes at the dawn of the wolves 
 
 
Your good health, your well-wisher, ‘The Poet of Al Qaida’ the Nabatean, but this poem 
came out in classical Arabic.  
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